Results for 'Russellian monism'

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  1. Russellian Monism and Ignorance of Non-structural Properties.Justin Mendelow - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-28.
    Russellian monists argue that non-structural properties, or a combination of structural and non-structural properties, necessitate phenomenal properties. Different Russellian monists offer varying accounts of the structural/non-structural distinction, leading to divergent forms of Russellian monism. In this paper, I criticise Derk Pereboom’s characterisation of the structural/non-structural distinction proposed in his Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism and further work. I argue that from Pereboom’s characterisation of structural and non-structural properties, one can formulate general metaphysical principles concerning what (...)
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  2. Russellian monism and mental causation.Torin Alter & Sam Coleman - 2021 - Noûs 55 (2):409-425.
    According to Russellian monism, consciousness is constituted at least partly by quiddities: intrinsic properties that categorically ground dispositional properties described by fundamental physics. If the theory is true, then consciousness and such dispositional properties are closely connected. But how closely? The contingency thesis says that the connection is contingent. For example, on this thesis the dispositional property associated with negative charge might have been categorically grounded by a quiddity that is distinct from the one that actually grounds it. (...)
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  3.  45
    AVOIDING RUSSELLIAN MONISM's PROBLEMS.Mostyn W. Jones - manuscript
    Russellian monism (RM) attributes experience to the intrinsic nature of physics’ abstract mathematical accounts of the world. It’s touted as a promising mind-body solution, for it avoids dualist and physicalist issues. Yet this status is imperiled by its deeply obscure ideas of mental combination, protophenomenal entities, emergent experience, grounded abstractions, et cetera. This “metaphysical magical mystery tour” may render RM as problematic as competing views. A clear, simple panpsychism akin to Strawson’s might avoid these issues. In this theory (...)
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  4. Russellian Monism or Nagelian Monism?Daniel Stoljar - 2015 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Yujin Nagasawa (eds.), Consciousness in the Physical World: Perspectives on Russellian Monism. New York: Oxford University Press.
  5. Can the Russellian Monist Escape the Epiphenomenalist’s Paradox?Lok-Chi Chan - 2020 - Topoi 39 (5):1093-1102.
    Russellian monism—an influential doctrine proposed by Russell (The analysis of matter, Routledge, London, 1927/1992)—is roughly the view that physics can only ever tell us about the causal, dispositional, and structural properties of physical entities and not their categorical (or intrinsic) properties, whereas our qualia are constituted by those categorical properties. In this paper, I will discuss the relation between Russellian monism and a seminal paradox facing epiphenomenalism, the paradox of phenomenal judgment: if epiphenomenalism is true—qualia are (...)
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  6.  20
    Russellian Monism and Epiphenomenalism.William S. Robinson - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (1):100-117.
    Contemporaries often reject epiphenomenalism out of hand, while Russellian Monism is regarded as worthy of further development. It is argued here that this difference of attitudes is indefensible, because the easy rejection of EPI is due to its violating a certain Causal Intuition, and RM implicitly violates that same intuition. An enriched version of RM mitigates the violation, but the same mitigation results if we make a parallel enrichment of EPI. If RM and EPI are approached on a (...)
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  7. Russellian Monism and Structuralism About Physics.Torin Alter & Derk Pereboom - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (4):1409-1428.
    It is often claimed that Russellian monism carries a commitment to a structuralist conception of physics, on which physics describes the world only in terms of its spatiotemporal structure and dynamics. We argue that this claim is mistaken. On Russellian monism, there is more to consciousness, and to the rest of concrete reality, than spatiotemporal structure and dynamics. But the latter claim supports only a conditional claim about physics: _if_ structuralism about physics is true, then there (...)
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  8. How Is Constitutive Russellian Monism (or Pansychism) Better than Dualism?Adam Pautz - manuscript
    This is a reply to Luke Roelof's comments (2017) on my paper "A Dilemma for Russellian Monists about Consciousness" (2015). On both Russellian monism and dualism, experiences are distinct from neural-functional states and they are correlated with some neural-functional states and not others. The only difference between them concerns the status of the extra-logical principles linking experiences with their neural-functional correlates (e. g. increasing S1 firing rates results in increasing pain): Russellian monists hold that they are (...)
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  9.  16
    Russellian Monism, Introspective Inaccuracy, and the Illusion Meta- Problem of Consciousness.D. Pereboom - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):182-193.
    Proposed is a two-factor explanation for our resistance to illusionism about phenomenal consciousness. The first is that we lack, and can't easily imagine, ways of checking the accuracy of introspective phenomenal representation. The second is that illusions of phenomenal consciousness would themselves appear to be phenomenally conscious. The illusionist's defence is to apply illusionism to illusions of consciousness, but the result, even if formally coherent, resists imaginative conception.
