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Ronald N. Giere [89]Ronald Nelson Giere [1]
  1. Scientific Perspectivism.Ronald N. Giere - 2006 - University of Chicago Press.
    Many people assume that the claims of scientists are objective truths. But historians, sociologists, and philosophers of science have long argued that scientific claims reflect the particular historical, cultural, and social context in which those claims were made. The nature of scientific knowledge is not absolute because it is influenced by the practice and perspective of human agents. Scientific Perspectivism argues that the acts of observing and theorizing are both perspectival, and this nature makes scientific knowledge contingent, as Thomas Kuhn (...)
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  2. Science Without Laws.Ronald N. Giere - 1999 - University of Chicago Press.
    Debate over the nature of science has recently moved from the halls of academia into the public sphere, where it has taken shape as the "science wars." At issue is the question of whether scientific knowledge is objective and universal or socially mediated, whether scientific truths are independent of human values and beliefs. Ronald Giere is a philosopher of science who has been at the forefront of this debate from its inception, and Science without Laws offers a much-needed mediating perspective (...)
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  3. How Models Are Used to Represent Reality.Ronald N. Giere - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (5):742-752.
    Most recent philosophical thought about the scientific representation of the world has focused on dyadic relationships between language-like entities and the world, particularly the semantic relationships of reference and truth. Drawing inspiration from diverse sources, I argue that we should focus on the pragmatic activity of representing, so that the basic representational relationship has the form: Scientists use models to represent aspects of the world for specific purposes. Leaving aside the terms "law" and "theory," I distinguish principles, specific conditions, models, (...)
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  4.  47
    Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World.Ronald N. Giere - 1988 - Philosophical Review 97 (3):444.
  5. An Agent-Based Conception of Models and Scientific Representation.Ronald N. Giere - 2010 - Synthese 172 (2):269–281.
    I argue for an intentional conception of representation in science that requires bringing scientific agents and their intentions into the picture. So the formula is: Agents (1) intend; (2) to use model, M; (3) to represent a part of the world, W; (4) for some purpose, P. This conception legitimates using similarity as the basic relationship between models and the world. Moreover, since just about anything can be used to represent anything else, there can be no unified ontology of models. (...)
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  6. Understanding Scientific Reasoning.Ronald N. Giere - 1991 - Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.
  7. Using Models to Represent Reality.Ronald N. Giere - 1999 - In L. Magnani, N. J. Nersessian & P. Thagard (eds.), Model-Based Reasoning in Scientific Discovery. Kluwer/Plenum. pp. 41--57.
  8. Distributed Cognition: Where the Cognitive and the Social Merge.Ronald N. Giere & B. Moffatt - 2003 - Social Studies of Science 33 (2):301--310.
    Among the many contested boundaries in science studies is that between the cognitive and the social. Here, we are concerned to question this boundary from a perspective within the cognitive sciences based on the notion of distributed cognition. We first present two of many contemporary sources of the notion of distributed cognition, one from the study of artificial neural networks and one from cognitive anthropology. We then proceed to reinterpret two well-known essays by Bruno Latour, ‘Visualization and Cognition: Thinking with (...)
     
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  9. Distributed Cognition Without Distributed Knowing.Ronald N. Giere - 2007 - Social Epistemology 21 (3):313-320.
    In earlier works, I have argued that it is useful to think of much scientific activity, particularly in experimental sciences, as involving the operation of distributed cognitive systems, as these are understood in the contemporary cognitive sciences. Introducing a notion of distributed cognition, however, invites consideration of whether, or in what way, related cognitive activities, such as knowing, might also be distributed. In this paper I will argue that one can usefully introduce a notion of distributed cognition without attributing other (...)
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  10.  27
    Origins of Logical Empiricism. Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science, Vol. XVI.Ronald N. Giere & Alan W. Richardson (eds.) - 1996 - Univ of Minnesota Press.
    This latest volume in the eminent Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science series examines the main features of the intellectual milieu from which logical empiricism sprang, providing the first critical exploration of this context by ...
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  11. Philosophy of Science Naturalized.Ronald N. Giere - 1985 - Philosophy of Science 52 (3):331-356.
    In arguing a "role for history," Kuhn was proposing a naturalized philosophy of science. That, I argue, is the only viable approach to the philosophy of science. I begin by exhibiting the main general objections to a naturalistic approach. These objections, I suggest, are equally powerful against nonnaturalistic accounts. I review the failure of two nonnaturalistic approaches, methodological foundationism (Carnap, Reichenbach, and Popper) and metamethodology (Lakatos and Laudan). The correct response, I suggest, is to adopt an "evolutionary perspective." This perspective (...)
