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Robert Van Gulick
Syracuse University
  1. Consciousness.Robert van Gulick - 2004 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  2. Mirror, Mirror -- Is That All?Robert Van Gulick - 2006 - In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.
    Consciousness and self-awareness seem intuitively linked, but how they intertwine is less than clear. Must one be self-aware in order to be consciousness? Indeed, is consciousness just a special type of self-awareness? Or perhaps it is the other way round: Is being self-aware a special way of being conscious? Discerning their connections is complicated by the fact that both the main relata themselves admit of many diverse forms and levels. One might be conscious or self- aware in many different ways (...)
     
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  3. What Difference Does Consciousness Make?Robert Van Gulick - 1989 - Philosophical Topics 17 (1):211-30.
  4. Reduction, Emergence and Other Recent Options on the Mind/Body Problem: A Philosophic Overview.Robert van Gulick - 2001 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (9-10):1-34.
    Though most contemporary philosophers and scientists accept a physicalist view of mind, the recent surge of interest in the problem of consciousness has put the mind /body problem back into play. The physicalists' lack of success in dispelling the air of residual mystery that surrounds the question of how consciousness might be physically explained has led to a proliferation of options. Some offer alternative formulations of physicalism, but others forgo physicalism in favour of views that are more dualistic or that (...)
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  5. Understanding the Phenomenal Mind: Are We All Just Armadillos.Robert van Gulick - 1993 - In Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Blackwell.
  6. Higher-Order Global States : An Alternative Higher-Order Model of Consciousness.Robert Van Gulick - 2004 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.
  7. Inward and Upward: Reflection, Introspection, and Self-Awareness.Robert Van Gulick - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (2):275-305.
  8.  8
    The Nature of Psychological Explanation.Robert Van Gulick - 1986 - Philosophy of Science 53 (4):616-618.
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  9.  75
    Scientific Reduction.Raphael van Riel & Robert Van Gulick - 2014 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  10.  26
    Conscious Wants and Self-Awareness.Robert Van Gulick - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):555-556.
  11.  15
    Inward and Upward.Robert Van Gulick - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (2):275-305.
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  12. Who's in Charge Here? And Who's Doing All the Work?Robert Van Gulick - 1993 - In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press. pp. 233-56.
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    What If Phenomenal Consciousness Admits of Degrees?Robert Van Gulick - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):528-529.
    If the phenomenality of consciousness admits of degrees and can be partial and indeterminate, then Block's inference to the best explanation may need to be revaluated both in terms of the supposed data on phenomenal overflow and the range of alternatives against which his view is compared.
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  14. Functionalism.Robert Van Gulick - 2009 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
     
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  15. So Many Ways of Saying No to Mary.Robert van Gulick - 2004 - In Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. MIT Press.
  16. Subjective Consciousness and Self-Representation.Robert Van Gulick - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (3):457-465.
    Subjective consciousness and self-representation Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-9 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9765-7 Authors Robert Van Gulick, Department of Philosophy, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  17. Phenomenal Unity, Representation and the Self.Robert Van Gulick - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):209-214.
  18. Deficit Studies and the Function of Phenomenal Consciousness.Robert van Gulick - 1994 - In George Graham & G. Lynn Stephens (eds.), Philosophical Psychopathology. MIT Press.
     
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  19. John Searle and His Critics.Robert van Gulick - 1993 - Wiley.
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  20.  18
    Three Bad Arguments for Intentional Property Epiphenomenalism.Robert van Gulick - 1992 - Erkenntnis 36 (3):311-331.
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  21. Functionalism, Information and Content.Robert van Gulick - 1980 - Nature and System 2 (September-December):139-62.
  22. How Should We Understand the Relation Between Intentionality and Phenomenal Consciousness.Robert van Gulick - 1995 - Philosophical Perspectives 9:271-89.
  23.  8
    What Difference Does Consciousness Make?Robert Van Gulick - 1989 - Philosophical Topics 17 (1):211-230.
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  24.  36
    What Would Count as Explaining Consciousness?Robert van Gulick - 1995 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Imprint Academic.
  25. 11. Maps, Gaps, and Traps.Robert Van Gulick - 2003 - In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
  26.  21
    Higher-Order Global States (HOGS) An Alternative Higher-Order Model.Robert Van Gulick - 2004 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.. pp. 67.
  27. Reduction, Emergence, and the Mind/Body Problem.Robert Van Gulick - 2007 - In Nancey Murphy (ed.), Evolution and Emergence: Systems, Organisms, Persons. Oxford University Press.
     
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  28.  13
    Physicalism and the Subjectivity of the Mental.Robert Van Gulick - 1985 - Philosophical Topics 13 (3):51-70.
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  29. Nonreductive Materialism and the Nature of Intertheoretical Constraint.Robert Van Gulick - 1992 - In Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr & Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. De Gruyter.
     
