The aim of this historically oriented article is to give an account of the methodological similarity of Whitehead and Russell with regard to the logico-mathematical mode of philosophical analysis, and of Whitehead and Moore with regard to common sense. According to the authors, these similarities, especially when taken together, justify the classification of Whitehead as an analytic philosopher. Because of the doctrinal uniqueness of Whitehead, however, they also hold that he will always remain an atypical analytic philosopher.

The aim of the first part of this article is to highlight some of the historical roots of the affinities of Whitehead's philosophy with Gestalt psychology by identifying a number of physicists as well as philosopher-psychologists playing a relevant role in both the genesis of Whitehead's thought and that of Gestalt psychology. The article goes beyond identifying Faraday and Maxwell as well as James andBergson as relevant in this respect It also focuses on others who have influenced Whitehead: Lorentz as (...) well as Lotze and Brentano, Ward and Stout The aim of the second part of this article is to introduce three of Whitehead's key ideas by means of a number of simple Gestalt experiments: his idea of what mathematics is all about, his idea of what is wrong with Einstein's interpretation of special and general relativity, and his idea of the role of recognition in the subjective form of feeling. (shrink)

This article addresses both philosophers of science and process philosophers. It shows that the acceptance of Einstein's general theory of relativity by British physicists in the early 1920s, and their rejection of Whitehead's experimentally indistinguishable theory of gravity, was a matter not only of empirical evaluation but also of aesthetic preference. To philosophers of science it offers a historical case study illustrating the entangled roles of empirical and aesthetic criteria in theory evaluation. To process philosophers it offers an answer to (...) the question of why Whitehead's alternative rendering of Einstein's general relativity has been neglected both by the majority of physicists, and by the majority of philosophers. (shrink)

On the occasion of the centenary of the publication of the first volume of Principia Mathematica, this article aims to shed some light on Whitehead’s philosophy of mathematics, to differentiate Whitehead’s version of logicism from Russell’s, and to show the unity of Whitehead’s thought. These aims rely on Whitehead’s basic insight that mathematics is the study of pattern.

Whitehead was critical with respect to Poincaré’s conventionalism. However, Whitehead stood closer to Poincaré than Bertrand Russell when Russell invoked Poincaré’s conventionalism to highlight that the choice between Arthur Eddington’s orthodox interpretation of Einstein’s general theory of relativity on the one hand, and Whitehead’s alternative interpretation on the other, is not a matter of empirical fact, but a matter of convention. Whitehead shared two of the premises of Poincaré’s conventionalism: the physics-independence of geometry, and the choice of a physical geometry (...) amongst geometries of constant curvature. This contributed significantly to his philosophical critique of Einstein, who held that the geometry of space-time depends on the physical distribution of matter, and that the non-homogeneity of this distribution (e.g., at the scale of the solar system) implies that the appropriate physical geometry is variably curved. Russell’s conventionalism, contrary to Whitehead’s view, did not take Poincaré’s premises into account, was shared by the logical positivists, and led to a philosophical defense of Einstein. (shrink)

This article addresses both philosophers of science and process philosophers. It shows that the acceptance of Einstein's general theory of relativity by British physicists in the early 1920s, and their rejection of Whitehead's experimentally indistinguishable theory of gravity, was a matter not only of empirical evaluation but also of aesthetic preference. To philosophers of science it offers a historical case study illustrating the entangled roles of empirical and aesthetic criteria in theory evaluation. To process philosophers it offers an answer to (...) the question of why Whitehead's alternative rendering of Einstein's general relativity has been neglected both by the majority of physicists, and by the majority of philosophers. (shrink)

Whitehead's 1925–1927 Harvard lectures (HL2) are too rich in content to easily summarize. Consequently, I limit myself in the present article to giving an account pivoting around Whitehead's functional theory of reality and his epochal theory of time.