26 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Richard G. Heck [22]Richard G. Heck Jr [4]Richard Gustave Heck [1]
See also
Richard Kimberly Heck
Brown University
  1. Solving Frege's Puzzle.Richard G. Heck Jr - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (1-2):132-174.
    So-called 'Frege cases' pose a challenge for anyone who would hope to treat the contents of beliefs (and similar mental states) as Russellian propositions: It is then impossible to explain people's behavior in Frege cases without invoking non-intentional features of their mental states, and doing that seems to undermine the intentionality of psychological explanation. In the present paper, I develop this sort of objection in what seems to me to be its strongest form, but then offer a response to it. (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  2.  24
    Frege's Theorem.Richard G. Heck - 2011 - Clarendon Press.
    The book begins with an overview that introduces the Theorem and the issues surrounding it, and explores how the essays that follow contribute to our understanding of those issues.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  3. Frege on Identity and Identity-Statements: A Reply to Thau and Caplan.Richard G. Heck - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):83-102.
    The paper argues, as against Thau and Caplan, that the traditional interpretation that Frege abandoned his earlier views about identity and identity--statements is correct.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  4. Cardinality, Counting, and Equinumerosity.Richard G. Heck - 2000 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 41 (3):187-209.
    Frege, famously, held that there is a close connection between our concept of cardinal number and the notion of one-one correspondence, a connection enshrined in Hume's Principle. Husserl, and later Parsons, objected that there is no such close connection, that our most primitive conception of cardinality arises from our grasp of the practice of counting. Some empirical work on children's development of a concept of number has sometimes been thought to point in the same direction. I argue, however, that Frege (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  5. A Liar Paradox.Richard G. Heck - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):36-40.
    The purpose of this note is to present a strong form of the liar paradox. It is strong because the logical resources needed to generate the paradox are weak, in each of two senses. First, few expressive resources required: conjunction, negation, and identity. In particular, this form of the liar does not need to make any use of the conditional. Second, few inferential resources are required. These are: (i) conjunction introduction; (ii) substitution of identicals; and (iii) the inference: From ¬(p (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  6. Language, Thought, and Logic: Essays in Honour of Michael Dummett.Richard G. Heck (ed.) - 1997 - Oxford University Press.
    In this exciting new collection, a distinguished international group of philosophers contribute new essays on central issues in philosophy of language and logic, in honor of Michael Dummett, one of the most influential philosophers of the late twentieth century. The essays are focused on areas particularly associated with Professor Dummett. Five are contributions to the philosophy of language, addressing in particular the nature of truth and meaning and the relation between language and thought. Two contributors discuss time, in particular the (...)
  7.  12
    Reading Frege's Grundgesetze.Richard G. Heck - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
    Richard G. Heck presents a new account of Gottlob Frege's Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, or Basic Laws of Arithmetic, which establishes it as a neglected masterpiece at the center of Frege's philosophy. He explores Frege's philosophy of logic, and argues that Frege knew that his proofs could be reconstructed so as to avoid Russell's Paradox.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  8. Frege and Semantics.Richard G. Heck - 2007 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):27-63.
    In recent work on Frege, one of the most salient issues has been whether he was prepared to make serious use of semantical notions such as reference and truth. I argue here Frege did make very serious use of semantical concepts. I argue, first, that Frege had reason to be interested in the question how the axioms and rules of his formal theory might be justified and, second, that he explicitly commits himself to offering a justification that appeals to the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  9. Predicative Frege Arithmetic and ‘Everyday’ Mathematics.Richard G. Heck - 2014 - Philosophia Mathematica 22 (3):279-307.
    The primary purpose of this note is to demonstrate that predicative Frege arithmetic naturally interprets certain weak but non-trivial arithmetical theories. It will take almost as long to explain what this means and why it matters as it will to prove the results.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  10.  38
    Consistency and the Theory of Truth.Richard G. Heck - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (3):424-466.
    This paper attempts to address the question what logical strength theories of truth have by considering such questions as: If you take a theory T and add a theory of truth to it, how strong is the resulting theory, as compared to T? Once the question has been properly formulated, the answer turns out to be about as elegant as one could want: Adding a theory of truth to a finitely axiomatized theory T is more or less equivalent to a (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  11. On the Consistency of Second-Order Contextual Definitions.Richard G. Heck - 1992 - Noûs 26 (4):491-494.
    One of the earliest discussions of the so-called 'bad company' objection to Neo-Fregeanism, I show that the consistency of an arbitrary second-order 'contextual definition' (nowadays known as an 'abstraction principle' is recursively undecidable. I go on to suggest that an acceptable such principle should satisfy a condition nowadays known as 'stablity'.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  12. MacFarlane on Relative Truth.Richard G. Heck - 2006 - Philosophical Issues 16 (1):88–100.
    John MacFarlane has made relativism popular again. Focusing just on his original discussion, I argue that the data he uses to motivate the position do not, in fact, motivatie it at all. Many of the points made here have since been made, independently, by Hermann Cappelen and John Hawthorne, in their book Relativism and Monadic Truth.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  13. Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, 82-3.George Boolos & Richard G. Heck - 1998 - In Matthias Schirn (ed.), Bulletin of Symbolic Logic. Clarendon Press. pp. 407-28.
