53 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Richard Bradley [52]Richard W. Bradley [1]
See also
Profile: Richard Bradley (London School of Economics)
  1.  79
    What is Risk Aversion?H. Orri Stefánsson & Richard Bradley - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axx035.
    According to the orthodox treatment of risk preferences in decision theory, they are to be explained in terms of the agent's desires about concrete outcomes. The orthodoxy has been criticised both for conflating two types of attitudes and for committing agents to attitudes that do not seem rationally required. To avoid these problems, it has been suggested that an agent's attitudes to risk should be captured by a risk function that is independent of her utility and probability functions. The main (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Climate Change Assessments: Confidence, Probability and Decision.Richard Bradley, Casey Helgeson & Brian Hill - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (3):500–522.
    The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has developed a novel framework for assessing and communicating uncertainty in the findings published in their periodic assessment reports. But how should these uncertainty assessments inform decisions? We take a formal decision-making perspective to investigate how scientific input formulated in the IPCC’s novel framework might inform decisions in a principled way through a normative decision model.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. How Valuable Are Chances?H. Orri Stefánsson & Richard Bradley - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (4):602-625.
    Chance Neutrality is the thesis that, conditional on some proposition being true, its chance of being true should be a matter of practical indifference. The aim of this article is to examine whether Chance Neutrality is a requirement of rationality. We prove that given Chance Neutrality, the Principal Principle entails a thesis called Linearity; the centerpiece of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s expected utility theory. With this in mind, we argue that the Principal Principle is a requirement of practical rationality but (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  4. Counterfactual Desirability.Richard Bradley & H. Orri Stefánsson - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (2):485-533.
    The desirability of what actually occurs is often influenced by what could have been. Preferences based on such value dependencies between actual and counterfactual outcomes generate a class of problems for orthodox decision theory, the best-known perhaps being the so-called Allais Paradox. In this paper we solve these problems by extending Richard Jeffrey's decision theory to counterfactual prospects, using a multidimensional possible-world semantics for conditionals, and showing that preferences that are sensitive to counterfactual considerations can still be desirability maximising. We (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  5.  76
    Supporters and Underminers: Reply to Chandler.Richard Bradley - 2017 - Mind 126 (502):603-608.
    I argue that two of the standard axioms of the AGM theory of belief revision stand in the way of it serving as the basis for an adequate account of defeasible reasoning, because they respectively disallow the adoption of beliefs not logically entailed by those previously learned and the abandonment of those not contradicted by them.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  6. The Kinematics of Belief and Desire.Richard Bradley - 2007 - Synthese 156 (3):513-535.
    Richard Jeffrey regarded the version of Bayesian decision theory he floated in ‘The Logic of Decision’ and the idea of a probability kinematics—a generalisation of Bayesian conditioning to contexts in which the evidence is ‘uncertain’—as his two most important contributions to philosophy. This paper aims to connect them by developing kinematical models for the study of preference change and practical deliberation. Preference change is treated in a manner analogous to Jeffrey’s handling of belief change: not as mechanical outputs of combinations (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  7.  90
    A Defence of the Ramsey Test.Richard Bradley - 2007 - Mind 116 (461):1-21.
    According to the Ramsey Test hypothesis the conditional claim that if A then B is credible just in case it is credible that B, on the supposition that A. If true the hypothesis helps explain the way in which we evaluate and use ordinary language conditionals. But impossibility results for the Ramsey Test hypothesis in its various forms suggest that it is untenable. In this paper, I argue that these results do not in fact have this implication, on the grounds (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  8. Desire-as-Belief Revisited.Richard Bradley & Christian List - 2009 - Analysis 69 (1):31-37.
    On Hume’s account of motivation, beliefs and desires are very different kinds of propositional attitudes. Beliefs are cognitive attitudes, desires emotive ones. An agent’s belief in a proposition captures the weight he or she assigns to this proposition in his or her cognitive representation of the world. An agent’s desire for a proposition captures the degree to which he or she prefers its truth, motivating him or her to act accordingly. Although beliefs and desires are sometimes entangled, they play very (...)
