The doctrine of the inchoatio formae is an important feature of Albert the Great’s metaphysics and natural philosophy, as modern scholars, starting at least with Bruno Nardi’s pioneering study, have recognised. Nevertheless, the notion of the inchoatio formae as employed by Albert is usually understood to refer exclusively to the relationship between matter and substantial forms. On the contrary, in his commentary on Aristotle’s De sensu et sensato, and specifically in the context of a discussion of the so-called issue of (...) minima sensibilia, i.e., the limits to the persistence of the accidental forms of sensible qualities according to the potential infinite divisibility of the matter with which they are united (cf. De sensu 6, 445b3-446a20), Albert talks explicitly of the inchoatio formarum sensibilium (possibly a hapax legomenon in the entire corpus of his writings), therefore applying the notion of the inchoatio formae to the accidental forms of sensible qualities themselves. This article reconstructs the precise meaning and the key features of the inchoatio formarum sensibilium in the context of Albert’s De sensu commentary and of his discussion of minima sensibilia and compares it with the notion of the inchoatio formae as applied to substantial forms, showing both the important similarities and the crucial differences between them. In this way, it becomes possible not only to better understand the intrinsic richness and complexity of the concept of the inchoatio formae in Albert’s writings, but also to do justice to the variety of functions it serves throughout Albert’s metaphysics and natural philosophy. (shrink)

This article contains a case study of some innovative early fourteenth-century conceptions of the temporal structure of substantial change. An important tenet of thirteenth-century scholastic hylomorphism is that substantial change is an instantaneous process. In contrast, three early fourteenth-century Aristotelian commentators, first Walter Burley and then John Buridan and Albert of Saxony, progressively develop a view on which substantial change is linked to temporal duration. This process culminated, in Buridan and Albert of Saxony, with the explicit recognition of the temporally (...) extended nature of some (if not most) instances of substantial change. This article sheds light on this neglected episode in the history of late medieval hylomorphism taking as its point of departure these commentators’ discussions of the issue of minima naturalia, i.e., the issue of the lowest possible limit of any division of substantial forms coming about through the potentially infinite division of the matter they inform. In short: is there a piece of matter so small that no substantial form can possibly inhere in it? (shrink)

L’articolo si concentra sull’analisi dell’estesa comparazione tra filosofia e amicizia proposta da Dante in Convivio III, xi, interpretandola come una consapevole analogia. A partire da un’attenta esegesi del capitolo, letto come un peculiare accessus ad philosophiam dantesco, l’articolo ripercorre le tappe dell’analogia evidenziandone i principali contenuti teorici. In questo modo, diventa possibile mostrare la rilevanza del tema dell’amicizia (in particolare di quella tra maestro e allievo) per una corretta comprensione di uno degli aspetti fondamentali (e anche più dibattuti) della pratica (...) filosofica così come concepita da Dante, ovvero il suo carattere intrinsecamente collettivo. Inoltre, l’articolo sottolinea come l’amicizia costituisca per Dante uno degli strumenti essenziali per l’allargamento del sapere filosofico al di fuori dei circoli universitari, obiettivo a cui il Convivio dichiaratamente mira. The article focuses on the analysis of the extended comparison between philosophy and friendship advanced by Dante in Convivio III, xi, interpreting it as a conscious analogy. Starting from a careful exegesis of the chapter, read as Dante’s peculiar accessus ad philosophiam, the article goes through the stages of the analogy, and it highlights its main theoretical contents. In this way, it becomes possible to show the relevance of the topic of friendship (especially that between master and student) for a correct understanding of one of the fundamental (and most debated) aspects of philosophical practice as conceived by Dante, i.e., its intrinsically collective character. Moreover, the article underlines that friendship constitutes for Dante one of the essential instruments in order to broaden philosophical knowledge outside of university circles, something that the Convivio explicitly purports to do. (shrink)