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  1. (1 other version)To B- or not to B- a relation.Robert E. Pezet - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (3):635-654.
    In his seminal work, McTaggart :457–484, 1908; The nature of existence, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1927) dismissed the possibility of understanding the B-Relations as irreducibly temporal relations, and with it dismissing the B-Theory of time, which assumes the reality of irreducible B-relations. Instead, he thought they were mere constructions from irreducible A-determinations and timeless ordering relations. However, since, philosophers have almost universally dismissed his dismissal of irreducible B-relations. This paper argues that McTaggart was correct to dismiss the possibility of B-relations, (...)
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  2. (1 other version)An Explanatory Virtue for Endurantist Presentism.Robert E. Pezet - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (1):157-182.
    This essay outlines an explanatory virtue of presentism: its unique ability amongst temporal metaphysics to deliver a partial explanation of the conservational character of natural laws. That explanation relies on presentism, uniquely amongst temporal metaphysics, being able to support an endurantist account of persistence. In particular, after reconsidering a former argument for endurantism entailing presentism by Merricks, a new argument for this entailment, is expounded. Before delivering the explanation of the conservational character of natural laws, a brief account of that (...)
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    (1 other version)Duration Enough for Presentism.Robert E. Pezet - 2020 - Axiomathes 30 (4):391-421.
    This paper considers a problem for dynamic presentism that has received little attention: its apparent inability to accommodate the duration of events. After outlining the problem, I defend presentism from it. This defence proceeds in two stages. First, I argue the objection rests on a faulty assumption: that duration is temporal extension. The paper challenges that assumption on several different ways of conceiving of temporal extension. This is the negative case and forms the bulk of the paper. Second, after diagnosing (...)
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  4. (1 other version)The Problem of Temporal Unity: an Examination of the Problem and Case Study on Ersatzer Presentism.Robert E. Pezet - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (3):791-821.
    This paper elaborates the problem of temporal unity for dynamic presentism and diagnoses the source of that problem in the dynamic presentist’s discarding the traditional C-series in its avoidance of McTaggart’s A-series paradox. This C-series provided the fixed structure of time which the transitory aspects of time then followed, and thereby unify those transitory aspects. It then considers ersatzer presentism as an ostensible solution to the problem of temporal unity by providing a new abstract C-series for dynamic presentism. However, after (...)
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  5. (1 other version)An impossible proof of God.Robert E. Pezet - 2018 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 83 (1):57-83.
    A new version of the ontological argument for the existence of God is outlined and examined. After giving a brief account of some traditional ontological arguments for the existence of God, where their defects are identified, it is explained how this new argument is built upon their foundations and surmounts their defects. In particular, this version uses the resources of impossible worlds to plug the common escape route from standard modal versions of the ontological argument. After outlining the nature of (...)
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  6. Finding satisfaction in presentism.Robert E. Pezet - 2020 - Synthese 197 (10):4519-4531.
    This paper argues for a pragmatic motivation for believing Presentism—the thesis that everything is present. After outlining a pragmatic source of justification for beliefs, in terms of their action-guiding aims, a pragmatic motivation for believing presentism is detailed and proffered. More specifically, the paper outlines two kinds of bases for our desires: a negative and a positive basis. The former concerns some dissatisfaction with a certain aspect of our present state, whilst the latter focuses instead on our potential future gratification (...)
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