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Profile: Robert Van Gulick (Syracuse University)
  1. Mirror, Mirror -- Is That All?Robert Van Gulick - 2006 - In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.
    Consciousness and self-awareness seem intuitively linked, but how they intertwine is less than clear. Must one be self-aware in order to be consciousness? Indeed, is consciousness just a special type of self-awareness? Or perhaps it is the other way round: Is being self-aware a special way of being conscious? Discerning their connections is complicated by the fact that both the main relata themselves admit of many diverse forms and levels. One might be conscious or self- aware in many different ways (...)
     
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  2. Consciousness.Robert van Gulick - 2004 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  3. Understanding the Phenomenal Mind: Are We All Just Armadillos?Robert van Gulick - 1993 - In Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Blackwell.
  4.  94
    What Difference Does Consciousness Make?Robert van Gulick - 1989 - Philosophical Topics 17 (1):211-30.
  5. Reduction, Emergence and Other Recent Options on the Mind/Body Problem: A Philosophic Overview.Robert van Gulick - 2001 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (9-10):1-34.
    Though most contemporary philosophers and scientists accept a physicalist view of mind, the recent surge of interest in the problem of consciousness has put the mind /body problem back into play. The physicalists' lack of success in dispelling the air of residual mystery that surrounds the question of how consciousness might be physically explained has led to a proliferation of options. Some offer alternative formulations of physicalism, but others forgo physicalism in favour of views that are more dualistic or that (...)
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  6.  2
    Conscious Wants and Self-Awareness.Robert Van Gulick - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):555-556.
  7. Inward and Upward: Reflection, Introspection, and Self-Awareness.Robert van Gulick - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (2):275-305.
  8.  16
    What If Phenomenal Consciousness Admits of Degrees?Robert Van Gulick - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):528-529.
    If the phenomenality of consciousness admits of degrees and can be partial and indeterminate, then Block's inference to the best explanation may need to be revaluated both in terms of the supposed data on phenomenal overflow and the range of alternatives against which his view is compared.
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  9. Higher-Order Global States : An Alternative Higher-Order Model of Consciousness.Robert Van Gulick - 2004 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.
  10.  54
    Scientific Reduction.Raphael van Riel & Robert Van Gulick - 2014 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  11. Who's in Charge Here? And Who's Doing All the Work?Robert van Gulick - 1993 - In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press. pp. 233-56.
  12. Subjective Consciousness and Self-Representation.van Gulick Robert - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (3):457-465.
    Subjective consciousness and self-representation Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-9 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9765-7 Authors Robert Van Gulick, Department of Philosophy, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  13. So Many Ways of Saying No to Mary.Robert van Gulick - 2004 - In Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. MIT Press.
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  14.  9
    Three Bad Arguments for Intentional Property Epiphenomenalism.Robert van Gulick - 1992 - Erkenntnis 36 (3):311-331.
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  15. How Should We Understand the Relation Between Intentionality and Phenomenal Consciousness.Robert van Gulick - 1995 - Philosophical Perspectives 9:271-89.
  16.  38
    Taking a Step Back From the Gap.van Gulick Robert - 1999 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1999:123-133.
    In this paper, I reflect on the assumptions implicit in the psychophysical explanatory gap metaphor. There are clearly gaps in our current understanding of the psycho-physical link, but how great are they? Are they different in kind from other gaps in our understanding of the world that cause us less metaphysical and epistemological distress? Further, why are we supposed to regard the gaps in our psychological understanding differently? Rather than assess such theories of why a special gap exists, I want (...)
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  17. Maps, Gaps, and Traps.Robert van Gulick - 2003 - In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
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  18.  84
    Phenomenal Unity, Representation and the Self.van Gulick Robert - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):209-214.
  19.  89
    On the Supposed Inconceivability of Absent Qualia Functional Duplicates--A Reply to Tye.Robert van Gulick - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):277-284.
    In “Absent Qualia and the Mind-Body Problem,” Michael Tye (2006) presents an argument by which he claims to show the inconceivability of beings that are functionally equivalent to phenomenally conscious beings but lack any qualia. On that basis, he concludes that qualia can be fully defined in functional terms. The argument does not suffice to establish the claimed results. In particular it does not show that such absent qualia cases are inconceivable. Tye’s argument relies on a principle P according to (...)
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  20. Deficit Studies and the Function of Phenomenal Consciousness.Robert van Gulick - 1994 - In George Graham & G. Lynn Stephens (eds.), Philosophical Psychopathology. MIT Press.
     
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  21.  20
    What Would Count as Explaining Consciousness?Robert van Gulick - 1995 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Imprint Academic.
  22.  12
    Inward and Upward.Robert van Gulick - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (2):275-305.
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  23.  5
    Time for More Alternatives.Robert Van Gulick - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):228-229.
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  24.  68
    Are Beliefs Brain States? And If They Are What Might That Explain?Robert van Gulick - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):205-15.
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  25. Functionalism, Information and Content.Robert van Gulick - 1980 - Nature and System 2 (September-December):139-62.
  26.  19
    Why the Connection Argument Doesn't Work.van Gulick Robert - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):201-7.
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  27.  76
    Conceiving Beyond Our Means: The Limits of Thought Experiments.Robert van Gulick - 1999 - In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & David J. Chalmers (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness Iii. MIT Press. pp. 13.
  28. Explaining Consciousness: What Would Count?Robert Van Gulick - 1995 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.
     
