95 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Robert Cummins [52]Robert C. Cummins [39]Robert A. Cummins [3]Robert Charles Cummins [1]
See also
Robert Cummins
University of California, Davis
  1.  15
    The Modularity of Mind.Robert Cummins & Jerry Fodor - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):101.
  2. Meaning and Mental Representation.Robert C. Cummins - 1989 - MIT Press.
  3. Functional Analysis.Robert Cummins - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (November):741-64.
  4. The Nature of Psychological Explanation.Robert C. Cummins - 1983 - MIT Press.
  5.  12
    Meaning and Mental Representation.Robert Cummins - 1989 - Philosophical Quarterly 40 (161):527-530.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   159 citations  
  6.  97
    Representations, Targets, and Attitudes.Robert C. Cummins - 1996 - MIT Press.
  7. "How Does It Work" Versus "What Are the Laws?": Two Conceptions of Psychological Explanation.Robert C. Cummins - 2000 - In F. Keil & Robert A. Wilson (eds.), Explanation and Cognition, 117-145. MIT Press.
    In the beginning, there was the DN (Deductive Nomological) model of explanation, articulated by Hempel and Oppenheim (1948). According to DN, scientific explanation is subsumption under natural law. Individual events are explained by deducing them from laws together with initial conditions (or boundary conditions), and laws are explained by deriving them from other more fundamental laws, as, for example, the simple pendulum law is derived from Newton's laws of motion.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   62 citations  
  8. Functions: New Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology and Biology.Andre Ariew, Robert Cummins & Mark Perlman (eds.) - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
  9. The Nature of Psychological Explanation.Robert Cummins - 1983 - Critica 17 (49):77-78.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   100 citations  
  10. Reflection on Reflective Equilibrium.Robert C. Cummins - 1998 - In Michael DePaul & William Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 113-128.
    As a procedure, reflective equilibrium is simply a familiar kind of standard scientific method with a new name. A theory is constructed to account for a set of observations. Recalcitrant data may be rejected as noise or explained away as the effects of interference of some sort. Recalcitrant data that cannot be plausibly dismissed force emendations in theory. What counts as a plausible dismissal depends, among other things, on the going theory, as well as on background theory and on knowledge (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   50 citations  
  11.  5
    Representations, Targets, and Attitudes.Robert Cummins - 1996 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (1):175-180.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   59 citations  
  12. The Lot of the Casual Theory of Mental Content.Robert Cummins - 1997 - Journal of Philosophy 94 (10):535.
    The thesis of this paper is that the causal theory of mental content (hereafter CT) is incompatible with an elementary fact of perceptual psychology, namely, that the detection of distal properties generally requires the mediation of a “theory.” I shall call this fact the nontransducibility of distal properties (hereafter NTDP). The argument proceeds in two stages. The burden of stage one is that, taken together, CT and the language of thought hypothesis (hereafter LOT) are incompatible with NTDP. The burden of (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  13.  33
    On Clear and Confused Ideas: An Essay About Substance Concepts. [REVIEW]Robert Cummins, Alexa Lee, Martin Roth, David Byrd & Pierre Poirier - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (2):102-108.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   36 citations  
  14. Programs in the Explanation of Behavior.Robert Cummins - 1977 - Philosophy of Science 44 (June):269-87.
    The purpose of this paper is to set forth a sense in which programs can and do explain behavior, and to distinguish from this a number of senses in which they do not. Once we are tolerably clear concerning the sort of explanatory strategy being employed, two rather interesting facts emerge; (1) though it is true that programs are "internally represented," this fact has no explanatory interest beyond the mere fact that the program is executed; (2) programs which are couched (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   82 citations  
  15. Inexplicit Information.Robert C. Cummins - 1986 - In Myles Brand & Robert M. Harnish (eds.), The Representation of Knowledge and Belief. University of Arizona Press.
    A discussion of a number of ways that information can be present in a computer program without being explicitly represented.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   43 citations  
  16.  22
    The Nature of Psychological Explanation.Robert Cummins - 1983 - Noûs 19 (3):473-474.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   53 citations  
  17. Neo-Teleology.Robert Cummins - 2002 - In Andre Ariew, Robert Cummins & Mark Perlman (eds.), Functions: New Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology and Biology. Oxford University Press.
    Neo-teleology is the two part thesis that, e.g., (i) we have hearts because of what hearts are for: Hearts are for blood circulation, not the production of a pulse, so hearts are there--animals have them--because their function is to circulate the blood, and (ii) that (i) is explained by natural selection: traits spread through populations because of their functions. This paper attacks this popular doctrine. The presence of a biological trait or structure is not explained by appeal to its function. (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  18.  19
    Meaning and Mental Representation.Ruth Garrett Millikan & Robert Cummins - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):422.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   36 citations  
  19.  29
    Representations, Targets, and Attitudes.Frances Egan & Robert Cummins - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (1):118.
