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Robin Elizabeth Pope
University of New South Wales
  1.  33
    Towards a More Precise Decision Framework.Robin Pope - 1995 - Theory and Decision 39 (3):241-265.
  2.  26
    Timing Contradictions in von Neumann and Morgenstern's Axioms and in Savage's?Sure-Thing? Proof.Robin Pope - 1985 - Theory and Decision 18 (3):229-261.
  3.  6
    Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorders, Panic Attacks, Epileptic Fits, Depressions and Dementias From Missing Out on Appropriate Fears and Hopes.Robin Pope - 2015 - Mind and Society 14 (1):107-127.
    Fear is often seen as pathological, to be eliminated by expensive emotion-damping pharmaceuticals that have drastic side effects. Such therapies have indiscernible long-term success since they ignore why we have brains. This paper offers a new fundamental theory based on recognising that mental illness is bad decisionmaking—bad risk processing of external stimuli. Whiffs of danger—small risks —generate little fears and hopes of whether an act will have a nice or nasty surprise. From enough whiffs of danger with rapid reliable feedback (...)
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  4. ‘Risk in a Simple Temporal Framework for Expected Utility Theory and for SKAT, the Stages of Knowledge Ahead Theory’, Risk and Decision Analysis, 2(1), 5-32. Selten Co-Author.Robin Pope & Reinhard Selten - 2010/2011 - Risk and Decision Analysis 2 (1).
    The paper re-expresses arguments against the normative validity of expected utility theory in Robin Pope (1983, 1991a, 1991b, 1985, 1995, 2000, 2001, 2005, 2006, 2007). These concern the neglect of the evolving stages of knowledge ahead (stages of what the future will bring). Such evolution is fundamental to an experience of risk, yet not consistently incorporated even in axiomatised temporal versions of expected utility. Its neglect entails a disregard of emotional and financial effects on well-being before a particular risk is (...)
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  5.  38
    Reconciliation with the Utility of Chance by Elaborated Outcomes Destroys the Axiomatic Basis of Expected Utility Theory.Robin Pope - 2000 - Theory and Decision 49 (3):223-234.
    Expected utility theory does not directly deal with the utility of chance. It has been suggested in the literature (Samuelson, 1952, Markowitz, 1959) that this can be remedied by an approach which explicitly models the emotional consequences which give rise to the utility of chance. We refer to this as the elaborated outcomes approach. It is argued that the elaborated outcomes approach destroys the possibility of deriving a representation theorem based on the usual axioms of expected utility theory. This is (...)
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  6.  8
    Attractions to and Repulsions From Chance.Robin Pope - 1998 - Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 5:95-107.
    This paper is concerned with the discussion of the phenomenon sometimes described as “the utility and disutility of chance” both from the descriptive and the prescriptive point of view Emphasis is not on axioms and formal properties but on the psychological content of decision theoretic constructs.
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  7.  7
    Symposium on “Fear, Economic Behavior and Public Policies” - Part I: Preface.Mario A. Cedrini, Marco Novarese & Robin Pope - 2014 - Mind and Society 13 (2):213-214.