Wenn Präsident Kennedy nicht erschossen worden wäre, hätte er dann Nordvietnam bombardiert? Das weiß Gott allein. Oder doch nicht? Weiß wenigstens Er, was Kennedy getan hätte? ... Die Jesuiten behaupteten unter anderem, daß viele menschliche Handlungen in dem Sinne frei seien, daß die Ausführenden nicht logisch oder kausal gezwungen seien, sie auszuführen. („Frei“ wird im vorliegenden Aufsatz stets in diesem Sinne verwendet werden.) Wie behält Gott dann die Kontrolle über die menschliche Geschichte? Nicht dadurch, daß Er menschliche Handlungen kausal determiniert, (...) wie die Dominikaner geglaubt zu haben scheinen , sondern indem Er Umstände herbeiführt, von denen Er weiß, daß wir in ihnen freiwillig Seinen Plänen entsprechend handeln werden. (shrink)

The paper explores the creative thinking process and throws light on creativity enhancement. From the perspective of possible creativity enhancement both the characteristics of creativity and the creative thinking process are discussed, together with an analysis of the process and its common factors. Constraints on innovation (as a special type of creativity), innovation management and the acceptance of change are discussed; creativity between cooperating individuals is also examined. Some possible computer-based tools to enhance creativity, including innovation, are discussed. A framework (...) of facilities to help promote and support the use of creativity enhancement techniques and tools (SOLI) is proposed. The paper is the result of a study undertaken by the author into creativity, innovation and cooperation. (shrink)

Beaucoup repetent depuis Hegel que Platon aurait ignore la liberte; tout au plus se serait-il interesse a son aspect politique, mais, dans ce cas, pour la combattre. Jusqu'a present, aucune reflexion de fond n'a ete engagee sur ce theme. Le present travail voudrait combler cette lacune, et c'est pourquoi il ne se limite pas aux debats lies a l'interpretation politique de la pensee de Platon, mais tente d'apprehender la notion de liberte au coeur meme de la doctrine platonicienne. Constatant que, (...) de fait, Platon s'exprime beaucoup sur la liberte, et souvent de maniere favorable, on s'est ainsi propose de determiner le sens et la coherence philosophiques de l'ensemble de ses prises de positions sur le sujet. (shrink)

On dit et répète que, dans la République, Platon a chassé les poètes de la cité. L’affirmation n’est pas fausse, à condition d’ajouter plusieurs réserves et précisions qui, si on les prend au sérieux, donnent une image très différente de l’attitude de Platon envers la poésie. La cité a besoin de poètes : une partie essentielle de l’éducation des gardiens (livres II-III) repose sur la musique-poésie, et c’est bien pourquoi Platon s’attarde longuement sur les règles à respecter en la matière. (...) Cette poésie soumise à la censure n’est pourtant pas la seule admise : vis-à-vis de la poésie existante (Homère, les Tragiques), le philosophe adopte une position nuancée : elle a beaucoup de charme, et si elle a beaucoup de défauts, il n’est pourtant pas impossible de l’accueillir dans la cité pour peu que les citoyens soient munis de l’antidote fourni par l’éducation. C’est à cette dernière qu’on doit apporter tous ses soins, à celle des gardiens mais aussi à celle des citoyens ordinaires. (shrink)

Summary In 1979, Robert C. Olby published an article titled ?Mendel no Mendelian??, in which he questioned commonly held views that Gregor Mendel (1822?1884) laid the foundations for modern genetics. According to Olby, and other historians of science who have since followed him, Mendel worked within the tradition of so-called hybridists, who were interested in the evolutionary role of hybrids rather than in laws of inheritance. We propose instead to view the hybridist tradition as an experimental programme characterized by (...) a dynamic development that inadvertently led to a focus on the inheritance of individual traits. Through a careful analysis of publications on hybridization by Carl Linnaeus (1707?1778), Joseph Gottlieb Koelreuter (1733?1806), Carl Friedrich Gärtner (1772?1850), and finally Mendel himself, we will show that this development consisted in repeated reclassifications of hybrids to accommodate anomalies, which in the end allowed Mendel to draw analogies between whole organisms, individual traits, and ?elements? contained in reproductive cells. Mendel's achievement was a product of normal science, and yet a revolutionary step forward. This also explains why, in 1900, when the report he gave on his experiments was ?rediscovered?, Mendel could be read as a ?Mendelian? (shrink)

Extensive case studies, questionnaires, and problem-solving exercises make this an essential guide for business people.

