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  1.  4
    The Cambridge Companion to Carnap.Michael Friedman & Richard Creath - 2009 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 15 (4):428-431.
    Rudolf Carnap is increasingly regarded as one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century. He was one of the leading figures of the logical empiricist movement associated with the Vienna Circle and a central figure in the analytic tradition more generally. He made major contributions to philosophy of science and philosophy of logic, and, perhaps most importantly, to our understanding of the nature of philosophy as a discipline. In this volume a team of contributors explores the major themes (...)
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  2.  38
    Dear Carnap, Dear Van: The Quine--Carnap Correspondence and Related Work.L. R. S., W. V. Quine, R. Carnap & Richard Creath - 1993 - Philosophical Quarterly 43 (170):121.
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  3.  40
    The Logical and the Analytic.Richard Creath - 2017 - Synthese 194 (1):79-96.
    This paper considers various objections to Carnap’s logical syntax definition of ’logical expression’, including those by Saunders Mac Lane and W. V. O. Quine. While the specific objections of these two authors can be answered, if necessary by a slight modification of Carnap’s definition, there are other objections that I do not see how to meet. I also consider the proposal by Denis Bonnay for avoiding the objections to Carnap’s definition. In light of the unresolved problems with Carnap’s definition, I (...)
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  4. Every Dogma has its Day.Richard Creath - 1991 - Erkenntnis 35 (1-3):347-389.
    This paper is a reexamination of Two Dogmas in the light of Quine's ongoing debate with Carnap over analyticity. It shows, first, that analytic is a technical term within Carnap's epistemology. As such it is intelligible, and Carnap's position can meet Quine's objections. Second, it shows that the core of Quine's objection is that he has an alternative epistemology to advance, one which appears to make no room for analyticity. Finally, the paper shows that Quine's alternative epistemology is itself open (...)
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  5. The Gentle Strength of Tolerance : The Logical Syntax of Language and Carnap's Philosophical Programme.Richard Creath - 2009 - In Pierre Wagner (ed.), Carnap's Logical Syntax of Language. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 203--214.
  6. Carnap's Conventionalism.Richard Creath - 1992 - Synthese 93 (1-2):141 - 165.
  7.  33
    The Initial Reception of Carnap's Doctrine of Analyticity.Richard Creath - 1987 - Noûs 21 (4):477-499.
  8. Quine and the Limit Assumption in Peirce's Theory of Truth.Richard Creath - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 90 (2):109-112.
    Quine rejects Peirce's theory of truth because, among other things, its notion of a limit of a sequence of theories is defective in that the notion of a limit depends on that of nearer than which is defined for numbers but not for theories. This paper shows that the missing definition of nearer than applied to theories can be supplied from within Quine's own epistemology. The upshot is that either Quine's epistemology must be rejected or Peirce's pragmatic theory of truth (...)
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  9. Induction and the Gettier Problem.Richard Creath - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):401-404.
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  10.  84
    On Protocol Sentences.Rudolf Carnap, Richard Creath & Richard Nollan - 1987 - Noûs 21 (4):457-470.
  11. Alfred Tarski and the Vienna Circle: Austro-Polish Connections in Logical Empiricism.Jan Woleński, Ilkka Niiniluoto, Hans Sluga, Anita Burdman Feferman, Solomon Feferman & Richard Creath - 1999 - Springer Verlag.
  12.  20
    Convention, Neutrality, and the Limits of Logic.Richard Creath - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (10):522-523.
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  13. Taking Theories Seriously.Richard Creath - 1985 - Synthese 62 (3):317 - 345.
    This paper defends scientific realism, the doctrine that we should interpret theories as being just as ontologically committing as beliefs at the observational level. I examine the character of observation to show that the difference in interpretation suggested by anti-realists is unwarranted. Second, I discuss Wilfrid Sellars'' approach to the issue. Finally, I provide a detailed study of recent work by Bas van Fraassen. While van Fraassen''s work is the focus of the paper, the conclusions are far broader: That a (...)
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  14.  25
    The Unimportance of Semantics.Richard Creath - 1990 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:405 - 416.
    Philosophers often divide Carnap's work into syntactic, semantic, and later periods, but this disguises the importance of his early syntactical writing. In Logical Syntax Carnap is a thoroughgoing conventionalist and pragmatist. Once we see that, it is easier to see as well that these views were retained throughout the rest of his life, that the breaks between periods are not as important as the continuities, and that our understanding of such Carnapian notions as analyticity and probability needs reevaluation.
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  15.  45
    On Kaplan on Carnap on Significance.Richard Creath - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 30 (6):393 - 400.
    In 'the methodological character of theoretical concepts' carnap offered a sophisticated criterion of empirical significance. Unfortunately, Shortly thereafter david kaplan devised a pair of devastating counter-Examples which appeared to show that carnap's criterion was simultaneously too wide and too narrow. In this note I show that kaplan's first counter-Example misses its mark and that his second counter-Example can be avoided by a natural generalization of carnap's method.
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  16. The Construction of Reason: Kant, Carnap, Kuhn, and Beyond.Richard Creath - 2010 - In Michael Friedman, Mary Domski & Michael Dickson (eds.), Discourse on a New Method: Reinvigorating the Marriage of History and Philosophy of Science. Open Court.
  17.  75
    Benacerraf and Mathematical Truth.Richard Creath - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 37 (4):335 - 340.
  18. Biology & Epistemology.David Magnus, Richard Creath & Jane Maienschein - 2000 - In Richard Creath & Jane Maienschein (eds.), Biology and Epistemology. Cambridge University Press.
     