    “Naturalistic” semantic theories attempt to specify, in nonintentional and nonsemantic terms, a sufficient condition for a mental representation’s having a particular meaning. Such theories have trouble accounting for the possibility of representational error. In his latest book, Robert Cummins traces the problem to the fact that the theories currently on offer identify the meaning of a representation with certain features of its use. Only a theory that takes meaning to be an intrinsic feature of a representation, Cummins argues, can both (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  20. Systematicity and the Cognition of Structured Domains.Robert Cummins, James Blackmon, David Byrd, Pierre Poirier, Martin Roth & Georg Schwarz - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (4):167 - 185.
    The current debate over systematicity concerns the formal conditions a scheme of mental representation must satisfy in order to explain the systematicity of thought.1 The systematicity of thought is assumed to be a pervasive property of minds, and can be characterized (roughly) as follows: anyone who can think T can think systematic variants of T, where the systematic variants of T are found by permuting T’s constituents. So, for example, it is an alleged fact that anyone who can think the (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  21.  7
    The Nature of Psychological Explanation.Robert Cummins - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 53 (4):616-618.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  22. Systematicity.Robert Cummins - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (12):591-614.
  23. Representation and Unexploited Content.James Blackmon, David Byrd, Robert C. Cummins, Alexa Lee & Martin Roth - 2006 - In Graham Macdonald & David Papineau (eds.), Teleosemantics. Oxford University Press.
    In this paper, we introduce a novel difficulty for teleosemantics, viz., its inability to account for what we call unexploited content—content a representation has, but which the system that harbors it is currently unable to exploit. In section two, we give a characterization of teleosemantics. Since our critique does not depend on any special details that distinguish the variations in the literature, the characterization is broad, brief and abstract. In section three, we explain what we mean by unexploited content, and (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  24. Meaning and Content in Cognitive Science.Robert C. Cummins & Martin Roth - 2012 - In Richard Schantz (ed.), Prospects for Meaning. de Gruyter.
    What are the prospects for a cognitive science of meaning? As stated, we think this question is ill posed, for it invites the conflation of several importantly different semantic concepts. In this paper, we want to distinguish the sort of meaning that is an explanandum for cognitive science—something we are going to call meaning—from the sort of meaning that is an explanans in cognitive science—something we are not going to call meaning at all, but rather content. What we are going (...)
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  25. Reply to Millikan.Robert Cummins - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):113-127.
  26.  18
    The Philosophical Problem of Truth-Of.Robert Cummins - 1975 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):103 - 122.
  27.  42
    Connectionism, Computation, and Cognition.Robert C. Cummins & Georg Schwarz - 1991 - In Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (eds.), Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 60--73.
  28.  17
    Philosophy and AI: Essays at the Interface.Robert C. Cummins & John L. Pollock (eds.) - 1992 - MIT Press.
    Philosophy and AI presents invited contributions that focus on the different perspectives and techniques that philosophy and AI bring to the theory of ...
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  29. Biological Preparedness and Evolutionary Explanation.Denise D. Cummins & Robert C. Cummins - 1999 - Cognition 73 (3):B37-B53.
    It is commonly supposed that evolutionary explanations of cognitive phenomena involve the assumption that the capacities to be explained are both innate and modular. This is understandable: independent selection of a trait requires that it be both heritable and largely decoupled from other `nearby' traits. Cognitive capacities realized as innate modules would certainly satisfy these contraints. A viable evolutionary cognitive psychology, however, requires neither extreme nativism nor modularity, though it is consistent with both. In this paper, we seek to show (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  30.  81
    Why It Doesn’T Matter to Metaphysics What Mary Learns.Robert Cummins, Martin Roth & Ian Harmon - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):541-555.
    The Knowledge Argument of Frank Jackson has not persuaded physicalists, but their replies have not dispelled the intuition that someone raised in a black and white environment gains genuinely new knowledge when she sees colors for the first time. In what follows, we propose an explanation of this particular kind of knowledge gain that displays it as genuinely new, but orthogonal to both physicalism and phenomenology. We argue that Mary’s case is an instance of a common phenomenon in which something (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  31. Truth and Meaning.Robert C. Cummins - 2002 - In Joseph Keim-Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & David Shier (eds.), Meaning and Truth: Investigations in Philosophical Semantics. Seven Bridges Press. pp. 175-197.
    D O N A L D D AV I D S O N’S “ Meaning and Truth,” re vo l u t i o n i zed our conception of how truth and meaning are related (Davidson    ). In that famous art i c l e , Davidson put forw a rd the bold conjecture that meanings are satisfaction conditions, and that a Tarskian theory of truth for a language is a theory of meaning for that language. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  32. Epistemological Strata and the Rules of Right Reason.Robert C. Cummins, Pierre Poirier & Martin Roth - 2004 - Synthese 141 (3):287 - 331.
    It has been commonplace in epistemology since its inception to idealize away from computational resource constraints, i.e., from the constraints of time and memory. One thought is that a kind of ideal rationality can be specified that ignores the constraints imposed by limited time and memory, and that actual cognitive performance can be seen as an interaction between the norms of ideal rationality and the practicalities of time and memory limitations. But a cornerstone of naturalistic epistemology is that normative assessment (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  33. Connectionism and the Rationale Constraint on Cognitive Explanations.Robert Cummins - 1995 - Philosophical Perspectives 9:105-25.
