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Ron Chrisley [23]Ronald L. Chrisley [19]Ronald Chrisley [3]
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Ron Chrisley
University of Sussex
  1. Virtual Machines and Consciousness.Aaron Sloman & Ronald L. Chrisley - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (4-5):133-172.
    Replication or even modelling of consciousness in machines requires some clarifications and refinements of our concept of consciousness. Design of, construction of, and interaction with artificial systems can itself assist in this conceptual development. We start with the tentative hypothesis that although the word “consciousness” has no well-defined meaning, it is used to refer to aspects of human and animal informationprocessing. We then argue that we can enhance our understanding of what these aspects might be by designing and building virtual-machine (...)
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  2.  19
    Prevailing Theories of Consciousness Are Challenged by Novel Cross-Modal Associations Acquired Between Subliminal Stimuli.Ryan B. Scott, Jason Samaha, Ron Chrisley & Zoltan Dienes - 2018 - Cognition 175:169-185.
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  3. Why Everything Doesn't Realize Every Computation.Ronald L. Chrisley - 1994 - Minds and Machines 4 (4):403-20.
    Some have suggested that there is no fact to the matter as to whether or not a particular physical system relaizes a particular computational description. This suggestion has been taken to imply that computational states are not real, and cannot, for example, provide a foundation for the cognitive sciences. In particular, Putnam has argued that every ordinary open physical system realizes every abstract finite automaton, implying that the fact that a particular computational characterization applies to a physical system does not (...)
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  4.  25
    Why Everything Doesn't Realize Every Computation.Ronald L. Chrisley - 1994 - Minds and Machines 4 (4):403-420.
    Some have suggested that there is no fact to the matter as to whether or not a particular physical system relaizes a particular computational description. This suggestion has been taken to imply that computational states are not real, and cannot, for example, provide a foundation for the cognitive sciences. In particular, Putnam has argued that every ordinary open physical system realizes every abstract finite automaton, implying that the fact that a particular computational characterization applies to a physical system does not (...)
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  5.  62
    Synthetic Phenomenology.Ron Chrisley - 2009 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (1):53-70.
    The term \synthetic phenomenology" refers to: 1) any attempt to characterize the phenomenal states possessed, or modeled by, an artefact ; or 2) any attempt to use an artefact to help specify phenomenal states. The notion of synthetic phenomenology is clari¯ed, and distinguished from some related notions. It is argued that much work in machine consciousness would bene¯t from being more cognizant of the need for synthetic phenomenology of the ¯rst type, and of the possible forms it may take. It (...)
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  6. Machine Consciousness.Robert Clowes, Steve Torrance & Ron Chrisley - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (7):7-14.
     
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  7.  76
    Embodiment.Ron Chrisley - 2003 - In L. Nagel (ed.), The Macmillan Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan.
  8.  80
    Synthetic Phenomenology:Exploiting Embodiment to Specify the Non-Conceptual Content of Visual Experience.Ron Chrisley & J. Parthemore - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (7):44-58.
    Not all research in machine consciousness aims to instantiate phenomenal states in artefacts. For example, one can use artefacts that do not themselves have phenomenal states, merely to simulate or model organisms that do. Nevertheless, one might refer to all of these pursuits -- instantiating, simulating or modelling phenomenal states in an artefact -- as 'synthetic phenomenality'. But there is another way in which artificial agents (be they simulated or real) may play a crucial role in understanding or creating consciousness: (...)
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  9. Philosophical Foundations of Artificial Consciousness.Ron Chrisley - 2008 - Artificial Intelligence in Medicine 44 (2):119-137.
    replicated by artificial intelligence (AI). The firstpersonal, subjective, what-it-is-like-to-be-something nature of consciousness is thought to be untouchable by the computations, algorithms, processing and functions of AI method. Since AI is the most promising avenue toward artificial consciousness (AC), the conclusion many draw is that AC is..
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  10.  23
    Embodied Artificial Intelligence.Ron Chrisley - 2003 - Artificial Intelligence 149 (1):131-150.
