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Robert S. Hartman [64]Robert J. Hartman [16]Robert Hartman [3]
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  1. Kant Does Not Deny Resultant Moral Luck.Robert J. Hartman - 2019 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43 (1):136-150.
    It is almost unanimously accepted that Kant denies resultant moral luck—that is, he denies that the lucky consequence of a person’s action can affect how much praise or blame she deserves. Philosophers often point to the famous good will passage at the beginning of the Groundwork to justify this claim. I argue, however, that this passage does not support Kant’s denial of resultant moral luck. Subsequently, I argue that Kant allows agents to be morally responsible for certain kinds of lucky (...)
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  2. Moral Luck and the Unfairness of Morality.Robert Hartman - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3179-3197.
    Moral luck occurs when factors beyond an agent’s control positively affect how much praise or blame she deserves. Kinds of moral luck are differentiated by the source of lack of control such as the results of her actions, the circumstances in which she finds herself, and the way in which she is constituted. Many philosophers accept the existence of some of these kinds of moral luck but not others, because, in their view, the existence of only some of them would (...)
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  3. In Defense of Moral Luck: Why Luck Often Affects Praiseworthiness and Blameworthiness.Robert J. Hartman - 2017 - Routledge.
    There is a contradiction in our ideas about moral responsibility. In one strand of our thinking, we believe that a person can become more blameworthy by luck. Consider some examples in order to make that idea concrete. Two reckless drivers manage their vehicles in the same way, and one but not the other kills a pedestrian. Two corrupt judges would each freely take a bribe if one were offered. By luck of the courthouse draw, only one judge is offered a (...)
     
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  4. Constitutive Moral Luck and Strawson's Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility.Robert J. Hartman - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (2):165-183.
    Galen Strawson’s Basic Argument is that because self-creation is required to be truly morally responsible and self-creation is impossible, it is impossible to be truly morally responsible for anything. I contend that the Basic Argument is unpersuasive and unsound. First, I argue that the moral luck debate shows that the self-creation requirement appears to be contradicted and supported by various parts of our commonsense ideas about moral responsibility, and that this ambivalence undermines the only reason that Strawson gives for the (...)
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  5. Against Luck-Free Moral Responsibility.Robert Hartman - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2845-2865.
    Every account of moral responsibility has conditions that distinguish between the consequences, actions, or traits that warrant praise or blame and those that do not. One intuitive condition is that praiseworthiness and blameworthiness cannot be affected by luck, that is, by factors beyond the agent’s control. Several philosophers build their accounts of moral responsibility on this luck-free condition, and we may call their views Luck-Free Moral Responsibility (LFMR). I offer moral and metaphysical arguments against LFMR. First, I maintain that considerations (...)
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  6. Consequentialism and Virtue.Robert J. Hartman & Joshua W. Bronson - forthcoming - In Christoph Halbig & Felix Timmermann (eds.), The Handbook of Virtue and Virtue Ethics.
    We examine the following consequentialist view of virtue: a trait is a virtue if and only if it has good consequences in some relevant way. We highlight some motivations for this basic account, and offer twelve choice points for filling it out. Next, we explicate Julia Driver’s consequentialist view of virtue in reference to these choice points, and we canvass its merits and demerits. Subsequently, we consider three suggestions that aim to increase the plausibility of her position, and critically analyze (...)
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  7. Aspiration: The Agency of Becoming. [REVIEW]Robert J. Hartman - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (275):427-429.
    Aspiration: The Agency of Becoming. By Callard Agnes.
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  8. Against the Character Solution to the Problem of Moral Luck.Robert J. Hartman - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (1):105-118.
    One way to frame the problem of moral luck is as a contradiction in our ordinary ideas about moral responsibility. In the case of two identical reckless drivers where one kills a pedestrian and the other does not, we tend to intuit that they are and are not equally blameworthy. The Character Response sorts these intuitions in part by providing an account of moral responsibility: the drivers must be equally blameworthy, because they have identical character traits and people are originally (...)
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  9. Utilitarian Moral Virtue, Admiration, and Luck.Robert J. Hartman - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (1):77-95.
    Every tenable ethical theory must have an account of moral virtue and vice. Julia Driver has performed a great service for utilitarians by developing a utilitarian account of moral virtue that complements a broader act-based utilitarian ethical theory. In her view, a moral virtue is a psychological disposition that systematically produces good states of affairs in a particular possible world. My goal is to construct a more plausible version of Driver’s account that nevertheless maintains its basic integrity. I aim to (...)
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  10. Alfred Mele, Manipulated Agents: A Window Into Moral Responsibility. [REVIEW]Robert J. Hartman - forthcoming - Journal of Moral Philosophy.
    Review of Manipulated Agents: A Window into Moral Responsibility. By Alfred R. Mele.
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  11. Indirectly Free Actions, Libertarianism, and Resultant Moral Luck.Robert J. Hartman - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-20.
