Simplicius reports that Xenocrates and Andronicus reproached Aristotle for positing an excessive number of categories, which can conveniently be reduced to two: τὰ καθ᾽αὑτά and τὰ πρός τι. Simplicius, followed by several modern commentators, interprets this move as being equivalent to a division into substance and accidents. I aim to show that, as far as Xenocrates is concerned, this interpretation is untenable and that the substance-accidents contrast cannot be equivalent to Xenocrates’ per se-relative one. Rather, Xenocrates aimed to stress the (...) primacy of Plato’s binary distinction of beings, as presented at Sophist 255c13–4, over Aristotle’s list of the categories. (shrink)

In explicating a passage from Physics A 3, Simplicius reports a criticism by Alexander of Aphrodisias against Plato’s conception of not-being in the Sophist. Alexander deems this conception contradictory, because it posits that unqualified not-being is. Simplicius defends Plato and gives a diagnosis of what he regards as Alexander’s interpretative mistake in raising his objection. I unpack this debate and bring out ways in which it sheds light on important aspects of Plato’s project in the Sophist and of Simplicius’ own (...) philosophical background, notably in Damascius’ De principiis. (shrink)

The revival of interest in the concept of essence witnessed in analytic metaphysics over the past half century has customarily been accompanied by the association of the original idea of (and of some of the main lines of thought on) essence with Aristotle. The book under review aims instead to show that Plato already ‘defends a comprehensive, coherent, and well-argued theory of essence’ (p. 11). Politis frames this claim in an overall interpretation of Plato's theory of Forms, governed by a (...) two-pronged principal thesis: (i) Platonic Forms simply are essences, not (as some believe) things that have essences—meaning by ‘essence’ specifically the entity ‘designated by an adequate and true answer to the question. ‘What is F?’ (p. 3), as opposed to an answer that accounts for what F is by merely appealing to an ‘example or exemplar’ of F (ch. 1). (ii) All chief attributes Plato ascribes to Forms follow uniquely from this basic notion, including their being non-perceptible by the senses (ch. 2), unitary, uniform, incomposite, changeless, eternal, and non-logically independent from each other (ch. 3), knowable only by reasoning (ch. 4), distinct and separate from perceptible things (chs. 5 and 9), the basis of causation and explanation (ch. 6), necessary for thought and speech (chs. 7–8). (shrink)

In Metaphysics B 3 Aristotle sets out a famous argument for the thesis that being is not a genus. In his commentary on Metaphysics B, Syrianus criticizes this argument and explains in what sense being is to be regarded as a genus. I reconstruct both Syrianus’ criticisms and his own view. I bring out ways in which they can help us rethink key assumptions of Aristotle’s ontology and shed light both on Syrianus’ critical attitude towards Aristotle and on some of (...) Syrianus’ main views in metaphysics. (shrink)

In this paper I investigate Aristotle’s account of predication in Topics I 9. I argue for the following interpretation. In this chapter Aristotle (i) presents two systems of predication cutting across each other, the system of the so-called four ‘predicables’ and of the ten ‘categories’, in order to distinguish them and explore their mutual relationship. I propose a semantic interpretation of the relationship between them. According to this reading, every proposition formed through a predicable constitutes at the same time a (...) predication according to one of the ten categories, and, consequently, signifies one of them, expressing one of the predicative relationship conveyed by them. Further, Aristotle (ii) explains the predicative connection between these two systems and the ten items signified by the ‘things said without any combination’ enumerated in Chapter 4 of the Categories, whose list is almost identical with that of categories in Top. I 9, with the only exception of their first members. (shrink)

This paper examines the fifth deduction (160b4-163b5) of the second part of the Parmenides and its connection with the Sophist. I argue that, far from providing us with clear formulations of arguments and theses developed in the Sophist, D5 aims to stimulate us to reflect on two main problems, which are relevant for the ontology and the theory of predication of the Sophist. First, the ontological requirements of the extra-linguistic correlates of contentful thought and meaningful speech. Second, the function of (...) being in the mechanism of the relation of participation. (shrink)

Dans cet article on se propose d’examiner les fondements ontologiques de l’argument anti-hédoniste de Philèbe 53c4-55a1. On soutiendra que l’usage des notions de γένεσις et οὐσία dans cet argument ne montre ni un abandon de la thèse de l’opposition du sensible à l’intelligible, ni, pour autant, une application mécanique de cette thèse. On souhaite montrer, en revanche, que ces notions jouissent d’une relativité sémantique telle que leurs significations varient en fonction des contextes argumentatifs, dont le passage retenu du Philèbe est (...) un exemple particulièrement représentatif. Dans ce passage, en effet, elles désignent, principalement, pour la première un processus génétique et pour la seconde un tout qui est constitué par l’imposition causale d’une limite à ce qui est en soi illimité. Sur la base de cette première proposition, on défendra une nouvelle lecture de la relation entre Phlb. 53c4-55a1 et les caractérisations de chaque membre du « troisième genre » comme γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν (26d8) et γεγενημένη οὐσία (27b8-9). (shrink)

The Diuisio Aristotelea 67M/32DL draws a distinction between two categories of beings, per se and relatives. I defend three main theses. First, that the relation of dependence characterizing the members of the latter category is modal and symmetrical in nature and, accordingly, the per se-relatives contrast cannot be equivalent to the substance-accidents contrast. Second, that the type of relativity relevant to this diuisio is both ontological and semantic in nature (but with different emphases depending on the version of the diuisio (...) considered). Third, I argue, against a widespread opinion, that the last line of the DL version of the diuisio does not concern metaphysical principles. Here I also compare the diuisio to other Early Academic bicategorial schemes and show that they differ from one another significantly, especially as far as the alleged connection between categories and metaphysical principles is concerned. (shrink)