Results for 'Russo-Williamson thesis'

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  1.  40
    EnviroGenomarkers: The Interplay Between Mechanisms and Difference Making in Establishing Causal Claims.Federica Russo & Jon Williamson - 2012 - Medicine Studies 3 (4):249-262.
    According to Russo and Williamson :157–170, 2007, Hist Philos Life Sci 33:389–396, 2011a, Philos Sci 1:47–69, 2011b), in order to establish a causal claim of the form, ‘C is a cause of E’, one typically needs evidence that there is an underlying mechanism between C and E as well as evidence that C makes a difference to E. This thesis has been used to argue that hierarchies of evidence, as championed by evidence-based movements, tend to give primacy to evidence (...)
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  2. Interpreting Causality in the Health Sciences.Federica Russo & Jon Williamson - 2007 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 21 (2):157 – 170.
    We argue that the health sciences make causal claims on the basis of evidence both of physical mechanisms, and of probabilistic dependencies. Consequently, an analysis of causality solely in terms of physical mechanisms or solely in terms of probabilistic relationships, does not do justice to the causal claims of these sciences. Yet there seems to be a single relation of cause in these sciences - pluralism about causality will not do either. Instead, we maintain, the health sciences require a theory (...)
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  3.  95
    Mechanisms and the Evidence Hierarchy.Brendan Clarke, Donald Gillies, Phyllis Illari, Federica Russo & Jon Williamson - 2014 - Topoi 33 (2):339-360.
    Evidence-based medicine (EBM) makes use of explicit procedures for grading evidence for causal claims. Normally, these procedures categorise evidence of correlation produced by statistical trials as better evidence for a causal claim than evidence of mechanisms produced by other methods. We argue, in contrast, that evidence of mechanisms needs to be viewed as complementary to, rather than inferior to, evidence of correlation. In this paper we first set out the case for treating evidence of mechanisms alongside evidence of correlation in (...)
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  4.  43
    Epistemic Causality and Evidence-Based Medicine.Federica Russo & Jon Williamson - 2011 - History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 33 (4).
    Causal claims in biomedical contexts are ubiquitous albeit they are not always made explicit. This paper addresses the question of what causal claims mean in the context of disease. It is argued that in medical contexts causality ought to be interpreted according to the epistemic theory. The epistemic theory offers an alternative to traditional accounts that cash out causation either in terms of “difference-making” relations or in terms of mechanisms. According to the epistemic approach, causal claims tell us about which (...)
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  5.  22
    The Evidence That Evidence-Based Medicine Omits.Brendan Clarke, Donald Gillies, Phyllis Illari, Frederica Russo & Jon Williamson - 2013 - Preventive Medicine 57:745-747.
    According to current hierarchies of evidence for EBM, evidence of correlation is always more important than evidence of mechanisms when evaluating and establishing causal claims. We argue that evidence of mechanisms needs to be treated alongside evidence of correlation. This is for three reasons. First, correlation is always a fallible indicator of causation, subject in particular to the problem of confounding; evidence of mechanisms can in some cases be more important than evidence of correlation when assessing a causal claim. Second, (...)
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  6. Models for Prediction, Explanation and Control.Lorenzo Casini, Phyllis Mckay Illari, Federica Russo & Jon Williamson - 2011 - Theoria 26 (1):5-33.
    The Recursive Bayesian Net (RBN) formalism was originally developed for modelling nested causal relationships. In this paper we argue that the formalism can also be applied to modelling the hierarchical structure of mechanisms. The resulting network contains quantitative information about probabilities, as well as qualitative information about mechanistic structure and causal relations. Since information about probabilities, mechanisms and causal relations is vital for prediction, explanation and control respectively, an RBN can be applied to all these tasks. We show in particular (...)
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  7. Interpreting Probability in Causal Models for Cancer.Federica Russo & Jon Williamson - 2007 - In Federica Russo & Jon Williamson (eds.), Causality and Probability in the Sciences. pp. 217--242.
    How should probabilities be interpreted in causal models in the social and health sciences? In this paper we take a step towards answering this question by investigating the case of cancer in epidemiology and arguing that the objective Bayesian interpretation is most appropriate in this domain.
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  8. Causality and Probability in the Sciences.Federica Russo & Jon Williamson (eds.) - 2007
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  9.  2
    Models for Prediction, Explanation and Control.Lorenzo Casini, Phyllis Mckay Illari, Federica Russo & Jon Williamson - 2011 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 26 (1):5-33.