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  12. Objective Single-Case Probabilities and the Foundations of Statistics.Ronald N. Giere - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge.
  13. Is Computer Simulation Changing the Face of Experimentation?Ronald N. Giere - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (1):59 - 62.
    Morrison points out many similarities between the roles of simulation models and other sorts of models in science. On the basis of these similarities she claims that running a simulation is epistemologically on a par with doing a traditional experiment and that the output of a simulation therefore counts as a measurement. I agree with her premises but reject the inference. The epistemological payoff of a traditional experiment is greater (or less) confidence in the fit between a model and a (...)
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  14. Representation in Scientific Practice.Ronald N. Giere, Michael Lynch & Steve Woolgar - 1994 - Biology and Philosophy 9 (1):113-120.
  15. History and Philosophy of Science: Intimate Relationship or Marriage of Convenience? "Historical and Philosophical Perspectives of Science, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science", 5). [REVIEW]Ronald N. Giere - 1973 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24:282.
  16. The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Theories.Ronald N. Giere - 1994 - Philosophy of Science 61 (2):276-296.
    This paper explores a new reason for preferring a model-theoretic approach to understanding the nature of scientific theories. Identifying the models in philosophers' model-theoretic accounts of theories with the concepts in cognitive scientists' accounts of categorization suggests a structure to families of models far richer than has commonly been assumed. Using classical mechanics as an example, it is argued that families of models may be "mapped" as an array with "horizontal" graded structures, multiply hierarchical "vertical" structures, and local "radial" structures. (...)
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  17. Discussion Note: Distributed Cognition in Epistemic Cultures.Ronald N. Giere - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (4):637-644.
    In Epistemic Cultures (1999), Karin Knorr Cetina argues that different scientific fields exhibit different epistemic cultures. She claims that in high energy physics (HEP) individual persons are displaced as epistemic subjects in favor of experiments themselves. In molecular biology (MB), by contrast, individual persons remain the primary epistemic subjects. Using Ed Hutchins' (1995) account of navigation aboard a traditional US Navy ship as a prototype, I argue that both HEP and MB exhibit forms of distributed cognition. That is, in both (...)
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  18.  47
    Scientific Rationality as Instrumental Rationality.Ronald N. Giere - 1989 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 20 (3):377.
  19.  89
    The Nature and Function of Models.Ronald N. Giere - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (6):1060-1060.
    There is no best scientific model of anything; there are only models more or less good for different purposes. Thus, there is no general answer to the question of whether one should model biological behavior using computer simulations or robots. It all depends on what one wants to learn. This is not a question about models, but about scientific goals.
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  20. Modest Evolutionary Naturalism.Ronald N. Giere - 2006 - Biological Theory 1 (1):52-60.
    I begin by arguing that a consistent general naturalism must be understood in terms of methodological maxims rather than metaphysical doctrines. Some specific maxims are proposed. I then defend a generalized naturalism from the common objection that it is incapable of accounting for the normative aspects of human life, including those of scientific practice itself. Evolutionary naturalism, however, is criticized as being incapable of providing a sufficient explanation of categorical moral norms. Turning to the epistemological norms of science itself, particularly (...)
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  21.  85
    A New Program for Philosophy of Science?Ronald N. Giere - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (1):15-21.
    I contend that Janet Kourany's "A Philosophy of Science for the Twenty-First Century" contains three levels of projects: (1) a naturalistic project, (2) a critical project, and (3) a political project. The naturalistic project is already well established. The critical project is less valued and less established within the profession, but seems a worthy and achievable goal. The political project, I argue, takes one outside the professional pursuit of the philosophy of science. The critical project encompasses both the evaluation of (...)
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  22.  3
    From W Issenschaftliche Philosophie to Philosophy of Science.Ronald N. Giere - 1999 - University of Chicago Press.
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  23.  96
    The Role of Agency in Distributed Cognitive Systems.Ronald N. Giere - 2006 - Philosophy of Science 73 (5):710-719.
    In previous publications I have argued that much scientific activity should be thought of as involving the operation of distributed cognitive systems. Since these contributions to the cognitive study of science appear in venues not necessarily frequented by philosophers of science, I begin with a brief introduction to the notion of a distributed cognitive system. I then describe what I take to be an exemplary case of a scientific distributed cognitive system, the Hubble Space Telescope (HST). I do not here (...)
