83 found
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  1. The Non-Reality of Free Will.Richard Double - 1990 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    The traditional disputants in the free will discussion--the libertarian, soft determinist, and hard determinist--agree that free will is a coherent concept, while disagreeing on how the concept might be satisfied and whether it can, in fact, be satisfied. In this innovative analysis, Richard Double offers a bold new argument, rejecting all of the traditional theories and proposing that the concept of free will cannot be satisfied, no matter what the nature of reality. Arguing that there is unavoidable conflict within our (...)
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  2. The Non-Reality of Free Will.Richard Double - 1993 - Behavior and Philosophy 20 (2):95-97.
     
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  3. The Non-Reality of Free Will.Richard Double - 1993 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 34 (2):124-125.
     
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  4. Metaphilosophy and Free Will.Richard Double - 1996 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Why is debate over the free will problem so intractable? In this broad and stimulating look at the philosophical enterprise, Richard Double uses the free will controversy to build on the subjectivist conclusion he developed in The Non-Reality of Free Will (OUP 1991). Double argues that various views about free will--e.g., compatibilism, incompatibilism, and even subjectivism--are compelling if, and only if, we adopt supporting metaphilosophical views. Because metaphilosophical considerations are not provable, we cannot show any free will theory to be (...)
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  5.  88
    The Moral Hardness of Libertarianism.Richard Double - 2002 - Philo 5 (2):226-234.
    The following is a criticism designed to apply to most libertarian free will theorists. I argue that most libertarians hold three beliefs that jointly show them to be unsympathetic or hard-hearted to persons whom they hold morally responsible: that persons are morally responsible only because they make libertarian choices, that we should hold persons responsible, and that we lack epistemic justification for thinking persons make such choices. Softhearted persons who held these three beliefs would espouse hard determinism, which exonerates all (...)
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  6.  46
    Two Types of Autonomy Accounts.Richard Double - 1992 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (1):65 - 80.
    Philosophers’ intuitions about what constitutes autonomy are largely driven by the exemplars or paradigms that we recognize. There are indefinitely many exemplars, inasmuch as there are relatively private personae that serve as autonomy exemplars such as our parents, third grade teacher, or, for the megalomaniac, oneself. But among Western philosophers there are doubtless some exemplars that are widely shared and broadly influential. Philosophical exemplars include Socrates, Aristotle’s magnanimous man, Kant’s noumenal self that is perfectly attuned to the moral law, Mill’s (...)
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  7. Puppeteers, hypnotists, and neurosurgeons.Richard Double - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 56 (June):163-73.
    The objection to R-S accounts that was raised by the possibility of external agents requires the acceptance of two premises, viz., that all R-S accounts allow for puppeteers and that puppeteers necessarily make us unfree. The Metaphilosophical reply shows that to the extent that puppeteers are more problematic than determinism per se, pup-peteers may be explicitly excluded since they violate our paradigm of free will. The Metaphilosophical reply also suggests that we should not expect our mature R-S account to supply (...)
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  8.  26
    The Hard-Heartedness of some Libertarians.Richard Double - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Research 42:313-318.
    In “The Moral Hardness of Libertarianism”, I accuse libertarians of being morally unsympathetic if they hold three widely shared beliefs: that persons are morally responsible only if they make libertarian choices; that we should hold persons morally responsible; and that we lack epistemic justification for thinking persons make libertarian choices. In “Hard-Heartedness and Libertarianism”, John Lemos, relying on the Kantian principle of ends, suggests a way for libertarians to accept these three beliefs while avoiding the charge of hard-heartedness. In this (...)
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  9.  60
    Libertarianism and Rat ionality.Richard Double - 1988 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):431-439.
  10. Metaethics, metaphilosophy, and free will subjectivism.Richard Double - 2001 - In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press.
  11. Misdirection on the free will problem.Richard Double - 1997 - American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (3):359-68.
    The belief that only free will supports assignments of moral responsibility -- deserved praise and blame, punishment and reward, and the expression of reactive attitudes and moral censure -- has fueled most of the historical concern over the existence of free will. Free will's connection to moral responsibility also drives contemporary thinkers as diverse in their substantive positions as Peter Strawson, Thomas Nagel, Peter van Inwagen, Galen Strawson, and Robert Kane. A simple, but powerful, reason for thinking that philosophers are (...)
