73 found
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  1. Consciousness.Robert van Gulick - 2004 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  2. What difference does consciousness make?Robert Van Gulick - 1989 - Philosophical Topics 17 (1):211-30.
  3. Understanding the phenomenal mind: Are we all just armadillos.Robert van Gulick - 1993 - In Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: psychological and philosophical essays. Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
  4. Reduction, emergence and other recent options on the mind/body problem: A philosophic overview.Robert van Gulick - 2001 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (9-10):1-34.
    Though most contemporary philosophers and scientists accept a physicalist view of mind, the recent surge of interest in the problem of consciousness has put the mind /body problem back into play. The physicalists' lack of success in dispelling the air of residual mystery that surrounds the question of how consciousness might be physically explained has led to a proliferation of options. Some offer alternative formulations of physicalism, but others forgo physicalism in favour of views that are more dualistic or that (...)
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  5. Scientific Reduction.Raphael van Riel & Robert Van Gulick - 2014 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  6.  18
    The Nature of Psychological Explanation.Robert Van Gulick - 1986 - Philosophy of Science 53 (4):616-618.
  7. Higher-order global states : An alternative higher-order model of consciousness.Robert Van Gulick - 2004 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.
  8. Mirror, mirror -- is that all?Robert Van Gulick - 2006 - In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.
    Consciousness and self-awareness seem intuitively linked, but how they intertwine is less than clear. Must one be self-aware in order to be consciousness? Indeed, is consciousness just a special type of self-awareness? Or perhaps it is the other way round: Is being self-aware a special way of being conscious? Discerning their connections is complicated by the fact that both the main relata themselves admit of many diverse forms and levels. One might be conscious or self- aware in many different ways (...)
     
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  9. Inward and upward: Reflection, introspection, and self-awareness.Robert Van Gulick - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (2):275-305.
  10.  26
    What Difference Does Consciousness Make?Robert Van Gulick - 1989 - Philosophical Topics 17 (1):211-230.
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  11.  56
    Conscious wants and self-awareness.Robert Van Gulick - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):555-556.
  12.  27
    Inward and Upward.Robert Van Gulick - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (2):275-305.
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  13. Who's in charge here? And who's doing all the work?Robert Van Gulick - 1995 - In Pascal Engel (ed.), Mental causation. Oxford University Press. pp. 233-56.
  14.  16
    John Searle and his critics.Robert van Gulick (ed.) - 1991 - Cambridge: Blackwell.
    ROBERT A. COOKE, CPA, has owned or co-owned three successful small businesses and is the author of six books, including Doing Business Tax-Free and How to Start Your Own S Corporation, Second Edition, both from Wiley.
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  15. Functionalism, information and content.Robert van Gulick - 1980 - Nature and System 2 (September-December):139-62.
  16. Deficit studies and the function of phenomenal consciousness.Robert van Gulick - 1994 - In George Graham & G. Lynn Stephens (eds.), Philosophical Psychopathology. MIT Press.
     
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  17.  57
    What if phenomenal consciousness admits of degrees?Robert Van Gulick - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):528-529.
    If the phenomenality of consciousness admits of degrees and can be partial and indeterminate, then Block's inference to the best explanation may need to be revaluated both in terms of the supposed data on phenomenal overflow and the range of alternatives against which his view is compared.
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  18.  36
    Physicalism and the Subjectivity of the Mental.Robert Van Gulick - 1985 - Philosophical Topics 13 (3):51-70.
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  19.  37
    Three bad arguments for intentional property epiphenomenalism.Robert van Gulick - 1992 - Erkenntnis 36 (3):311-331.
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  20. Who's in charge here? And who's doing all the work?Robert van Gulick - 1993 - In Charge Here? And Who's Doing All the Work? In Mental Causation. New York: Clarendon Press.
  21. So many ways of saying no to Mary.Robert van Gulick - 2004 - In Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. MIT Press.
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  22.  88
    What would count as explaining consciousness?Robert van Gulick - 1995 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh.
  23.  46
    Higher-order global states (HOGS) An alternative higher-order model.Robert Van Gulick - 2004 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins. pp. 67.
  24. How should we understand the relation between intentionality and phenomenal consciousness.Robert van Gulick - 1995 - Philosophical Perspectives 9:271-89.
  25. Consciousness, intrinsic intentionality, and self-understanding machines.Robert van Gulick - 1988 - In Anthony J. Marcel & Edoardo Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. New York: Oxford University Press.
     
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  26. Functionalism.Robert Van Gulick - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
  27. Nonreductive materialism and the nature of intertheoretical constraint.Robert Van Gulick - 1992 - In Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr & Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. De Gruyter.
     