In this paper, we explore Fregean metatheory, what Frege called the New Science. The New Science arises in the context of Frege’s debate with Hilbert over independence proofs in geometry and we begin by considering their dispute. We propose that Frege’s critique rests on his view that language is a set of propositions, each immutably equipped with a truth value (as determined by the thought it expresses), so to Frege it was inconceivable that axioms could even be considered to be (...) other than true. Because of his adherence to this view, Frege was precluded from the sort of metatheoretical considerations that were available to Hilbert; but from this, we shall argue, it does not follow that Frege was blocked from metatheory in toto. Indeed, Frege suggests in Die Grundlagen der Geometrie a metatheoretical method for establishing independence proofs in the context of the New Science. Frege had reservations about the method, however, primarily because of the apparent need to stipulate the logical terms, those terms that must be held invariant to obtain such proofs. We argue that Frege’s skepticism on this score is not warranted, by showing that within the New Science a characterization of logical truth and logical constant can be obtained by a suitable adaptation of the permutation argument Frege employs in indicating how to prove independence. This establishes a foundation for Frege’s metatheoretical method of which he himself was unsure, and allows us to obtain a clearer understanding of Frege’s conception of logic, especially in relation to contemporary conceptions. (shrink)

Power and authority in terms of the Ten Commandments (TCs) are discussed. The paper reviews the TCs in Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. The treatment and basis for power and authority in each religion are clarified. Implications of power and authority using the perspective of the TCs are provided. The paper suggests that in today's business environment people tend to be selective in identifying only with certain elements of the TCs that fit their interest and that the TCs should be viewed (...) as general moral guidelines. (shrink)

Fifty years ago, two Princeton professors established game theory as an important new branch of applied mathematics. Game theory has become a celebrated discipline in its own right, and it npw plays a prestigues role in many disciplines, including ethics, due in particular to the neo-Hobbesian thinking of David Gauthier and others. Now it is perched at the edge of business ethics. I believe that it is dangerous and demeaning. It makes us look the wrong way at business, reinforcing a (...) destructive obsession with measurable outcomes and a false sense of competition. It falsely characterizes or insidiously advocates a style of human behavior that is utterly unacceptable. To put the matter quite crudely, a person who actually practiced the form of "rationality" advocated by game theory would be something of a monster. (shrink)

This article and the following ones by Slife and Westerman represent a coordinated effort on the authors' part to begin to mine the resources of what has been termed the "practice turn in contemporary theory" for psychology. The liberal approach tends to focus on a fear of power and how it can corrupt our best ideals, while the postmodernist tends to focus on a fascination with power flowing through the social and institutional expressions of these very ideals. Given modern Western (...) culture's deep antiauthoritarian tenor, these two responses can be seen as reflecting what might be termed an underlying "control or be controlled" dilemma. We suggest the practice turn and hermeneutics offer an avenue for effectively getting past this basic dilemma. They make it clear that in everyday life, we are both profoundly shaped and influenced by the world and other people and influence them, in turn, by the way we interpret them and adjust to them as we engage in the fields of practices in which we find ourselves. Personal and social influences at play in the everyday business of human living create a continuum rather than a dichotomy regarding issues of control and power, leading to a dissolution of our taxing "control or be controlled" dilemma. Such an ontology clearly entails rethinking some prominent cultural ideals, leading us perhaps to think as much or more in terms of character than achievement, of cooperation than competition, of patience than striving restlessly to get somewhere. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Many patients believe that cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) is more likely to be successful than it really is in clinical practice. Even when working with accurate information, some nevertheless remain resolute in demanding maximal treatment. They maintain that even if survival after cardiac arrest with CPR is extremely low, the fact remains that it is still greater than the probability of survival after cardiac arrestwithoutCPR (ie, zero). Without realising it, this line of reasoning is strikingly similar to Pascal’s Wager, a Renaissance-era (...) argument for accepting the proposition for God’s existence. But while the original argument is quite logical—if not universally compelling—the modern variant makes several erroneous assumptions. The authors here present a case of a patient who unwittingly appeals to Pascal’s Wager to explain his request for maximal treatment, in order to highlight the crucial divergences from the original Wager. In understanding the faulty assumptions inherent in the application of Pascal’s Wager to code status decisions—and identifying the underlying motivations which the Wager serves to confirm—providers can better ensure that the true values and preferences of patients are upheld. (shrink)

