47 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Robert M. Gordon [47]Robert Morris Gordon [1]
  1. The Simulation Theory: Objections and Misconceptions.Robert M. Gordon - 1992 - Mind and Language 7 (1-2):11-34.
  2. The Structure of Emotions: Investigations in Cognitive Philosophy.Robert M. Gordon - 1987 - Cambridge University Press.
    The Structure of Emotions argues that emotion concepts should have a much more important role in the social and behavioural sciences than they now enjoy, and shows that certain influential psychological theories of emotions overlook the explanatory power of our emotion concepts. Professor Gordon also outlines a new account of the nature of commonsense (or ‘folk’) psychology in general.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   125 citations  
  3.  98
    Simulation Without Introspection or Inference From Me to You.Robert M. Gordon - 1995 - In Martin Davies & Tony Stone (eds.), Mental Simulation. Blackwell.
  4.  23
    The Structure of Emotions.Robert M. Gordon & Ronald De Sousa - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (9):493-504.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   97 citations  
  5. 'Radical' Simulationism.Robert M. Gordon - 1996 - In Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   66 citations  
  6.  37
    Reply to Stich and Nichols.Robert M. Gordon - 1992 - Mind and Language 7 (1-2):87-97.
  7. Sympathy, Simulation, and the Impartial Spectator.Robert M. Gordon - 1996 - In L. May, Michael Friedman & A. Clark (eds.), Ethics. MIT Press. pp. 727-742.
  8.  88
    The Rationality of Emotion.Robert M. Gordon - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (2):284.
    How should we understand the emotional rationality? This first part will explore two models of cognition and analogy strategies, test their intuition about the emotional desire. I distinguish between subjective and objective desire, then presents with a feeling from the "paradigm of drama" export semantics, here our emotional repertoire is acquired all the learned, and our emotions in the form of an object is fixed. It is pretty well in line with the general principles of rationality, especially the lowest reasonable (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   66 citations  
  9.  24
    Reply to Perner and Howes.Robert M. Gordon - 1992 - Mind and Language 7 (1-2):98-103.
  10. Sympathy, Simulation, and the Impartial Spectator.Robert M. Gordon - 1995 - Ethics 105 (4):727-742.
  11. Ascent Routines for Propositional Attitudes.Robert M. Gordon - 2007 - Synthese 159 (2):151 - 165.
    An ascent routine (AR) allows a speaker to self-ascribe a given propositional attitude (PA) by redeploying the process that generates a corresponding lower level utterance. Thus, we may report on our beliefs about the weather by reporting (under certain constraints) on the weather. The chief criticism of my AR account of self-ascription, by Alvin Goldman and others, is that it covers few if any PA’s other than belief and offers no account of how we can attain reliability in identifying our (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  12. Folk Psychology as Mental Simulation.Luca Barlassina & Robert M. Gordon - 2004 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Mindreading (or folk psychology, Theory of Mind, mentalizing) is the capacity to represent and reason about others’ mental states. The Simulation Theory (ST) is one of the main approaches to mindreading. ST draws on the common-sense idea that we represent and reason about others’ mental states by putting ourselves in their shoes. More precisely, we typically arrive at representing others’ mental states by simulating their mental states in our own mind. This entry offers a detailed analysis of ST, considers theoretical (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  13. Beyond Mindreading.Robert M. Gordon - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):219 – 222.
    I argue that there is no conflict between the simulation theory, once it is freed from certain constraints carried over from theory theory, and Gallagher's view that our primary and pervasive way of engaging with others rests on 'direct', non-mentalizing perception of the 'meanings' of others' facial expressions, gestures, and intentional actions.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  14.  88
    The Passivity of Emotions.Robert M. Gordon - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (July):339-60.
  15.  9
    The Structure of Emotions: Investigations in Cognitive Philosophy.Robert C. Roberts & Robert M. Gordon - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (2):266.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  16. Simulation Theory.Joe Cruz & Robert M. Gordon - 2002 - In L. Nagel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group.
    What is the simulation theory? Arguments for simulation theory Simulation theory versus theory theory Simulation theory and cognitive science Versions of simulation theory A possible test of the simulation theory.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  17.  50
    Simulation and Reason Explanation: The Radical View.Robert M. Gordon - 2001 - Philosophical Topics 29 (1-2):175-192.
    Alvin Goldman's early work in action theory and theory of knowledge was a major influence on my own thinking and writing about emotions. For that reason and others, it was a very happy moment in my professional life when I learned, in 1988, that in his presidential address to the Society for Philosophy and Psychology Goldman endorsed and defended the “simulation” theory I had put forward in a 1986 article. I discovered afterward that we share a strong conviction that empirical (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  18.  54
    The Aboutness of Emotions.Robert M. Gordon - 1974 - American Philosophical Quarterly 11 (1):27-36.
    I attempt to show that when someone is, E.G., Angry about something, The events or states that conjointly are causing him to be angry conform to a certain structure, And that from the causal structure underlying his anger it is possible to 'read out' what he is angry about. In this respect, And even in some of the details of the structure, My analysis of being angry about something resembles the belief-Want analysis of intentional action. The chief elements of the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  19. Simulation and the Explanation of Action.Robert M. Gordon - 2000 - In K. R. Stueber & H. H. Kogaler (eds.), Empathy and Agency: The Problem of Understanding in the Human Sciences. Boulder: Westview Press.
