The aim of the paper is to draw a connection between a semantical theory of conditional statements and the theory of conditional probability. First, the probability calculus is interpreted as a semantics for truth functional logic. Absolute probabilities are treated as degrees of rational belief. Conditional probabilities are explicitly defined in terms of absolute probabilities in the familiar way. Second, the probability calculus is extended in order to provide an interpretation for counterfactual probabilities--conditional probabilities where the condition has zero probability. (...) Third, conditional propositions are introduced as propositions whose absolute probability is equal to the conditional probability of the consequent on the antecedent. An axiom system for this conditional connective is recovered from the probabilistic definition. Finally, the primary semantics for this axiom system, presented elsewhere, is related to the probabilistic interpretation. (shrink)

This paper concerns the applications of two-dimensional modal semantics to the explanation of the contents of speech and thought. Different interpretations and applications of the apparatus are contrasted. First, it is argued that David Kaplan's two-dimensional semantics for indexical expressions is different from the use that I made of a formally similar framework to represent the role of contingent information in the determination of what is said. But the two applications are complementary rather than conflicting. Second, my interpretation of the (...) apparatus is contrasted with that of David Chalmers, Frank Jackson, and David Lewis. It is argued that this difference reflects a contrast between internalist and externalist approaches to the problem of intentionality. (shrink)

The first amounts, roughly, to "It is necessarily the case that any President of the U.S. is a citizen of the U.S." But the second says, "the person who in fact is the President of the U.S, has the property of necessarily being a citizen of the U.S," Thus, while (2) is clearly true, it would be reasonable to consider (3) false.

This paper explores the conception of self proposed by Thomas Nagel. It is argued that more must be said to clarify the place of a subjective point of view in the objective world than is said by semantic diagnosis. The paper discusses the semantic diagnosis and Nagel’s reasons for finding it unsatisfactory. A metaphysical solution to the problem is presented and the place of subjective point of view in an objective world is explained. It is then analyses whether the austere (...) view of contextual or subjective information can account for information about the qualitative character of experience. (shrink)

In the same way that it is possible - by a loosely specified class of more or less well accepted statements - to know the referent of an ordinary proper name, we can understand a name like "the Renaissance." But names of events and periods have an indeterminacy not shared by names of men; with holistic names, the criteria of identity for the kind of thing are fluid, while the analogous criteria for being a man are not. Despite this indeterminacy, (...) the conceptualization of events and periods is useful in historical inquiry, where general statements about events, periods, and institutions can be reconciled with statements about particular facts, and with the evidence. Holistic terms cannot reasonably be prohibited on philosophical grounds; their legitimate use is a problem historians must judge case by case. (shrink)

This introductory chapter presents an overview of the papers included in this book. The author begins with a discussion on what metaphysics is. He observes recurring themes in his papers that echo the philosophies of W.V. Quine and David Lewis, and cites a mix of agreements and disagreements between Lewis and himself on both substantive and methological issues.