This chapter examines some issues concerning the structure of time. It considers arguments for and against Temporal Finitism. Temporal Discretism is a kind of Finitism: any finitely extended interval is made up of only finitely many indivisible units of time. In the chapter, the authors assume for the sake of argument that Intervalism is true, that is, that some temporally extended intervals and processes are among the world's fundamental entities. The main argument for Intervalism is that it follows from the (...) metaphysical impossibility of certain infinitary scenarios involving super‐tasks. Strong Intervalism denies that instants are fundamental, while Moderate Intervalism, or Interval‐Boundary Dualism, embraces the fundamentality of both instants and intervals. Infinitary Intervalism is relative to the three competing theories of Aristotelian Temporal Finitism, Temporal Discretism, and Instantism. In the chapter, the authors also assume that all Intervalists are either Discretists or Aristotelian Finitists, and that all Instantists are Temporal Infinitists. (shrink)

Proponents of the dominant paradigm in evolutionary psychology argue that a viable evolutionary cognitive psychology requires that specific cognitive capacities be heritable and “quasi-independent” from other heritable traits, and that these requirements are best satisfied by innate cognitive modules. We argue here that neither of these are required in order to describe and explain how evolution shaped the mind.

This is a book that brings together material from an unusually wide range of perspectives on an important topic. The scholarship is first-rate--one profits from reading the footnotes as well as the text.

Causal connectionists need to provide an account of causal linkage and of causal direction. This chapter distinguishes between two kinds of causal connection, namely, discrete and continuous. Causal connectionists have a number of options for explaining the linkage between causes and effects in the case of discrete causation. The chapter provides some popular options. If some causation is discrete, and the exercise of causal powers provides a direction to discrete causation, then the causal direction of processes can be derived from (...) the causal direction of discrete interaction. David Hume famously made the claim about the knowledge of causation in his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Hume offers, in defense of his principle, a set of thought‐experiments that seem to show that we can always imagine any event's having a different result from the one we in fact observe. Causal processes like locomotion may provide counterexamples to Hume's Epistemic Principle. (shrink)

This chapter examines whether space and extended bodies are ultimately composed of points (and point‐masses) or spatial regions (and voluminous bodies). It focuses on three positions: Pointillism, according to which only points and point‐sized bodies are fundamental; Voluminism, according to which the only fundamental things are regions and voluminous bodies; and Volume‐Boundary Dualism, according to which both points and regions really exist and are equally fundamental. The first prima facie problem for Voluminism concerns continuous variation. The chapter looks at the (...) idea of constructing points from regions and concerns whether points or regions are fundamental. It lays out three arguments against Pointillism, the thesis that points are the only fundamental entities, namely, the arguments from Finitism, from mathematical paradoxes, and from the nature of contact. Aristotelian Finitists can explain why some sets of points have measurable volume and why some do not. (shrink)

I have been arguing, for almost thirty years now, that emotions have been unduly neglected in philosophy. Back in the seventies, it was an argument that attracted little sympathy. I have also been arguing that emotions are a ripe for philosophical analysis, a view that, as evidenced by the Manchester 2001 conference and a large number of excellent publications, has now become mainstream. My own analysis of emotion, first published in 1973, challenged the sharp divide between emotions and rationality, insisted (...) that we reject the established notion that the emotions are involuntary, and argued, in a brief slogan, that ‘emotions are judgments.’ Since then, although the specific term ‘judgment’ has come under considerable fire and my voluntarist thesis continues to attract incredulousness the general approach I took to emotions has been widely accepted in both philosophy and the social sciences. When Paul Griffiths took on what he misleadingly characterized as ‘propositional attitude’ theories of emotion as the enemy of all that was true and scientifically worthy, I knew that we had made it. Such ferocious abuse is surely a sign that we had shifted, in Kuhnian terms, from being revolutionary to becoming the ‘normal’ paradigm. The current counter-revolution of affect programmes and neuro-reductionism says a lot about who we are and how far we have come. (Progress in philosophy is moved more by this drama of one outrageous thesis after another—once called ‘dialectic’—than by cautious, careful argument.). (shrink)

THE BIG QUESTIONS: A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY tackles the tough issues and helps you form your own opinions while presenting the best philosophical ...

Horror is not the same as fear, and while fear contains an essential action tendency horror does not. And while we can enjoy fear there is no enjoying of horror.