    Mike Anderson1 has given us a thoughtful and useful field guide: Not in the genre of a bird-watcher’s guide which is carried in the field and which contains detailed descriptions of possible sightings, but in the sense of a guide to a field (in this case embodied cognition) which aims to identify that field’s general principles and properties. I’d like to make some comments that will hopefully complement Anderson’s work, highlighting points of agreement and disagreement between his view of the (...)
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  11.  41
    Virtualist Representation.Robert W. Clowes & Ron Chrisley - 2012 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 4 (2):503-522.
    This paper seeks to identify, clarify, and perhaps rehabilitate the virtual reality metaphor as applied to the goal of understanding consciousness. Some proponents of the metaphor apply it in a way that implies a representational view of experience of a particular, extreme form that is indirect, internal and inactive (what we call “presentational virtualism”). In opposition to this is an application of the metaphor that eschews representation, instead preferring to view experience as direct, external and enactive (“enactive virtualism”). This paper (...)
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  12. Transparent Computationalism.Ronald L. Chrisley - unknown
    Summary. A distinction is made between two senses of the claim “cognition is computation”. One sense, the opaque reading, takes computation to be whatever is described by our current computational theory and claims that cognition is best understood in terms of that theory. The transparent reading, which has its primary allegiance to the phenomenon of computation, rather than to any particular theory of it, is the claim that the best account of cognition will be given by whatever theory turns out (...)
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  13.  76
    Taking Embodiment Seriously: Nonconceptual Content and Robotics.Ronald L. Chrisley - 1994 - In Kenneth M. Ford, C. Glymour & Patrick Hayes (eds.), Android Epistemology. MIT Press.
    The development and deployment of the notion of pre-objective or nonconceptual content for the purposes of intentional explanation of requires assistance from a practical and theoretical understanding of computational/robotic systems acting in real-time and real-space. In particular, the usual "that"-clause specification of content will not work for non-conceptual contents; some other means of specification is required, means that make use of the fact that contents are aspects of embodied and embedded systems. That is, the specification of non-conceptual content should use (...)
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  14. Modelling Consciousness-Dependent Expertise in Machine Medical Moral Agents.Steve Torrance & Ron Chrisley - unknown
    It is suggested that some limitations of current designs for medical AI systems stem from the failure of those designs to address issues of artificial consciousness. Consciousness would appear to play a key role in the expertise, particularly the moral expertise, of human medical agents, including, for example, autonomous weighting of options in diagnosis; planning treatment; use of imaginative creativity to generate courses of action; sensorimotor flexibility and sensitivity; empathetic and morally appropriate responsiveness; and so on. Thus, it is argued, (...)
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  15. Non-Conceptual Psychological Explanation: Content and Computation.Ronald L. Chrisley - 1996 - Dissertation, Oxford
    2.4 The Example: Infants and object-(im)permanence : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 17 2.4.1 Why a contentful account is warranted: Perspectival sensitivity : : : 17 2.4.2 The \searching under a cloth" and \AB" data : : : : : : : : : : : : 24 2.4.3 Two constraints on objectuality : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : (...)
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  16. Learning in Non-Superpositional Quantum Neurocomputers.Ronald L. Chrisley - 1996 - In Paavo Pylkkänen & Pauli Pylkkö (eds.), Brain, Mind & Physics.
    A distinction is made between superpositional and non-superpositional quantum computers. The notion of quantum learning systems - quantum computers that modify themselves in order to improve their performance - is introduced. A particular non-superpositional quantum learning system, a quantum neurocomputer, is described: a conventional neural network implemented in a system which is a variation on the familiar two-slit apparatus from quantum physics. This is followed by a discussion of the advantages that quantum computers in general, and quantum neurocomputers in particular, (...)
