29 found
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  1.  68
    Mesosomes: A Study in the Nature of Experimental Reasoning.Robert G. Hudson - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (2):289-309.
    Culp (1994) provides a defense for a form of experimental reasoning entitled 'robustness'. Her strategy is to examine a recent episode in experimental microbiology--the case of the mistaken discovery of a bacterial organelle called a 'mesosome'--with an eye to showing how experimenters effectively used robust experimental reasoning (or could have used robust reasoning) to refute the existence of the mesosome. My plan is to criticize Culp's assessment of the mesosome episode and to cast doubt on the epistemic significance of robustness. (...)
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  2.  45
    Who Rules in Science? An Opinionated Guide to the Wars. [REVIEW]Robert G. Hudson - 2003 - Dialogue 42 (3):616-617.
    James Robert Brown’s Who Rules in Science? is an engaging, candid discussion of various postmodern and sociological challenges that have recently been launched at the orthodoxy of science. Interspersed throughout the book are various, largely introductory discussions of issues pertaining to the history of philosophy of science, issues such as realism, unification, instrumentalism, novel predictions, objectivity, and so forth. At the end of the book Brown takes up topics relevant to the politics of science. Altogether it is a pleasant book (...)
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  3.  65
    What’s Really at Issue with Novel Predictions?Robert G. Hudson - 2007 - Synthese 155 (1):1 - 20.
    In this paper I distinguish two kinds of predictivism, ‘timeless’ and ‘historicized’. The former is the conventional understanding of predictivism. However, I argue that its defense in the works of John Worrall (Scerri and Worrall 2001, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 32, 407–452; Worrall 2002, In the Scope of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, 1, 191–209) and Patrick Maher (Maher 1988, PSA 1988, 1, pp. 273) is wanting. Alternatively, I promote an historicized predictivism, and briefly defend such (...)
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  4.  10
    What’s Really at Issue with Novel Predictions?Robert G. Hudson - 2007 - Synthese 155 (1):1-20.
    In this paper I distinguish two kinds of predictivism, 'timeless' and 'historicized'. The former is the conventional understanding of predictivism. However, I argue that its defense in the works of John Worrall and Patrick Maher is wanting. Alternatively, I promote an historicized predictivism, and briefly defend such a predictivism at the end of the paper.
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  5. The Relevance of History to Philosophy of Science.Robert G. Hudson - 2006 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 21 (2):197-212.
    My task in this paper is to defend the legitimacy of historicist philosophy of science, defined as the philosophic study of science that takes seriously case studies drawn from the practice of science. Historicistphilosophy of science suffers from what I call the ’evidence problem’. The worry is that case studies cannot qualify as rigorous evidence for the adjudication of philosophic theories. I explore the reasons why one might deny to historical cases a probative value, then reply to these reasons on (...)
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  6.  32
    Discoveries, When and by Whom?Robert G. Hudson - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (1):75-93.
    The Structure of Scientific Revolutions) and Alan Musgrave argue that it is impossible to precisely date discovery events and precisely identify discoverers. They defend this claim mainly on the grounds that so-called discoverers have in many cases misconceived the objects of discovery. In this paper, I argue that Kuhn and Musgrave arrive at their view because they lack a substantive account of how well discoverers must be able to conceptualize discovered objects. I remedy this deficiency by providing just such an (...)
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  7.  19
    Annual Modulation Experiments, Galactic Models and WIMPs.Robert G. Hudson - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38 (1):97-119.
  8. Perceiving Empirical Objects Directly.Robert G. Hudson - 2000 - Erkenntnis 52 (3):357-371.
    The goal of this paper is to defend the claim that there is such a thing as direct perception, where by ‘direct perception’ I mean perception unmediated by theorizing or concepts. The basis for my defense is a general philosophic perspective which I call ‘empiricist philosophy’. In brief, empiricist philosophy (as I have defined it) is untenable without the occurrence of direct perception. It is untenable without direct perception because, otherwise, one can't escape the hermeneutic circle, as this phrase is (...)
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  9. Classical Physics and Early Quantum Theory: A Legitimate Case of Theoretical Underdetermination.Robert G. Hudson - 1997 - Synthese 110 (2):217-256.
    In 1912, Henri Poincaré published an argument which apparently shows that the hypothesis of quanta is both necessary and sufficient for the truth of Planck''s experimentally corroborated law describing the spectral distribution of radiant energy in a black body. In a recent paper, John Norton has reaffirmed the authority of Poincarés argument, setting it up as a paradigm case in which empirical data can be used to definitively rule out theoretical competitors to a given theoretical hypothesis. My goal is to (...)
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  10.  25
    Background Independence and the Causation of Observations.Robert G. Hudson - 1994 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 25 (4):595-612.
  11.  1
    Annual Modulation Experiments, Galactic Models and WIMPs.Robert G. Hudson - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38 (1):97-119.
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  12.  16
    Searching for WIMPs.Robert G. Hudson - 2005 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):245-262.
    The WIMP (weakly interacting dark matter) is currently the leading candidate for what is thought to be dark matter, the cosmological material claimed to make up almost 99% of the matter of the universe and which is indiscernible by means of electromagnetic radiation. There are many research groups dedicated to experimentally isolating WIMPs, and in this paper we describe the work of three of these groups, the Saclay group, DAMA and UKDM. This exploration into the recent history of astroparticle physics (...)
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  13.  8
    Annual Modulation Experiments, Galactic Models and WIMPs.Robert G. Hudson - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38 (1):97-119.
  14.  25
    The Generality Problem.Robert G. Hudson - 2004 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (2):193-211.
  15.  63
    Novelty and the 1919 Eclipse Experiments.Robert G. Hudson - 2003 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 34 (1):107-129.
  16.  71
    Faint-Hearted Anti-Realism and Knowability.Robert G. Hudson - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (3):511-523.
    It is often claimed that anti-realists are compelled to reject the inference of the knowability paradox, that there are no unknown truths. I call those anti-realists who feel so compelled ‘faint-hearted’, and argue in turn that anti-realists should affirm this inference, if it is to be consistent. A major part of my strategy in defending anti-realism is to formulate an anti-realist definition of truth according to which a statement is true only if it is verified by someone, at some time. (...)
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  17. Leslie Stevenson and Henry Byerly, The Many Faces of Science: An Introduction to Scientists, Values, and Society Reviewed By.Robert G. Hudson - 1995 - Philosophy in Review 15 (4):292-294.
     