  34. New York Branch of the American Psychological Association.Robert A. Cummins, G. C. Myers, E. L. Cornell, A. I. Gates & A. T. Poffenberger - 1918 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 15 (5):130-134.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35.  18
    Biological Preparedness and Evolutionary Explanation.Denise Dellarosa Cummins & Robert Cummins - 1999 - Cognition 73 (3):B37-B53.
  36. Innate Modules Vs Innate Learning Biases.Denise D. Cummins & Robert C. Cummins - 2005 - Cognitive Processing.
    Proponents of the dominant paradigm in evolutionary psychology argue that a viable evolutionary cognitive psychology requires that specific cognitive capacities be heritable and “quasi-independent” from other heritable traits, and that these requirements are best satisfied by innate cognitive modules. We argue here that neither of these are required in order to describe and explain how evolution shaped the mind.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37.  80
    Representation and Indication.Robert C. Cummins & Pierre Poirier - 2004 - In Hugh Clapin (ed.), Representation in Mind. Elsevier. pp. 21--40.
    This paper is about two kinds of mental content and how they are related. We are going to call them representation and indication. We will begin with a rough characterization of each. The differences, and why they matter, will, hopefully, become clearer as the paper proceeds.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  38. The Role of Mental Meaning in Psychological Explanation.Robert C. Cummins - 1991 - In Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and His Critics. Blackwell.
  39.  51
    Two Tales of Functional Explanation.Martin Roth & Robert Cummins - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (6):773-788.
    This paper considers two ways functions figure into scientific explanations: (i) via laws?events are causally explained by subsuming those events under functional laws; and (ii) via designs?capacities are explained by specifying the functional design of a system. We argue that a proper understanding of how functions figure into design explanations of capacities makes it clear why such functions are ill-suited to figure into functional-cum-causal law explanations of events, as those explanations are typically understood. We further argue that a proper understanding (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  40.  90
    The Role of Representation in Connectionist Explanation of Cognitive Capacities.Robert C. Cummins - 1991 - In William Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & D. Rumelhart (eds.), Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Lawrence Erlbaum. pp. 91--114.
  41. Conceptual Role Semantics and the Explanatory Role of Content.Robert Cummins - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 65 (1-2):103-127.
    I've tried to argue that there is more to representational content than CRS can acknowledge. CRS is attractive, I think, because of its rejection of atomism, and because it is a plausible theory of targets. But those are philosopher's concerns. Someone interested in building a person needs to understand representation, because, as AI researchers have urged for some time, good representation is the secret of good performance. I have just gestured in the direction I think a viable theory of representation (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  42.  18
    Traits Have Not Evolved to Function the Way They Do Because of a Past Advantage.Cummins Robert & Roth Martin - 2009 - In Francisco José Ayala & Robert Arp (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Biology. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 72--88.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  43. Artificial Intelligence and Scientific Method.Donald Gillies, Robert Cummins & John Pollock - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (4):610-612.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  44.  41
    What Systematicity Isn’T.Robert Cummins, Jim Blackmon, David Byrd, Alexa Lee & Martin Roth - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Research 30:405-408.
    In “On Begging the Systematicity Question,” Wayne Davis criticizes the suggestion of Cummins et al. that the alleged systematicity of thought is not as obvious as is sometimes supposed, and hence not reliable evidence for the language of thought hypothesis. We offer a brief reply.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  45.  31
    On an Argument for Truth-Functionality.Robert C. Cummins & Dale Gottlieb - 1972 - American Philosophical Quarterly 9 (3):265 - 269.
    Quine argued that any context allowing substitution of logical equivalents and coextensive terms is truth functional. We argue that Quine's proof for this claim is flawed.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  46.  45
    What Can Be Learned From Brainstorms?Robert Cummins - 1981 - Philosophical Topics 12 (1):83-92.
  47. Explanation and Subsumption.Robert C. Cummins - 1978 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1978:163 - 175.
    The thesis that subsumption is sufficient for explanation is dying out, but the thesis that it is necessary is alive and well. It is difficult to attack this thesis: non-subsumptive counter-examples are declared incomplete, or mere promissory notes. No theory, it is thought, can be explanatory unless it resorts to subsumption at some point. In this paper I attack this thesis by describing a theory that (1) would explain every event it could describe, (2) does not explain by subsumption, and (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48.  28
    A Theory of Content and Other Essays. Jerry Fodor.Robert C. Cummins - 1993 - Philosophy of Science 60 (1):172-174.
  49.  5
    Berkeley.Robert Cummins & George Pitcher - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (2):299.
  50.  23
    The World in the Head.Robert Cummins - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
    Robert Cummins presents a series of essays motivated by the following question: Is the mind a collection of beliefs and desires that respond to and condition our feeling and perceptual experiences, or is this just a natural way to talk about it? What sort of conceptual framework do we need to understand what is really going on in our brains?
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 95