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  17. Connectionist Synthetic Epistemology: Requirements for the Development of Objectivity.Ron Chrisley & Andy Holland - unknown
    A connectionist system that is capable of learning about the spatial structure of a simple world is used for the purposes of synthetic epistemology: the creation and analysis of artificial systems in order to clarify philosophical issues that arise in the explanation of how agents, both natural and artificial, represent the world. In this case, the issues to be clarified focus on the content of representational states that exist prior to a fully objective understanding of a spatial domain. In particular, (...)
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  18. A View From Anywhere: Prospects for an Objective Understanding of Consciousness.Ronald L. Chrisley - 2001 - In Paavo Pylkkanen & Tere Vaden (eds.), Dimensions of Conscious Experience. John Benjamins.
    It is by now commonly agreed that the proper study of consciousness requires a multidisciplinary approach which focuses on the varieties and dimensions of conscious experience from different angles. This book, which is based on a workshop held at the University of Skövde, Sweden, provides a microcosm of the emerging discipline of consciousness studies and focuses on some important but neglected aspects of consciousness. The book brings together philosophy, psychology, cognitive neuroscience, linguistics, cognitive and computer science, biology, physics, art and (...)
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  19. Some Foundational Issues Concerning Anticipatory Systems.Ron Chrisley - unknown
    Some foundational conceptual issues concerning anticipatory systems are identified and discussed: 1) The doubly temporal nature of anticipation is noted: anticipations are directed toward one time, and exist at another; 2) Anticipatory systems can be open: they can perturb and be perturbed by states external to the system; 3) Anticipation may be facilitated by a system modeling the relation between its own output, its environment, and its future input; 4) Anticipations must be a part of the system whose anticipations they (...)
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  20.  40
    Robotic Specification of the Non-Conceptual Content of Visual Experience.Ron Chrisley & Joel Parthemore - 2007 - In Proceedings of the AAAI Fall Symposium on "Consciousness and Artificial Intelligence: Theoretical foundations and current approaches". AAAI.
    Standard, linguistic means of specifying the content of mental states do so by expressing the content in question. Such means fail when it comes to capturing non-conceptual aspects of visual experience, since no linguistic expression can adequately express such content. One alternative is to use depictions: images that either evoke (reproduce in the recipient) or refer to the content of the experience. Practical considerations concerning the generation and integration of such depictions argue in favour of a synthetic approach: the generation (...)
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  21. The Macmillan Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science.Ron Chrisley - 2003
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  22. Connectionism, Cognitive Maps and the Development of Objectivity.Ronald L. Chrisley - 1993 - AI Review 7:329-354.
    It is claimed that there are pre-objective phenomena, which cognitive science should explain by employing the notion of non-conceptual representational content. It is argued that a match between parallel distributed processing (PDP) and non-conceptual content (NCC) not only provides a means of refuting recent criticisms of PDP as a cognitive architecture; it also provides a vehicle for NCC that is required by naturalism. A connectionist cognitive mapping algorithm is used as a case study to examine the affinities between PDP and (...)
     
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  23. Assessing Artificial Consciousness.Igor Aleksander, Susan Stuart, Tom Ziemke, Ron Chrisley & Uziel Awret - 2008 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (7):95-110.
    While the recent special issue of JCS on machine consciousness (Volume 14, Issue 7) was in preparation, a collection of papers on the same topic, entitled Artificial Consciousness and edited by Antonio Chella and Riccardo Manzotti, was published. 1 The editors of the JCS special issue, Ron Chrisley, Robert Clowes and Steve Torrance, thought it would be a timely and productive move to have authors of papers in their collection review the papers in the Chella and Manzotti book, and include (...)
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  24. Appearances Can Be Deceiving: Critical Notice of Consciousness and Robot Sentience.Ron Chrisley - 2014 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 6 (1):13-20.
    Ron Chrisley, Int. J. Mach. Conscious., 06, 13 (2014). DOI: 10.1142/S1793843014400034.
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  25. Artificial Consciousness, Meta-Knowledge, and Physical Omniscience.Ron Chrisley - 2020 - Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness 7 (2):199-215.
