Ricoeur developed a very elaborated philosophy of religion. At the same time, he always moved along interdisciplinary borders of philosophy, theology, exegesis, historical and language sciences. His religious concerns are in this sense related to pre-philosophical experiences that within certain fields lend themselves to hermeneutical articulation. His analysis of the Scriptures in terms of narrativity deals with biblical texts. However, he doesn’t speak as a theologian,but as a philosopher, since the question of a philosophical and theological hermeneutics is from his (...) own point of view closely related to the fundamentaltension between autonomy and heteronomy. This paper regards his work as a new form of French philosophy of religion, and as a result of this includes a criticalconsideration of the pre-textual sphere understood as an absolute “priority”. This absolute “priority” should be presupposed by any hermeneutics of the written revelation, even when it is not able to provide a final response to its radical-phenomenological implications. (shrink)
A phenomenological reading of Pierre Maine de Brian offers a valuable understanding of one's own body in relation to the ego's apperceptive effort. As an organic mass, the body follows the double movement of this effort, manifested by an inner and an outer resistance. This movement allows the „constitution” of the world as correlative to the deployment of a force, identified with the apperception of the ego itself. This practical radicalization of the cogito can be viewed as the first outstanding (...) achievement of phenomenology itself, even prior to its historical foundation by Husserl. (shrink)
A phenomenological reading of Pierre Maine de Brian (1766-1824) offers a valuable understanding of one's own body in relation to the ego's apperceptive effort. As an organic mass, the body follows the double movement of this effort, manifested by an inner and an outer resistance. This movement allows the „constitution” of the world as correlative to the deployment of a force, identified with the apperception of the ego itself. This practical radicalization of the cogito can be viewed as the first (...) outstanding achievement of phenomenology itself, even prior to its historical foundation by Husserl. (shrink)
According to Henry, in Husserl’s analysis of time the retentional intentionality of the “now” implies that you cannot have the sensation of its pure reality. This inner-phenomenological criticism can be generally transferred to the relationship between time and life, since temporality, as the most inner structure of the world of becoming-outsideitself, does not allow any affective self-appearance of life. Finally, this aspect has critical consequences for the existential structure of care, which must be suspended as “transcendental illusion” of the ego, (...) in order to do justice to the immediacy of an immemorial birth in life. (shrink)
In Lacan’s perspective, the cogito is unable to account for the separation between desire and language for the individual. The fundamental difference pertaining to the signifier makes it impossible for the enunciation to ever coincide with what is enunciated. Therefore no final knowledge of self, being and reality is possible within the framework of the imaginary-symbolic life-world. This analysis, which is decisive for the therapeutic process, is then confronted with a radical-phenomenological critique that questions Lacan’s presuppositions about alterity from the (...) perspective of a primal and transcendental life, a confrontation that ought to bear fruit for the dialog between psychoanalysis and phenomenology. (shrink)
The paper attempts to propound a new understanding of the experience of the world and others on the basis of a radical phenomenology of the body, as it is revealed in the originary impressibility as affect and desire. This impressibility shapes every relation to beings and others due to the unity of an originary life that founds individuation before any temporal difference, having ethical consequences for a plural communality, which can no longer be characterized by means of mere abstract processes (...) of objectivation. (shrink)
ZusammenfassungDie traditionelle Bestimmung der Individuierung im philosophischen Sinne verläuft seit Aristoteles über die ousiologische Differenz als Kategorialisierung des Erscheinenden durch Sprache und Urteil. Demgegenüber ist der klassisch phänomenologische Individuierungsprozess an die innerzeitliche Lokalisierung im Bewusstseinsfeld gebunden, wodurch die reine Differenz von Erscheinen/Erscheinendem zum transzendentalen Faktum der Individuierung wird. Ungedacht bleibt dabei jedoch auch hier der originäre Bezug zum absoluten Leben diesseits jeglichen Seins. Wird daher die radikale Reziprozität von Leben/Individuum als Ur-Individuierung im Sinne einer ausschließlich intensiven »affektiven Differenz« bestimmt, so (...) ergibt sich eine Affinität zur christologischen Inkarnation. In jeder Bestimmung oder Setzung seitens philosophischen Denkens wird diese von der Philosophie selbst nicht geschaffene Faktizität vorausgesetzt, so dass der philosophische Vollzug als Selbstvollzug je individuierter Natur letztlich seinerseits in einer solch christologisch fundierten Individuierung begründet ist.SummarySince Aristotle the traditional definition of individuation has been considered on the basis of ousiological difference, i.e. in the sense of a categorization of the appearing in terms of language and judgment. In contrast, classical phenomenology has conceived the process of individuation with reference to the inner-temporal localization within the field of consciousness . Thereby the pure difference of appearing/appearances turns out to be the transcendental fact of individuation. But even in this phenomenological perspective the original relationship to absolute Life, taking place unmortgaged by Being, remains unthought. If, consequently, we take into account this radical reciprocity of absolute Life and the individual as the primal-individuation in the sense of an exclusively “affective difference”, a deeply-rooted affinity to the christological account on incarnation becomes visible. This reciprocity's facticity, which itself has not been created by philosophy, is taken for granted in every philosophical determination or position. Consequently, we have to understand that every philosophical performance in the sense of an ever individuated self-performance originates from this Christologically founded individuation. (shrink)
SOMMAIRE 1. Bewusstsein und Bestimmung als philosophische Problematik 2. Bedürfen als Einheit der Lebensbestimmung 3. Ökonomie und Bedürfen 4. Vom Gebrauchswert zum monetären Tauschwert 5. Kapitalismus als gegenwärtige „Bestimmung“.