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Robert J. Levy [11]Robert Jay Levy [1]
  1.  43
    Conjectures and Rational Preferences.Robert J. Levy - 1984 - Philosophy Research Archives 10:173-188.
    I survey the difficulties of several probabilistic views of non-deductive argument and of inductive probability and propose to explicate non-deductive reasoning in terms of rational preference. Following a critical examination of Popper’s allegedly deductive theory of rational preference, I draw upon the work of Popper and Rescher to present my view which includes: (i) the conjecturing of a set of alternative answers to or theories or hypotheses about the questions prompting the inquiry and (ii) the “reduction” of this set via (...)
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  2.  1
    Conjectures and Rational Preferences.Robert J. Levy - 1984 - Philosophy Research Archives 10:173-188.
    I survey the difficulties of several probabilistic views of non-deductive argument and of inductive probability and propose to explicate non-deductive reasoning in terms of rational preference. Following a critical examination of Popper’s allegedly deductive theory of rational preference, I draw upon the work of Popper and Rescher to present my view which includes: (i) the conjecturing of a set of alternative answers to or theories or hypotheses about the questions prompting the inquiry and (ii) the “reduction” of this set via (...)
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  3.  3
    Introductory Logic.Robert J. Levy - 1984 - Upa.
    This non-technical, easy-to-read introduction to symbolic logic discusses truth-functional and predicate logic in a simple and concise manner. Emphasizes indirect proof of an especially simple form, while avoiding entirely conditional proof. Proof construction is taught by using: finished proofs; partially completed proofs in which the students are to supply missing justifications for lines of proof; and partially completed proofs in which the students are to supply the missing lines of proof, given their justifications. The difficult topic of symbolization of sentences (...)
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  4.  2
    Regarding the Raven Paradox.Robert J. Levy - 1988 - PSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988 (1):17-23.
    In this paper I take Hempel’s raven paradox as the claim that statements of the form ‘∼Ru v Bu’, ‘u is not a raven or u is black,’ confirm the hypothesis h ‘(x)(Rx → Bx)’, ‘All ravens are black.’ Although Hempel discusses this using a criterion of confirmation expressed wholly in terms of deductive logic (see 1965, pp. 35-9), it has become more common to articulate criteria of confirmation using concepts of probability and, in particular, to employ the positive relevance (...))
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  5.  30
    Concepts. [REVIEW]Robert J. Levy - 2001 - Teaching Philosophy 24 (1):104-105.
  6.  5
    Concepts. [REVIEW]Robert J. Levy - 2001 - Teaching Philosophy 24 (1):104-105.
  7.  22
    Epistemology. [REVIEW]Robert J. Levy - 2001 - Teaching Philosophy 24 (3):299-299.
  8.  3
    Epistemology. [REVIEW]Robert J. Levy - 2001 - Teaching Philosophy 24 (3):299-299.
  9.  31
    Pursuit of Truth. [REVIEW]Robert J. Levy - 1992 - Review of Metaphysics 45 (3):634-635.
    In this valuable and interesting book, Quine gives us his current views on evidence, reference, meaning, intension, and truth. Viewing the problem of evidential support as that of specifying logical relations between the sentences of a theory and observation sentences, Quine presents a form of confirmational holism. Observation sentences are occasion sentences which are firmly and intersubjectively associated holophrastically with ranges of stimulations. Only testable sentences which directly imply observation sentences may be refuted by observation. All other testable sentences are (...)
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