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  10.  30
    The Matter of Consciousness: From the Knowledge Argument to Russellian Monism.Torin Andrew Alter - 2023 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    This book defends Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument against physicalism. According to physicalism, consciousness is a physical phenomenon. The knowledge argument stars Mary, who learns all objective, physical information through black-and-white media and yet acquires new information when she first sees colors for herself: information about what it is like to see in color. Based partly on that case, Jackson concludes that not all information is physical. The book argues that the knowledge argument succeeds in refuting all standard versions of physicalism: (...)
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  11.  15
    Russell on Russellian Monism.Donovan Wishon - 2015 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Yujin Nagasawa (eds.), Consciousness in the Physical World: Perspectives on Russellian Monism. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 91-118.
    In recent decades, Russell’s “Neutral Monism” has reemerged as a topic of great scholarly interest among philosophers of mind, philosophers of science, and historians of early analytic philosophy. One of the most controversial points of scholarly dispute regarding Russell’s theory concerns how it best fits into standard classificatory schemes for understanding the relationship between mental phenomena and physical reality. The task of classifying Russell’s Neutral Monism is made all the more difficult by the fact that his conception of (...)
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  12. A Dilemma for Russellian Monists About Consciousness.Adam Pautz - 2015
    I develop a new argument against Russellian Monism about consciousness.
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  13. What is Russellian Monism?Torin Alter & Yujin Nagasawa - 2012 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (9-10):67–95.
    Russellian monism offers a distinctive perspective on the relationship between the physical and the phenomenal. For example, on one version of the view, phenomenal properties are the categorical bases of fundamental physical properties, such as mass and charge, which are dispositional. Russellian monism has prominent supporters, such as Bertrand Russell, Grover Maxwell, Michael Lockwood, and David Chalmers. But its strengths and shortcomings are often misunderstood. In this paper we try to eliminate confusions about the view and (...)
     
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  14. Four Kinds of Russellian Monism.Daniel Stoljar - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. New York, New York: Routledge. pp. 17.
    Russellian Monism” is a name given to a family of views in philosophy of mind. The family is exciting because it seems to present an alternative both to materialism and to dualism. After briefly setting out the need for this alternative, I distinguish four different kinds of Russellian Monism (RM), and assess their pros and cons. My own feeling, as will emerge in the final section of the paper, is that only the fourth of these represents (...)
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  15. A Physicalist Critique of Russellian Monism.Alyssa Ney - 2015 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Yujin Nagasawa (eds.), Consciousness in the Physical World: Perspectives on Russellian Monism. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 346-369.
     
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  16.  45
    Russellian Monism and Epistemic Pessimism.Ståle Gundersen - 2015 - SATS 16 (1):27-48.
    Journal Name: SATS Issue: Ahead of print.
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  17.  90
    IIT vs. Russellian Monism: A Metaphysical Showdown on the Content of Experience.M. Grasso - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (1-2):48-75.
    Integrated information theory attempts to account for both the quantitative and the phenomenal aspects of consciousness, and in taking consciousness as fundamental and widespread it bears similarities to panpsychist Russellian monism. In this paper I compare IIT's and RM's response to the conceivability argument, and their metaphysical account of conscious experience. I start by claiming that RM neutralizes the conceivability argument, but that by virtue of its commitment to categoricalism it doesn't exclude fickle qualia scenarios. I argue that (...)
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  18. The Russellian monist’s problems with mental causation.Robert Howell - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (258):22-39.
  19. Pessimism About Russellian Monism.Amy Kind - 2015 - In Yujin Nagasawa (ed.), Consciousness in the Physical World: Perspectives on Russellian Monism. New York: Oup Usa. pp. 401-421.
    From the perspective of many philosophers of mind in these early years of the 21st Century, the debate between dualism and physicalism has seemed to have stalled, if not to have come to a complete standstill. There seems to be no way to settle the basic clash of intuitions that underlies it. Recently however, a growing number of proponents of Russellian monism have suggested that their view promises to show us a new way forward. Insofar as Russellian (...)
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  20.  60
    Russellian Monism: The Heritage of Russell’s Construction of Matter from Experience – Review of Consciousness in the Physical World: Perspectives on Russellian Monism.L. Hengwei & D. Da - 2016 - Constructivist Foundations 12 (1):126-129.
