In this paper we defend a direct reference theory of names. We maintain that the meaning of a name is its bearer. In the case of vacuous names, there is no bearer and they have no meaning. We develop a unified theory of names such that one theory applies to names whether they occur within or outside fiction. Hence, we apply our theory to sentences containing names within fiction, sentences about fiction or sentences making comparisons across fictions. We then defend (...) our theory against objections and compare our view to the views of Currie, Walton, and others. (shrink)
_Interpretation and Construction_ examines the interpretation and products of intentional human behavior, focusing primarily on issues in art, law, and everyday speech. Focuses on artistic interpretation, but also includes extended discussion of interpretation of the law and everyday speech and communication. Written by one of the leading theorists of interpretation. Theoretical discussions are consistently centered around examples for ease of comprehension.
In many artworks, both aesthetic and ethical values are present, and both can contribute to the overall artistic value of a work. The question explored in this paper is: does the presence of one kind of value affect the degree of the other? For example, does a work that expresses a morally reprehensible attitude diminish the aesthetic value of a work? Let ‘interaction’ name the view that the presence of one kind of value affects the degree of the other. We (...) will argue in favour of the existence of interaction. However, we will argue further that such interaction is a contingent feature of artworks and that the most common argument that has been offered for interaction—the affective -response -argument—fails to identify the main reason why it holds, when it in fact does. (shrink)
What possesses aesthetic value? According to a broad view, it can be found almost anywhere. According to a narrower view, it is found primarily in art and is applied to other items by courtesy of sharing some of the properties that make artworks aesthetically valuable. In this paper I will defend the broad view in answering the question: how should we characterize aesthetic value and other aesthetic concepts? I will also criticize some alternative answers.
Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art is an essential introduction to some of the central topics and approaches being debated in contemporary aesthetics and philosophy of art. By taking a stand on each of the issues addressed and arguing for certain resolutions and against others, the text does not simply present a controversy in its current state of play, but instead helps to advance it toward a solution.
It is not uncommon these days to claim that we should distinguish between artistic value and other types of value, including aesthetic value. A problem for this proposal is posed by the fact that artworks have valuable properties that are no part of its artistic value. Unless there is a way to distinguish artistically valuable properties from other valuable properties, some will be unconvinced that the distinction is viable.1 For this reason, I have proposed a test for artistic value to (...) underwrite support for the distinction.2 The main idea of the test is that we gain access to artistic values of artworks by means of understanding or appreciating those works, and this is not necessary to identify a work’s non-artistic values. Julian Dodd has argued the test is flawed and his criticism is based on a phenomenon I will call value entanglement.3 In this paper, I will identify the interesting phenomena of value entanglement, argue that it does not threaten the current version of the test I endorse, and explore whether there are other problems for that test. (shrink)
Praised in its original edition for its up-to-date, rigorous presentation of current debates and for the clarity of its presentation, Robert Stecker's new edition of Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art preserves the major themes and conclusions of the original, while expanding its content, providing new features, and enhancing accessibility. Described as a "remarkably unified introduction to many contemporary debates in aesthetics and the philosophy of art," Stecker specializes in sympathetically laying bear the play of argument that emerges as competing (...) views on a topic engage each other. (shrink)
Can a moral defect be an artistic virtue? Can it make a positive contribution to artistic value? Further, if this can happen on occasion, does this imply that moral value has no systematic connection to artistic value since every conceivable relation between them is possible? The idea that moral defects can sometimes be artistic virtues has received a fair number of defenders recently and so has the anti-theoretical view that there is no systematic relation between artistic and moral value. But (...) I think immoralism—as the first of these views is called—is mistaken and I will try to show that no good reason has been offered to believe it. If immoralism is wrong, the anti-theoretical view at best devolves into moderate moralism—the idea that moral defects sometimes, but not always, are responsible for artistic defects. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)
In "the art circle", dickie presents a revised institutional account of art. i argue: 1) if we consider the letter of the new account, it fails to distinguish works of art from many other artifacts; 2) if we consider its spirit, it is closer to the approach of those who claim art cannot be defined than to dickie's own earlier approach; 3) dickie fails to show that an institutional framework is a necessary condition for being a work of art.