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  29.  10
    Non-Reductive Physicalism and the Teleo-Pragmatic Theory of Mind.Robert Van Gulick - 2011 - Philosophia Naturalis 48 (1):103-124.
  30.  12
    Beautiful Red Squares.Robert Van Gulick - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):50-51.
    The reflectance types that Byrne & Hilbert identify with colors count as types only in a way that is more dependent on, and more relative to color perceivers, than their account suggests. Their account of perceptual content may be overly focused on input conditions and distal causes.
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  31. Mental Representation: A Functionalist View.Robert van Gulick - 1982 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (January):3-20.
     
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  32. And the Knowledge Argument.Robert van Gulick - 2009 - In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford University Press.
     
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  33.  7
    Closing the Gap?Robert van Gulick - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (4):93-97.
    [opening paragraph]: Nicholas Humphrey's ambitiously titled paper falls into two main parts. In the first, he offers a diagnosis of the current state of the mind-body debate and a general prescription for how to go about seeking its solution. In the second, he aims to fill that prescription with a specific proposal that he regards as bringing us much closer to a resolution of the underlying problem. Though I will take issue below with a few important details, I largely agree (...)
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  34.  17
    Vehicles, Processes, and Neo-Classical Revival.Robert Van Gulick - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):170-171.
    O'Brien & Opie unfairly restrict the classicist's range of options for explaining phenomenal consciousness. Alternative approaches that rely upon differences among representation types offer better prospects of success. The authors rely upon two distinctions: one between symbol processing and connectionist models, the other between process and vehicle models. In this context, neither distinction may be as clear as they assume.
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  35.  55
    Out of Sight but Not Out of Mind: Isomorphism and Absent Qualia.Robert Van Gulick - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):974-974.
    The isomorphism constraint places plausible limits on the use of third-person evidence to explain color experience but poses no difficulty for functionalists; they themselves argue for just such limits. Palmer's absent qualia claim is supported by neither the Color Machine nor Color Room examples. The nature of color experience depends on relations external to the color space, as well as internal to it.
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  36.  17
    Functionalism and Qualia.Robert Van Gulick - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.
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  37. Understanding the Phenomenal Mind: Are We All Just Armadillos? Part I: Phenomenal Knowledge and Explanatory Gaps.Robert Van Gulick - 1993 - In M. Davies & G. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: A Mind and Language Reader. Blackwell.
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  38.  8
    Taking a Step Back From the Gap.Robert van Gulick - 1999 - In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Bowling Green: Philosophy Doc Ctr. pp. 123-133.
    In this paper, I reflect on the assumptions implicit in the psychophysical explanatory gap metaphor. There are clearly gaps in our current understanding of the psycho-physical link, but how great are they? Are they different in kind from other gaps in our understanding of the world that cause us less metaphysical and epistemological distress? Further, why are we supposed to regard the gaps in our psychological understanding differently? Rather than assess such theories of why a special gap exists, I want (...)
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  39. Metaphysical Arguments for Internalism and Why They Don't Work.Robert van Gulick - 1989 - In Stuart Silvers (ed.), ReRepresentation. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
  40.  10
    Higher-Order Global States (HOGS) An Alternative Higher-Order Model.Robert Van Gulick - 2004 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.. pp. 67.
  41. Consciousness, Intrinsic Intentionality, and Self-Understanding Machines.Robert van Gulick - 1988 - In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press.
     
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  42.  25
    Still Room for Representations.Robert Van Gulick - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):1007-1008.
    One can support O'Regan & Noë's (O&N's) commitment to the active nature of vision and the importance of sensorimotor contingencies without joining them in rejecting any significant role for neurally realized visual representations in the process.
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  43.  6
    Drugs, Mental Instruments, and Self-Control.Robert Van Gulick - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (6):325-326.
    The instrumental model offered by Müller & Schumann (M&S) is broadened to apply not only to drugs, but also to other methods of self-control, including the use of mental constructs to produce adaptive changes in behavior with the possibility of synergistic interactions between various instruments.
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  44.  6
    Dennett, Drafts, and Phenomenal Realism.Robert van Gulick - 1995 - Philosophical Topics 22 (1/2):443-55.
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  45.  3
    Rationality and the Anomalous Nature of the Mental.Robert van Gulick - 1980 - Philosophy Research Archives 7:1404.
    Donald Davidson's argument for the nonlawlike nature of psycho-physical generalizations is discussed and refuted. It is shown that his appeals to the rational and holistic character of intentional description do not support his conclusion of anomalism. An alternative methodological role is suggested for the concept of rationality in application to current empirical research in cognitive psychology.
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  46. Jackson's Change of Mind: Representationalism, a Priorism and the Knowledge Argument.Robert Van Gulick - 2009 - In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford University Press.
     
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  47.  4
    Prosopagnosia, Conscious Awareness and the Interactive Brain.Robert Van Gulick - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):84.
  48.  1
    What Difference Does Consciousness Make?Robert Van Gulick - 1989 - Philosophical Topics 17 (1):211-230.
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  49.  5
    11. Maps, Gaps, and Traps.Robert Van Gulick - 2003 - In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
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  50.  13
    Is the Higher Order of Linguistic Thought Model of Feeling Adequate?Robert Van Gulick - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):218-219.
    Despite its explanatory value, the “higher order linguistic thought” model comes up short as an account of the felt aspect of motivational states.
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