Results for 'Richard F. Foley'

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  1. ``Knowledge is Accurate and Comprehensive Enough True Belief&Quot.Richard F. Foley - 1996 - In Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge. Savage, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield.
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  2. "Probability, Objectivity and Evidence" by F. C. Benenson. [REVIEW]Richard Foley - 1987 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (3):515.
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  3.  3
    The Theory of Epistemic Rationality.Hilary Kornblith & Richard Foley - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (1):131.
  4.  81
    Dretske's 'Information-Theoretic' Account of Knowledge.Richard Foley - 1987 - Synthese 70 (February):159-184.
  5.  62
    Conceptual Diversity in Epistemology.Richard Foley - 2002 - In Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 177--203.
    In “Conceptual Diversity in Epistemology,” Richard Foley reflects on such central topics in epistemology as knowledge, warrant, rationality, and justification, with the purpose of distinguishing such concepts in a general theory. Foley uses “warrant” to refer to that which constitutes knowledge when added to true belief and suggests that rationality and justification are not linked to knowledge by necessity. He proceeds to offer a general schema for rationality. This schema enables a distinction between “rationality” and “rationality all (...)
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  6. A Free but Modest Censure on the Late Controversial Writings and Debates of the Lord Bishop of Vvorcester and Mr. Locke: Mr. Edwards and Mr. Locke: The Honble Charles Boyle, Esq; and Dr. Bently. Together with Brief Remarks on Monsieur le Clerc's Ars Critica. By F.B. M.A. Of Cambridg. [REVIEW]B. F. - 1698 - Printed for A. Baldwin in Warwick-Lane.
  7.  49
    Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others.Richard Foley - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.
    To what degree should we rely on our own resources and methods to form opinions about important matters? To what degree should we depend on various authorities, such as a recognized expert or a social tradition? In this provocative account of intellectual trust and authority, Richard Foley argues that it can be reasonable to have intellectual trust in oneself even though it is not possible to provide a defence of the reliability of one's faculties, methods and opinions that (...)
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    Allison P. Coudret, Richard H. Popkin and Gordon M. Weiner (Eds.) Leibniz, Mysticism and Religion. (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998). (International Archives of the History of Ideas, Vol. 158). Pp. VII+198. NLG180. £61 Hbk. [REVIEW]S. F. - 1999 - Religious Studies 35 (3):385-388.
  9.  73
    Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology.Richard Foley - 1992 - Oxford University Press.
    In this new book, Foley defends an epistemology that takes seriously the perspectives of individual thinkers. He argues that having rational opinions is a matter of meeting our own internal standards rather than standards that are somehow imposed upon us from the outside. It is a matter of making ourselves invulnerable to intellectual self-criticism. Foley also shows how the theory of rational belief is part of a general theory of rationality. He thus avoids treating the rationality of belief (...)
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  10. Working Without a Net: Essays in Egocentric Epistemology.Richard Foley - 1992 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Avoiding treating the rationality of belief as a fundamentally different kind of phenomenon from the rationality of decision or action, Foley's approach generates promising suggestions about a wide range of issues--e.g., the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic reasons for belief; the questions of what aspects of the Cartesian project are still worth doing; and the significance of simplicity and other theoretical virtues.
     
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  11.  59
    Fumerton's Puzzle.Richard Foley - 1990 - Journal of Philosophical Research 15:109-113.
    There is a puzzle that is faced by every philosophical account of rational belief, rational strategy, rational planning or whatever. I describe this puzzle, examine Richard Fumerton’s proposed solution to it and then go on to sketch my own preferred solution.
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  12. Fumerton’s Puzzle.Richard Foley - 1990 - Journal of Philosophical Research 15:109-113.
    There is a puzzle that is faced by every philosophical account of rational belief, rational strategy, rational planning or whatever. I describe this puzzle, examine Richard Fumerton’s proposed solution to it and then go on to sketch my own preferred solution.
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  13.  25
    The Theory of Epistemic Rationality.Richard Foley - 1987 - Harvard University Press.
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  14. Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis.Richard Foley - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer. pp. 37-47.
    What propositions are rational for one to believe? With what confidence is it rational for one to believe these propositions? Answering the first of these questions requires an epistemology of beliefs, answering the second an epistemology of degrees of belief.
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  15.  73
    The Epistemology of Belief and the Epistemology of Degrees of Belief.Richard Foley - 1992 - American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (2):111 - 124.
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  16.  20
    When is True Belief Knowledge?Richard Foley - 2012 - Princeton University Press.
