In his Logical Investigations Edmund Husserl criticizes John Stuart Mill’s account of meaning as connotation, especially Mill’s failure to separate the distinction between connotative and non-connotative names from the distinction between the meaningful and the meaningless. According to Husserl, both connotative and non-connotative names have meaning or “signification”, that is, what Gottlob Frege calls the sense (“Sinn”) of an expression. The distinction between connotative and non-connotative names is a distinction between two kinds of meaning (or sense), attributive and non-attributive meaning (...) (“attributive und nicht-attributive Bedeutung”). Attributive (connotative) names denote (refer to) objects through their attributes, whereas a non-attributive name means a thing directly (“direkt”). In this paper I examine the concepts of attributive and non-attributive meaning by means of the semiotic theory of Charles S. Peirce, and compare Peirce’s account with the views of Frege, Husserl, Alexius Meinong, and David Kaplan and Gareth Evans. (shrink)
Expressions of the form "s represents an F", "s represents t as G", and "s represents an F as G" are analysed by means of C. S. Peirce's and Nelson Goodman's semiotic theories, and these theories are compared with each other. It is argued that Peirce's concept of interpretant provides a plausible account of what Goodman calls the exemplification features of aesthetic signs (works of art).
This paper outlines the main features of the conception of empirical knowledge presented by Moritz Schlick in his paper 'Über das Fundament der Erkenntnis', and contains a detaüed analysis of Schlick's concept of "Konstatierung". It is argued that in spite of its basically foundationalist appearance, Schlick's theory resembles in important respects contemporary coherence theories of knowledge.
This paper discusses the skeptical argument presented by Keith Lehrer in his paper Why Not Scepticism?. It is argued that Lehrer's argument depends on unacceptable premises, and therefore fails to establish the skeptical conclusion. On the other hand, it is also shown that even if the skeptic's opponent (called a dogmatist) knows something, he may be unable to prove this in a way which could convince the skeptic; hence the difficulty of refuting skepticism. The paper also criticises Dretske's attempt to (...) refute skeptical arguments by rejecting the consequence condition for epistemic justification. (shrink)
Charles S. Peirce introduces the distinction between a token and a type into semiotics and philosophy by using as an example two ways of individuating words:(P1) A common mode of estimating the amount of matter in a MS. or printed book is to count the number of words. There will ordinarily be about twenty the's on a page, and of course they count as twenty words. In another sense of the word "word," however, there is but one word "the" in (...) the English language; and it is impossible that this word should lie visibly on a page or be heard in any voice, for the reason that it is not a Single thing or Single event. It does not exist; it only determines things that do exist. Such a definitely significant Form, I propose .. (shrink)
: According to C. S. Peirce, there are two ways of explaining what a sign means, namely, a definition and a precept. A precept tells the interpreters of a sign what the sign means by prescribing what they have to do in order to find or become acquainted with an object of the sign. A precept for a concept specifies how an interpreter can determine whether the concept is applicable to a given situation or object.Peirce accepted the scholastic definition of (...) truth, according to which a proposition is true if and only if its subject and predicate refer to the same thing, and applied this analysis to complex as well as singular propositions. However, this account does not tell how an interpreter can become acquainted with the objects of the predicate "true," that is, true propositions: it is not a good precept for the concept of truth. On the other hand, the so-called pragmatic conception of truth, truth as the limit or end of inquiry, can be regarded as a precept for truth, or as a general form of such a precept.The requirement that concepts should have precepts attached to them is a version of Peirce's principle of pragmatism. The availability of precepts should make it possible for an interpreter to determine whether a concept is applicable to a given situation, or whether a given proposition is true. Thus the principle of pragmatism is closely related to the principle knowability, according to which any truth should be knowable. Some formulations of the principle of knowability lead to a paradox. The paper discusses several forms of the principle of knowability, and it is argued that the existence of precept for a proposition entails only a relatively weak form of the principle.Keywords: