Bermúdez argues for rational framing effects based on normatively appropriate quasi-cyclical preferences. We suggest that this argument conflates preferences over specific outcomes with preferences over outcome aspects. Instead of implying quasi-cyclical preferences, framing affects decisions through standard economic trade-offs. Nonetheless, we demonstrate that framing can affect behavior through altering perceptions of particular outcome aspects when framing effects are not decomposable.

How do people attribute responsibility in situations where the contributions of multiple agents combine to produce a joint outcome? The prevalence of over-determination in such cases makes this a difficult problem for counterfactual theories of causal responsibility. In this article, we explore a general framework for assigning responsibility in multiple agent contexts. We draw on the structural model account of actual causation (e.g., Halpern & Pearl, 2005) and its extension to responsibility judgments (Chockler & Halpern, 2004). We review the main (...) theoretical and empirical issues that arise from this literature and propose a novel model of intuitive judgments of responsibility. This model is a function of both pivotality (whether an agent made a difference to the outcome) and criticality (how important the agent is perceived to be for the outcome, before any actions are taken). The model explains empirical results from previous studies and is supported by a new experiment that manipulates both pivotality and criticality. We also discuss possible extensions of this model to deal with a broader range of causal situations. Overall, our approach emphasizes the close interrelations between causality, counterfactuals, and responsibility attributions. (shrink)

Significant advancements towards a future of big data genomic medicine, associated with large-scale public dataset repositories, intensify dilemmas of genomic privacy. To resolve dilemmas adequately, we need to understand the relative force of the competing considerations that make them up. Attitudes towards genomic privacy are complex and not well understood; understanding is further complicated by the vague claim of ‘genetic exceptionalism’. In this paper, we distinguish between consequentialist and non-consequentialist privacy interests: while the former are concerned with harms secondary to (...) exposure, the latter represent the interest in a private sphere for its own sake, as an essential component of human dignity. Empirical studies of attitudes towards genomic privacy have almost never targeted specifically this important dignitary component of the privacy interest. In this paper we first articulate the question of a non-consequentialist genomic privacy interest, and then present results of an empirical study that probed people’s attitudes towards that interest. This was done via comparison to other non-consequentialist privacy interests, which are more tangible and can be more easily assessed. Our results indicate that the non-consequentialist genomic privacy interest is rather weak. This insight can assist in adjudicating dilemmas involving genomic privacy. (shrink)

The moral comparison of the three venues of deception—lying, falsely implicating, and nonverbal deception—is a central, ongoing debate in the ethics of deception. To date there has been no attempt to advance in the debate through experimental philosophy. Using methods of experimental economics, we devised a strategic game to test positions in the debate. Our article presents the experimental results and shows how philosophical analysis of the results allows drawing valid normative conclusions. Our conclusions testify against the dominant position in (...) the debate—that lying is morally worse than all non-lying deceptions. They offer prima facie support to the view that the venue of deception makes no moral difference. (shrink)

The book you hold in your hands is the outcome of the "ISCS 2013: Interdisciplinary Symposium on Complex Systems" held at the historical capital of Bohemia as a continuation of our series of symposia in the science of complex systems. Prague, one of the most beautiful European cities, has its own beautiful genius loci. Here, a great number of important discoveries were made and many important scientists spent fruitful and creative years to leave unforgettable traces. The perhaps most significant period (...) was the time of Rudolf II who was a great supporter of the art and the science and attracted a great number of prominent minds to Prague. This trend would continue. Tycho Brahe, Niels Henrik Abel, Johannes Kepler, Bernard Bolzano, August Cauchy Christian Doppler, Ernst Mach, Albert Einstein and many others followed developing fundamental mathematical and physical theories or expanding them. Thus in the beginning of the 17th century, Kepler formulated here the first two of his three laws of planetary motion on the basis of Tycho Brahe’s observations. In the 19th century, nowhere differentiable continuous functions (of a fractal character) were constructed here by Bolzano along with a treatise on infinite sets, titled “Paradoxes of Infinity” (1851). Weierstrass would later publish a similar function in 1872. In 1842, Doppler as a professor of mathematics at the Technical University of Prague here first lectured about a physical effect to bear his name later. And the epoch-making physicist Albert Einstein – while being a chaired professor of theoretical physics at the German University of Prague – arrived at the decisive steps of his later finished theory of general relativity during the years 1911–1912. In Prague, also many famous philosophers and writers accomplished their works; for instance, playwright arel ape coined the word "robot" in Prague (“robot” comes from the Czech word “robota” which means “forced labor”). (shrink)

Excellent compilation of incidents of irrationality in India with special reference to Tamil Nadu.