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  28. Subjective consciousness and self-representation.Robert Van Gulick - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (3):457-465.
    Subjective consciousness and self-representation Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-9 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9765-7 Authors Robert Van Gulick, Department of Philosophy, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  29. Phenomenal Unity, Representation and the Self.Robert van Gulick - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):209-214.
  30. Metaphysical arguments for internalism and why they don't work.Robert van Gulick - 1988 - In Stuart Silvers (ed.), Representation: Readings In The Philosophy Of Mental Representation. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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    Mental representation: A functionalist view.Robert Van Gulick - 1982 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (1):3-20.
  32. Who's in charge here? And who's doing all the work?Robert Van Gulick - 2007 - In Nancey C. Murphy & William R. Stoeger (eds.), Evolution and emergence: systems, organisms, persons. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  33. Understanding the phenomenal mind: Are we all just armadillos? Part I: Phenomenal knowledge and explanatory gaps.Robert Van Gulick - 1993 - In M. Davies & G. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: A Mind and Language Reader. Blackwell.
  34.  68
    Functionalism and qualia.Robert Van Gulick - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. New York: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 430–444.
    Functionalism, in one form or another, is probably at present the most commonly held position concerning the nature of mental states among philosophers. Functionalists all accept the basic thesis that mental kinds are functional kinds, and that what makes a mental item an item of a given mental type is the functional role it plays within a relevantly organized system. This chapter considers arguments meant to show that various forms of functionalism are unable to accommodate or explain some of the (...)
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  35.  10
    Dennett, Drafts, and Phenomenal Realism.Robert Van Gulick - 1994 - Philosophical Topics 22 (1-2):443-455.
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  36.  20
    Functionalism as a Theory of Mind.Robert Van Gulick - 1982 - Philosophy Research Archives 8:185-204.
    A general characterization of functionalist theories of mind is offered and a number of issues are discussed which allow for alternative versions of functionalism. Some issues, such as the distinction between the implicit definition and partial specification views are of a general nature, while others raise questions more specific to functionalism, such as whether the relation between psychological and physiological properties is one of identity or instantiation. Section II attempts to undermine several arguments which have been offered to support the (...)
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  37.  89
    Non-Reductive Physicalism and the Teleo-Pragmatic Theory of Mind.Robert Van Gulick - 2011 - Philosophia Naturalis 48 (1):103-124.
  38.  19
    Analytical isomorphism and Marilyn Monroe.Robert Van Gulick - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6):776-777.
    Pessoa, Thompson & Noë present compelling evidence in support of their central claims about the diversity of filling-in, but they embed those claims within a larger framework that rejects analytical isomorphism and uses the personal/subpersonal distinction to challenge the explanatory importance of filling-in. The latter views seem more problematic.
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  39. Explaining Consciousness: What Would Count?Robert Van Gulick - 1995 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh.
     
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  40. Maps, gaps, and traps.Robert van Gulick - 2002 - In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  41.  29
    Time for more alternatives.Robert Van Gulick - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):228-229.
  42. Reduction, emergence, and the mind/body problem.Robert Van Gulick - 2007 - In Nancey C. Murphy & William R. Stoeger (eds.), Evolution and emergence: systems, organisms, persons. New York: Oxford University Press.
     
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  43.  56
    Consciousness and Self-awareness—an Alternative Perspective.Robert Van Gulick - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (2):329-340.
    An alternative model of the relation between consciousness and self-consciousness is proposed. The model combines a non-standard version of the higher-order theory of consciousness with the global neuronal workspace theory and argues that implicit higher-order self-awareness is a pervasive feature of the globally integrative states formed in the global workspace.
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  44.  98
    Conceiving beyond our means: The limits of thought experiments.Robert van Gulick - 1999 - In S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak & David Chalmers (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness III: The Third Tucson Discussions and Debates. MIT Press. pp. 13.
  45.  15
    Dennett, drafts, and phenomenal realism.Robert Van Gulick - 1994 - Philosophical Topics 22 (1/2):443-55.
  46. Outing the Mind.Robert Van Gulick - 2004 - In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter. pp. 255--284.
  47.  23
    Prosopagnosia, conscious awareness and the interactive brain.Robert Van Gulick - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):84-85.
  48.  38
    Vehicles, processes, and neo-classical revival.Robert Van Gulick - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):170-171.
    O'Brien & Opie unfairly restrict the classicist's range of options for explaining phenomenal consciousness. Alternative approaches that rely upon differences among representation types offer better prospects of success. The authors rely upon two distinctions: one between symbol processing and connectionist models, the other between process and vehicle models. In this context, neither distinction may be as clear as they assume.
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  49. On the Supposed Inconceivability of Absent Qualia Functional Duplicates—a Reply to Tye.Robert Van Gulick - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):277-284.
    In “Absent Qualia and the Mind-Body Problem,” Michael Tye (2006) presents an argument by which he claims to show the inconceivability of beings that are functionally equivalent to phenomenally conscious beings but lack any qualia. On that basis, he concludes that qualia can be fully defined in functional terms. The argument does not suffice to establish the claimed results. In particular it does not show that such absent qualia cases are inconceivable. Tye’s argument relies on a principle P according to (...)
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  50.  12
    Are Beliefs Brain-States? And If They Are What Might That Explain?Robert Van Gulick - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 76 (2/3):205 - 215.
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