    Previous work [Chrisley & Sloman, 2016, 2017] has argued that a capacity for certain kinds of meta-knowledge is central to modeling consciousness, especially the recalcitrant aspects of qualia, in computational architectures. After a quick review of that work, this paper presents a novel objection to Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument (KA) against physicalism, an objec- tion in which such meta-knowledge also plays a central role. It is first shown that the KA's supposition of a person, Mary, who is physically omniscient, and (...)
     
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  26.  33
    Artificial Intelligence: Critical Concepts in Cognitive Science.Ronald Chrisley (ed.) - 2001 - Routledge.
    The scientific field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) began in the 1950s but the concept of artificial intelligence, the idea of something with mind-like attributes, predates it by centuries. This historically rich concept has served as a blueprint for the research into intelligent machines. But it also has staggering implications for our notions of who we are: our psychology, biology, philosophy, technology and society. This reference work provides scholars in both the humanities and the sciences with the material essential for charting (...)
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  27.  4
    A View From Anywhere Prospects for an Objective Understanding.Ronald L. Chrisley - 2001 - In Paavo Pylkkanen & Tere Vaden (eds.), Dimensions of Conscious Experience. John Benjamins. pp. 37--3.
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  28. Brain Inspired Cognitive Systems (BICS).Ron Chrisley - unknown
    This Neurocomputing special issue is based on selected, expanded and significantly revised versions of papers presented at the Second International Conference on Brain Inspired Cognitive Systems (BICS 2006) held at Lesvos, Greece, from 10 to 14 October 2006. The aim of BICS 2006, which followed the very successful first BICS 2004 held at Stirling, Scotland, was to bring together leading scientists and engineers who use analytic, syntactic and computational methods both to understand the prodigious processing properties of biological systems and, (...)
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  29. Cognitive Robot Architectures: Proceedings of EUCognition 2016.Ron Chrisley, Vincent C. Müller, Yulia Sandamirskaya & Markus Vincze (eds.) - 2017 - Hamburg: CEUR-WS.
    The European Association for Cognitive Systems is the association resulting from the EUCog network, which has been active since 2006. It has ca. 1000 members and is currently chaired by Vincent C. Müller. We ran our annual conference on December 08-09 2016, kindly hosted by the Technical University of Vienna with Markus Vincze as local chair. The invited speakers were David Vernon and Paul F.M.J. Verschure. Out of the 49 submissions for the meeting, we accepted 18 a papers and 25 (...)
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  30. Externalism Before Language: The Real Reason Why “Thoughts Ain't in the Head”.Ronald L. Chrisley - unknown
    It is argued that standard arguments for the Externalism of mental states do not succeed in the case of pre-linguistic mental states. Further, it is noted that standard arguments for Internalism appeal to the principle that our individuation of mental states should be driven by what states are explanatory in our best cognitive science. This principle is used against the Internalist to reject the necessity of narrow individuation of mental states, even in the prelinguistic case. This is done by showing (...)
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  31. European Review of Philosophy, Volume 1: Philosophy of Mind.Ronald L. Chrisley - 1994 - Stanford: CSLI Publications.
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  32.  22
    Guest Editors' Introduction.Ron Chrisley & Robert W. Clowes - 2012 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 4 (2):313-323.
  33.  47
    How Velmans' Conscious Experiences Affected Our Brains.Ron Chrisley & Aaron Sloman - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (11):58-62.
    Velmans’ paper raises three problems concerning mental causation: (1) How can consciousness affect the physical, given that the physical world appears causally closed? 10 (2) How can one be in conscious control of processes of which one is not consciously aware? (3) Conscious experiences appear to come too late to causally affect the processes to which they most obviously relate. In an appendix Velmans gives his reasons for refusing to resolve these problems through adopting the position (which he labels ‘physicalism’) (...)
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  34. IgorAleksanderThe World in My Mind, My Mind in the World: Key Mechanisms of Consciousness in People, Animals and Machines2005Imprint Academic1 845 40021 6£ 17.95 (UK)/$34.90 (US)(196 Pp.). [REVIEW]Ron Chrisley - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (1):5-6.
