I propose a modest Bayesian reductionism as an alternative to Quine's moderate confirmational holism. Employing only first-order predicate logic with identity and elementary probability theory, I present two models of confirmation for individual hypotheses within blocks of theoretical sentences. Testing these models, I consider: (1) the old evidence problem; (2) the raven paradox; (3) a version of the the thesis of underdetermination which says that the evidence never provides adequate epistemic grounds for deciding between rival theories; and (4) the confirmation (...) of modal conditionals. (shrink)

I survey the difficulties of several probabilistic views of non-deductive argument and of inductive probability and propose to explicate non-deductive reasoning in terms of rational preference. Following a critical examination of Popper’s allegedly deductive theory of rational preference, I draw upon the work of Popper and Rescher to present my view which includes: (i) the conjecturing of a set of alternative answers to or theories or hypotheses about the questions prompting the inquiry and (ii) the “reduction” of this set via (...) plausibilistic principles of rational preference. (shrink)

This non-technical, easy-to-read introduction to symbolic logic discusses truth-functional and predicate logic in a simple and concise manner. Emphasizes indirect proof of an especially simple form, while avoiding entirely conditional proof. Proof construction is taught by using: finished proofs; partially completed proofs in which the students are to supply missing justifications for lines of proof; and partially completed proofs in which the students are to supply the missing lines of proof, given their justifications. The difficult topic of symbolization of sentences (...) is presented in a quasi-mechanical way which stresses the recognition of standard form expressions. (shrink)

Reflecting the influence of both Bayesian and Popperian methodology, this paper presents an interpersonal view of confirmation which: (i) explains why a non-black non-raven may constitute evidence for and a black non-raven fails to constitute evidence for the hypothesis 'All ravens are black;' (ii) accounts for the common sense belief that black ravens confirm the raven hypothesis more than do non-black non-ravens; and (iii) applies to lawlike sentences understood as subjunctive conditionals as well as to accidental generalizations.

In this valuable and interesting book, Quine gives us his current views on evidence, reference, meaning, intension, and truth. Viewing the problem of evidential support as that of specifying logical relations between the sentences of a theory and observation sentences, Quine presents a form of confirmational holism. Observation sentences are occasion sentences which are firmly and intersubjectively associated holophrastically with ranges of stimulations. Only testable sentences which directly imply observation sentences may be refuted by observation. All other testable sentences are (...) disconfirmed or retained only as components of larger blocks of sentences. Quine mentions, but does not develop, reasoning in support of hypotheses which uses background beliefs and "the technology of probability and statistics". (shrink)