    Martin Luther affirms his theological position by saying “Here I stand. I can do no other.” Supposing that Luther’s claim is true, he lacks alternative possibilities at the moment of choice. Even so, many libertarians have the intuition that he is morally responsible for his action. One way to make sense of this intuition is to assert that Luther’s action is indirectly free, because his action inherits its freedom and moral responsibility from earlier actions when he had alternative possibilities and (...)
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  12. Accepting Moral Luck.Robert J. Hartman - 2019 - In Ian M. Church & Robert J. Hartman (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck. New York: Routledge.
    I argue that certain kinds of luck can partially determine an agent’s praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. To make this view clearer, consider some examples. Two identical agents drive recklessly around a curb, and one but not the other kills a pedestrian. Two identical corrupt judges would freely take a bribe if one were offered. Only one judge is offered a bribe, and so only one judge takes a bribe. Put in terms of these examples, I argue that the killer driver and (...)
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  13. Counterfactuals of Freedom and the Luck Objection to Libertarianism.Robert J. Hartman - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Research 42 (1):301-312.
    Peter van Inwagen famously offers a version of the luck objection to libertarianism called the ‘Rollback Argument.’ It involves a thought experiment in which God repeatedly rolls time backward to provide an agent with many opportunities to act in the same circumstance. Because the agent has the kind of freedom that affords her alternative possibilities at the moment of choice, she performs different actions in some of these opportunities. The upshot is that whichever action she performs in the actual-sequence is (...)
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  14. How to Apply Molinism to the Theological Problem of Moral Luck.Robert J. Hartman - 2014 - Faith and Philosophy 31 (1):68-90.
    The problem of moral luck is that a general fact about luck and an intuitive moral principle jointly imply the following skeptical conclusion: human beings are morally responsible for at most a tiny fraction of each action. This skeptical conclusion threatens to undermine the claim that human beings deserve their respective eternal reward and punishment. But even if this restriction on moral responsibility is compatible with the doctrine of the final judgment, the quality of one’s afterlife within heaven or hell (...)
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  15. Rik Peels, Responsible Belief: A Theory in Ethics and Epistemology. [REVIEW]Robert J. Hartman - 2018 - Ethics 128 (3):646-651.
  16. The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck.Ian M. Church & Robert J. Hartman (eds.) - 2019 - Routledge.
    Luck permeates our lives, and this raises a number of pressing questions: What is luck? When we attribute luck to people, circumstances, or events, what are we attributing? Do we have any obligations to mitigate the harms done to people who are less fortunate? And to what extent is deserving praise or blame a ected by good or bad luck? Although acquiring a true belief by an uneducated guess involves a kind of luck that precludes knowledge, does all luck undermine (...)
     
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  17. Armstrong on Probabilistic Laws of Nature.Jonathan D. Jacobs & Robert J. Hartman - 2017 - Philosophical Papers 46 (3):373-387.
    D. M. Armstrong famously claims that deterministic laws of nature are contingent relations between universals and that his account can also be straightforwardly extended to irreducibly probabilistic laws of nature. For the most part, philosophers have neglected to scrutinize Armstrong’s account of probabilistic laws. This is surprising precisely because his own claims about probabilistic laws make it unclear just what he takes them to be. We offer three interpretations of what Armstrong-style probabilistic laws are, and argue that all three interpretations (...)
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  18. Involuntary Belief and the Command to Have Faith.Robert J. Hartman - 2011 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 69 (3):181-192.
    Richard Swinburne argues that belief is a necessary but not sufficient condition for faith, and he also argues that, while faith is voluntary, belief is involuntary. This essay is concerned with the tension arising from the involuntary aspect of faith, the Christian doctrine that human beings have an obligation to exercise faith, and the moral claim that people are only responsible for actions where they have the ability to do otherwise. Put more concisely, the problem concerns the coherence of the (...)
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  19. Axiología y semántica: un ensayo sobre la medición del valor.Robert S. Hartman - 1960 - Dianoia 6 (6):44.
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  20.  9
    Logic.Kirk D. Wilson, Immanuel Kant, Robert S. Hartman & Wolfgang Schwarz - 1976 - Philosophical Review 85 (1):97.
  21. El conocimiento del valor: teoría de los valores a mediados del siglo XX.Robert S. Hartman - 1958 - Dianoia 4 (4):105.
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  22.  20
    Singular and Particular.Robert S. Hartman - 1968 - Critica 2 (4):15-51.
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  23. Risieri Frondizi on the Nature of Value.Robert S. Hartman - 1961 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 22 (2):223-232.
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  24. Reason in History a General Introduction to the Philosophy of History.Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel & Robert S. Hartman - 1953 - Liberal Arts Press.
     
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  25.  23
    The Knowledge of Good: Critique of Axiological Reason.Robert S. Hartman, Arthur R. Ellis & Rem B. Edwards (eds.) - 2002 - Rodopi.
