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Ron Aboodi
University of Toronto, St. George Campus
  1.  90
    One Thought Too Few: Where De Dicto Moral Motivation is Necessary.Ron Aboodi - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (2):223-237.
    De dicto moral motivation is typically characterized by the agent’s conceiving of her goal in thin normative terms such as to do what is right. I argue that lacking an effective de dicto moral motivation would put the agent in a bad position for responding in the morally-best manner in a certain type of situations. Two central features of the relevant type of situations are the appropriateness of the agent’s uncertainty concerning her underived moral values, and the practical, moral importance (...)
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  2. Deontology, Individualism, and Uncertainty, a Reply to Jackson and Smith.Ron Aboodi, Adi Borer & and David Enoch - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (5):259-272.
    How should deontological theories that prohibit actions of type K — such as intentionally killing an innocent person — deal with cases of uncertainty as to whether a particular action is of type K? Frank Jackson and Michael Smith, who raise this problem in their paper "Absolutist Moral Theories and Uncertainty" (2006), focus on a case where a skier is about to cause the death of ten innocent people — we don’t know for sure whether on purpose or not — (...)
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  3. The Wrong Time to Aim at What's Right: When is De Dicto Moral Motivation Less Virtuous?Ron Aboodi - 2015 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (3pt3):307-314.
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 115, Issue 3pt3, Page 307-314, December 2015.
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    Normative Uncertainty Without Unjustified Value Comparisons.Ron Aboodi - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 21 (3).
    Jennifer Rose Carr’s (2020) article “Normative Uncertainty Without Theories” proposes a method to maximize expected value under normative uncertainty without Intertheoretic Value Comparison (hereafter IVC). Carr argues that this method avoids IVC because it avoids theories: the agent’s credence is distributed among normative hypotheses of a particular type, which don’t constitute theories. However, I argue that Carr’s method doesn’t avoid or help to solve what I consider as the justificatory problem of IVC, which isn’t specific to comparing theories as such. (...)
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  5. What’s Wrong with Manipulation in Education?Ron Aboodi - 2021 - Philosophy of Education 77 (2):66-80.
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