     
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  35. Non-Conceptual Psychological Explanation: Content and Computation.Ronald L. Chrisley - 1996 - Dissertation, Oxford
  36. Non-Compositional Representation in Connectionist Networks.Ronald L. Chrisley - unknown
    have context-sensitive constituents, but rather because they sometimes have no constituents at all. The argument to be rejected depends on the assumption that one can only assign propositional contents to representations if one starts by assigning sub-propositional contents to atomic representations. I give some philosophical arguments and present a counterexample to show that this assumption is mistaken.
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  37.  98
    Painting an Experience: Las Meninas, Consciousness and the Aesthetic Mode.Ron Chrisley - 2008 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (9):40-45.
    Paintings are usually paintings of things: a room in a palace, a princess, a dog. But what would it be to paint not those things, but the experience of seeing those things? Las Meninas is sufficiently sophisticated and masterfully executed to help us explore this question. Of course, there are many kinds of paintings: some abstract, some conceptual, some with more traditional subjects. Let us start with a focus on naturalistically depictive paintings: paintings that aim to cause an experience in (...)
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  38.  67
    Quantum Learning.Ronald Chrisley - 1995 - In P. Pyllkkänen & P. Pyllkkö (eds.), New Directions in Cognitive Science. Finnish Society for Artificial Intelligence.
  39. Singular Terms and Reference: Evans and "Julius".Ronald Chrisley - 1998 - Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 6.
    "Let us call whoever invented the zip "Julius"." With this stipulation, Gareth Evans introduced "Julius" into the language as one of a category of terms that seem to lie somewhere between definite descriptions (such as "whoever invented the zip") and proper names (such as "John", or "Julius" as usually used) (Evans 1982: 31). He dubbed these terms "descriptive names"1, and used them as a foil against which to test several theories of reference: Frege's, Russell's, and his own. I want to (...)
     
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  40. Taking Embodiment Seriously Non-Conceptual Content and Computation.Ronald L. Chrisley - 1992 - School of Cognitive and Computing Sciences, University of Sussex.
  41. The Ontological Status of Computational States.Ronald L. Chrisley - 1994 - In Gianfranco Soldati (ed.), European Review of Philosophy, 1: Philosophy of Mind. CSLI Publications. pp. 55-75.
  42. The Ontological Status of Computational States.Ronald L. Chrisley - 1992 - School of Cognitive and Computing Sciences, University of Sussex.
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  43.  46
    What Might Dynamical Intentionality Be, If Not Computation?Ronald L. Chrisley - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):634-635.
    (1) Van Gelder's concession that the dynamical hypothesis is not in opposition to computation in general does not agree well with his anticomputational stance. (2) There are problems with the claim that dynamic systems allow for nonrepresentational aspects of computation in a way in which digital computation cannot. (3) There are two senses of the “cognition is computation” claim and van Gelder argues against only one of them. (4) Dynamical systems as characterized in the target article share problems of universal (...)
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  44. Weak Strong AI: An Elaboration of the English Reply to the Chinese Room.Ronald L. Chrisley - unknown
    Searle (1980) constructed the Chinese Room (CR) to argue against what he called \Strong AI": the claim that a computer can understand by virtue of running a program of the right sort. Margaret Boden (1990), in giving the English Reply to the Chinese Room argument, has pointed out that there isunderstanding in the Chinese Room: the understanding required to recognize the symbols, the understanding of English required to read the rulebook, etc. I elaborate on and defend this response to Searle. (...)
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  45.  11
    The Physical Mandate for Belief-Goal Psychology.Simon McGregor & Ron Chrisley - 2020 - Minds and Machines 30 (1):23-45.
    This article describes a heuristic argument for understanding certain physical systems in terms of properties that resemble the beliefs and goals of folk psychology. The argument rests on very simple assumptions. The core of the argument is that predictions about certain events can legitimately be based on assumptions about later events, resembling Aristotelian ‘final causation’; however, more nuanced causal entities must be introduced into these types of explanation in order for them to remain consistent with a causally local Universe.
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