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  24.  59
    Scientific Cognition: Human Centered but Not Human Bound.Ronald N. Giere - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):199 - 206.
    While agreeing that cognition in the sciences is usefully thought of as involving processes encompassing both humans and artifacts, I object to attributing cognitive states to extended systems. I argue that cognitive states, such as ?knowing?, should be confined to the human components of cognitive systems. My argument appeals to the large dimensions, both spatial and temporal, of many scientific cognitive systems, the existence of epistemic norms, and the need for agents in science.
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  25.  49
    A Laplacean Formal Semantics for Single-Case Propensities.Ronald N. Giere - 1976 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 (3):321 - 353.
    Even those generally skeptical of propensity interpretations of probability must now grant the following two points. First, the above single-case propensity interpretation meets recognized formal conditions for being a genuine interpretation of probability. Second, this interpretation is not logically reducible to a hypothetical relative frequency interpretation, nor is it only vacuously different from such an interpretation.The main objection to this propensity interpretation must be not that it is too vague or vacuous, but that it is metaphysically too extravagant. It asserts (...)
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  26. The Role of Computation in Scientific Cognition.Ronald N. Giere - unknown
    This paper is a contribution to that part of science studies known as 'the cognitive study of science'. The general goal of such studies is to understand cogni-.
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  27. Kuhn as Perspectival Realist.Ronald N. Giere - 2013 - Topoi 32 (1):53-57.
    In this essay I argue that T. S. Kuhn, at least in his later works, can be regarded as a perspectival realist. This is a retrospective interpretation based mainly on the essays published posthumously under the title The Road Since Structure (Kuhn 2000). Among the strongest grounds for this interpretation is that Kuhn explicitly states that one must have a “lexicon” in place before raising questions about the truth or falsity of claims made using elements of the lexicon. This, in (...)
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  28.  18
    ESP and Psychokinesis: A Philosophical Examination.Ronald N. Giere & Stephen E. Braude - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (2):288.
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  29. Scientific Perspectivism: Behind the Stage Door.Ronald N. Giere - 2009 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (2):221-223.
    Adopting the stage metaphor suggested in Brown’s review, and treating Scientific perspectivism as a play in five acts, I respond to his review as a playwright might respond to a generally favorable review. Taking the reader behind the stage door, I discuss the playwright’s intentions for each act, paying special attention to the expected audience for the play as a whole. The result, therefore, supplements the review from the standpoint of the playwright. It also provides answers to some of the (...)
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  30. Scientific Realism: Old and New Problems.Ronald N. Giere - 2005 - Erkenntnis 63 (2):149-165.
    Scientific realism is a doctrine that was both in and out of fashion several times during the twentieth century. I begin by noting three presuppositions of a succinct characterization of scientific realism offered initially by the foremost critic in the latter part of the century, Bas van Fraassen. The first presupposition is that there is a fundamental distinction to be made between what is “empirical” and what is “theoretical”. The second presupposition is that a genuine scientific realism is committed to (...)
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  31.  47
    Feyerabend's perspectivism.Ronald N. Giere - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 57:137-141.
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  32.  95
    Propensity and Necessity.Ronald N. Giere - 1979 - Synthese 40 (3):439 - 451.
  33.  38
    The Scientist as Adult.Ronald N. Giere - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (4):538-541.
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  34.  71
    No Representation Without Representation.Ronald N. Giere - 1994 - Biology and Philosophy 9 (1):113-120.
  35.  13
    What Does Explanatory Coherence Explain?Ronald N. Giere - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):475-476.
  36.  50
    A New Program for the Philosophy of Science?Ronald N. Giere - 2012 - Perspectives on Science 20 (3):339-343.
  37. Computation and Agency in Scientific Cognition.Ronald N. Giere - unknown
    I begin with a representative example of a contemporary scientific activity, observations using the Hubble Space Telescope, and ask what approaches within the cognitive sciences seem most fruitful as aids in developing an overall account of this sort of scientific activity. After presenting the Hubble Space Telescope System and a recent result, I consider applying a standard computational paradigm to this system. I find difficulties in identifying an appropriate cognitive agent and in making a suitable place for the instrumentation that (...)