    Direct download (15 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  9. Desire, Expectation and Invariance.Richard Bradley & H. Orri Stefánsson - 2016 - Mind 125 (499):691-725.
    The Desire-as-Belief thesis (DAB) states that any rational person desires a proposition exactly to the degree that she believes or expects the proposition to be good. Many people take David Lewis to have shown the thesis to be inconsistent with Bayesian decision theory. However, as we show, Lewis's argument was based on an Invariance condition that itself is inconsistent with the (standard formulation of the) version of Bayesian decision theory that he assumed in his arguments against DAB. The aim of (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. A Preservation Condition for Conditionals.Richard Bradley - 2000 - Analysis 60 (3):219–222.
  11. Aggregating Causal Judgments.Richard Bradley, Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (4):491-515.
    Decision-making typically requires judgments about causal relations: we need to know the causal effects of our actions and the causal relevance of various environmental factors. We investigate how several individuals' causal judgments can be aggregated into collective causal judgments. First, we consider the aggregation of causal judgments via the aggregation of probabilistic judgments, and identify the limitations of this approach. We then explore the possibility of aggregating causal judgments independently of probabilistic ones. Formally, we introduce the problem of causal-network aggregation. (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  12.  72
    Becker's Thesis and Three Models of Preference Change.Richard Bradley - 2009 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 8 (2):223-242.
    This article examines Becker's thesis that the hypothesis that choices maximize expected utility relative to fixed and universal tastes provides a general framework for the explanation of behaviour. Three different models of preference revision are presented and their scope evaluated. The first, the classical conditioning model, explains all changes in preferences in terms of changes in the information held by the agent, holding fundamental beliefs and desires fixed. The second, the Jeffrey conditioning model, explains them in terms of changes in (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  13. Belief Revision Generalized: A Joint Characterization of Bayes's and Jeffrey's Rules.Franz Dietrich, Christian List & Richard Bradley - 2016 - Journal of Economic Theory 162:352-371.
    We present a general framework for representing belief-revision rules and use it to characterize Bayes's rule as a classical example and Jeffrey's rule as a non-classical one. In Jeffrey's rule, the input to a belief revision is not simply the information that some event has occurred, as in Bayes's rule, but a new assignment of probabilities to some events. Despite their differences, Bayes's and Jeffrey's rules can be characterized in terms of the same axioms: "responsiveness", which requires that revised beliefs (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14.  70
    Radical Probabilism and Bayesian Conditioning.Richard Bradley - 2005 - Philosophy of Science 72 (2):342-364.
    Richard Jeffrey espoused an antifoundationalist variant of Bayesian thinking that he termed ‘Radical Probabilism’. Radical Probabilism denies both the existence of an ideal, unbiased starting point for our attempts to learn about the world and the dogma of classical Bayesianism that the only justified change of belief is one based on the learning of certainties. Probabilistic judgment is basic and irreducible. Bayesian conditioning is appropriate when interaction with the environment yields new certainty of belief in some proposition but leaves one’s (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  15. Making Climate Decisions.Richard Bradley & Katie Steele - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (11):799-810.
    Many fine-grained decisions concerning climate change involve significant, even severe, uncertainty. Here, we focus on modelling the decisions of single agents, whether individual persons or groups perceived as corporate entities. We offer a taxonomy of the sources and kinds of uncertainty that arise in framing these decision problems, as well as strategies for making a choice in spite of uncertainty. The aim is to facilitate a more transparent and structured treatment of uncertainty in climate decision making.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16.  78
    Conditional Desirability.Richard Bradley - 1999 - Theory and Decision 47 (1):23-55.
    Conditional attitudes are not the attitudes an agent is disposed to acquire in event of learning that a condition holds. Rather they are the components of agent's current attitudes that derive from the consideration they give to the possibility that the condition is true. Jeffrey's decision theory can be extended to include quantitative representation of the strength of these components. A conditional desirability measure for degrees of conditional desire is proposed and shown to imply that an agent's degrees of conditional (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  17. A Unified Bayesian Decision Theory.Richard Bradley - 2007 - Theory and Decision 63 (3):233-263,.
