Pervasive though it is in modern life, the concept of self‐esteem is often viewed with distrust. This paper departs from an idea that was recently aired by Richard Smith: that we might be better off without this concept. The meaning of self‐esteem is explored within four ‘homes’: the self‐help industry, social science, therapy and education. It is suggested that the first two use a ‘simple’ concept of self‐esteem that indeed we are better off without. This concept eliminates the distinction between (...) truthfulness and delusion, and relies on a chimera of quantifiability. The much richer concept of situated self‐esteem is explored, and it is argued that low self‐esteem in children should command the attention of educators. Teachers should address this through education and communication, and reject the idea of boosting self‐esteem through a content‐free curriculum. (shrink)

Pervasive though it is in modern life, the concept of self-esteem is often viewed with distrust. This paper departs from an idea that was recently aired by Richard Smith: that we might be better off without this concept. The meaning of self-esteem is explored within four ‘homes’: the self-help industry, social science, therapy and education. It is suggested that the first two use a ‘simple’ concept of self-esteem that indeed we are better off without. This concept eliminates the distinction between (...) truthfulness and delusion, and relies on a chimera of quantifiability. The much richer concept of situated self-esteem is explored, and it is argued that low self-esteem in children (often narcissistically disguised) should command the attention of educators. Teachers should address this through education and communication, and reject the idea (prevalent in the USA) of boosting self-esteem through a content-free curriculum. (shrink)

This paper takes a sideways look at the controversial topic of educational assessment, raising the question: what place should the success/failure distinction have in an effective and humane educational system? Though the experience of failure may undermine the self-esteem that is conducive to learning, its possibility is clearly important educationally. Instead of asking whether teachers should be truthful about children’s achievements or dishonestly promote their self-esteem, we need to recognise a certain logical indeterminacy about what young children can do. Given (...) this, it is reasonable to presume in favour of many of their capacities rather than against them, for this is how children develop the confidence to act. This includes the confidence to fail as well as the confidence to succeed. It is argued that both are crucial for learning. (shrink)

Happiness is a large idea. It looms enticingly before us when we are young, delivers verdicts on our lives when we are old, and seems to inform a responsible engagement with children. The question is raised: do we want this idea? I explore a distinction between rich and poor conceptions of happiness, suggesting that many sceptical arguments are directed against the latter. If happiness is to receive its teleological due, recognised in rather the way Aristotle saw it, as a final (...) end that crucially lacks specificity, it must be richly conceived without denying the significance of unhappiness or despair. I suggest that Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics is ‘completed’ in a distinctively Aristotelian sense by authors like George Eliot and Virginia Woolf. Substantial excerpts are discussed to show how ideas like ‘making others happy’ may be richly conceived. By treating literary examples (poetically articulated, sensually received) as ineliminable reference points in our thinking, we open up a new way of imagining relationships in education. We attend communally, conversationally and often argumentatively to the dramas of human life. This, I argue, is how we grapple with large ideas and bring about ethical learning. (shrink)

This paper takes a sideways look at the controversial topic of educational assessment, raising the question: what place should the success/failure distinction have in an effective and humane educational system? Though the experience of failure may undermine the self-esteem that is conducive to learning, its possibility is clearly important educationally. Instead of asking whether teachers should be truthful about children’s achievements or dishonestly promote their self-esteem, we need to recognise a certain logical indeterminacy about what young children can do. Given (...) this, it is reasonable to presume in favour of many of their capacities rather than against them, for this is how children develop the confidence to act. This includes the confidence to fail as well as the confidence to succeed. It is argued that both are crucial for learning. (shrink)

Through a collection of contributions from an international team of empirical researchers and philosophers, _New Philosophies of Learning_ signals the need for a sharper critical awareness of the possibilities and problems that the recent spate of innovative learning techniques presents. Explores some of the many contemporary innovations in approaches to learning, including neuroscience and the focus on learners’ well-being and happiness Debates the controversial approaches to categorising learners such as dyslexia Raises doubts about the preoccupation with quasi-mathematical scrutiny and the (...) neglect of ethical reflection about education Discusses the possible grounds for concern, without exaggerating their similarities or offering sweeping judgements Includes contributions from empirical researchers and philosophers, including Usha Goswami, Howard Gardner, Julian Elliott, David Bakhurst, John White and Christopher Winch. (shrink)