    The Recursive Bayesian Net formalism was originally developed for modelling nested causal relationships. In this paper we argue that the formalism can also be applied to modelling the hierarchical structure of mechanisms. The resulting network contains quantitative information about probabilities, as well as qualitative information about mechanistic structure and causal relations. Since information about probabilities, mechanisms and causal relations is vital for prediction, explanation and control respectively, an RBN can be applied to all these tasks. We show in particular how (...)
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  10.  1
    Combining Probability and Logic.Fabio Cozman, Rolf Haenni, Jan-Willem Romeijn, Federica Russo, Gregory Wheeler & Jon Williamson - 2009 - Journal of Applied Logic 7 (2):131-135.
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  11. Why Look at Causality in the Sciences?Phyllis McKay Illari, Federica Russo & Jon Williamson - 2011 - In Phyllis McKay Illari, Federica Russo & Jon Williamson (eds.), Causality in the Sciences. Oxford University Press.
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  12. Scientific Evidence and the Law.Barbara Osimani, Frederica Russo & Jon Williamson - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy, Science and Law 11 (2):1-24.
    The paper considers the legal tools that have been developed in German pharmaceutical regulation as a result of the precautionary attitude inaugurated by the Contergan decision. These tools are the notion of “well-founded suspicion”, which attenuates the requirements for safety intervention by relaxing the requirement of a proved causal connection between danger and source, and the introduction of the reversal of proof burden in liability norms. The paper focuses on the first and proposes seeing the precautionary principle as an instance (...)
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  13. Key Terms in Logic.Jon Williamson & ‎Federica Russo (eds.) - 2010 - Continuum Press.
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  14. Imaging Technology and the Philosophy of Causality.Jon Williamson - 2011 - Philosophy and Technology 24 (2):115-136.
    Russo and Williamson (Int Stud Philos Sci 21(2):157–170, 2007) put forward the thesis that, at least in the health sciences, to establish the claim that C is a cause of E, one normally needs evidence of an underlying mechanism linking C and E as well as evidence that C makes a difference to E. This epistemological thesis poses a problem for most current analyses of causality which, in virtue of analysing causality in terms of just one of mechanisms (...)
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  15.  46
    Mechanistic Evidence: Disambiguating the Russo–Williamson Thesis.Phyllis McKay Illari - 2011 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (2):139 - 157.
    Russo and Williamson claim that establishing causal claims requires mechanistic and difference-making evidence. In this article, I will argue that Russo and Williamson's formulation of their thesis is multiply ambiguous. I will make three distinctions: mechanistic evidence as type vs object of evidence; what mechanism or mechanisms we want evidence of; and how much evidence of a mechanism we require. I will feed these more precise meanings back into the Russo?Williamson thesis and argue that it is both true (...)
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  16. The Russo-Williamson Thesis and the Question of Whether Smoking Causes Heart Disease.Donald Gillies - 2011 - In Phyllis McKay Illari, Federica Russo & Jon Williamson (eds.), Causality in the Sciences. Oxford University Press. pp. 110--125.
     
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  17.  3
    Evidence, Illness, and Causation: An Epidemiological Perspective on the Russo–Williamson Thesis.Alexander R. Fiorentino & Olaf Dammann - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 54:1-9.
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  18.  29
    Strong Boethius' Thesis and Consequential Implication.Claudio Pizzi & Timothy Williamson - 1997 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (5):569-588.
    The paper studies the relation between systems of modal logic and systems of consequential implication, a non-material form of implication satisfying "Aristotle's Thesis" (p does not imply not p) and "Weak Boethius' Thesis" (if p implies q, then p does not imply not q). Definitions are given of consequential implication in terms of modal operators and of modal operators in terms of consequential implication. The modal equivalent of "Strong Boethius' Thesis" (that p implies q implies that p (...)
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  19.  20
    Watkins and the Taylor-Warrender Thesis.Colwyn Williamson - 1969 - Mind 78 (312):600-606.
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  20.  18
    The Russo–Williamson Theses in the Social Sciences: Causal Inference Drawing on Two Types of Evidence.François Claveau - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 43 (4):806-813.
    This article examines two theses formulated by Russo and Williamson in their study of causal inference in the health sciences. The two theses are assessed against evidence from a specific case in the social sciences, i.e., research on the institutional determinants of the aggregate unemployment rate. The first Russo–Williamson Thesis is that a causal claim can only be established when it is jointly supported by difference-making and mechanistic evidence. This thesis is shown not to hold. While researchers in (...)