    Her belief is true, but it isn't knowledge. This is a classic illustration of a central problem in epistemology: determining what knowledge requires in addition to true belief.
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  17. Justified Belief as Responsible Belief.Richard Foley - 2005 - In Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. pp. 313--26.
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  18.  81
    Epistemic Conservatism.Richard Foley - 1983 - Philosophical Studies 43 (2):165 - 182.
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  19. Evidence and Reasons for Belief.Richard Foley - 1991 - Analysis 51 (2):98 - 102.
  20.  34
    Davidson's Theism?Richard Foley & Richard Fumerton - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (1):83 - 89.
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  21.  95
    What's Wrong With Reliabilism?Richard Foley - 1985 - The Monist 68 (2):188-202.
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  22. Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge.Jonathan L. Kvanvig, Laurence Bonjour, Earl Conee, Richard Feldman, Richard Foley, Peter Klein, Jonathan Kvanvig, Keith Lehrer, William Lycan, Peter Markie, George Pappas, Alvin Plantinga, Ernest Sosa, Marshall Swain & Bas van Fraassen - 1996 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    In his widely influential two-volume work, Warrant: The Current Debate and Warrant and Proper Function, Alvin Plantinga argued that warrant is that which explains the difference between knowledge and true belief. Plantinga not only developed his own account of warrant but also mapped the terrain of epistemology. Motivated by Plantinga's work, fourteen prominent philosophers have written new essays investigating Plantingian warrant and its contribution to contemporary epistemology. The resulting collection, representing a broad array of views, not only gives readers a (...)
     
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  23. A Trial Separation Between the Theory of Knowledge and the Theory of Justified Belief.Richard Foley - manuscript
    In his 1963 article, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”1 Edmund Gettier devised a pair of counterexamples designed to illustrate that knowledge cannot be adequately defined as justified true belief. The basic idea behind both of his counterexamples is that one can be justified in believing a falsehood P from which one deduces a truth Q, in which case one has a justified true belief in Q but does not know Q. Gettier’s article inspired numerous other counterexamples, and the search was (...)
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  24.  31
    Justified Inconsistent Beliefs.Richard Foley - 1979 - American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (4):247 - 257.
  25. Rationality and Intellectual Self-Trust.Richard Foley - 1998 - In William Ramsey & Michael R. DePaul (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. pp. 241--56.
  26.  61
    Universal Intellectual Trust.Richard Foley - 2005 - Episteme 2 (1):5-12.
    All of us get opinions from other people. And not just a few. We acquire opinions from others extensively and do so from early childhood through virtually every day of the rest our lives. Sometimes we rely on others for relatively inconsequential information. Is it raining outside? Did the Yankees win today? But we also depend on others for important or even life preserving information. Where is the nearest hospital? Do people drive on the left or the right here? We (...)
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  27.  66
    What Am I to Believe?Richard Foley - manuscript
    The central issue of Descartes’s Meditations is an intensely personal one. Descartes asks a simple question of himself, one that each of us can also ask of ourselves, “What am I to believe?” One way of construing this question--indeed, the way Descartes himself construed it--is as a methodological one. The immediate aim is not so much to generate a specific list of propositions for me to believe. Rather, I want to formulate for myself some general advice about how to proceed (...)
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  28.  21
    Being Knowingly Incoherent.Richard Foley - 1992 - Noûs 26 (2):181-203.
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  29.  44
    An Epistemology That Matters.Richard Foley - 2008 - In Philip L. Quinn & Paul J. Weithman (eds.), Liberal Faith: Essays in Honor of Philip Quinn. University of Notre Dame Press.
    The two most fundamental questions for an epistemology are, what is involved in having good reasons to believe a claim, and what is involved in meeting the higher standard of knowing that a claim is true? The theory of justified belief tries to answer the former, whereas the theory of knowledge addresses the latter.
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  30. Compatibilism.Richard Foley - 1978 - Kind 87 (July):421-28.
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  31.  36
    ``Epistemic Luck and the Purely Epistemic".Richard Foley - 1984 - American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (2):113-124.
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  32.  54
    Inferential Justification and the Infinite Regress.Richard Foley - 1978 - American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (4):311 - 316.
    It is commonly thought that the requirements of inferential justification are such that necessarily the process of inferentially justifying a belief will come to an end. But, If this is so, We should be able to pick out those requirements of justification which necessitate an end to the justification process. Unfortunately, Although there is nearly unanimous agreement as to the need for such an end, It is by no means clear which particular requirements of justification impose this need. I examine (...)