    Upshot: The central issue of Consciousness in the Physical World is Russellian monism, which claims that consciousness could be ontologically reduced to intrinsic properties of physical objects. In contemporary discussions, Russellian monism is more broadly defined than Russell’s original version of neutral monism, and it even becomes a family of views. In this review, based on two major distinctions between Russellian monism and Russell’s neutral monism, we point out that these current re-interpretations (...)
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  21. Grounding, Analysis, and Russellian Monism.Philip Goff - 2019 - In Sam Coleman (ed.), The Knowledge Argument. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 198-222.
    Few these days dispute that the knowledge argument demonstrates an epistemic gap between the physical facts and the facts about experience. It is much more contentious whether that epistemic gap can be used to demonstrate a metaphysical gap of a kind that is inconsistent with physicalism. In this paper I will explore two attempts to block the inference from an epistemic gap to a metaphysical gap – the first from the phenomenal concept strategy, the second from Russellian monism (...)
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  22. Deconstructing the Physical World: Relationship to Russellian Monism.Brendon Hammer - manuscript
    This is Appendix A to the note: Deconstructing the Physical World (DPW). It shows how the conceptual framework developed in DPW relates to Russellian Monism (RM) and that it can accrue RM’s benefits while defeating the combination problem that challenges many RMs.
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  23.  13
    Russellian Monism and Absolutely Intrinsic Properties.Derk Pereboom - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. New York, New York: Routledge. pp. 40.
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  24. Dispositional and categorical properties, and Russellian Monism.Eric Hiddleston - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (1):65-92.
    This paper has two main aims. The first is to present a general approach for understanding “dispositional” and “categorical” properties; the second aim is to use this approach to criticize Russellian Monism. On the approach I suggest, what are usually thought of as “dispositional” and “categorical” properties are really just the extreme ends of a spectrum of options. The approach allows for a number of options between these extremes, and it is plausible, I suggest, that just about everything (...)
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  25. Against Constitutive Russellian Monism.Philip Goff - 2015 - In Yujin Nagasawa (ed.), Consciousness in the Physical World: Perspectives on Russellian Monism. New York: Oup Usa.
  26.  20
    Consciousness in the Physical World: Perspectives on Russellian Monism.Torin Andrew Alter & Yujin Nagasawa (eds.) - 2015 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Consciousness in the Physical World collects historical selections, recent classics, and new pieces on Russellian monism, a unique alternative to the physicalist and dualist approaches to the problem of consciousness.
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  27. Classical Levels, Russellian Monism and the Implicate Order.William Seager - 2013 - Foundations of Physics 43 (4):548-567.
    Reception of the Bohm-Hiley interpretation of quantum mechanics has a curiously Janus faced quality. On the one hand, it is frequently derided as a conservative throwback to outdated classical patterns of thought. On the other hand, it is equally often taken to task for encouraging a wild quantum mysticism, often regarded as anti-scientific. I will argue that there are reasons for this reception, but that a proper appreciation of the dual scientific and philosophical aspects of the view reveals a powerful (...)
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  28.  29
    Précis of The Matter of Consciousness: From the Knowledge Argument to Russellian Monism.Torin Alter - 2024 - Philosophia 52 (2):203-210.
    In The Matter of Consciousness (TMOC), I defend Frank Jackson’s (1982, 1986, 1995) knowledge argument, which poses a significant challenge to physicalism. I also argue that the knowledge argument leads to Russellian monism.
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  29.  15
    Consciousness in the Physical World: Perspectives on Russellian Monism.Torin Nagasawa, Yujin, Alter (ed.) - 2015 - New York: Oup Usa.
    Consciousness in the Physical World collects historical selections, recent classics, and new pieces on Russellian monism, a unique alternative to the physicalist and dualist approaches to the problem of consciousness.
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  30.  8
    Mentalism vs. Physicalism? [review of Torin Alter and Yujin Nagasawa, eds., Consciousness in the Physical World: Perspectives on Russellian Monism ].Chad Trainer - 2018 - Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 37.
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  31. Against the Middle Ground: Why Russellian Monism is Unstable.Brian Cutter - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (2):109-129.
  32.  6
    Mentalism vs. Physicalism? [review of Torin Alter and Yujin Nagasawa, eds., Consciousness in the Physical World: Perspectives on Russellian Monism ].Chad Trainer - 2017 - Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 37 (2).
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  33. Panquidditist Monism.Giovanni Merlo - forthcoming - In G. Rabin (ed.), Grounding and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    According to Russellian monism (RM), the quiddities which underlie the fundamental causal structure of the physical world are also responsible for the existence of phenomenal consciousness. This view has been argued to provide an attractive alternative to physicalism and dualism, but it is plagued by the so-called ‘combination problem’ – namely, the problem of explaining how the quiddities underlying the microphysical structure of a macroscopic conscious agent (e.g., a human being) combine together to constitute his or her phenomenal (...)