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  12. Searle, programs and functionalism.Richard Double - 1983 - Nature and System 5 (March-June):107-14.
  13.  51
    Morality, Impartiality, and What We Can Ask of Persons.Richard Double - 1999 - American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (2):149 - 158.
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  14.  41
    The case against the case against belief.Richard Double - 1985 - Mind 94 (375):420-430.
  15.  95
    How to Accept Wegner's Illusion of Conscious Will and Still Defend Moral Responsibility.Richard Double - 2004 - Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):479 - 491.
    In "The Illusion of Conscious Will," Daniel Wegner (2002) argues that our commonsense belief that our conscious choices cause our voluntary actions is mistaken. Wegner cites experimental results that suggest that brain processes initiate our actions before we become consciously aware of our choices, showing that we are systematically wrong in thinking that we consciously cause our actions. Wegner's view leads him to conclude, among other things, that moral responsibility does not exist. In this article I propose some ways that (...)
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  16.  85
    Phenomenal properties.Richard Double - 1985 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (March):383-92.
  17.  70
    The Principle of Rational Explanation Defended.Richard Double - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (2):133-142.
  18. Honderich on the Consequences of Determinism.Richard Double - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):847-854.
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  19.  10
    Determinism and the experience of freedom.Richard Double - 1991 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (March):1-8.
  20.  28
    On the very idea of eliminating the intentional.Richard Double - 1986 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 16 (2):209–216.
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  21.  59
    Searle’s Answer to ‘Hume’s Problem’.Richard Double - 1984 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):435-438.
    John searle has recently claimed to have dissolved what daniel dennett calls 'hume's problem'--The question whether the explanation of behavior by appeal to mental representations can be done without circularity or infinite regress. Searle argues that a careful analysis of the concept of an intentional state shows that mental representations do not require intentional "homunculi" to explain how intentional states have their contents, And, Hence dennett's worry is groundless. I argue that searle's conceptual analysis of intentional states, Even if correct, (...)
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  22. The Ethical Advantages of Free Will Subjectivism.Richard Double - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):411-422.
    Adopting meta‐level Free Will Subjectivism is one among several ways to maintain that persons never experience moral freedom in their choices. The other ways of arguing against moral freedom I consider are presented by Saul Smilansky, Ted Honderich, Bruce Waller, Galen Strawson, and Derk Pereboom. In this paper, without arguing for the acceptance of free will subjectivism, I argue that subjectivism has some moral and theoretical advantages over its kindred theories.
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  23.  99
    The price of access.Richard Double - 2004 - The Philosophers' Magazine 26 (26):17-18.
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  24.  44
    The Non-Reality of Free Will.Freedom Within Reason.David Cockburn, Richard Double & Susan Wolf - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (168):383.
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  25. Brain Bisection: Philosophy Meets Science.Richard Double - 1984 - Diálogos. Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Puerto Rico 19 (43):39.
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  26.  23
    Beginning philosophy.Richard Double - 1999 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Beginning Philosophy offers students and general readers a uniquely straightforward yet challenging introduction to fundamental philosophical problems. Readily accessible to novices yet rich enough for more experienced readers, it combines serious investigation across a wide range of subjects in analytic philosophy with a clear, user-friendly writing style. Topics include logic and reasoning, the theory of knowledge, the nature of the external world, the mind/body problem, normative ethics, metaethics, free will, the existence of God, and the problem of evil. A concluding (...)
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  27. Blaming the victim and blaming the culprit.Richard Double - 2005 - Think 4 (10):21-24.
    Psychologists and common sense recognize blaming the victim as a cognitive error (fallacy) that many of us use to support the just-world hypothesis — the view that life is basically fair. In this article Richard Double compares a related phenomenon, blaming the culprit. When we commit the fallacy of blaming the culprit we mistakenly conclude that judging a culprit to deserve blame for an action exonerates everyone else from blame for that action. Double provides several examples of the fallacy.
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  28. Call for Papers.Richard Double - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 75 (1/2):173.
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  29.  25
    Central state materialism.Richard Double - 1981 - Philosophical Studies (Dublin) 28:229-37.