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  19. Languages Without Logic.Richard Creath - 1996 - In Giere, N. Ronald & Alan W. Richardson (eds.), Origins of Logical Empiricism. University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis. pp. 251--65.
     
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  20.  13
    Carnap’s Move to Semantics: Gains and Losses.Richard Creath - 1999 - Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 6:65-76.
    In 1931 Walter Sellar and Robert Yeatman published a delightfully silly history of England entitled 1066 and All That 2, as they said, “comprising, all the parts you can remember including one hundred and three good things, five bad kings, and two genuine dates”.3 History, they tell us, is not what you think; it is what you can remember. So their history is simplified and garbled, and the moral point is put front and center: every development is described as a (...)
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  21.  27
    Nominalism by Theft.Richard Creath - 1980 - American Philosophical Quarterly 17 (4):311 - 318.
  22.  28
    Some Remarks on "Protocol Sentences".Richard Creath - 1987 - Noûs 21 (4):471-475.
  23.  41
    Are Dinosaurs Extinct?Richard Creath - 1995 - Foundations of Science 1 (2):285-297.
    It is widely believed that empiricism, though once dominant, is now extinct. This turns out to be mistaken because of incorrect assumption about the initial dominance of logical empiricism and about the content and variety of logical empiricist views. In fact, prominent contemporary philosophers (Quine and Kuhn) who are thought to have demolished logical empiricism are shown to exhibit central views of the logical empiricists rather than having overthrown them.
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  24. Biology and Epistemology.Richard Creath & Jane Maienschein (eds.) - 1999 - Cambridge University Press.
    This set of original essays by some of the best names in philosophy of science explores a range of diverse issues in the intersection of biology and epistemology. It asks whether the study of life requires a special biological approach to knowledge and concludes that it does not. The studies, taken together, help to develop and deepen our understanding of how biology works and what counts as warranted knowledge and as legitimate approaches to the study of life. The first section (...)
     
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  25.  48
    The Pragmatics of Observation.Richard Creath - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:149 - 153.
    To assess van Fraassen's anti-realism, I examine observation and its relation to judging. I argue that the boundary of observability is determined pragmatically, because observing depends on the context of inquiry and because the 'able' in 'observable' implicitly involves human interests and concerns. Thus, observability is like van Fraassen's notions of simplicity and explanation. While a non-pragmatic notion of observability can be devised, then virtually any event is potentially observable. Consequently, van Fraassen's attempt to divide empirical adequacy from the pragmatic (...)
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  26.  36
    Counterfactuals for Free.Richard Creath - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 57 (1):95 - 101.
    Quine does not like counterfactuals. He thinks them unclear, and so he eschews them. It is enough, he thinks, for science to say of what it is that it is and that it is all that is. There is no need to say of what is not that it is not, or even worse, to say of what is not what it would be if ...
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  27. The Linguistic Doctrine and Conventionality: The Main Argument in ”Carnap and Logical Truth”.Richard Creath - 2003 - In Gary L. Hardcastle & Alan W. Richardson (eds.), Logical Empiricism in North America. University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis. pp. 234--256.
     