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  34. Russellian Physicalism and its Dilemma.Lok-Chi Chan - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178:2043-2062.
    Russellian monism – an influential doctrine proposed by Russell (1927/1992) – is roughly the view that the natural sciences can only ever tell us about the causal, dispositional, and structural properties of physical entities and not about their categorical properties, and, moreover, that our qualia are constituted by categorical properties. Recently, Stoljar (2001a, 2001b), Strawson (2008), Montero (2010, 2015), Alter and Nagasawa (2012), and Chalmers (2015) have attempted to develop this doctrine into a version of physicalism. Russellian (...)
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  35.  95
    Russellian Physicalism, Bare Structure, and Swapped Inscrutables.Kevin Morris - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (9-10):180-198.
    This paper discusses and evaluates a recent argument for the conclusion that an attractive variety of Russellian monism ought to be regarded as a form of physicalism. According to this line of thought, if the Russellian’s “inscrutable” properties are held to ground not only experience, but also the physical structure of the world—and in this sense are not “experience-specific”—they thereby have an unproblematic place in physicalist metaphysics. I argue, in contrast, that there can be a sense in (...)
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  36. Panpsychism, physicalism, neutral monism and the Russellian theory of mind.Emmett Holman - 2008 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (5):48-67.
    As some see it, an impasse has been reached on the mind- body problem between mainstream physicalism and mainstream dualism. So lately another view has been gaining popularity, a view that might be called the 'Russellian theory of mind' (RTM) since it is inspired by some ideas once put forth by Bertrand Russell. Most versions of RTM are panpsychist, but there is at least one version that rejects panpsychism and styles itself as physicalism, and neutral monism is also (...)
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  37.  14
    Hui Shi's Monism: A Russellian Interpretation.Liu Jingxian & Li Mao - 2020 - Philosophy East and West 70 (3):781-800.
    A dilemma in interpreting Hui Shi's ten theses is that they are understandable only in the light of relativistic pluralism, which conflicts with his own main theme of absolutistic monism. However, after a careful investigation of the evolutionary paths of the tense and aspect uses of the temporal adverb fang 方 in classical Chinese language, a construction argument can be made for fang sheng fang si 方 生 方 死. But before presenting this construction argument, we first introduce the (...)
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  38. Russellian physicalism and protophenomenal properties.Torin Alter & Sam Coleman - 2020 - Analysis 80 (3):409-417.
    According to Russellian monism, phenomenal consciousness is constituted by inscrutables: intrinsic properties that categorically ground dispositional properties described by fundamental physics. On Russellian physicalism, those inscrutables are construed as protophenomenal properties: non-structural properties that both categorically ground dispositional properties and, perhaps when appropriately structured, collectively constitute phenomenal properties. Morris and Brown argue that protophenomenal properties cannot serve this purpose, given assumptions Russellian monists typically make about the modal profile of such properties. Those assumptions, it is argued, (...)
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  39. The Neo-Russellian Ignorance Hypothesis: A Hybrid Account of Phenomenal Consciousness.Tom McClelland - 2013 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (3-4):125 - 151.
    We have reason to believe that phenomenal properties are nothing over and above certain physical properties. However, doubt is cast on this by the apparent epistemic gap that arises for attempts to account for phenomenal properties in physical terms. I argue that the epistemic gap should be divided into two more fundamental conceptual gaps. The first of these pertains to the distinctive subjectivity of phenomenal states, and the second pertains to the intrinsicality of phenomenal qualities. Stoljars ignorance hypothesis (IH) attempts (...)
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  40. A Properly Physical Russellian Physicalism.Christopher Devlin Brown - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (11-12):31-50.
    Russellian physicalism has the promise of answering all the typical challenges that non-physicalists have issued against standard versions of physicalism, while not giving up physicalism's commitment to the non-existence of fundamental mentality. However, it has been argued that Russellian physicalism must endorse the existence of physically unacceptable protomental properties in order to address these challenges, which would mean giving up on a core physicalist tenet of keeping the fundamental realm untainted by a special relationship to mentality. Against this, (...)
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  41.  28
    Neutral Monism.Leopold Stubenberg & Donovan Wishon - 2023 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  42. Is the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness Compatible with Russellian Panpsychism?Hedda Hassel Mørch - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (5):1065-1085.
