It is argued here that business firms can and do provide an incubator that enables the Aristotelian category of friendships of advantage to develop into friendships of virtue. This contradicts other literature that views acquaintances of utility as the business norm, and expresses pessimism concerning more advanced virtuous development of friendship within the business firm. It is argued here, however, that this virtuous development is integral to the Kantian social aim of pursuing a moral community, an aim which declares the (...) appropriate moral motivation for business, and that certainly should incorporate a role for developing virtuous relations as a component of that pursuit. An atmosphere that encourages the development of relations of virtue is feasible, exists in real business, and is optimal for pursuit of moral business communities. (shrink)
This book gives a descriptive analysis of specific Madhyamika texts. It compares the ideology of Kumarajiva (a translator of the four Madhyamika treatises 400 A.D.) with the ideologies of the three Chinese contemporaries - HuiYuan, Seng-Jui and Seng-Chao. It envisages an intercultural transmission of religious and philosophical ideas from India to China.
The societal benefits derived from competitive markets certainly depend upon participants conforming to generally accepted notions of moral duty. These notions include negative duties such as those against fraud, deception, and coercion and also positive duties such as those that favor beneficence but with limits. This investigation examines the extent that product, capital, and internal-labor markets are capable of imposing conformance to society’s expectations of duty through both formally and informally organized boycotts. A categorization of classic and recent boycotts into (...) those motivated by establishing new norms, or enforcing existing generally accepted norms is provided. This categorization helps to explain why some boycotts are successful, and others not. Through this exploration, a contribution to the resolution of the so called “Adam Smith problem” concerning the morality-enforcing capability of the invisible hand is offered. (shrink)
The word ought is often used to express moral judgments. It is used to express moral laws, as in “We ought to honour our parents”; and it is used to express singular moral judgments, as in “You ought not to have spoken to your mother like that”". Some singular moral judgments are clearly deductions from some moral law, as is “You ought not to have spoken to your mother like that”. Others, however, are not clearly so, e.g. “You ought not (...) to have done that”. Where both the agent and the action are indicated merely by a contextual reference, no underlying moral law is suggested by the words alone. Even when the singular judgment characterizes both the agent and the action, as “You, being a strong man, ought to have gone to his aid”, it may still be quite obscure what, if any, moral law implies this judgment. Clearly there is no moral law that “Every strong man ought always to go to everybody's aid”. (shrink)
A nexus of imperfect duty, defined as positive commitments that have practical limits, describes business behavior toward building affable and virtuous relations, maintaining reasoned social discourse, and performing the due diligence necessary for making knowledgeable business decisions. A theory of the development and extent of the limits of these imperfect managerial duties is presented here, a theory that in part explains the activities and personnel included under the firm’s umbrella. As a result, the nexus of imperfect duty is shown to (...) complement the perfect-duty-based nexus-of-contracts theory of the firm. The existence of flexible trade-offs involving these duties, trade-offs limited by contractual arrangements whether explicit or implicit, is shown to be one of the advantages of imperfect duty for developing business relations. (shrink)
He does not consider the suggestions that the occurrence of complex things entails only the occurrence of less complex things, and that analysis might theoretically go on for ever. His argument here seems to me no better than arguing that, if we keep on taking points nearer and nearer to each other, we shall eventually come to two points that are next each other. There must be unanalysed concepts, but there need not be unanalysable concepts. Just so, there must be (...) integers that have never been thought of, but there is no integer that cannot be thought of. Possibly this is concealed from Dr. Ewing by his assuming that, if we analyse x into yz, y and z must have been familiar to us before. Whereas it seems possible that our first analysing x into yz should also be our first conceiving of y or of z or of both. (shrink)
Much of the criticism of Stevens's criterion for permissible statistics as applied to measurement data results from a lack of clarity in Stevens's position. In this paper set-theoretical notions have been used to clarify that position. We define a sig-function as a function defined on numerical assignments. If A and R are empirical and numerical relational systems, respectively, then a sig-function F is constant on A with respect to R if, and only if, the value of F is the same (...) for all numerical assignments for A with respect to R. Using these notions we prove rigorously certain generalizations of Stevens's results. (shrink)