This paper explores the ethical obligations of pharmaceutical companies to charge fair prices for essential medicines. The moral issue at stake here is distributive justice. Rawls'' framework is especially germane since it underlines the material benefits everyone deserves as Kantian persons and the need for an egalitarian approach for the distribution of society''s essential commodities such as health care. This concern for distributive justice should be a critical factor in the equation of variables used to set prices for pharmaceuticals.
This paper uses two recentworks as a springboard for discussing theproper contours of intellectual propertyprotection. Professor Lessig devotes much ofThe Future of Ideas to demonstrating howthe expanding scope of intellectual propertyprotection threatens the Internet as aninnovation commons. Similarly, ProfessorLitman''s message in Digital Copyright isthat copyright law is both too complicated andtoo restrictive. Both authors contend that asa result of overprotecting individual rights,creativity is stifled and the vitality of theintellectual commons is in jeopardy. It isdifficult to evaluate the claims and policyprescriptions (...) of these books without someappreciation for the moral foundations ofintellectual property. The utility and labordesert theories remain the two most prominentin the Anglo-American tradition. Afterexploring those theories, we argue for a secureregime of protection based on the Lockeanvision that property rights are justly deservedas a reward for labor that creates value. However, as Locke''s famous proviso implies,even a natural property right is not absoluteand must be balanced by regard for the publicdomain. But a natural right cannot besacrificed simply to advance technologicalinnovation or to achieve marginal social andeconomic gains. While we agree with Lessig andLitman that recent legislation goes too far weconclude the essay by attempting to illustratethat some of their policy recommendations errin the opposite direction by underprotectingvalid property rights. (shrink)
The primary theme of this paper is the normative case against ownership of one's genetic information along with the source of that information (usually human tissues samples). The argument presented here against such “upstream” property rights is based primarily on utilitarian grounds. This issue has new salience thanks to the Human Genome Project and “bio-prospecting” initiatives based on the aggregation of genetic information, such as the one being managed by deCODE Genetics in Iceland. The rationale for ownership is twofold: ownership (...) will protect the basic human rights of privacy and autonomy and it will enable the data subjects to share in the tangible benefits of the genetic research. Proponents of this viewpoint often cite the principle of genetic exceptionalism, which asserts that genetic information needs a higher level of protection than other kinds of personal information such as financial data. We argue, however, that the recognition of such ownership rights would lead to inefficiency along with the disutility of genetic discoveries. Biomedical research will be hampered if property rights in genes and genetic material are too extensive. We contend that other mechanisms such as informed consent and strict confidentiality rules can accomplish the same result as a property right without the liabilities of an exclusive entitlement. (shrink)
Abstract: The Internet presents opportunities for corporations to efficiently build their brands online and to enhance their global reach. But there are threats as well as opportunities, since anti-branding and free-riding activities are easier in cyberspace. One such threat is the unauthorized incorporation of a trademark into a domain name. This can lead to trademark dilution and cause consumer confusion. But some users claim a right to use these trademarks for the purpose of parody or criticism. Underlying these trademark conflicts (...) is the familiar tension between property rights and free speech rights. While some trademark scholars are reluctant to consider a trademark as property, we find strong support for the property paradigm in Hegel’s philosophy. Assuming that a trademark is an earned property right, we propose that a trademark owner should be allowed to control the permutations of its trademark incorporated into domain names unless a reasonable person would not confuse that domain name with the company’s mark. But we also conclude that there must be latitude to employ a domain name for negative editorial comment, so long as the source and purpose of that domain name is plainly apparent. (shrink)
The Internet presents opportunities for corporations to efficiently build their brands online and to enhance their global reach. But there are threats as well as opportunities, since anti-branding and free-riding activities are easier in cyberspace. One such threat is theunauthorized incorporation of a trademark into a domain name. This can lead to trademark dilution and cause consumer confusion. But some users claim a right to use these trademarks for the purpose of parody or criticism. Underlying these trademark conflicts is the (...) familiar tension between property rights and free speech rights. While some trademark scholars are reluctant to consider a trademark as property, we find strong support for the property paradigm in Hegel’s philosophy. Assuming that a trademark is an earned property right, we propose that a trademark owner should be allowed to control the permutations of its trademark incorporated into domain names unless a reasonable person would not confuse that domain name with the company’s mark. But we also conclude that there must be latitude to employ a domain name for negative editorial comment, so long as the source and purpose of that domain name is plainly apparent. (shrink)