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  21.  25
    Information Channels and Biomarkers of Disease.Phyllis Illari & Federica Russo - 2016 - Topoi 35 (1):175-190.
    Current research in molecular epidemiology uses biomarkers to model the different disease phases from environmental exposure, to early clinical changes, to development of disease. The hope is to get a better understanding of the causal impact of a number of pollutants and chemicals on several diseases, including cancer and allergies. In a recent paper Russo and Williamson address the question of what evidential elements enter the conceptualisation and modelling stages of this type of biomarkers research. Recent research in causality has (...)
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  22. Causality in Medicine with Particular Reference to the Viral Causation of Cancers.Brendan Clarke - 2011 - Dissertation, University College London
    In this thesis, I give a metascientific account of causality in medicine. I begin with two historical cases of causal discovery. These are the discovery of the causation of Burkitt’s lymphoma by the Epstein-Barr virus, and of the various viral causes suggested for cervical cancer. These historical cases then support a philosophical discussion of causality in medicine. This begins with an introduction to the Russo- Williamson thesis (RWT), and discussion of a range of counter-arguments against it. Despite these, (...)
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  23. Modality & Other Matters: An Interview with Timothy Williamson.Timothy Williamson & Paal Antonsen - 2010 - Perspectives: International Postgraduate Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):16-29.
    An interview with Timothy Williamson on Modality and other matters. Williams is asked three main questions: the first about the difference between philosophical and non-philosophical knowledge, the second concerns the epistemology of modality, and the third is on the emerging metaphysical picture.
     
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  24.  56
    On 'Stabilising' Medical Mechanisms, Truth-Makers and Epistemic Causality: A Critique to Williamson and Russo's Approach.Stefan Dragulinescu - 2012 - Synthese 187 (2):785-800.
    In this paper I offer an anti-Humean critique to Williamson and Russo’s approach to medical mechanisms. I focus on one of the specific claims made by Williamson and Russo, namely the claim that micro-structural ‘mechanisms’ provide evidence for the stability across populations of causal relationships ascertained at the (macro-) level of (test) populations. This claim is grounded in the epistemic account of causality developed by Williamson, an account which—while not relying exclusively on mechanistic evidence for justifying causal judgements—appeals nevertheless to (...)
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  25. The Philosophy of Philosophy • by Timothy Williamson • Blackwell, 2007. X + 332 Pp. £ 15.99 Paper: Summary. [REVIEW]Timothy Williamson - 2009 - Analysis 69 (1):99-100.
    The book is primarily an essay on the epistemology of the sort of armchair knowledge that we can hope to achieve in philosophy. The possibility of such knowledge is not to be explained by reinterpreting philosophical questions as questions about words or concepts. Although there are philosophical questions about words and concepts, most philosophical questions are not about words or concepts: they are, just as they seem to be, about the things, many of them independent of us, to which the (...)
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  26. Williamson on the A Priori and the Analytic Reply.Timothy Williamson - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):498-506.
     
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  27. Williamson's Philosophy of Philosophy Reply.Timothy Williamson - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):534-542.
  28. II—Timothy Williamson: Understanding and Inference.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):249-293.
  29.  20
    Thinking Deeply, Contributing Originally: An Interview with Timothy Williamson (Special Contribution).Timothy Williamson, B. O. Chen & Koji Nakatogawa - 2009 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 18:57-87.
  30.  1
    Hesiodi Scutum. Introduzione, testo critico e commento con traduzione e indici a cura di C. F. Russo.J. H. Quincey & C. F. Russo - 1953 - Journal of Hellenic Studies 73:149.
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  31. Dibattito: Interventi di: Guido Guglielmi, Guido Morpurgo-Tagliabue, Franco Rella, Claudio Vicentini, Luigi Russo.Guido Guglielmi, Guido Morpurgo-Tagliabue, Franco Rella, Claudio Vicentini & Luigi Russo - 1983 - Studi di Estetica 2:42-60.
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  32. The Lost Worlds of German Orientalism: George S. Williamson.George S. Williamson - 2012 - Modern Intellectual History 9 (3):699-711.