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  33. Epistemic Indolence: A Reply to Schmitt.Richard Foley & Richard Fumerton - 1984 - Mind 93 (369):108-110.
  34. ``Justified Inconsistent Beliefs".Richard Foley - 1979 - American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (4):247-257.
     
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  35.  81
    Quine and Naturalized Epistemology.Richard Foley - 1994 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):243-260.
  36.  31
    How Should Future Opinion Affect Current Opinion?Richard Foley - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):747-766.
  37.  72
    The Foundational Role of Epistemology in a General Theory of Rationality.Richard Foley - manuscript
    A common complaint against contemporary epistemology is that its issues are too rarified and, hence, of little relevance for the everyday assessments we make of each other=s beliefs. The notion of epistemic rationality focuses on a specific goal, that of now having accurate and comprehensive beliefs, whereas our everyday assessments of beliefs are sensitive to the fact that we have an enormous variety of goals and needs, intellectual as well as nonintellectual. Indeed, our everyday assessments often have a quasi-ethical dimension; (...)
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  38. Index.Richard Foley - 2012 - In When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. pp. 149-153.
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  39.  77
    Review: Knowledge and its Limits. [REVIEW]Richard Foley - 2002 - Mind 111 (443):718-726.
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  40.  55
    Compatibilism and Control Over the Past.Richard Foley - 1979 - Analysis 39 (March):70-74.
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  41.  1
    ``Evidence and Reasons for Belief".Richard Foley - 1991 - Analysis 51 (2):98-102.
  42. Epistemically Rationality as Invulnerability to Self-Criticism.Richard Foley - manuscript
    Part of the appeal of classical foundationalism was that it purported to provide a definitive refutation of skepticism. With the fall of foundationalism, we can no longer pretend that such a refutation is possible. We must instead acknowledge that skeptical worries cannot be completely banished and that, thus, inquiry always involves an element of risk which cannot be eliminated by further inquiry, whether it be scientific or philosophical. The flip side of this point is that inquiry always involves some element (...)
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  43.  48
    Epistemically Rational Belief and Responsible Belief.Richard Foley - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:181-188.
    Descartes, and many of the other great epistemologists of the modern period, looked to epistemology to put science and intellectual inquiry generally on a secure foundation. Epistemology’s role was to provide assurances of the reliability of properly conducted inquiry. Indeed, its role was nothing less than to be czar of the sciences and of intellectual inquiry in general. This conception of epistemology is now almost universally regarded as overly grandiose. Nonetheless, Descartes and the other great epistemologists of the modern era (...)
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  44.  79
    Reply to Van Inwagen.Richard Foley - 1980 - Analysis 40 (March):101-103.
    I reply to professor vaninwagen's comment on an earlier paper of mine ("analysis", March 1979), In which I argue that compatibilists are not committed to accepting the claim that people might have control over the past.
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    Three Attempts to Refute Skepticism and Why They Fail.Richard Foley - 2003 - In S. Luper (ed.), The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays. Ashgate Publishing.
    One of the advantages of classical foundationalism was that it was thought to provide a refutation of skeptical worries, which raise the specter that our beliefs might be extensively mistaken. The most extreme versions of these worries are expressed in familiar thought experiments such as the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis, which imagines a world in which, unbeknownst to you, your brain is in a vat hooked up to equipment programmed to provide it with precisely the same visual, auditory, tactile, and other sensory (...)
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  46.  28
    Epistemic Indolence.Richard Foley & Richard Fumerton - 1982 - Mind 91 (361):38-56.
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  47. A Preliminary Analysis of the Suppressive Effects of Denatonium Saccharide.Stephen F. Davis, Lisa A. Cunningham, Tom J. Burke, M. Melissa Richard, William M. Langley & John Theis - 1986 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 24 (3):229-232.
  48.  19
    The Purely Epistemic.Richard Foley - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (11):718-718.
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  49.  73
    Epistemology.Richard Foley - manuscript
    In epistemology Chisholm was a defender of FOUNDATIONALISM [S]. He asserted that any proposition that it is justified for a person to believe gets at least part of its justification from basic propositions, which are themselves justified but not by anything else. Contingent propositions are basic insofar as they correspond to selfpresenting states of the person, which for Chisholm are states such that whenever one is in the state and believes that one is in it, one’s belief is maximally justified. (...)
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  50.  41
    Reply to Moser.Richard Foley - 1989 - Analysis 49 (2):89 - 92.
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