The web creates manyopportunities for encroachment on intellectualproperty including trademarks. Our principaltask in this paper is an investigation into anunusual form of such encroachment: theimproper use of metatags. A metatag is a pieceof HTML code that provides summary informationabout a web page. If used in an appropriatemanner, these metatags can play a legitimaterole in helping consumers locate information. But the ``keyword'' metatag is particularlysusceptible to manipulation. These tags can beeasily abused by web site creators anxious tobait search engines and bring (...) scores ofvisitors to their sites. The law aboutmetatags is far from settled and many legalscholars are uncomfortable with the conclusionthat the unauthorized use of a trademark in ametatag represents infringement. How should weassess this practice known as ``spamdexing'' froma normative perspective? Is it commercial fairplay or something more sinister? We make thecase here that there are salient moral problemswith spamdexing since it exploits thereputational goodwill of trademark owners andconfuses consumers. It violates basic moralduties and it flouts the golden rule principle. Hence unauthorized use of a competitor'strademark in a metatag is not morallyacceptable. (shrink)
This paper reviews the intriguing history of information and computer ethics. Information ethics began as a branch of applied ethics concerned with the responsible management of information resources, while computer ethics was originally concerned with the training of computer professionals. Thanks to the Internet and the Web, these two fields merged together as access and communications issues became more prominent. In more recent years, responding to the ongoing debate about this discipline's structural foundations, philosophers like Floridi have given information ethics (...) a new meaning by focusing on information's ontological status and the intrinsic worth of all information objects. (shrink)
This paper reviews Facebook's controversial privacy policies as a basis for considering how social network sites can better protect the personal information of their users. We argue that Facebook's architecture leaves its users too exposed, especially to online surveillance. This architecture must be modified and Facebook must be more proactive in safeguarding the rights of their customers as it seeks to find the proper balance between user privacy and its commercial interests.
The RIAA v. Verizon case offers an opportunity to analyze the scope of an Internet service provider’s responsibility to help deter copyright infringement. In this case, the RIAA served Verizon with a subpoena requesting the identity of two users who were making available copyrighted recordings for downloading on peer‐to‐peer networks. The main axis of discussion is whether or not Verizon has a moral obligation to reveal the names of these individuals. Should Verizon cooperate with the RIAA or should it seek (...) to shield the identity of these users in order to protect their anonymity and privacy? A secondary theme concerns Verizon’s prospective responsibility to curtail infringement. We will argue that Verizon and other ISPs have a limited obligation to assist copyright holders by disclosing the identity of infringers, but we contend that any prospective responsibility is constrained by law and technological capability. (shrink)
As the notion of artificial moral agency gains popularity among ethicists, it threatens the unique status of the human person as a responsible moral agent. The philosophy of ontocentrism, popularized by Luciano Floridi, argues that biocentrism is too restrictive and must yield to a new philosophical vision that endows all beings with some intrinsic value. Floridi’s macroethics also regards more sophisticated digital entities such as robots as accountable moral agents. To refute these principles, this paper turns to the thought of (...) Karol Wojtyla, who argued cogently for an intimate correlation between personal action and moral agency. By examining the distinguishing characteristics of personal action, we can ascertain the necessary conditions of moral agency and demonstrate why artificial entities do not meet those conditions. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11.3 : 479–501. (shrink)
This essay is a critique of LarryLessig's book, Code and other Laws ofCyberspace (Basic Books, 1999). Itsummarizes Lessig's theory of the fourmodalities of regulation in cyberspace: code,law, markets, and norms. It applies thistheory to the topics of privacy and speech,illustrating how code can undermine basicrights or liberties. The review raisesquestions about the role of ethics in thismodel, and it argues that ethical principlesmust be given a privileged position in anytheory that purports to deal with the shapingof behavior in cyberspace. Finally, (...) itproposes a philosophy of ethicalself-regulation instead of an over-reliance ongovernment policy to deal with certainimproprieties and negative externalities thattend to disrupt the Net. (shrink)
Pope St. John Paul II’s work on the Theology of the Body is well known among his many followers. Less well known is his conception of the human soul. Karol Wojtyla’s intricate philosophy of the soul fully endorses Aristotelian Thomistic psychology. Wojtyla’s main contribution is a phenomenological description of human action, which provides a credible basis for inferring the soul’s necessity. In the papal writings, John Paul II develops other resourceful doctrines, especially about the timing of ensoulment. His unelaborated notion (...) of the genealogy of the person has implications for ethics. Following in the tradition of St. Thomas Aquinas, John Paul II presents an integrated wisdom about the soul that weaves together Christian revelation, modern science, and different modes of philosophical reflection. (shrink)