This section aims to summarize and conclude Part I in the form of a taxonomy of legitimate and illegitimate corporate moral responsibility attributions. I believe we can categorise four types of corporate moral responsibility attributions two of which are legitimate and two which are illegitimate with regard to our concept of moral agency and our moral intuition of fairness.

This book is based on the outcome of the ""2012 Interdisciplinary Symposium on Complex Systems"" held at the island of Kos. The book consists of 12 selected papers of the symposium starting with a comprehensive overview and classification of complexity problems, continuing by chapters about complexity, its observation, modeling and its applications to solving various problems including real-life applications. More exactly, readers will have an encounter with the structural complexity of vortex flows, the use of chaotic dynamics within evolutionary algorithms, (...) complexity in synthetic biology. (shrink)

Common sense supposes that general terms, which are negative, non-referring or contradictory, may be quite understandable, i.e. meaningful. But attempts to give a theoretical explanation of this fact very oftenly came to the conclusion, that this must be false. This paper tries to show that Leibniz - thanks to his new understanding of ideas and notions - has been able to resolve a great part of meaning paradoxes, which are the consequences of that contradiction. The paper includes a comparison of (...) Leibniz's position with that of some other philosophers, especially that of Aristode and Locke. (shrink)

This chapter highlights the significance of Yi I 李珥 and his contribution to the development of Korean Neo-Confucianism. Yulgok was a “synthesizer” in his approach to the some fundamental issues and controversies that dominated the sixteenth century Joseon Neo-Confucianism. Some of most controversial issues that Yulgok dealt with were the relationship between “principle” or i/li 理 and “vital force” or gi/qi 氣, the famous “four-seven” debates, the problem of relating the “human mind” and the “dao-mind”, and the idea of understanding (...) the human in relation to the cosmos. Yulgok dealt each of these vital issues with his unique non-dualistic approach which synthesized the conceptual polarity that caused serious debates in the Korean Neo-Confucian circle. The concepts such as i/li and gi/qi, eum/yin and yang, the “human mind” and the “dao-mind,” for example, were understood by some leading Confucian scholars including Yi Hwang 李滉 structured dualistically. Yulgok thought that although these ideas appeared to be conceptually dualistic, they were, in fact, related to each other with an intrinsic ontological unity based on the same reality. However, Yulgok made a clear distinction between different manifestations of the same ontological substance. For example, Yulgok discussed about the mysterious relationship of i and gi: “The mystery of i and gi is difficult to see or to talk. The origin of i is one, the origin of gi is also one…. gi does not part from i, and i does not part from gi. This being the case, i and gi are one.” It is essential to understand Yulgok’s non-dualistic view of reality. For Yulgok, reality was profoundly relational. For him relation was not simply a connection or an external binding but it was fundamentally an intrinsic unity of beings or entities by stating that one cannot exist without the other. In this respect, Yulgok was a non-dualistic thinker who understood reality not in the framework of dichotomy but in the intrinsic unity of i and gi and the “four beginnigs” and the “seven feelings”, etc. Yulgok’s anthropology, ontology, and cosmology were based on his synthetic and comprehensive approach to the critical issues of Korean Neo-Confucianism. This chapter is a brief summary of Yulgok’s life and thoughts in relationship to each other to observe his intellectual development in light of his personal growth. (shrink)

Let I be an ideal of subsets of a Polish space X, containing all singletons and possessing a Borel basis. Assuming that I does not satisfy ccc, we consider the following conditions (B), (M) and (D). Condition (B) states that there is a disjoint family F $\subseteq$ P(X) of size c, consisting of Borel sets which are not in I. Condition (M) states that there is a Borel function f: X → X with $f^{-1}[\{x\}] \not\in$ I for each x ∈ (...) X. Provided that X is a group and I is invariant, condition (D) states that there exist a Borel set B $\not\in$ I and a perfect set P $\subseteq$ X for which the family $\{B + x: x \in P\}$ is disjoint. The aim of the paper is to study whether the reverse implications in the chain (D) $\Rightarrow$ (M) $\Rightarrow$ (B) $\Rightarrow$ not-ccc can hold. We build a σ-ideal on the Cantor group witnessing (M) & ¬ (D) (Section 2). A modified version of that σ-ideal contains the whole space (Section 3). Some consistency results on deriving (M) from (B) for "nicely" defined ideals are established (Sections 4 and 5). We show that both ccc and (M) can fail (Theorems 1.3 and 5.6). Finally, some sharp versions of (M) for invariant ideals on Polish groups are investigated (Section 6). (shrink)

Hana man ŭi sŏnt'aek, ch'ŏrhakchŏk chajŏn -- Samul ŭi ŏnŏ, silchonjŏk chajŏn -- Na ŭi kil, na ŭi sam -- Tŏburŏ sanŭn sam ŭi silch'ŏn, int'ŏbyu -- Pak I-mun, saengae wa hŭnjŏk.