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Rivka Weinberg [15]Rivka M. Weinberg [2]
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Rivka Weinberg
Scripps College
  1. Whose Problem Is Non-Identity?Paul Hurley & Rivka Weinberg - 2014 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 12 (6):699-730.
    Teleological theories of reason and value, upon which all reasons are fundamentally reasons to realize states of affairs that are in some respect best, cannot account for the intuition that victims in non-identity cases have been wronged. Many philosophers, however, reject such theories in favor of alternatives that recognize fundamentally non-teleological reasons, second-personal reasons that reflect a moral significance each person has that is not grounded in the teleologist’s appeal to outcomes. Such deontological accounts appear to be better positioned to (...)
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  2.  47
    The Risk of a Lifetime: How, When, and Why Procreation May Be Permissible.Rivka Weinberg - 2015 - Oxford University Press USA.
    Having children is probably as old as the first successful organism. It is often done thoughtlessly. This book is an argument for giving procreating some serious thought, and a theory of how, when, and why procreation may be permissible.Rivka Weinberg begins with an analysis of the kind of act procreativity is and why we might be justifiably motivated to engage in it. She then proceeds to argue that, by virtue of our ownership and control of the hazardous material that is (...)
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  3. Identifying and Dissolving the Non-Identity Problem.Rivka Weinberg - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (1):3-18.
    Philosophers concerned with procreative ethics have long been puzzled by Parfit’s Non-Identity Problem (NIP). Various solutions have been proposed, but I argue that we have not solved the problem on its own narrow person-affecting terms, i.e., in terms of the identified individuals affected by procreative decisions and acts, especially future children. Thus, the core problem remains unsolved. This is a nagging concern for all who hold the common intuition that actions that harm no one are permissible. I argue against Harmon’s (...)
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  4. The Moral Complexity of Sperm Donation.Rivka Weinberg - 2008 - Bioethics 22 (3):166–178.
    Sperm donation is a widely accepted and increasingly common practice. In the standard case, a sperm donor sells sperm to an agency, waives his parental rights, and is absolved of parental responsibility. We tend to assume that this involves no problematic abandonment of parental responsibility. If we regard the donor as having parental responsibilities at all, we may think that his parental responsibilities are transferred to the sperm recipients. But, if a man creates a child accidentally, via contraception failure, we (...)
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  5. Is Having Children Always Wrong?Rivka Weinberg - 2012 - South African Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):26-37.
    Life stinks. Mel Brooks knew it, David Benatar knows it,1 and so do I. Even when life does not stink so badly, there’s always the chance that it will begin to do so. Nonexistence, on the other hand, is odor free. Whereas being brought into existence can be harmful, or at least bad, nonexistence cannot be harmful or bad. Even if life is not clearly bad, it is at the very least extremely risky. David Benatar argues, somewhat notoriously, that since (...)
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  6.  81
    The Endless Umbilical Cord: Parental Obligation to Grown Children.Rivka Weinberg - 2018 - Journal of Practical Ethics 6 (2):55-72.
    One might think that parental obligation to children ends with the end of childhood. I argue that if we consider why parents are obligated to their children, we will see that this view is false. Creating children exposes them to life’s risks. When we expose others to risks, we are often obligated to minimize damages and compensate for harms. Life’s risks last a lifetime, therefore parental obligation to one’s children does too. Grown children’s autonomy, and grown children’s independent responsibility for (...)
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  7. Existence: Who Needs It? The Non‐Identity Problem and Merely Possible People.Rivka Weinberg - 2013 - Bioethics 27 (9):471-484.
    In formulating procreative principles, it makes sense to begin by thinking about whose interests ought to matter to us. Obviously, we care about those who exist. Less obviously, but still uncontroversially, we care about those who will exist. Ought we to care about those who might possibly, but will not actually, exist? Recently, unusual positions have been taken regarding merely possible people and the non-identity problem. David Velleman argues that what might have happened to you – an existent person – (...)
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  8.  35
    Procreative Justice: A Contractualist Account.Rivka M. Weinberg - 2002 - Public Affairs Quarterly 16 (4):405-425.
  9.  21
    Choosing Down Syndrome: Ethics and New Prenatal Testing Technologies Chris Kaposy MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2018, 240 Pp, Hardcover, US$$27.95 Pp. ISBN: 9780262037716. [REVIEW]Rivka Weinberg - 2019 - Bioethics 33 (8):976-977.
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  10.  42
    Review of Tim Mulgan, Future People: A Moderate Consequentialist Account of Our Obligations to Future Generations[REVIEW]Rivka Weinberg - 2006 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (12).
    of Tim Mulgan , , from Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
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  11. It Ain't My World.Rivka Weinberg - 2009 - Utilitas 21 (2):144-162.
    It seems we have some obligation to aid some others, but it's unclear why, to whom, and to what extent. Many consequentialists claim that we are obligated to help everyone to the marginal utility point but they do so without examining why we are obligated to aid others at all. I argue that we must investigate the basis of our duty to aid others in order to determine the nature and extent of our obligation. Although some consequentialists, notably, Kagan, Singer (...)
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  12.  99
    It Depends.Rivka Weinberg - 2016 - The Philosophers' Magazine 75:100-105.
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  13. Procreative Justice: A Contractualist Approach.Rivka M. Weinberg - 2001 - Dissertation, University of Michigan
    My dissertation investigates the requirements of procreative justice. The procreative justice problem is that parents' interest in procreation conflicts with children's interest in optimal birth conditions. Intergenerational reciprocity is the principle that adjudicates this conflict: reciprocity dictates that children demand no more of their parents' procreative practices than they themselves are willing to abide by as adults and dig parents only procreate in accordance with principles dig they would have wanted their own parents to have followed. I develop a Rawlsian (...)
     
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  14.  37
    Permissible Progeny? The Morality of Procreation and Parenting, Edited by Sarah Hannan, Samantha Brennan, and Richard Vernon.Rivka Weinberg - 2018 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 15 (6):781-783.
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  15.  15
    Review of Mark Norris Lance, Matjaž Potrč, and Vojko Strahovnik (Eds.), Challenging Moral Particularism[REVIEW]Rivka Weinberg - 2009 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (4).
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  16.  62
    Why Life is Absurd: A Consideration of Time, Space, Relativity, Meaning, and Absurdity (Yep, All of It).Rivka Weinberg - 2015 - The New York Times.
    Human life is absurd because it is too short relative to reasonable human purposes. In contrast to our absurd relationship to time, our relationship to space is not absurd. Although our lives are way too short for reasonable human purposes, we are adapted to our size and the space we have to live in relative to the space of the universe and relative to reasonable human purposes. Because the human lifespan is so short as to render human life absurd, human (...)
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  17. “You Got Me Into This…”: Procreative Responsibility and Its Implications for Suicide and Euthanasia.Rivka Weinberg - 1st ed. 2015 - In Jukka Varelius & Michael Cholbi (eds.), New Directions in the Ethics of Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia. Springer Verlag.
    This paper investigates connections between procreative ethics and the ethics of suicide and euthanasia. While there are good reasons for distinguishing between lives worth starting and lives worth continuing, I argue that those reasons provide no reason for denying that there is a relationship between procreative and end of life ethics. Regarding euthanasia/assisted suicide, we might think it too demanding to ask parents to help euthanize their terminally ill, suffering child, but had the parents not procreated, thereby exposing their child (...)
     
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