    This paper provides new foundations for Bayesian Decision Theory based on a representation theorem for preferences defined on a set of prospects containing both factual and conditional possibilities. This use of a rich set of prospects not only provides a framework within which the main theoretical claims of Savage, Ramsey, Jeffrey and others can be stated and compared, but also allows for the postulation of an extended Bayesian model of rational belief and desire from which they can be derived as (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  18.  52
    More Triviality.Richard Bradley - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (2):129-139.
    This paper uses the framework of Popper and Miller's work on axiom systems for conditional probabilities to explore Adams' thesis concerning the probabilities of conditionals. It is shown that even very weak axiom systems have only a very restricted set of models satisfying a natural generalisation of Adams' thesis, thereby casting severe doubt on the possibility of developing a non-Boolean semantics for conditionals consistent with it.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  19.  32
    Comparing Evaluations.Richard Bradley - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1part1):85-100.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  20.  68
    Indicative Conditionals.Richard Bradley - 2002 - Erkenntnis 56 (3):345-378.
    Adams Thesis has much evidence in its favour, but David Lewis famously showed that it cannot be true, in all but the most trivial of cases, if conditionals are proprositions and their probabilities are classical probabilities of truth. In this paper I show thatsimilar results can be constructed for a much wider class of conditionals. The fact that these results presuppose that the logic of conditionals is Boolean motivates a search for a non-Boolean alternative. It is argued that the exact (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  21.  56
    Types of Uncertainty.Richard Bradley & Mareile Drechsler - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (6):1225-1248.
    We distinguish three qualitatively different types of uncertainty—ethical, option and state space uncertainty—that are distinct from state uncertainty, the empirical uncertainty that is typically measured by a probability function on states of the world. Ethical uncertainty arises if the agent cannot assign precise utilities to consequences. Option uncertainty arises when the agent does not know what precise consequence an act has at every state. Finally, state space uncertainty exists when the agent is unsure how to construct an exhaustive state space. (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  22.  67
    A Representation Theorem for a Decision Theory with Conditionals.Richard Bradley - 1998 - Synthese 116 (2):187-229.
    This paper investigates the role of conditionals in hypothetical reasoning and rational decision making. Its main result is a proof of a representation theorem for preferences defined on sets of sentences (and, in particular, conditional sentences), where an agent’s preference for one sentence over another is understood to be a preference for receiving the news conveyed by the former. The theorem shows that a rational preference ordering of conditional sentences determines probability and desirability representations of the agent’s degrees of belief (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  23.  34
    Conditionals and Supposition-Based Reasoning.Richard Bradley - 2011 - Topoi 30 (1):39-45.
    Case-based reasoning is a familiar method of evaluating sentences. But when applied to conditionals, it seems to lead to implausible conclusions. In this paper I argue that the problem arises from equating the probability of a conditional sentence on the evidential supposition of some condition with the conditional probability of the former, given the latter.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  24.  34
    Ramsey's Representation Theorem.Richard Bradley - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (4):483–497.
    This paper reconstructs and evaluates the representation theorem presented by Ramsey in his essay 'Truth and Probability', showing how its proof depends on a novel application of Hölder's theory of measurement. I argue that it must be understood as a solution to the problem of measuring partial belief, a solution that in many ways remains unsurpassed. Finally I show that the method it employs may be interpreted in such a way as to avoid a well known objection to it due (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  25.  86
    Taking Advantage of Difference in Opinion.Richard Bradley - 2006 - Episteme 3 (3):141-155.
    Diversity of opinion both presents problems and aff ords opportunities. Diff erences of opinion can stand in the way of reaching an agreement within a group on what decisions to take. But at the same time, the fact that the differences in question could derive from access to different information or from the exercise of diff erent judgemental skills means that they present individuals with the opportunity to improve their own opinions. This paper explores the implications for solutions to the (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  26.  88
    Revising Incomplete Attitudes.Richard Bradley - 2009 - Synthese 171 (2):235 - 256.