    This paper contains a close analysis of Frege's proofs of the axioms of arithmetic §§70-83 of Die Grundlagen, with special attention to the proof of the existence of successors in §§82-83. Reluctantly and hesitantly, we come to the conclusion that Frege was at least somewhat confused in those two sections and that he cannot be said to have outlined, or even to have intended, any correct proof there. The proof he sketches is in many ways similar to that given in (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  14.  9
    Finitude and Hume's Principle.Richard G. Heck - 1997 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (6):589-617.
    The paper formulates and proves a strengthening of 'Frege's Theorem', which states that axioms for second-order arithmetic are derivable in second-order logic from Hume's Principle, which itself says that the number of Fs is the same as the number of Gs just in case the Fs and Gs are equinumerous. The improvement consists in restricting this claim to finite concepts, so that nothing is claimed about the circumstances under which infinite concepts have the same number. 'Finite Hume's Principle' also suffices (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  15. Julius Caesar and Basic Law V.Richard G. Heck - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (2):161–178.
    This paper dates from about 1994: I rediscovered it on my hard drive in the spring of 2002. It represents an early attempt to explore the connections between the Julius Caesar problem and Frege's attitude towards Basic Law V. Most of the issues discussed here are ones treated rather differently in my more recent papers "The Julius Caesar Objection" and "Grundgesetze der Arithmetik I 10". But the treatment here is more accessible, in many ways, providing more context and a better (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  16.  18
    Frege on Identity and Identity-Statements: A Reply to Thau and Caplan.Richard G. Heck - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):83-102.
  17.  98
    In Defense of Formal Relationism.Richard G. Heck - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):243-250.
    In his paper “Flaws of Formal Relationism”, Mahrad Almotahari argues against the sort of response to Frege's Puzzle I have defended elsewhere, which he dubs ‘Formal Relationism’. Almotahari argues that, because of its specifically formal character, this view is vulnerable to objections that cannot be raised against the otherwise similar Semantic Relationism due to Kit Fine. I argue in response that Formal Relationism has neither of the flaws Almotahari claims to identify.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  18.  82
    Intuition and the Substitution Argument.Richard G. Heck - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (1):1-30.
    The 'substitution argument' purports to demonstrate the falsity of Russellian accounts of belief-ascription by observing that, e.g., these two sentences: -/- (LC) Lois believes that Clark can fly. (LS) Lois believes that Superman can fly. -/- could have different truth-values. But what is the basis for that claim? It seems widely to be supposed, especially by Russellians, that it is simply an 'intuition', one that could then be 'explained away'. And this supposition plays an especially important role in Jennifer Saul's (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  19.  33
    Grundgesetze der Arithmetik I §§29‒32.Richard G. Heck - 1997 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (3):437-474.
    Frege's intention in section 31 of Grundgesetze is to show that every well-formed expression in his formal system denotes. But it has been obscure why he wants to do this and how he intends to do it. It is argued here that, in large part, Frege's purpose is to show that the smooth breathing, from which names of value-ranges are formed, denotes; that his proof that his other primitive expressions denote is sound and anticipates Tarski's theory of truth; and that (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  20.  28
    The Frontloading Argument.Richard G. Heck - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2583-2608.
    Maybe the most important argument in David Chalmers’s monumental book Constructing the World is the one he calls the ‘Frontloading Argument’, which is used in Chapter 4 to argue for the book’s central thesis, A Priori Scrutability. And, at first blush, the Frontloading Argument looks very strong. I argue here, however, that it is incapable of securing the conclusion it is meant to establish.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21.  20
    The Logical Strength of Compositional Principles.Richard G. Heck Jr - 2018 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 59 (1):1-33.
    This paper investigates a set of issues connected with the so-called conservativeness argument against deflationism. Although I do not defend that argument, I think the discussion of it has raised some interesting questions about whether what I call “compositional principles,” such as “a conjunction is true iff its conjuncts are true,” have substantial content or are in some sense logically trivial. The paper presents a series of results that purport to show that the compositional principles for a first-order language, taken (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22.  10
    Cognitive Hunger: Remarks on Imogen Dickie's Fixing Reference.Richard G. Heck - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):738-744.
    The main focus of my comments is the role played in Dickie's view by the idea that "the mind has a need to represent things outside itself". But there are also some remarks about her (very interesting) suggestion that descriptive names can sometimes fail to refer to the object that satisfies the associated description.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23.  14
    That There Might Be Vague Objects (So Far as Concerns Logic).Richard G. Heck Jr - 1998 - The Monist 81 (2):274 - 296.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  24.  21
    Is Frege's Definition of the Ancestral Adequate.Richard G. Heck - 2016 - Philosophia Mathematica 24 (1):91-116.
    Why should one think Frege's definition of the ancestral correct? It can be proven to be extensionally correct, but the argument uses arithmetical induction, and that seems to undermine Frege's claim to have justified induction in purely logical terms. I discuss such circularity objections and then offer a new definition of the ancestral intended to be intensionally correct; its extensional correctness then follows without proof. This new definition can be proven equivalent to Frege's without any use of arithmetical induction. This (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25.  3
    Frege’s Theorem: An Introduction.Richard G. Heck Jr - 1999 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 7 (1):56-73.
  26.  2
    Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, §§82-3.George Boolos, Richard G. Heck, Crispin Wright & Michael Dummett - 2000 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 6 (4):498-504.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark