At a 2011 meeting of the Society of Christian Philosophers, N. T. Wright offered four reasons for rejecting the existence of soul. This was surprising, as many Christian philosophers had previously taken Wright's defense of a disembodied intermediate state as a defense of a substance dualist view of the soul. In this paper, I offer responses to each of Wright's objections, demonstrating that Wright's arguments fail to undermine substance dualism. In so doing, I expose how popular arguments against dualism fail, (...) such as dualism is merely an unwarranted influence of Greek culture on Christianity, and substance dualism is merely a soul-of-the-gaps hypothesis. Moreover, I demonstrate that Wright himself has offered a powerful reason for adopting substance dualism in his previous works. In conclusion I offer a view that explains why the human soul needs a resurrected body. (shrink)
Spade 1988 sugges t s tha t t he r e are ac tua l l y two theo r i e s t o address t h i s ques t i o n t o , an ear l y one and a l a t e r one . 2 Most o f the presen t pape r i s a deve l o pmen t o f t h i s i dea . I sugges t (...) tha t ear l y work by Sherwood and o the r s was a s tudy o f quan t i f i e r s : the i r semant i c s and t he e f f e c t s o f con t e x t on i n f e r e n ce s t ha t can be made f r om quan t i f i e d te rms . La te r , i n the hands o f Bur l e y and o the r s , i t changed i n t o a s tudy o f someth i n g e l se , a s tudy o f what I ca l l g loba l quan t i f i c a t i o n a l e f f e c t . In sec t i o n 1 , I exp l a i n what these two op t i o n s are. (shrink)
For a theory T, we study relationships among IΔ n +1 (T), LΔ n+1 (T) and B * Δ n+1 (T). These theories are obtained restricting the schemes of induction, minimization and (a version of) collection to Δ n+1 (T) formulas. We obtain conditions on T (T is an extension of B * Δ n+1 (T) or Δ n+1 (T) is closed (in T) under bounded quantification) under which IΔ n+1 (T) and LΔ n+1 (T) are equivalent. These conditions depend (...) on Th Πn +2 (T), the Π n+2 –consequences of T. The first condition is connected with descriptions of Th Πn +2 (T) as IΣ n plus a class of nondecreasing total Π n –functions, and the second one is related with the equivalence between Δ n+1 (T)–formulas and bounded formulas (of a language extending the language of Arithmetic). This last property is closely tied to a general version of a well known theorem of R. Parikh. Using what we call Π n –envelopes we give uniform descriptions of the previous classes of nondecreasing total Π n –functions. Π n –envelopes are a generalization of envelopes (see ) and are closely related to indicators (see ). Finally, we study the hierarchy of theories IΔ n+1 (IΣ m ), m≥n, and prove a hierarchy theorem. (shrink)
In this paper we continue the study of the theories IΔ n+1 (T), initiated in . We focus on the quantifier complexity of these fragments and theirs (non)finite axiomatization. A characterization is obtained for the class of theories such that IΔ n+1 (T) is Π n+2 –axiomatizable. In particular, IΔ n+1 (IΔ n+1 ) gives an axiomatization of Th Π n+2 (IΔ n+1 ) and is not finitely axiomatizable. This fact relates the fragment IΔ n+1 (IΔ n+1 ) to induction (...) rule for Δ n+1 –formulas. Our arguments, involving a construction due to R. Kaye (see ), provide proofs of Parsons’ conservativeness theorem (see ) and (a weak version) of a result of L.D. Beklemishev on unnested applications of induction rules for Π n+2 and Δ n+1 formulas (see ). (shrink)
D. Compaeetti, Leggi antiche delta città di Gortyna, Firenze, 1885 F. Bücheler and E. Zitelmann, Rheinisches Museum N. F. Bd. 40 J. and T. Baunack, Die Inschrift von Gortyn, Stuttgart, 1886H. Lewy, Stadtrecht von Gortyn, Berlin, 1885Museo Italiano di Antickità classiche, edited by D. Comparetti, Florence, 1885 sqq. Vols. i, ii.
It is well known that the extensional axiom of choice implies the law of excluded middle. We here prove that the converse holds as well if we have the intensional axiom of choice ACint, which is provable in Martin-Löf's type theory, and a weak extensionality principle, which is provable in Martin-Löf's extensional type theory. In particular, EM is equivalent to ACext in extensional type theory.
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What is the best way to approach our environmental problems? Or what kind of environmental ethics or philosophy is best suited to address and possibly solve some of the most serious environmental problems of our time? These questions have been discussed several times over the last decades and various alternative answers have been proposed for how to deal with contemporary environmental problems. One influential approach in the early 1970s was deep ecology, launched by Arne Naess in his article «The Shallow (...) and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: A Summary». Deep ecology or the deep ecological movement was for a long time a dominant theme in environmental philosophy and it has given rise to numerous articles, books and conferences. Deep ecology flourished in the 1970-80s, but its standing today is severely diminished. Why has deep ecology lost its standing as a leading environmental philosophy and movement? In this paper, I discuss some of the reasons why I think deep ecology has such a limited appeal today. I will argue that the flaw of deep ecology lies in its adherence to ontology rather than ethics. Supporters of deep ecology, such as Naess himself, have tended to attach great importance to our experience of reality as a source of environmental attitudes. But I believe that this focus on environmental ontology has been a recipe for disaster rather than a success for deep ecology and its supporters. I suggest that a proper environmental position should be based on critical thinking and moral principles rather than on ontological assumptions about human experiences of the world. (shrink)
T hese are indignant times. Reading news- papers, talking to friends or coworkers, we seem often to live in a state of perpetual moral outrage.The targets of our indignation depend on the particular group, religion, and political party we are associated with. If the Terry Schiavo case does not convince of you of this, take the issue of same-sex marriage. Conservatives are furious over the prospect of gays and lesbians marrying, and liberals are furious that conservatives are furious. But has (...) anyone on either side subjected their views to serious scrutiny? What’s the response, for example, when conservatives are asked exactly why gays and lesbians shouldn’t be allowed to marry? “It threatens the institution of marriage.” OK. How? “Marriage is between a man and a woman.” (Democ- rats give this answer as well.) Right, but why? “It’s unnatu- ral.” Isn’t that true of marriage in general? “Well… look… I.. (shrink)
6. Seeing With the Mind’s Eye 1: The Puzzle of Mental Imagery .................................................6-1 6.1 What is the puzzle about mental imagery?..............................................................................6-1 6.2 Content, form and substance of representations ......................................................................6-6 6.3 What is responsible for the pattern of results obtained in imagery studies?.................................6-8..