The 'enhancement agenda' in educational policy is based on the idea that 'something affective', which supports and improves learning, can be a) measured and b) enhanced. This idea is explored, and it is argued that the identity of the 'something' that the enhancement agenda seeks to enhance is fatally obscure, as is the idea of measurable enhancement. Interpreted in Aristotelian terms as the desire to cultivate certain emotional dispositions, the idea of 'prevailing' on children morally makes good sense. Unlike the (...) enhancement agenda, however, the Aristotelian project is informal, intimate and bound to the notion of human flourishing. The paper concludes with an enquiry into the central concerns that drive the enhancement debate, and an answer is sketched in terms of excessive fear and shame, and the circular logic of failure. This answer, it is argued, elucidates an 'ordinary' concept of low self-esteem that is a potential 'barrier to learning', and should therefore be taken seriously by educators. (shrink)

The ‘enhancement agenda’ in educational policy is based on the idea that ‘something affective’, which supports and improves learning, can be a) measured and b) enhanced. This idea is explored, and it is argued that the identity of the ‘something’ that the enhancement agenda seeks to enhance is fatally obscure, as is the idea of measurable enhancement. Interpreted in Aristotelian terms as the desire to cultivate certain emotional dispositions, the idea of ‘prevailing’ on children morally makes good sense. Unlike the (...) enhancement agenda, however, the Aristotelian project is informal, intimate and bound to the notion of human flourishing. The paper concludes with an enquiry into the central concerns that drive the enhancement debate, and an answer is sketched in terms of excessive fear and shame, and the circular logic of failure. This answer, it is argued, elucidates an ‘ordinary’ concept of low self-esteem that is a potential ‘barrier to learning’, and should therefore be taken seriously by educators. (shrink)

Pervasive though it is in modern life, the concept of self-esteem is often viewed with distrust. This paper departs from an idea that was recently aired by Richard Smith: that we might be better off without this concept. The meaning of self-esteem is explored within four ‘homes’: the self-help industry, social science, therapy and education. It is suggested that the first two use a ‘simple’ concept of self-esteem that indeed we are better off without. This concept eliminates the distinction between (...) truthfulness and delusion, and relies on a chimera of quantifiability. The much richer concept of situated self-esteem is explored, and it is argued that low self-esteem in children (often narcissistically disguised) should command the attention of educators. Teachers should address this through education and communication, and reject the idea (prevalent in the USA) of boosting self-esteem through a content-free curriculum. (shrink)

The universalist argument that all children should be educated in inclusive mainstream schools, irrespective of their difficulties or disabilities, is traced to the claims that special schools and disability ‘labels’ are inherently humiliating, and that no decent society tolerates inherently humiliating institutions. I ask whether there is a sound reason for a child to feel humiliated by special schools/disability ‘labels’ as such, and find none. Empirically, some do and some do not find these humiliating, and it is argued that the (...) failure to address the multiple ‘realities’ of disability and learning difficulty is responsible for the policy impasse in this area. (shrink)

The universalist argument that all children should be educated in inclusive mainstream schools, irrespective of their difficulties or disabilities, is traced to the claims (a) that special schools and disability ‘labels’ are inherently humiliating, and (b) that no decent society tolerates inherently humiliating institutions. I ask (following Avishai Margalit) whether there is a sound reason for a child to feel humiliated by special schools/disability ‘labels’ as such, and find none. Empirically, some do and some do not find these humiliating, and (...) it is argued that the failure to address the multiple ‘realities’ of disability and learning difficulty is responsible for the policy impasse in this area. (shrink)

