PHILOSOPHERS have a patrimony of ninety generations or so of philosophical experience. Collingwood's plea that we take this cumulative legacy seriously I am disposed to repeat. Philosophical experience rewards the labor of philosophic thought quite as geological experience rewards the labor of geological thought, and mathematical experience that of mathematical thought. Philosophical experience brings to light the categories and categorial order. It thus makes its contribution to interscientific meaning, which is the distinction and mark of philosophy among the sciences. Think (...) of it as a hard-won richesse, a communal fund, to which multitudes of our predecessors have added and upon which they have drawn, as we now are professionally qualified to do. So viewed, philosophical experience records a communal venture, an itinerarium mentis, towards system and categorial coherence. (shrink)

An edited transcript of the great Harvard philosopher Josiah Royce's last year-long course in metaphysics, given at Harvard in 1915-1916.

_An edited transcript of the great Harvard philosopher Josiah Royce's last year-long course in metaphysics, given at Harvard in 1915-1916._.

On September 14, 1956, we shall be observing the fortieth anniversary of Royce's death. Fortunately, we are near enough to 1916 so that two of the authors, Mr. Robinson and Mr. Cotton, can share with their readers some of the direct experience gained from having sat in Royce's classes and from remembering the living habits of his mind.

The question has been stirring in the minds of those who have the Cave volumes before them. The present book, bearing the title Ascent to the Absolute, with its fifteen “metaphysical papers and lectures”, brings substantial support to the answer which is to be found in the Gifford Lectures.

In four compact chapters, Kant and Marx are appraised in terms of their accounts of human passivity and activity. Comparatively brief examinations of Hegel’s treatment of this theme provide a transition from Kant to Marx. The “idealism” of Kant is found to be incoherent. Contradictions abound in it. The “naturalism” of Marx is free of contradictions; it carries the day. The writer’s style is a close explication of texts. The reader does well to have the sources at his elbow.

In four compact chapters, Kant and Marx are appraised in terms of their accounts of human passivity and activity. Comparatively brief examinations of Hegel’s treatment of this theme provide a transition from Kant to Marx. The “idealism” of Kant is found to be incoherent. Contradictions abound in it. The “naturalism” of Marx is free of contradictions; it carries the day. The writer’s style is a close explication of texts. The reader does well to have the sources at his elbow.