  20. Emotions and Knowledge.Robert M. Gordon - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (July):408-413.
  21. The Structure of Emotions: Investigations in Cognitive Philosophy.Robert M. Gordon - 1990 - Behavior and Philosophy 18 (1):63-67.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  22.  32
    Sellars’s Ryleans Revisited.Robert M. Gordon - 2000 - ProtoSociology 14:102-114.
    Wilfrid Sellars's essay, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," (1) introduced, although it did not exactly endorse, what many philosophers consider the first defense of functionalism in the philosophy of mind and the original "theory" theory of commonsense psychology.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  23. Autism and the "Theory of Mind" Debate.Robert M. Gordon & John A. Barker - 1994 - In George Graham & G. Lynn Stephens (eds.), Philosophical Psychopathology. MIT Press.
  24.  7
    Simulation and Reason Explanation: The Radical View.Robert M. Gordon - 2001 - Philosophical Topics 29 (1/2):175-192.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  25.  50
    Fear.Robert M. Gordon - 1980 - Philosophical Review 89 (4):560-578.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  26.  42
    Emotion Labelling and Cognition.Robert M. Gordon - 1978 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 8 (2):125–135.
  27.  20
    Teleology and Agency in Speech Production.Robert M. Gordon - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (3):525-525.
  28. Moorean Pretense.Robert M. Gordon - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  29. Judgmental Emotions.Robert M. Gordon - 1973 - Analysis 34 (December):40-48.
  30.  18
    Self-Ascription of Belief and Desire.Robert M. Gordon - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):45-46.
  31. Developing Commonsense Psychology: Experimental Data and Philosophical Data.Robert M. Gordon - manuscript
    Philosophers have been debating the nature of folk or commonsense psychology for three decades. We ask: What are the resources that enable us to navigate the social world, anticipating what others do, explaining what they’ve done, and perceiving them--and ourselves--as selves, subjects, persons, with beliefs, desire, perceptions, and feelings? Unlike traditional philosophy of mind, instead of directly confronting the mind-body problem and subproblems such as intentionality and qualia, we step back and look at the resources that give us the concepts (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  32.  19
    The Prior Question: Do Human Primates Have a Theory of Mind?Robert M. Gordon - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):120-121.
    Given Heyes's construal of there is still no convincing evidence of theory of mind in human primates, much less nonhuman. Rather than making unfounded assumptions about what underlies human social competence, one should ask what mechanisms other primates have and then inquire whether more sophisticated elaborations of those might not account for much of human competence.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  33.  38
    Socratic Definitions and "Moral Neutrality".Robert M. Gordon - 1964 - Journal of Philosophy 61 (15):433-450.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  34.  26
    Desire and Self-Intervention.Robert M. Gordon - 1986 - Noûs 20 (2):221-238.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  35.  24
    The Morality of Self-Interest. [REVIEW]Robert M. Gordon - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (3):115-118.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36.  26
    Simulation and Systematic Errors in Prediction.Robert M. Gordon - 2005 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (8):361-362.
  37.  24
    A Causal Role for “Conscious” Seeing.Robert M. Gordon - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):628.
  38.  39
    Empathy, Simulation, and Pam.Robert M. Gordon - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):37-37.
    The wealth of important and convergent evidence discussed in the target article contrasts with the poorly conceived theory put forward to explain it. The simulation theory does a better job of explaining how automatic “mirroring” mechanisms might work together with high-level cognitive processes. It also explains what the authors' PAM theory merely stipulates.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39.  16
    2. The Impact of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms Upon Canadian Mental Health Law: The Dawn of a New Era or Business as Usual?Robert M. Gordon & Simon N. Verdun-Jones - 1986 - Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 14 (3-4):190-197.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40.  18
    First Person Representations Need a Methodology Based on Simulation or Theory.Robert M. Gordon - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):130-131.
    Although their thesis is generally sound, Barresi & Moore give insufficient attention to the need for a methodology, whether simulation based or theory-based, for choosing among alternative possible matches of first person and third person information. This choice must be sensitive to contextual information, including past behavior. Moreover, apart from simulation or theory, first person information would not help predict future behavior.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41.  10
    The Morality of Self-Interest.Robert M. Gordon - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (3):115-118.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42.  16
    The Impact of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms Upon Canadian Mental Health Law: The Dawn of a New Era or Business as Usual?Robert M. Gordon & Simon N. Verdun-Jones - 1986 - Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 14 (3-4):190-197.
  43.  12
    Abstract of Comments: The Call of the Wild Epistemic Engine.Robert M. Gordon - 1983 - Noûs 17 (1):19 - 20.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44.  6
    Benefits and Costs of a Propositional Focus: Response to Deigh.Robert M. Gordon - 1990 - Behavior and Philosophy 18 (2):57 - 60.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. Reason Explanations and Counterfactuals.Robert M. Gordon - manuscript
    In evaluating conditionals concerning what a person would have done in counterfactual circumstances, we suppose the counterfactual antecedent to be true, just as in what I loosely term the standard "Ramsey" procedure; but then we follow a different path--a simulative path--in evaluating the consequent. The simulative path imposes an implicit restriction on possible worlds, a procedural guarantee that the individual simulated is aware of or knows about the counterfactual condition. This difference makes clear the way in which reason explanations are (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. Representing Minds.Robert M. Gordon - manuscript
    investigation).{1} We project ourselves into what, from his remarks and other indications, we imagine the speaker's state of mind to have been, . . . even into what from his behavior we imagine a mouse's state of mind to have been, and dramatize it as a belief, wish or striving, verbalized as seems relevant and natural to us in the state thus.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. Sellars's Rylean Ancestors Revisited.Robert M. Gordon - 2000 - ProtoSociology 14:102-114.