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  30. Understanding the Phenomenal Mind: Are We All Just Armadillos? Part I: Phenomenal Knowledge and Explanatory Gaps.Robert Van Gulick - 1993 - In M. Davies & G. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: A Mind and Language Reader. Blackwell.
  31. Consciousness, Intrinsic Intentionality, and Self-Understanding Machines.Robert van Gulick - 1988 - In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press.
     
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  32. On the Supposed Inconceivability of Absent Qualia Functional Duplicates--A Reply to Tye.Robert van Gulick - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):277-284.
    In “Absent Qualia and the Mind-Body Problem,” Michael Tye (2006) presents an argument by which he claims to show the inconceivability of beings that are functionally equivalent to phenomenally conscious beings but lack any qualia. On that basis, he concludes that qualia can be fully defined in functional terms. The argument does not suffice to establish the claimed results. In particular it does not show that such absent qualia cases are inconceivable. Tye’s argument relies on a principle P according to (...)
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  33.  8
    Functionalism as a Theory of Mind.Robert Van Gulick - 1982 - Philosophy Research Archives 8:185-204.
    A general characterization of functionalist theories of mind is offered and a number of issues are discussed which allow for alternative versions of functionalism. Some issues, such as the distinction between the implicit definition and partial specification views are of a general nature, while others raise questions more specific to functionalism, such as whether the relation between psychological and physiological properties is one of identity or instantiation. Section II attempts to undermine several arguments which have been offered to support the (...)
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  34.  13
    Time for More Alternatives.Robert Van Gulick - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):228-229.
  35. Mental Representation: A Functionalist View.Robert van Gulick - 1982 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (1):3-20.
     
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  36.  43
    Non-Reductive Physicalism and the Teleo-Pragmatic Theory of Mind.Robert Van Gulick - 2011 - Philosophia Naturalis 48 (1):103-124.
  37. Metaphysical Arguments for Internalism and Why They Don't Work.Robert van Gulick - 1989 - In Stuart Silvers (ed.), ReRepresentation. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
  38.  28
    Vehicles, Processes, and Neo-Classical Revival.Robert Van Gulick - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):170-171.
    O'Brien & Opie unfairly restrict the classicist's range of options for explaining phenomenal consciousness. Alternative approaches that rely upon differences among representation types offer better prospects of success. The authors rely upon two distinctions: one between symbol processing and connectionist models, the other between process and vehicle models. In this context, neither distinction may be as clear as they assume.
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  39. Outing the Mind.Robert Van Gulick - 2004 - In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter. pp. 255--284.
  40.  77
    Are Beliefs Brain States? And If They Are What Might That Explain?Robert Van Gulick - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):205-15.
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  41. Explaining Consciousness: What Would Count?Robert Van Gulick - 1995 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.
     
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  42. And the Knowledge Argument.Robert van Gulick - 2009 - In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford University Press.
     
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  43.  82
    Conceiving Beyond Our Means: The Limits of Thought Experiments.Robert van Gulick - 1999 - In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & David J. Chalmers (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness Iii. MIT Press. pp. 13.
  44.  29
    Still Room for Representations.Robert Van Gulick - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):1007-1008.
    One can support O'Regan & Noë's (O&N's) commitment to the active nature of vision and the importance of sensorimotor contingencies without joining them in rejecting any significant role for neurally realized visual representations in the process.
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    Beautiful Red Squares.Robert Van Gulick - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):50-51.
    The reflectance types that Byrne & Hilbert identify with colors count as types only in a way that is more dependent on, and more relative to color perceivers, than their account suggests. Their account of perceptual content may be overly focused on input conditions and distal causes.
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  46.  38
    Functionalism and Qualia.Robert Van Gulick - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.
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  47.  72
    Out of Sight but Not Out of Mind: Isomorphism and Absent Qualia.Robert Van Gulick - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):974-974.
    The isomorphism constraint places plausible limits on the use of third-person evidence to explain color experience but poses no difficulty for functionalists; they themselves argue for just such limits. Palmer's absent qualia claim is supported by neither the Color Machine nor Color Room examples. The nature of color experience depends on relations external to the color space, as well as internal to it.
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  48. Life, Holism and Emergence: Converging Themes.Robert Van Gulick - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (5-6):139 - 147.
     
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  49.  12
    Closing the Gap?Robert van Gulick - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (4):93-97.
    [opening paragraph]: Nicholas Humphrey's ambitiously titled paper falls into two main parts. In the first, he offers a diagnosis of the current state of the mind-body debate and a general prescription for how to go about seeking its solution. In the second, he aims to fill that prescription with a specific proposal that he regards as bringing us much closer to a resolution of the underlying problem. Though I will take issue below with a few important details, I largely agree (...)
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  50.  11
    Prosopagnosia, Conscious Awareness and the Interactive Brain.Robert Van Gulick - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):84-85.
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