Action. Inquiry. Knowledge. Meaning. Peirce. Pragmatism. Precept.Resumo: Segundo C. S. Peirce, há dois modos de explicar o que um signo significa, a saber, uma definição e um preceito. Um preceito diz aos intérpretes de um signo o que o signo significa, prescrevendo o que eles devem fazer para encontrar ou inteirar-se de um objeto do signo. Um preceito para um conceito especifica como um intérprete pode determinar se o conceito é aplicável a uma dada situação ou a um dado objeto.Peirce aceitou a definição escolástica de verdade, segundo a qual uma proposição é verdadeira se, e somente se, seu sujeito e seu predicado se referirem à mesma coisa, e aplicou essa análise tanto a proposições complexas quanto a singulares. Entretanto, essa visão não informa como um intérprete pode inteirar-se dos objetos do predicado "verdadeiro", ou seja, proposições verdadeiras: não é um bom preceito para o conceito de ver- On a Pragmatic Theory of Meaning and Knowledge dade. De outro lado, a assim chamada concepção pragmática de verdade, a verdade como o limite ou fim da investigação, pode ser vista como um preceito para a verdade, ou como uma forma geral de tal preceito.A exigência de que conceitos tenham preceitos ligados a eles é uma versão do princípio do pragmatismo de Peirce . A disponibilidade de preceitos deve tornar possível que um intérprete determine se um conceito é aplicável a uma dada situação, ou seja, se certa proposição é verdadeira. Portanto, o princípio do pragmatismo está intimamente ligado ao princípio da cognoscibilidade, segundo o qual toda verdade pode ser conhecida. Algumas formulações do princípio da cognoscibilidade levam a um paradoxo. O artigo discute algumas formas não-paradoxais do princípio da cognoscibilidade, defendendo que a existência de um preceito para uma proposição exige apenas uma forma relativamente fraca do princípio.Palavras-chave: Ação. Investigação. Conhecimento. Significação. Peirce. Pragmatismo. Preceito. (shrink)
This paper discusses the probabilities of inductive generalizations in languages containing two-place predicates. The depth of the sentences considered here is restricted to two, that is, they contain at most two layers of quantifiers. The analysis of relational hypotheses presented below is based on the theory of distributive normal forms in first-order logic. The main purpose of this paper is not to present methods of calculating unique probability-values for various generalizations, but rather to clarify the general conceptual situation and concentrate (...) on issues of philosophical interest. (shrink)
: This paper is a commentary on some topics discussed by Thomas Short in his recent book Peirce's Theory of Signs: Peirce's distinction between iconic and indexical signs, the objects of propositions, and different ways of interpreting the distinction between the immediate and dynamic objects of signs. Peirce's distinction between immediate and dynamic objects is in certain respects analogous to Alexius Meinong's distinction between the "auxiliary objects" and the "ultimate objects" ("target objects") of mental representations. It is suggested that the (...) models of a theory can be regarded as its immediate objects, and the real systems represented by the models are the dynamic objects of the theory. (shrink)
This paper is a commentary on some topics discussed by Thomas Short in his recent book Peirce's Theory of Signs: Peirce's distinction between iconic and indexical signs, the objects of propositions, and different ways of interpreting the distinction between the immediate and dynamic objects of signs. Peirce's distinction between immediate and dynamic objects is in certain respects analogous to Alexius Meinong's distinction between the "auxiliary objects" and the "ultimate objects" ("target objects") of mental representations. It is suggested that the models (...) of a theory can be regarded as its immediate objects, and the real systems represented by the models are the dynamic objects of the theory. (shrink)
THIS PAPER DISCUSSES A CONCEPT OF IMPERSONAL KNOWLEDGE ('Kp') SATISFYING THE PRINCIPLE ('K subscript a'p implies Kp), BUT NOT ITS CONVERSE. IT IS ARGUED THAT SEVERAL GETTIER-TYPE COUNTEREXAMPLES TO THE CLASSICAL ANALYSIS KNOWLEDGE (ESPECIALLY THOSE DEPENDING UPON THE 'SOCIAL' ASPECT OF KNOWLEDGE) CAN BE ACCOUNTED FOR IN TERMS OF THE ABOVE PRINCIPLE.
In the 1890s, Peirce reformulated quantification theory by expressing it in a language of diagrams, called existential graphs. Peirce thought that the iconicity of his graphs made them suitable for analyzing logical reasoning. Iconic signs can be said to show their meaning, and this paper studies the ways in which graphs do this. Peirce's pragmatic analysis of propositions resembles game-theoretical semantics, and existential graphs show what they mean by displaying the structure of the semantic game for the proposition represented by (...) a graph. (shrink)