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  38. Critical Hypothetical Evolutionary Naturalism.Ronald N. Giere - unknown
    Among philosophers, Don Campbell is best known for his naturalistic, evolutionary approach to epistemology. There can be no doubt, however, that he was a thoroughgoing naturalist in all matters, even though he seems to have had little interest in exploring naturalism as a general philosophical position. He was professionally more interested in the origins and workings of knowledge producing social systems. I am interested in these things too, but also naturalism in general. So my tribute to Don will be to (...)
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  39.  21
    A New Framework for Teaching Scientific Reasoning.Ronald N. Giere - 2001 - Argumentation 15 (1):21-33.
  40.  51
    An Orthodox Statistical Resolution of the Paradox of Confirmation.Ronald N. Giere - 1970 - Philosophy of Science 37 (3):354-362.
    Several authors, e.g. Patrick Suppes and I. J. Good, have recently argued that the paradox of confirmation can be resolved within the developing subjective Bayesian account of inductive reasoning. The aim of this paper is to show that the paradox can also be resolved by the rival orthodox account of hypothesis testing currently employed by most statisticians and scientists. The key to the orthodox statistical resolution is the rejection of a generalized version of Hempel's instantiation condition, namely, the condition that (...)
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  41.  48
    Bayesian Statistics and Biased Procedures.Ronald N. Giere - 1969 - Synthese 20 (3):371 - 387.
    A comparison of Neyman's theory of interval estimation with the corresponding subjective Bayesian theory of credible intervals shows that the Bayesian approach to the estimation of statistical parameters allows experimental procedures which, from the orthodox objective viewpoint, are clearly biased and clearly inadmissible. This demonstrated methodological difference focuses attention on the key difference in the two general theories, namely, that the orthodox theory is supposed to provide a known average frequency of successful estimates, whereas the Bayesian account provides only a (...)
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  42.  19
    Causal Models with Frequency Dependence.Ronald N. Giere - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (7):384.
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  43.  36
    Viewing Science.Ronald N. Giere - 1994 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:3 - 16.
    This address focuses on those of us engaged in viewing science, particularly philosophers and sociologists of science. I begin with a historical perspective on the philosophy of science, focusing on the historical contingencies which have shaped its development since the 1930s. I then turn my gaze to the more recent history of the sociology of science. For both disciplines I hold up to view the reflexive problem of the status of that discipline's claims from its own perspective. I conclude with (...)
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  44.  20
    The Feminism Question in the Philosophy of Science.Ronald N. Giere - 1996 - In Lynn Hankinson Nelson & Jack Nelson (eds.), Feminism, Science, and the Philosophy of Science. pp. 3--15.
  45.  29
    Causal Models with Frequency Dependence.Ronald N. Giere - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (7):384-391.
  46. Is Realism Dead?Ronald N. Giere - 2005 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 86 (1):287-304.
    I appreciate Norton Wise’s comparison of my project in Explaining Science (1988) with that of Enlightenment scientists and philosophers. When rejecting one’s immediate philosophical predecessors, it is comforting to be able to portray oneself not as a heretic who has abandoned philosophy, but as a reformer who would return philosophy to the correct path from which his predecessors had strayed. -/- But we cannot simply return to the ideals of the Enlightenment. Some doctrines that were fundamental to the Enlightenment picture (...)
     
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  47.  27
    Cognitive Models in the Philosophy of Science.Ronald N. Giere - 1986 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:319 - 328.
    This paper provides a general defense of the idea that the cognitive sciences provide models that are useful for exploring issues that have traditionally occupied philosophers of science. Questions about the nature of theories, for example, are assimilated into studies of the nature of cognitive representations, while questions concerning the choice of theories fall under studies of human judgment and decision making. The implications of adopting "a cognitive approach" are explored, particularly the rejection of foundationist epistemologies which might provide a (...)
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  48. Foundations of Scientific Method: The Nineteenth Century. Edited by Ronald N. Giere and Richard S. Westfall. --.Ronald N. Giere & Richard S. Westfall (eds.) - 1973 - Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
     
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  49.  12
    The Structure, Growth and Application of Scientific Knowledge: Reflections on Relevance and the Future of Philosophy of Science.Ronald N. Giere - 1970 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1970:539 - 551.
  50. Why Scientific Models Are Not Works of Fiction.Ronald N. Giere - unknown
    The usual question, “Are models fictions?” is replaced by the question, “Should scientific models be regarded as works of fiction?” This makes it clear that the issue is not one of definition but of interpretation. First one must distinguish between the ontology of scientific models and their function in the practice of science. Theoretical models and works of fiction are ontologically on a par, their both being creations of human imagination. It is their differing functions in practice that makes it (...)
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