    The opening lines of Franz Delitzsch's Babel und Bibel offer an unusually frank confession of the personal and psychological motives that animated German orientalism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For Delitzsch and countless others like him, orientalist scholarship provided an opportunity not just to expand their knowledge of the Near East and India, but also to explore the world of the Bible and, in doing so, effect a reckoning with the religious beliefs of their childhoods. In German Orientalism (...)
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  33. The Philosophy of Philosophy By Timothy Williamson.Timothy Williamson - 2009 - Analysis 69 (1):99-100.
    The book is primarily an essay on the epistemology of the sort of armchair knowledge that we can hope to achieve in philosophy. The possibility of such knowledge is not to be explained by reinterpreting philosophical questions as questions about words or concepts. Although there are philosophical questions about words and concepts, most philosophical questions are not about words or concepts: they are, just as they seem to be, about the things, many of them independent of us, to which the (...)
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  34.  20
    Causality in the Sciences. Edited by Russo, Williamson and Illari. Oxford University Press, 2011, Pp. 952, £95. ISBN: 978-0-19-957413-1. [REVIEW]Jordan Bartol - 2013 - Philosophy 88 (3):487-493.
  35.  2
    The Russo–Williamson Theses in the Social Sciences: Causal Inference Drawing on Two Types of Evidence.François Claveau - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 43 (4):806-813.
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  36. [Review of] Jon Williamson/Federica Russo (Eds.), Key Terms in Logic, London: Continuum, 2010. [REVIEW]Stamatios Gerogiorgakis - 2013 - Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 16:384-386.
  37.  20
    Mechanisms and Difference-Making.Stefan Dragulinescu - 2016 - Acta Analytica 32 (1):1-26.
    I argue that difference-making should be a crucial element for evaluating the quality of evidence for mechanisms, especially with respect to the robustness of mechanisms, and that it should take central stage when it comes to the general role played by mechanisms in establishing causal claims in medicine. The difference-making of mechanisms should provide additional compelling reasons to accept the gist of Russo-Williamson thesis and include mechanisms in the protocols for Evidence-Based Medicine, as the EBM+ research group has (...)
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  38.  27
    Understanding Mechanisms in the Health Sciences.Raffaella Campaner - 2011 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 32 (1):5-17.
    This article focuses on the assessment of mechanistic relations with specific attention to medicine, where mechanistic models are widely employed. I first survey recent contributions in the philosophical literature on mechanistic causation, and then take issue with Federica Russo and Jon Williamson’s thesis that two types of evidence, probabilistic and mechanistic, are at stake in the health sciences. I argue instead that a distinction should be drawn between previously acquired knowledge of mechanisms and yet-to-be-discovered knowledge of mechanisms and that (...)
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  39. Evaluating Williamson’s Anti-Scepticism.Tony Cheng - 2008 - Sorites 21:06-11.
    Timothy Williamson’s Knowledge and its Limits has been highly influential since the beginning of this century. It can be read as a systematic response to scepticism. One of the most important notions in this response is the notion of «evidence,» which will be the focus of the present paper. I attempt to show primarily two things. First, the notion of evidence invoked by Williamson does not address the sceptical worry: he stipulates an objective notion of evidence, but this begs the (...)
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  40. Williamson on Knowledge, Action, and Causation.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2005 - SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):15-28.
    In his Knowledge and its Limits (2000) Timothy Williamson argues that knowledge can be causally efficacious and as such figure in psychological explanation. His argument for this claim figures as a response to a key objection to his overall thesis that knowing is a mental state. In this paper I argue that although Williamson succeeds in establishing that knowledge in some cases is essential to the power of certain causal explanations of actions, he fails to do this in a (...)
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  41. Does Perceiving Entail Knowing?John Turri - 2010 - Theoria 76 (3):197-206.
    This article accomplishes two closely connected things. First, it refutes an influential view about the relationship between perception and knowledge. In particular, it demonstrates that perceiving does not entail knowing. Second, it leverages that refutation to demonstrate that knowledge is not the most general factive propositional attitude.
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  42.  27
    A SOLUTION TO FITCH'S PARADOX OF KNOWABILITY.Helge Rückert - 2004 - In S. Rahman J. Symons (ed.), Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science. Kluwer Academic Publisher. pp. 351--380.
    There is an argument (first presented by Fitch), which tries to show by formal means that the anti-realistic thesis that every truth might possibly be known, is equivalent to the unacceptable thesis that every truth is actually known (at some time in the past, present or future). First, the argument is presented and some proposals for the solution of Fitch's Paradox are briefly discussed. Then, by using Wehmeier's modal logic with subjunctive marks (S5*), it is shown how the (...)