The current debate on “free agency” seems to highlight the romantic aspects of free agent and considers it a genuine response to changing economic conditions (e.g., high-unemployment rate, importance of knowledge in the labor market, the eclipse of organizational loyalty, and self pride). Little attention, if any, has been given to the religious root of the free agency concept and its persistent existence across history. In this paper, the current discourse on free agency and the conditions that have led to (...) its emergence are briefly discussed. The paper focuses on the theological perspectives of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam on the concept. Implications for management and business organizations are provided. (shrink)

Introduction -- What is ethics? -- Ethics and religion -- The history of ethics -- Ethical questions -- What is the good life? -- Why be good : the problem of justification -- Why be rational : the place of reason in ethics -- Which is right : ethical dilemmas -- Ethical concepts -- Universality -- Prudence and morals -- Happiness and the good -- Egoism and altruism -- Virtue and the virtues -- Facts and values -- Justice and equality (...) -- Rights and duties -- Ethical theories and approaches -- Teleology -- Utilitarianism -- Kant and deontology -- Social contract theory -- Ethical relativism -- Pluralism and history -- Feminist ethics -- Prologue : ethics and religion -- The Hebrew Bible -- The Ten commandments -- The New Testament -- The Qur'an -- Ancient Asia -- India : Hinduism and Buddhism -- Buddhism -- China : Confucianism and Taoism -- China : Taoism -- Plato -- Aristotle -- Epicurus -- Augustine -- Thomas Hobbes -- David Hume -- Immanuel Kant -- Mary Wollstonecraft -- John Stuart Mill -- Friedrich Nietzsche -- John Rawls. (shrink)

This chapter introduces many of the themes that are developed in more detail in later contributions: the notion that deception and self-deception are essential to self-maintenance; the suspicion that philosophers place too high a price on the truth, and naively fail to recognize the importance of false beliefs and even lies for human flourishing; the complex nature of both deception and self-deception, and their importance to communication; the observation that lies and self-deceptions are crucial to social interaction; the difficulties of (...) defining lie and deception; and the suggestion that it may be the motives behind a deception and not the deception itself that people find morally blameworthy. Nevertheless, it stresses that the truth is to be prized, and deceptions are to be viewed as a kind of necessary evil. (shrink)

Nietzsche, the Godfather of Fascism? What can Nietzsche have in common with this murderous ideology? Frequently described as the "radical aristocrat" of the spirit, Nietzsche abhorred mass culture and strove to cultivate an Übermensch endowed with exceptional mental qualities. What can such a thinker have in common with the fascistic manipulation of the masses for chauvinistic goals that crushed the autonomy of the individual? The question that lies at the heart of this collection is how Nietzsche came to acquire the (...) deadly "honor" of being considered the philosopher of the Third Reich and whether such claims had any justification. Does it make any sense to hold him in some way responsible for the horrors of Auschwitz? The editors present a range of views that attempt to do justice to the ambiguity and richness of Nietzsche's thought. First-rate contributions by a variety of distinguished philosophers and historians explore in depth Nietzsche's attitudes toward Jews, Judaism, Christianity, anti-Semitism, and National Socialism. They interrogate Nietzsche's writings for fascist and anti-Semitic proclivities and consider how they were read by fascists who claimed Nietzsche as their intellectual godfather. There is much that is disturbingly antiegalitarian and antidemocratic in Nietzsche, and his writings on Jews are open to differing interpretations. Yet his emphasis on individualism and contempt for German nationalism and anti-Semitism put him at stark odds with Nazi ideology. The Nietzsche that emerges here is a tragic prophet of the spiritual vacuum that produced the twentieth century's totalitarian movements, the thinker who best diagnosed the pathologies of fin-de-siècle European culture. Nietzsche dared to look into the abyss of modern nihilism. This book tells us what he found. The contributors are Menahem Brinker, Daniel W. Conway, Stanley Corngold, Kurt Rudolf Fischer, Jacob Golomb, Robert C. Holub, Berel Lang, Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, Alexander Nehamas, David Ohana, Roderick Stackelberg, Mario Sznajder, Geoffrey Waite, Robert S. Wistrich, and Yirmiyahu Yovel. (shrink)

