7 found
  1. Common Knowledge, Salience and Convention: A Reconstruction of David Lewis' Game Theory.Robin P. Cubitt & Robert Sugden - 2003 - Economics and Philosophy 19 (2):175-210.
    David Lewis is widely credited with the first formulation of common knowledge and the first rigorous analysis of convention. However, common knowledge and convention entered mainstream game theory only when they were formulated, later and independently, by other theorists. As a result, some of the most distinctive and valuable features of Lewis' game theory have been overlooked. We re-examine this theory by reconstructing key parts in a more formal way, extending it, and showing how it differs from more recent game (...)
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  2.  31
    Common Reasoning in Games: A Lewisian Analysis of Common Knowledge of Rationality.Robin P. Cubitt & Robert Sugden - 2014 - Economics and Philosophy 30 (3):285-329.
  3.  24
    Discovered Preferences and the Experimental Evidence of Violations of Expected Utility Theory.Robin P. Cubitt, Chris Starmer & Robert Sugden - 2001 - Journal of Economic Methodology 8 (3):385-414.
    The discovered preference hypothesis appears to insulate expected utility theory (EU) from disconfirming experimental evidence. It asserts that individuals have coherent underlying preferences, which experiments may not reveal unless subjects have adequate opportunities and incentives to discover which actions best satisfy their preferences. We identify the confounding effects to be expected in experiments, were that hypothesis true, and consider how they might be controlled for. We argue for a design in which each subject faces just one distinct choice task for (...)
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    On the Possibility of Rational Dilemmas: An Axiomatic Approach: Robin P. Cubitt.Robin P. Cubitt - 1993 - Economics and Philosophy 9 (1):1-23.
    In this paper, I address two connected issues that arise when one considers a rational agent facing a decision problem. One is whether or not the agent may find that the dictates of rationality are such that they cannot all be followed. For example, one may ask whether or not the requirements on the agent's actions imposed by rationality can conflict in an irreconcilable way, making it impossible to satisfy all of them. Put differently, one may ask whether or not (...)
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    The Mutual Investment Game: Peculiarities of Indifference.Robin P. Cubitt & Martin Hollis - 1991 - Analysis 51 (3):113 - 120.
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  6. The Mutual Investment Game: Peculiarities of Indifference.Robin P. Cubitt & Alonso Church - 1991 - Analysis 51 (3):113.
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    Edward F. McLennen, Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, Pp. Xiv + 311.Robin P. Cubitt - 1993 - Utilitas 5 (1):128.