    The Integrated Information Theory is a leading scientific theory of consciousness, which implies a kind of panpsychism. In this paper, I consider whether IIT is compatible with a particular kind of panpsychism, known as Russellian panpsychism, which purports to avoid the main problems of both physicalism and dualism. I will first show that if IIT were compatible with Russellian panpsychism, it would contribute to solving Russellian panpsychism’s combination problem, which threatens to show that the view does not (...)
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  43.  69
    Introduction to Monist Alternatives to Physicalism.Max Velmans, Yujin Nagasawa, In M. Velmans & Y. Nagasawa - 2012 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (9-10):7-18.
    This Introduction to a Journal of Consciousness Studies Special Issue on Monist Alternatives to Physicalism summarises some of the basic problems of Physicalism and common fallacies in arguments for its defence that are found in the philosophical and scientific literature. It then introduces six monist alternatives: 1) a form of emergent panpsychism developed by William Seager; 2) a novel introduction to the process philosophy of A.N. Whitehead by Anderson Weekes; 3) a review of current developments in Russellian Monism (...)
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  44. Neutral Monism Reconsidered.Erik C. Banks - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (2):173-187.
    Neutral monism is a position in metaphysics defended by Mach, James, and Russell in the early twentieth century. It holds that minds and physical objects are essentially two different orderings of the same underlying neutral elements of nature. This paper sets out some of the central concepts, theses and the historical background of ideas that inform this doctrine of elements. The discussion begins with the classic neutral monism of Mach, James, and Russell in the first part of the (...)
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  45.  31
    Answering the Difference-Maker Problem for Russellian Physicalism.Christopher Devlin Brown - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (3):1111-1127.
    Russellian physicalism is a promising answer to the mind–body problem which attempts to satisfy the motivating epistemic and metaphysical concerns of non-physicalists with regards to consciousness, while also maintaining a physicalist commitment to the non-existence of fundamental mentality. Chan (_Philosophical Studies, 178_:2043–62, 2021) has recently described a challenge to Russellian physicalism he deems the ‘difference-maker problem’, which is a Russellian-physicalism-specific version of the more well-known ‘combination problem’ for Russellian monism generally. The problem is to determine (...)
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  46.  39
    Radical Empiricism, Neutral Monism, and the Elements of Mind.Donovan Wishon - 2021 - The Monist 104 (1):125-151.
    Neutral monism is the view that both ‘mind’ and ‘matter’ are grounded in a more fundamental form of reality that is intrinsically neither mental nor material. It has often been treated as an odd fringe theory deserving of at most a footnote in the broader philosophical debates. Yet such attitudes do a grave disservice to its sophistications and significance for late nineteenth and early twentieth-century philosophy of mind and psychology. This paper sheds light on this neglected view by situating (...)
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  47. Paradise Regained: A Non-Reductive Realist Account of the Sensible Qualities.Brian Cutter - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):38-52.
    This paper defends a non-reductive realist view of the sensible qualities—roughly, the view that the sensible qualities are really instantiated by the external objects of perception, and not reducible to response-independent physical properties or response-dependent relational properties. I begin by clarifying and motivating the non-reductive realist view. I then consider some familiar difficulties for the view. Addressing these difficulties leads to the development and defence of a general theory, inspired by Russellian Monist theories of consciousness, of how the sensible (...)
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  48.  66
    Panprotopsychism Instantiated.Daniel Giberman - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (2):238-258.
    The problem of many-over-one asks how it can be thatmanyproperties are ever instantiated byoneobject. A putative solution might, for example, claim that the properties are appropriately bundled, or somehow tied to a bare particular. In this essay, the author argues that, surprisingly, an extant candidate solution to this problem is at the same time an independently developed candidate solution to the mind-body problem. Specifically, what is argued here to be the best version of the relata-specific bundle theory—the thesis that each (...)
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  49. Russelliánský monismus jako svébytné metafyzické stanovisko.Jakub Mihálik - 2018 - Filosofie Dnes 9 (2):23-43.
    The paper critically discusses the treatment of Russellian monism in Tomáš Hříbek’s monograph Jaké to je, nebo o čem to je? (What It’s Like, or What It’s About?). According to Hříbek, Russellian monism, the approach to phenomenal consciousness inspired by the insights of Bertrand Russell, is not a real alternative to materialism, dualism and idealism. I argue that Russellian monism, on the contrary, can be viewed as a self-standing philosophical position which, moreover, avoids the (...)
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  50. Panpsychism and Neutral Monism: How to make up One's Mind.Sam Coleman - 2016 - In Jaskolla Brüntrup (ed.), Panpsychism. Oxford University Press.
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