    Bayesian models typically assume that agents are rational, logically omniscient and opinionated. The last of these has little descriptive or normative appeal, however, and limits our ability to describe how agents make up their minds (as opposed to changing them) or how they can suspend or withdraw their opinions. To address these limitations this paper represents the attitudinal states of non-opinionated agents by sets of (permissible) probability and desirability functions. Several basic ways in which such states of mind can be (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  27.  47
    Ellsberg's Paradox and the Value of Chances.Richard Bradley - unknown
    What value should we put on our chances of obtaining a good? This paper argues that, contrary to the widely accepted theory of von Neumann and Morgenstern, the value of a chance of some good G may be a nonlinear function of the value of G. In particular, chances may have diminishing marginal utility, a property that is termed chance uncertainty aversion. The hypothesis that agents are averse to uncertainy about chances explains a pattern of preferences often observed in the (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28.  42
    A (Mainly Epistemic) Case for Multiple-Vote Majority Rule.Richard Bradley & Christopher Thompson - 2012 - Episteme 9 (1):63-79.
    Multiple-vote majority rule is a procedure for making group decisions in which individuals weight their votes on issues in accordance with how competent they are on them. When individuals are motivated by the truth and know their relative competence on different issues, multiple-vote majority rule performs nearly as well, epistemically speaking, as rule by an expert oligarchy, but is still acceptable from the point of view of equal participation in the political process.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  29.  62
    Adams Conditionals and Non-Monotonic Probabilities.Richard Bradley - 2006 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 15 (1-2):65-81.
    Adams' famous thesis that the probabilities of conditionals are conditional probabilities is incompatible with standard probability theory. Indeed it is incompatible with any system of monotonic conditional probability satisfying the usual multiplication rule for conditional probabilities. This paper explores the possibility of accommodating Adams' thesis in systems of non-monotonic probability of varying strength. It shows that such systems impose many familiar lattice theoretic properties on their models as well as yielding interesting logics of conditionals, but that a standard complementation operation (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  30.  43
    Ramsey and the Measurement of Belief.Richard Bradley - 2001 - In David Corfield & Jon Williamson (eds.), Foundations of Bayesianism.
    Foundations of Bayesianism is an authoritative collection of papers addressing the key challenges that face the Bayesian interpretation of probability today. Some of these papers seek to clarify the relationships between Bayesian, causal and logical reasoning. Others consider the application of Bayesianism to artificial intelligence, decision theory, statistics and the philosophy of science and mathematics. The volume includes important criticisms of Bayesian reasoning and also gives an insight into some of the points of disagreement amongst advocates of the Bayesian approach. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  31.  29
    Reaching a Consensus.Richard Bradley - 2007 - Social Choice and Welfare 29:609-632.
    This paper explores some aspects of the relation between aggregation and deliberation as ways of achieving a consensus amongst a group of indviduals on some set of issues. I argue firstly that the framing of an aggregation problem itself generates information about the judgements of others that individuals are rationally obliged to take into account. And secondly that the constraints which aggregation theories typically place on consensual or collective judgements need not be consistent with the outcomes of rational deliberative processes (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  32.  19
    Consensus by Aggregation and Deliberation.Richard Bradley - 2007 - In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (ed.), Homage à Wlodek: Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz.
    On the face of it both aggregation and deliberation represent alternative ways of producing a consensus. I argue, however, that the adequacy of aggregation mechanisms should be evaluated with an eye to the effects, both possible and actual, of public deliberation. Such an evaluation is undertaken by sketching a Bayesian model of deliberation as learning from others.
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  33.  74
    Proposition-Valued Random Variables as Information.Richard Bradley - 2010 - Synthese 175 (1):17 - 38.