As the World Wide Web has grown in popularity, the propriety of linking to other web sites has achieved some prominence as an important moral and legal issue. Hyperlinks represent the essence of Web-based activity, since they facilitate navigation in a unique and efficient fashion. But the pervasive activity of linking has generated notable controversies. While most sites welcome and support incoming links, others block them or seek to license them in some way. Particularly problematic are so-called 'deep links,' which (...) bypass the home page along with the extensive advertising and promotional material that is usually found there. While some contend that a site's mere presence on the web is implicit permission for virtually any form of linking, others argue that at least in some circumstances deep linking is unfair and constitutes misappropriation of intellectual property.In this paper we will explore the issue of deep linking from a distinctly moral vantage point. While legal scholars have vigorously debated this issue, it has received little attention from moralists. But deep linking raises a plethora of complex property issues with subtle moral implications, and hence it deserves our careful scrutiny. The most fundamental question concerns the appropriate scope of property rights for a web site and how those rights can be properly balanced against the common good of free and open communications on the Web. It is our contention that there is no presumptive claim to the liberty of deep linking at will, since it may be disrespectful of property rights in certain situations. In order to defend this position we first make the case that a web site is a form of intellectual property, drawing support from the major theories that justify property ownership. Once we have established that a web site is really property, we consider the specific rights implied by such ownership. We conclude that on the basis of those rights, a prima facie case can be made that because of the potential for negative effects, users should not presume that deep linking is acceptable unless they first seek out the permission of the target web site.We also fully appreciate the dangers inherent in propertizing the web and the need to encourage the most flexible forms of linking. Therefore, we argue that any arbitrary or unnecessary restrictions against deep linking should be eschewed for the sake of the common good of open communications, flexibility, and maximum porosity in the Internet environment. While web site authors may indeed have a property right in their creative work they have a correlative obligation to promote the sharing and free flow of information when their specific ownership rights are not put in jeopardy by deep linking. (shrink)
What exactly is Cyberethics? How did the field develop? What are some of the central issues and themes in this field, and what methodologies are used by those working in this area of applied ethics? These and related questions are considered in the readings included in Chapter 1. It is perhaps important to note at the outset that the field that many are now beginning to refer to as "cyberethics" has until quite recently been referred to by the more general (...) label "computer ethics." Other expressions that are also now used to refer to ethical issues involving computing and Internet technologies are "information ethics," "information technology ethics," "information and communication technology ethics," "global information ethics," and "Internet ethics." As in the case of "Internet ethics," "cyberethics" is intended to refer to ethical concerns involving the Internet, in particular. And it is primarily with ethical issues involving that particular medium that we will be concerned in this textbook of readings. It is also important to note that the expression "computer ethics" describes better the impact that computing technology in general has had for ethics as well as for our social and political institutions. Although our main concern will be with those ethical issues involving the Internet, many of the readings included in Chapter 1 are also concerned with ethical issues in a broader sense of computing technologies. Hence, the expressions "cyberethics" and "computer ethics" may, at times, be used interchangeably in this chapter. (shrink)
The principal theme of this paper is secondary liability ‐ to what extent should we hold those who cooperate in wrongdoing and illicit behavior accountable? We probe this question by considering a lawsuit filed by the entertainment industry against the file‐swapping services of Grokster and StreamCast. Our focus is on the legal and moral implications of this case. We argue that the courts, which have so far ruled in favor of the defendants, have misapplied the socalled Sony precedent for two (...) reasons. The business model of these companies depends on copyright infringement with advertising volume directly proportionate to the level of that infringement. Also, Sony’s safe harbor should not apply if there is active inducement of infringement. The key ethical question is the extent to which technological innovators must design and write their code to deal with infringement ex ante. We argue that purveyors of peerto‐ peer technology are formal cooperators in wrongdoing if they deliberately configure their system to enable the illicit copying of copyrighted music and movie files. We also consider the conditions for unjustifiable material cooperation, and propose these conditions as a normative standard especially relevant for software vendors. (shrink)