The author replies to ronald suter's "russell's 'refutation' of meinong in 'on denoting'," "philosophy and phenomenological research," june, 1967. suter's interpretation of one of russell's arguments is criticized on exegetical grounds, and his defense of another argument is rebutted on logical grounds. meinong's thesis is presented as the thesis that all statements of a certain form are true. it is argued that all of russell's arguments are attempts to pose counter-examples to this single view. meinong is defended against russell's counter-examples.

To find more information about Rowman and Littlefield titles, please visit www.rowmanlittlefield.com.

THIS PAPER DISCUSSES TWO THINGS. FIRST, STRAWSON'S EXPLANATION IN "ON REFERRING" ("MIND," 1950) WHY TWO USES OF SENTENCES OF THE FORM NN=NN MUST DIFFER FROM THOSE OF THE FORM NN=THE F, WHERE 'NN' AND 'THE F' ARE PROPER NAMES AND DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS, RESPECTIVELY. IT IS SHOWN THAT HIS ACCOUNT OF THE MATTER HAS UNACCEPTABLE CONSEQUENCES. SECONDLY, IT IS DEMONSTRATED THAT HIS EXPLANATION OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SENTENCES OF THE FORM NN=THE F AND THOSE OF THE FORM NN IS (AN) F (...) IS EVEN LESS SATISFACTORY. STRAWSON'S CONFUSIONS HERE DERIVE CHIEFLY FROM HIS NOTION OF A 'PRESUPPOSITION'. (shrink)

HINTIKKA ("COGITO, ERGO SUM: INFERENCE OR PERFORMANCE?") WISHES TO REJECT (1) IF B(A) THEN THERE EXISTS X SUCH THAT X=A, POINTING OUT THAT IT WOULD CEASE TO BE PROVABLE IN QUANTIFICATION THEORY IF LOGICIANS DROPPED THE DUBIOUS ASSUMPTION THAT (2) ALL THE SINGULAR TERMS WITH WHICH WE HAVE TO DEAL DESIGNATE SOME ACTUALLY EXISTING INDIVIDUAL. HE ALSO ARGUES FOR THE FALSITY OF (3) THINKING ENTAILS EXISTENCE. WILLIAMS ("THE CERTAINTY OF THE COGITO") CONTENDS THAT DESCARTES INFERRED 'I EXIST' FROM 'I THINK' (...) USING (4) 'B(A)' PRESUPPOSES THAT THERE EXISTS X SUCH THAT X=A AS HIS PRINCIPLE OF INFERENCE. IN THIS PAPER, THE AUTHOR SHOWS WHY (3) SHOULD BE AFFIRMED AND (1), (2), AND (4) REJECTED. WHILE HE THUS AGREES WITH HINTIKKA AND WILLIAMS THAT APPEAL TO OUR LOWER FUNCTIONAL CALCULI FAILS TO EXPLAIN THE NECESSITY OF THE CONNECTION BETWEEN 'COGITO' AND 'SUM', HE OFFERS AN ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT OF WHY 'SUM' IS NEVERTHELESS A LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE OF 'COGITO'. (EDITED). (shrink)

Saul Kripke is struck by a skeptical argument which he says is neither Wittgenstein’s nor his own. I call this new skeptic “Saul Wittgenstein”. SW’s conclusion is that there is no such thing as following a rule. My first aim is to show that Kripke misunderstands the Investigations when he says it offers a “skeptical solution” to SW’s paradox. Wittgenstein’s view of philosophy commits him to a dissolution of the paradox. I show next that LW’s writing contains an implicit dissolution (...) of it. Finally, I point out the main lesson to be derived from Kripke’s discussion--namely, that there is nothing which is common and peculiar to what we call following a rule. (shrink)