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  28.  22
    Was Carnap a Complete Verificationist in the Aufbau?Richard Creath - 1982 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:384 - 393.
    It is argued that Carnap was not a complete verificationist in the Aufbau despite the widespread view that he was. That doctrine would be intrinsic to constructionalism only if either of two additional assumptions are made, and there is no reason to believe that Carnap made these assumptions. Further, in the Aufbau Carnap did not demand verifiability independently of constructionalism, and his clear rejection of verifiability in Pseudoproblems counts heavily against his ever having accepted it in the Aufbau.
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  29.  13
    Metaphysics In The Thirties And Why Should Anyone Care Now?Richard Creath - 2014 - Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 17:67-76.
    We live in a metaphysical age. And I do not mean just that too many people still believe The Prophecies of Nostradamus and/or the horoscopes found in most local newspapers. It is a metaphysical age among philosophers – even among those who shun horoscopes and are frankly embarrassed to fi nd Nostradamus so prominently displayed in the metaphysics section of their campus bookstore. Nowadays, distinguished philosophers in prestigious departments proudly call themselves metaphysicians. They all know, of course, that Carnap and (...)
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  30.  24
    The Role of History in Science.Richard Creath - 2010 - Journal of the History of Biology 43 (2):207 - 214.
    The case often made by scientists (and philosophers) against history and the history of science in particular is clear. Insofar as a field of study is historical as opposed to law-based, it is trivial. Insofar as a field attends to the past of science as opposed to current scientific issues, its efforts are derivative and, by diverting attention from acquiring new knowledge, deplorable. This case would be devastating if true, but it has almost everything almost exactly wrong. The study of (...)
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  31.  10
    Understandability.Richard Creath - 2016 - Metascience 25 (1):25-30.
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  32.  14
    Analyticity in the Theoretical Language: Is a Different Account Really Necessary?Richard Creath - 2012 - In R. Creath (ed.), Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook. Springer Verlag. pp. 57--66.
    Recent essays by Michael Friedman1 and William Demopoulos2 on Carnap’s late approach to analyticity in the theoretical language make a convincing case for the continuing philosophic interest of this part of Carnap’s work. The present essay is intended not to disagree with any of these essays but to raise a logically prior worry as to whether Carnap’s account of analyticity here is well motivated and consistent with other attractive aspects of his view. To do this I outline, in §1, Frank (...)
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  33.  32
    Carnap's Early Conventionalism. An Inquiry Into the Historical Background of the Vienna Circle.Richard Creath - 1986 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 24 (3):430-431.
  34.  4
    Russell, Idealism and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy.Richard Creath & Peter Hylton - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (1):107.
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  35.  21
    Book Review:Reflexive Epistemology: The Philosophical Legacy of Otto Neurath Danilo Zolo, D. McKie. [REVIEW]Richard Creath - 1993 - Philosophy of Science 60 (2):359-.
  36. Carnap, Quine, and the Rejection of Intuition.Richard Creath - 1990 - In Barret And Gibson (ed.), Perspectives on Quine. pp. 55--66.
     
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  37.  16
    From Königsberg to Vienna: Coffa on the Rise of Modern Semantics.Richard Creath - 1995 - Dialogue 34 (1):113.
  38.  17
    Body Worlds as Education and Humanism.Jane Maienschein & Richard Creath - 2007 - American Journal of Bioethics 7 (4):26 – 27.
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  39.  16
    The Root of the Problem.Richard Creath - 1977 - Linguistics and Philosophy 1 (2):273 - 275.
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  40.  9
    Smart, Salmon, and Scientific Realism.Richard Creath - 1984 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (4):404 – 409.
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  41.  8
    A Query on Entrenchment.Richard Creath - 1978 - Philosophy of Science 45 (3):474-477.
  42.  1
    Paolo Parrini, Wesley C. Salmon, and Merrilee H. Salmon : Logical Empiricism: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives. [REVIEW]Richard Creath - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (4):623-626.
    With its seventeen papers roughly evenly divided between European and American scholars, Logical Empiricism is a welcome addition to the rapidly growing literature on that movement. It both broadens and deepens our understanding of the logical empiricists themselves. It shows their work often to have been continuous with that of more modern figures. And it explores from a variety of perspectives the connections both between science and philosophy and between the study of historical figures and problems and the ongoing systematic (...)
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  43.  3
    Review of Parrini. [REVIEW]Richard Creath - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (4):623-626.
  44.  3
    Book Reviews. [REVIEW]Richard Creath - 1993 - Mind 102 (406):339-340.
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  45. Biology and Epistemology.Richard Creath & Jane Maienschein - 2000 - Journal of the History of Biology 33 (2):411-414.
     
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  46. Before Explication.Richard Creath - 2012 - In Pierre Wagner (ed.), Carnap's Ideal of Explication and Naturalism. Palgrave-Macmillan.
     
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  47. Cambridge Companion to Rudolf Carnap.Richard Creath & Michael Friedman (eds.) - 2007 - Cambridge University Press.
  48. Creative Understanding: Philosophical Reflections on Physics by Roberto Toretti. [REVIEW]Richard Creath - 1992 - Isis: A Journal of the History of Science 83:373-374.
     
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  49. Creative Understanding: Philosophical Reflections on PhysicsRoberto Toretti.Richard Creath - 1992 - Isis 83 (2):373-374.
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  50. Dear Carnap, Dear Van: The Quine-Carnap Correspondence and Related Work: Edited and with an Introduction by Richard Creath.Richard Creath (ed.) - 1990 - University of California Press.
    Rudolf Carnap and W. V. Quine, two of the twentieth century's most important philosophers, corresponded at length—and over a long period of time—on matters personal, professional, and philosophical. Their friendship encompassed issues and disagreements that go to the heart of contemporary philosophic discussions. Carnap was a founder and leader of the logical positivist school. The younger Quine began as his staunch admirer but diverged from him increasingly over questions in the analysis of meaning and the justification of belief. That they (...)
     
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