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  18.  20
    Reliability, Pragmatic and Epistemic.Robert G. Hudson - 1994 - Erkenntnis 40 (1):71 - 86.
    Experimental data are often acclaimed on the grounds that they can be consistently generated. They are, it is said, reproducible. In this paper I describe how this feature of experimental-data (their pragmatic reliability) leads to their epistemic worth (their epistemic reliability). An important part of my description is the supposition that experimental procedures are to certain extent fixed and stable. Various illustrations from the actual practice of science are introduced, the most important coming at the end of the paper with (...)
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  19.  7
    Empirical Constraints in the Aufbau.Robert G. Hudson - 1994 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 11 (2):237-251.
  20.  20
    Carnap's Empiricism, Lost and Found.Robert G. Hudson - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 43:81-88.
    Recent scholarship (by mainly Michael Friedman, but also by Thomas Uebel) on the philosophy of Rudolf Carnap covering the period from the publication of Carnap’s’ 1928 book Der Logische Aufbau der Welt through to the mid to late 1930’s has tended to view Carnap as espousing a form of conventionalism (epitomized by his adoption of the principle of tolerance) and not a form of empirical foundationalism. On this view, it follows that Carnap’s 1934 The Logical Syntax of Language is the (...)
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  21.  12
    Arnold I. Davidson. The Emergence of Sexuality: Historical Epistemology and the Formation of Concepts. Xvi+254 Pp., Illus., Bibl., Index. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002. $39.95. [REVIEW]Robert G. Hudson - 2003 - Isis 94 (4):691-692.
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  22.  30
    Pritchard’s Angst.Robert G. Hudson - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (3):85-92.
    In this paper, I raise some questions about Pritchard ’s internalist argument for scepticism. I argue that his internalism begs the question in support of scepticism. Correlatively I advance what I take to be a better internalist argument for scepticism, one that leaves open the possibility of empirically adjudicating sceptical hypotheses. I close by discussing what it means to be an internalist.
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  23.  11
    First Page Preview.Jonathan Bain, Timothy Bays, Katherine A. Brading, Stephen G. Brush, Murray Clarke, Sharyn Clough, Jonathan Cohen, Giancarlo Ghirardi, Brendan S. Gillon & Robert G. Hudson - 2004 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 18 (2-3).
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  24.  17
    The Book of Evidence Peter Achinstein Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Science New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, 290 Pp., $79.95. [REVIEW]Robert G. Hudson - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (1):184-.
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  25.  6
    Novelty and the 1919 Eclipse Experiments.Robert G. Hudson - 2003 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 34 (1):107-129.
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  26.  1
    The Empirical Basis to Skepticism.Robert G. Hudson - 2007 - Minerva - An Internet Journal of Philosophy 11 (1).
    Broadly speaking, there are two different ways in which one might defend skepticism – an a priori way and an empirical way. My first task in this paper is to defend the view that the preferred way to defend skepticism is empirical. My second task is to explain why this approach actually makes sense. I accomplish this latter task by responding to various criticisms one might advance against the possibility of empirically defending skepticism. In service of this response, I distinguish (...)
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  27. Lorraine Daston, Ed., Biographies of Scientific Objects Reviewed By.Robert G. Hudson - 2001 - Philosophy in Review 21 (4):249-251.
     
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  28. The Book of Evidence. [REVIEW]Robert G. Hudson - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (1):184-185.
    Anyone interested in how analytic methods can clearly and efficiently dispatch controversial issues arising in the philosophy of science is encouraged to read Peter Achinstein’s The Book of Evidence.
     
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  29. Why is Observation Important to Science?Robert G. Hudson - 1991 - Dissertation, The University of Western Ontario (Canada)
    I believe observation is valued by scientists because it is an objective source of information. Objective here can mean two things. First, observation could be objective in that it is an assured source of truths about the world, truths whose meaning is the same for everyone regardless of their personal theoretical vantage points. I criticize this construal of observational objectivity in chapter one. The guilty doctrine, which I entitle 'empiricistic epistemological foundationalism', is shown to be untenable on, in part, historical (...)
     
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