    This book presents Robert S. Hartman’s formal theory of value and critically examines many other twentieth century value theorists in its light, including A.J. Ayer, Kurt Baier, Brand Blanshard, Paul Edwards, Albert Einstein, William K. Frankena, R.M. Hare, Nicolai Hartmann, Martin Heidegger, G.E. Moore, P.H. Nowell-Smith, Jose Ortega y Gasset, Charles Stevenson, Paul W. Taylor, Stephen E. Toulmin, and J.O. Urmson.
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  26. Valor y razón.Robert S. Hartman - 1961 - Dianoia 7 (7):79.
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  27. Formal Axiology and the Measurement of Values.Robert S. Hartman - 1967 - Journal of Value Inquiry 1 (1):38-46.
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  28.  99
    Problems and Perplexities.Hiranmoy Banerjee, Fred A. Westphal, M. E. Williams, Stephen D. Crites, Don Locke, Robert S. Hartman, Warren E. Steinkraus & Donald W. Sherburne - 1962 - Review of Metaphysics 16 (1):133 - 162.
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  29.  29
    XIII—The Definition of Good: Moore's Axiomatic of the Science of Ethics.Robert S. Hartman - 1965 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 65 (1):235-256.
  30.  77
    Axiology as a Science.Robert S. Hartman - 1962 - Philosophy of Science 29 (4):412-433.
  31.  35
    The Value Structure of Creativity.Robert S. Hartman - 1971 - Journal of Value Inquiry 6 (4):243-279.
  32.  72
    The Axiometric Structure of Intrinsic Value.Robert S. Hartman - 1974 - Journal of Value Inquiry 8 (2):81-101.
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  33.  21
    Ethik in der Schauweise der Wissenschaften Vom Menschen Und von der Gesellschaft.Robert S. Hartman - 1949 - Journal of Philosophy 46 (7):215-220.
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  34. Comentario sobre "Our Public Life" de Paul Weiss.Robert S. Hartman - 1963 - Dianoia 9 (9):312.
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  35. El origen de la axiometría en La república de Platón.Robert S. Hartman - 1971 - Dianoia 17 (17):103.
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  36. La axiomática del valor.Robert S. Hartman - 1966 - Dianoia 12 (12):104.
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  37. La creación de una ética científica.Robert S. Hartman - 1955 - Dianoia 1 (1):205.
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  38. La diferencia lógica entre la filosofía y la ciencia.Robert S. Hartman - 1959 - Dianoia 5 (5):72.
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  39. La ontogenia del símbolo. Prolegómenos a una filosofía de las formas sintomáticas.Robert S. Hartman - 1965 - Dianoia 11 (11):60.
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  40. La situación como campo ético.Robert S. Hartman - 1972 - Dianoia 18 (18):103.
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  41. Razón y razones del valor: la axiología de la Escuela de Oxford.Robert S. Hartman - 1964 - Dianoia 10 (10):63.
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  42. Sentimiento y valor.Robert S. Hartman - 1967 - Dianoia 13 (13):248.
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  43.  55
    A Logical Definition of Value.Robert S. Hartman - 1951 - Journal of Philosophy 48 (13):413-420.
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  44.  31
    The Logical Difference Between Philosophy and Science.Robert S. Hartman - 1963 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 23 (3):353-379.
    The purpose is to determine logically the difference between philosophy and science. It is concluded that the fundamental logical difference is: in the analytic concepts of philosophy intension and extension vary inversely whereas in the synthetic concepts of science they vary directly. The scientific concept is the ideal limit of the more and more intensive specification of philosophical concepts. (staff).
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  45.  28
    Is a Science of Ethics Possible.Robert S. Hartman - 1950 - Philosophy of Science 17 (3):238-246.
  46.  35
    Sparshott's "Enquiry Into Goodness".Robert S. Hartman - 1968 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 29 (1):97-104.
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  47.  26
    Kant’s Science of Metaphysics and the Scientific Method.Robert S. Hartman - 1972 - Kant-Studien 63 (1-4):18-35.
  48.  16
    The Logic of Value.Robert S. Hartman - 1961 - Review of Metaphysics 14 (3):389 - 432.
    Formal axiology, as does every scientific system, stems from the unfolding of its axiom or axioms. The axiom of formal axiology is the following: Value is the degree in which a thing fulfills the attributes contained in the intension of its concept. "Fulfillment" means the possession by a thing of a set of properties corresponding to the set of attributes in the intension of its concept. A thing is good if it possesses all the properties in question. The development of (...)
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  49.  34
    The Moral Situation: A Field Theory of Ethics.Robert S. Hartman - 1948 - Journal of Philosophy 45 (11):292-300.
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  50. The Structure of Value: Foundations of Scientific Axiology.Robert S. Hartman - 1968 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (2):179-180.
     
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