Teachers need grounded ethical confidence: an intellectual virtue analogous to courage. I distinguish this from SCAA's notion of teacher confidence, based on the ‘authority of consensus’. Such a notion is challenged by Wittgenstein's later philosophy. I argue that confidence in authority is deferential rather than intellectual, which is not what we want for teachers. As courage (according to Aristotle) is a mean between vices, grounded ethical confidence is a mean between tendencies to excessive and insufficient doubt (forms of ‘not knowing (...) one's way about’ philosophically.) It is the virtue of thinking well ethically, and knowing that one thinks well. (shrink)

Teachers need grounded ethical confidence: an intellectual virtue analogous to courage. I distinguish this from SCAA's notion of teacher confidence, based on the ‘authority of consensus’. Such a notion is challenged by Wittgenstein's later philosophy. I argue that confidence in authority is deferential rather than intellectual, which is not what we want for teachers. As courage (according to Aristotle) is a mean between vices, grounded ethical confidence is a mean between tendencies to excessive and insufficient doubt (forms of ‘not knowing (...) one's way about’ philosophically.) It is the virtue of thinking well ethically, and knowing that one thinks well. (shrink)

The Humean legacy in moral philosophy has given rise to the following familiar divergence of views: 1. Moral questions are questions of feeling. Rational discussion can occur given the acceptance of unreasoned commitments to values or principles, but it must not be thought that these values or principles can themselves be justified rationally. Moral disagreements may be resolved through persuasion, but it is appropriate for rational persons to be permanently irreconcilable in their moral views. 2. Moral questions are questions of (...) fact and/or logic. They are therefore in principle resolvable through rational discussion, like any other questions of fact and/or logic. The idea that rational persons should be permanently unable to agree on moral questions, despite indefinitely lengthy discussion and enquiry, is unintelligible. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Inclusive Education and the Decent Society III Self‐Respect and the Goals of Inclusion IV Inclusion and the Concept of Possibility V Inclusive Education and the Concept of Reality VI Conclusion References.

What is a good human life? A life of duty? Virtue? Happiness? This book weaves a path through traditional answers. We live well, suggests the author, not primarily by pursuing goods for ourselves, but by cherishing other people and guiding them towards lives of cherishing. We cherish objects too - the planet, my grandfather's watch - and practices like music-making to which we are personally drawn. In this work of 'populated philosophy' (copiously illustrated by literary and 'real life' examples), a (...) cherishing life is presented as hard and irreducibly individual. The idea of cherishing, says the author, points towards intimate, unreasonable layers of the ethical life, as well as the deepening of wisdom and connection. It also points towards incomparable satisfactions, reminding us who we are and who we want to be. (shrink)

Happiness is a large idea. It looms enticingly before us when we are young, delivers verdicts on our lives when we are old, and seems to inform a responsible engagement with children. This chapter briefly talks about happiness, as its largeness—including its large history—deserves. Despite numerous refinements, the author believes the science of happiness also lacks the richness we need if we are to claim and retain this large idea. Whether we want to do so should be seen as an (...) open question, requiring in the first instance a distinction between rich and poor conceptions. The chapter examines what a rich conception might look like. To defend a theory of happiness is to attempt to tell people ‘what to think’ about a matter that properly belongs to first person enquiry and conversation. Finally, the chapter explores into what is for a philosophy of happiness, untypically, to avoid doing this. (shrink)

An implicit rationale for ethics in medical schools is that there is a perceived need to teach students how not to think and how not to act, if they are to avoid a lawsuit or being struck off by the GMC. However, the imperative to keep within the law and professional guidance focuses attention on risks to patients that can land a doctor in trouble, rather than what it means to treat a patient humanely or well. In this paper I (...) explore the gap between learning how not to think and act as a doctor, and learning to be reflective and responsive to patients as fellow human beings. This gap is exposed by the difference between a GMC web resource for doctors, and a detailed ethical discussion by Gawande in his book Complications. The latter raises fundamental questions of meaning, and exemplifies an approach to ethical thinking as the appropriate management of doubt that, according to the argument of this paper, is of utmost importance for doctors. (shrink)