    The notion of a proposition as a set of possible worlds or states occupies central stage in probability theory, semantics and epistemology, where it serves as the fundamental unit both of information and meaning. But this fact should not blind us to the existence of prospects with a different structure. In the paper I examine the use of random variables—in particular, proposition-valued random variables— in these fields and argue that we need a general account of rational attitude formation with respect (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34.  65
    Review. James M. Joyce 'Foundations of Causal Decision Theory'. [REVIEW]Richard Bradley - 2001 - Economics and Philosophy 17 (2):275-294.
  35.  35
    Conditionals and the Logic of Decision.Richard Bradley - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (3):32.
    In this paper Richard Jeffrey's 'Logic of Decision' is extended by examination of agents' attitudes to the sorts of possibilities identified by indicative conditional sentences. An expression for the desirability of conditionals is proposed and, along with Adams' thesis that the probability of a conditional equals the conditional probability of its antecedent given its consequent, is defended by informally deriving it from Jeffrey's notion of desirability and some weak constraints on rational preference for conditional possibilities. Finally a statement is given (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  36.  25
    A Unified Characterization of Belief-Revision Rules.Franz Dietrich, Christian List & Richard Bradley - manuscript
    This paper characterizes several belief-revision rules in a unified framework: Bayesian revision upon learning some event, Jeffrey revision upon learning new probabilities of some events, Adams revision upon learning some new conditional probabilities, and 'dual-Jeffrey' revision upon learning a new conditional probability function. Despite their differences, these revision rules can be characterized in terms of the same two axioms: responsiveness, which requires that revised beliefs incorporate what has been learnt, and conservativeness, which requires that beliefs on which the learnt input (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. 1. From the New Editor From the New Editor (P. Iii).Michael Dickson, Elisabeth A. Lloyd, C. Kenneth Waters, Matthew Dunn, Jennifer Cianciollo, Costas Mannouris, Richard Bradley & James Mattingly - 2005 - Philosophy of Science 72 (2).
  38.  57
    Review: Ethics Out of Economics. [REVIEW]Richard Bradley - 2002 - Mind 111 (444):837-841.
  39.  34
    Preference Kinematics.Richard Bradley - 2008 - In Till Grune (ed.), Preference Change: Approaches from Philosophy, Economics and Psychology.
  40.  2
    Editor’s Pick: Economics and Philosophy.Richard Bradley - 2014 - The Philosophers' Magazine 67:102-104.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41.  17
    Impartiality in Weighing Lives.Richard Bradley - 2007 - Philosophical Books 48 (4):292-302.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42.  12
    Review. Steven Rappaport 'Models and Reality in Economics' [Book Review].Richard Bradley - 2000 - Economics and Philosophy 16 (1):159-163.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43.  5
    Colin Oakes/Interpretations of Intuitionist Logic in Non-Normal Modal Logics 47–60 Aviad Heifetz/Iterative and Fixed Point Common Belief 61–79 Dw Mertz/the Logic of Instance Ontology 81–111. [REVIEW]Richard Bradley, Roya Sorensen, Mirror Notation & Philip Kremer - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 28:661-662.
  44.  4
    Ethics Out of Economics.Richard Bradley - 2002 - Mind 111 (444):837-841.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45.  11
    Models and Reality in Economics, Steven Rappaport. Edward Elgar, 1998, VI + 233 Pages. [REVIEW]Richard Bradley - 2000 - Economics and Philosophy 16 (1):147-174.
  46.  10
    Book Review: Roger Backhouse 'Explorations in Economic Methodology: From Lakatos to Empirical Philosophy of Science'. [REVIEW]Richard Bradley - unknown
  47.  8
    Book Review: John Broome 'Ethics Out of Economics'. [REVIEW]Richard Bradley - unknown
    Book reviewed:David A. Jopling, Self‐knowledge and the Self.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48.  3
    The Nationalization of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany From the Napoleonic Wars Through the Third Reich.Richard Bradley - 1994 - History of European Ideas 18 (6):944-946.
  49. Richard Bradley.E. Clinton- Andrews & Richard Bradley - 1903
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50. Book Review. [REVIEW]Richard Bradley - 2001 - Economics and Philosophy 17 (2):275-294.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 53