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  1. Sufficiency: Restated and Defended.Robert Huseby - 2010 - Journal of Political Philosophy 18 (2):178-197.
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  2.  59
    Should the Beneficiaries Pay?Robert Huseby - 2015 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 14 (2):1470594-13506366.
    Many theorists claim that if an agent benefits from an action that harms others, that agent has a moral duty to compensate those who are harmed, even if the agent did not cause the harm herself. In the debate on climate justice, this idea is commonly referred to as the beneficiary-pays principle . This paper argues that the BPP is implausible, both in the context of climate change and as a normative principle more generally. It should therefore be rejected.
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    Should the Beneficiaries Pay?Robert Huseby - 2015 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 14 (2):209-225.
    Many theorists claim that if an agent benefits from an action that harms others, that agent has a moral duty to compensate those who are harmed, even if the agent did not cause the harm herself. In the debate on climate justice, this idea is commonly referred to as the beneficiary-pays principle. This paper argues that the BPP is implausible, both in the context of climate change and as a normative principle more generally. It should therefore be rejected.
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  4.  20
    Luck Egalitarianism and the Distributive Trilemma.Robert Huseby - 2019 - Social Theory and Practice 45 (1):1-19.
    It is generally acknowledged that most accounts of distributive justice face a trilemma pertaining to agents who are badly off, or risk becoming so, due to their own imprudent behavior: If we a) leave such agents to their own devices, some might perish, which is harsh. If we b) force such agents to buy insurance, for their own good, we act paternalistically. If we c) secure sufficiency for such agents by taxing everyone, we exploit the prudent. This paper discusses how (...)
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  5.  13
    Luck Egalitarianism and the Distributive Trilemma in Advance.Robert Huseby - forthcoming - Social Theory and Practice.
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  6. Duties and Responsibilities Towards the Poor.Robert Huseby - 2008 - Res Publica 14 (1):1-18.
    Thomas Pogge has argued that we have strong negative duties to assist the global poor because we harm them through our contribution to the global economic order. I argue that Pogge’s concept of harm is indeterminate. The resources of any group will typically be affected by at least two economic schemes. Pogge suggests that the responsibility for any affected group’s shortfall from a minimum standard ought to be shared between the contributing schemes. I argue that shared responsibility can be interpreted (...)
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  7.  13
    Can Luck Egalitarianism Justify the Fact That Some Are Worse Off Than Others?Robert Huseby - 2016 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 33 (3):259-269.
    According to luck egalitarianism it is bad or unjust if someone is worse off than another through no fault or choice of her own. This article argues that there is a tension in standard luck egalitarian theory between justifying absolute and comparative welfare levels. If a person responsibly acts in a way that brings her welfare level below that of others, this is justified according to the theory. However, even if we can say that the person's new welfare level is (...)
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  8.  41
    Person-Affecting Moral Theory, Non-Identity and Future People.Robert Huseby - 2010 - Environmental Values 19 (2):193 - 210.
    Many of our actions will affect the welfare of future people. For instance, continued emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) may lead to future environmental degradation, which will negatively affect people's lives. If we continue GHG-emissions, are we harming future people? In light of the non-identity problem, apparently, we are not. This article assesses three recent attempts (by Carter, Page and Kumar) at grounding concern for future generations in person-affecting moral theory. Although these attempts are promising, the conclusion is that none (...)
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  9.  76
    Spinning the Wheel or Tossing a Coin?Robert Huseby - 2011 - Utilitas 23 (2):127-139.
    In the literature on the so-called numbers problem, some authors have recently argued that the individualist lottery (IL) avoids the flaws of the proportional lottery. This article first presents two recent defenses of the IL, and then argues that both are implausible if we focus, as we should, strictly on their non-consequentialist aspects. This conclusion holds even if we take account of the fact that the IL is arguably that solution to the numbers problem which best meets the marginal difference (...)
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  10.  46
    Sufficiency and Population Ethics.Robert Huseby - 2012 - Ethical Perspectives 19 (2):187-206.
    Climate change highlights the relevance of population ethics. Should we attempt to maximize the combined welfare of future people? Many versions of Utilitarianism hold that we should. However, most Utilitarian theories have quite unpleasant implications when applied to all future generations.In this article, I consider the prospects for a Telic Sufficientarian theory of welfare . According to this theory, shortfalls from a sufficient level of welfare are morally bad, and this is all that matters as far as welfare is concerned (...)
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  11.  78
    John Rawls and Climate Justice: An Amendment to The Law of Peoples.Robert Huseby - 2013 - Environmental Ethics 35 (2):227-243.
    To what extent does John Rawls’ theory of international justice meet the normative challenges posed by climate change? There are two broadly compatible Rawlsian ways of addressing climate change. The first alternative is based on the two principles that Rawls applies to the domains of international and intergenerational justice. The second alternative starts from Rawls’ general theory of international justice, in particular his idea of a Society of Peoples, which is an idealized vision of a peaceful and stable association of (...)
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  12.  16
    The Beneficiary Pays Principle and Luck Egalitarianism.Robert Huseby - 2016 - Journal of Social Philosophy 47 (3):332-349.
  13.  13
    Global Luck Egalitarianism and Border Control.Kim Angell & Robert Huseby - 2019 - Ratio Juris 32 (2):177-192.
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  14.  6
    Secession and Political Capacity.Kim Angell & Robert Huseby - forthcoming - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy:1-21.
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  15.  11
    The All Affected Principle, and the Weighting of Votes.Kim Angell & Robert Huseby - 2020 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 19 (4):366-381.
    In this article we defend the view that, on the All Affected Principle of voting rights, the weight of a person’s vote on a decision should be determined by and only by the degree to which that dec...
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  16.  10
    How Should Citizens’ Collective Liability for State Action Be Grounded?Robert Huseby - 2017 - Journal of Global Ethics 13 (3):366-379.
    ABSTRACTThis paper assesses one type of justification for collective liability – the democratic authorization account – according to which citizens can be held liable for what their state does, because they collectively authorize the state’s actions. I argue that the democratic authorization view, properly understood, has an implausibly narrow scope, which risks leaving many victims of injustice without compensation. Hence, I propose a subsidiary account that is wider in scope, and which applies to most cases of state-inflicted harm. This view (...)
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  17.  9
    In or Out?Robert Huseby - 2018 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 13 (2).
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  18.  2
    No Title Available: Reviews.Robert Huseby - 2011 - Economics and Philosophy 27 (2):198-203.
  19.  18
    Review of Luck Egalitarianism – Equality, Responsibility and Justice. [REVIEW]Robert Huseby - 2011 - Economics and Philosophy 27 (2):198-203.
  20.  20
    Sufficiency and the Threshold Question.Robert Huseby - 2020 - The Journal of Ethics 24 (2):207-223.
    In this paper I address the objection to sufficientarianism posed by Paula Casal and Richard Arneson, that it is hard to conceive of a sufficiency threshold such that distribution is highly important just below it, and not required at all just above it. In order to address this objection, I elaborate on the idea that sufficientarianism structurally can be seen to require two separate thresholds, which may or may not overlap. I then argue that a version of such a view (...)
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  21.  12
    Should We Relinquish or Distribute the Benefits of Injustice?Robert Huseby - 2018 - Journal of Value Inquiry 52 (2):213-225.
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  22.  19
    Why Numbers (Almost Always) Count–Nonconsequentialism and Intrapersonal Aggregation.Robert Huseby - 2012 - SATS 13 (1):60-74.
  23.  13
    Why Numbers Count – Nonconsequentialism and Intrapersonal Aggregation.Robert Huseby - 2012 - SATS 13 (1).