  30.  46
    Double freedom.Richard Double - 2002 - The Philosophers' Magazine 18:17-18.
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  31.  14
    Four Naturalist Accounts of Moral Responsibility.Richard Double - 1996 - Behavior and Philosophy 24 (2):137 - 143.
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  32. Fear of sphexishness.Richard Double - 1988 - Analysis 48 (January):20-26.
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  33.  10
    Free Will and Values.Richard Double - 1988 - Philosophical Books 29 (2):96-97.
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  34.  59
    Hume's Empirical Argument for Empiricism.Richard Double - 1978 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 16 (4):329-337.
  35.  8
    How Free Are You?Richard Double - 1995 - Philosophical Books 36 (4):265-266.
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  36.  58
    How rational must free will be?Richard Double - 1992 - Metaphilosophy 23 (3):268-78.
  37. How to frame the free will problem.Richard Double - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):149-72.
  38.  46
    Informal fallacies in James's the will to Believe.Richard Double - 2004 - Think 2 (6):29-34.
    Richard Double takes us through James' defence of belief in God, exposing a few fallacies along the way.
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  39. Libertarianism and rationality.Richard Double - 1995 - In Timothy O'Connor (ed.), Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will. Oxford University Press USA.
  40.  21
    Meta-compatibilism.Richard Double - 1988 - American Philosophical Quarterly 25 (4):323-329.
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  41.  13
    Metaphysics and the Mind-Body Problem.Richard Double - 1982 - Philosophical Studies (Dublin) 29:228-234.
  42.  5
    Metaphysics and the Mind-Body Problem.Richard Double - 1982 - Philosophical Studies (Dublin) 29:228-234.
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  43.  35
    More on the ineliminable intentional: A reply to Churchland.Richard Double - 1987 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 17 (2):219–225.
  44.  11
    Metaethical Subjectivism.Richard Double - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):690-693.
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  45.  19
    Metaethical Subjectivism.Richard Double - 2006 - Routledge.
    Metaethical subjectivism, the idea that the truth or falsity of moral statements is contingent upon the attitudes or conventions of observers, is often regarded as a lurid philosophical doctrine which generates much psychological resistance to its acceptance. In this accessible book, Richard Double, presents a vigorous defense of metaethical subjectivism, arguing that the acceptance of this doctrine need have no deleterious effects upon theorizing either in normative ethics or in moral practice. Proceeding from a 'worldview' methodology Double criticizes the rival (...)
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  46. Nagel’s Argument That Mental Properties Are Nonphysical.Richard Double - 1983 - Philosophy Research Archives 9:217-22.
    One of Thomas Nagel’s premises in his argument for panpsychism is criticized. The principal criticisms are: Nagel has failed to provide a clear sense in which mental properties are nonphysical. Even within the framework of Nagel’s argumeent, there is no strong reason to think that the psychological lies outside the explanatory web of physical properties. This is because certain reducing properties common to both the psychological and nonpsychological may well be physical.
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  47.  67
    On A Wittgensteinian Objection to Kripke’s Dualism Argument.Richard Double - 1981 - Philosophy Research Archives 1414:171-181.
    In 'kripke's argument against the identity theory' michael levin argues that the private language argument can be used to undermine saul kripke's cartesian claim to be able to imagine mental states and brain states existing apart, and, thus, refute his argument for dualism. in this paper it is argued that levin's use of the private language argument relies implicitly upon the descriptivist theory of mental language, to which kripke has provided a plausible alternative, "viz"., the causal theory of reference. thus, (...)
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  48. Reply to C.A. Field's Double on Searle's Chinese Room.Richard Double - 1984 - Nature and System 6 (March):55-58.
     
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  49. Reply to ward's philosophical functionalism.Richard Double - 1989 - Behaviorism 17 (2):159-160.
  50. Reply to ward.Richard Double - 1989 - Behaviorism 17 (2):159-160.
    In "Philosophical Functionalism" , Andrew Ward claims that my "The Computational Model of the Mind and Philosophical Functionalism" begs the question against philosophical functionalism by assuming that sensations possess nonrelational characteristics that cannot be explained in functional terms. In this reply I point out that my argument does not claim this, but only the much weaker premise that sensations appear to have such characteristics. I then show how the latter is strong enough to discredit philosophical functionalism.
     
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