Give style to your character, a great and rare art.Nietzsche Gay Science What are we to make of Nietzsche? There has been an explosion of scholarship over the past twenty years, much of it revealing and insightful, a good deal of it controversial if not polemical. The controversy and polemics are for the most part straight from Nietzsche, of course, and the scholarly disputes over what he ‘really’ meant are rather innocuous and often academic compared with what Nietzsche meant with (...) his conscientiously inflammatory rhetoric and hyperbole. We have been treated to extended debates about Nietzsche's politics, his attacks on Christianity and morality, his famed notion of the übermensch and his less lampooned doctrine of the ‘eternal recurrence’. We have recently heard Nietzsche reinterpreted as an analytic philosopher, as a deconstructionist, as a feminist, even as a closet Christian and a liberal. Stephen Aschheim suggests in his recent book that Nietzsche provides us with something like a Rorschach test, inviting readers with amazingly different commitments and ideologies to ‘make their own Nietzsche’. But there is another approach to Nietzsche, something quite different from interpreting him in terms of his various ‘theses’ and positions, unpacking his ‘system’ or repeating unhelpfully that he displayed no such coherence and consistency, something more than finding out ‘who’ Nietzsche is as opposed to what we have made out of him. The simplest way of getting at this alternative approach might be to ask, what Nietzsche would make of us? I grant that this is a bit cryptic, and it invites a variety of unflattering answers. But I think it is very much in the spirit of what he are all about. It is an intimately personal approach to Nietzsche, an approach that will, no doubt, be somewhat different for each and every one of us. But that, too, of course, is just what Nietzsche would have demanded. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Fighting for Life: Nietzsche ad hominem Falling in Love: Schopenhauer, Music, and the Greeks Nietzsche, Science, Truth, and Truthfulness The Campaign Against Morality Taking on the World: Masters, Slaves, and Resentment The Will to Power, Life Affirmation, and Eternal Recurrence Naturalizing Spirituality: The Faith of an “Antichrist”.

The turn of the nineteenth century marked a rich and exciting explosion of philosophical energy and talent. The enormity of the revolution set off in philosophy by Immanuel Kant was comparable, in Kant's own estimation, with the Copernican Revolution that ended the Middle Ages. The movement he set in motion, the fast-moving and often cantankerous dialectic of "German Idealism," inspired some of the most creative philosophers in modern times: including G. W. F. Hegel and Arthur Schopenhauer as well as those (...) who reacted against Kant--Marx and Kierkegaard, for example. This volume traces the emergence of German Idealism from Kant and his predecessors through the first half of the nineteenth century, ending with the irrationalism of Kierkegaard. It provides a broad, scholarly introduction to this period for students of philosophy and related disciplines, as well as some original interpretations of these authors. Also included is a glossary of technical terms as well as a chronological table of philosophical, scientific and other important cultural events. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Facing Death Individuals and Shared Destinies Rats! A Note on Plague The Plague as Horror Facing Death Together: Being‐with‐Others.

Originally published by Harcourt Brace Jovanovich in 1979, this volume offers a cross-disciplinary portrait of a fascinating period in modern European history and culture, 1750ó1850. It presents a philosophically contentious thesis about the nature of history and "human nature".

Introducing Philosophy : A Text with Integrated Readings is a topically organized hybrid textbook, introducing core philosophical problems and the many ways they are, and have been, answered. The authors combine substantial selections from significant works in the history of philosophy with excerpts from current philosophy, clarifying the readings and providing context with their own detailed commentary and explanation. Spanning 2,500 years, the selections range from the oldest known fragments to cutting-edge contemporary essays. The chapters present alternative perspectives-including analytic, continental, (...) feminist, and non-Western viewpoints-alongside the historical works of major Western philosophers; this juxtaposition encourages students to carefully evaluate the theories themselves. (shrink)

Introducing Philosophy: A Text with Integrated Readings, Tenth Edition is a thorough introduction to the core problems of philosophy, including explanations and background by the authors along with generous excerpts from the philosophers under discussion. Organized topically, the chapters present alternative perspectives-including analytic, continental, feminist, and non-Western viewpoints-alongside the historical works of major philosophers. The text provides the course materials that allow instructors and students to focus on a variety of philosophical problems and perspectives. Spanning 2,500 years, the selections range (...) from the oldest known fragments to cutting-edge contemporary essays. (shrink)

Philosophy is very much alive today but is also deeply rooted in the past. ntroducing Philosophy combines substantial original sources from significant works in the history of philosophy with detailed commentary and explanation. The selections range from the oldest known fragments to cutting-edge essays in feminism, multiculturalism, and cognitive science.