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  43.  11
    Knowledge, Evidence, and Inference.Masashi Kasaki - 2016 - Philosophical Forum 47 (3-4):439-458.
    In this paper, first, I distinguish four questions concerning evidence: (a) the ontological question: what kind of entity qualifies as evidence? (b) the possession question: what is it for S to possess evidence? (c) the evidential relation question: what is it for one or a set of things to be evidence for another? And (d) the evidential basis question: how does S’s evidence contribute to forming, maintaining, or revising S’s doxastic attitudes? Williamson’s E = K thesis is only concerned (...)
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  44.  51
    Inferential Evidence.Jeffrey Dunn - 2014 - American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (3):203-213.
    Consider: -/- The Evidence Question: When, and under what conditions does an agent have proposition E as evidence (at t)? -/- Timothy Williamson's (2000) answer to this question is the well-known E = K thesis: -/- E = K: E is a member of S's evidence set at t iff S knows E at t. -/- I will argue that this answer is inconsistent with the version of Bayesianism that Williamson advocates. This is because E = K allows an (...)
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  45.  44
    What Do Deviant Logians Show About the Epistemology of Logic?Arthur Sullivan - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (2):179-191.
    What I will call “the deviant logician objection” [DLO] is one line of attack against the common and compelling tenet that our justification for logical truths is grounded in our understanding of their constituent concepts. This objection seeks to undermine the possibility of any deep constitutive connection, in the epistemology of logic, between understanding and justification. I will consider varieties of the deviant logician objection developed by Horwich and by Williamson. My thesis is that while the deviant logician objection (...)
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  46. The Defeasibility of Knowledge-How.J. Adam Carter & Jesús Navarro - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Reductive intellectualists (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a; 2011b; Brogaard 2008; 2009; 2011) hold that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. If this thesis is correct, then we should expect the defeasibility conditions for knowledge-how and knowledge-that to be uniform—viz., that the mechanisms of epistemic defeat which undermine propositional knowledge will be equally capable of imperilling knowledge-how. The goal of this paper is twofold: first, against intellectualism, we will show that knowledge-how is in fact resilient to being undermined (...)
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  47.  21
    Bivalence and the Challenge of Truth-Value Gaps.Teresa Marques - 2004 - Dissertation, Stirling
    This thesis is concerned with the challenge truth-value gaps pose to the principle of bivalence. The central question addressed is: are truth-value gaps counterexamples to bivalence and is the supposition of counterexamples coherent? My aim is to examine putative cases of truth-value gaps against an argument by Timothy Williamson, which shows that the supposition of counterexamples to bivalence is contradictory. The upshot of his argument is that either problematic utterances say nothing, or they cannot be neither true nor false. (...)
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  48. Luck, Propositional Perception, and the Entailment Thesis.Chris Ranalli - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1223-1247.
    Looking out the window, I see that it's raining outside. Do I know that it’s raining outside? According to proponents of the Entailment Thesis, I do. If I see that p, I know that p. In general, the Entailment Thesis is the thesis that if S perceives that p, S knows that p. But recently, some philosophers (McDowell 2002; Turri 2010; Pritchard 2011, 2012) have argued that the Entailment Thesis is false. On their view, we can (...)
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  49. The Uniqueness Thesis.Matthew Kopec & Michael G. Titelbaum - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (4):189-200.
    The Uniqueness Thesis holds, roughly speaking, that there is a unique rational response to any particular body of evidence. We first sketch some varieties of Uniqueness that appear in the literature. We then discuss some popular views that conflict with Uniqueness and others that require Uniqueness to be true. We then examine some arguments that have been presented in its favor and discuss why permissivists find them unconvincing. Last, we present some purported counterexamples that have been raised against Uniqueness (...)
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  50.  43
    A Formal Framework for Representing Mechanisms?Alexander Gebharter - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (1):138-153.
    In this article I tackle the question of how the hierarchical order of mechanisms can be represented within a causal graph framework. I illustrate an answer to this question proposed by Casini, Illari, Russo, and Williamson and provide an example that their formalism does not support two important features of nested mechanisms: (i) a mechanism’s submechanisms are typically causally interacting with other parts of said mechanism, and (ii) intervening in some of a mechanism’s parts should have some influence on the (...)
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