110 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Ruth Garrett Millikan [82]Ruth G. Millikan [28]
  1. Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1984 - MIT Press.
    Preface by Daniel C. Dennett Beginning with a general theory of function applied to body organs, behaviors, customs, and both inner and outer representations, ...
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1298 citations  
  2. Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1984 - Behaviorism 14 (1):51-56.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1680 citations  
  3. White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1993 - MIT Press.
    This collection of essays serves both as an introduction to Ruth Millikan’s much-discussed volume Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories and as an extension and application of Millikan’s central themes, especially in the philosophy of psychology. The title essay discusses meaning rationalism and argues that rationality is not in the head, indeed, that there is no legitimate interpretation under which logical possibility and necessity are known a priori. In other essays, Millikan clarifies her views on the nature of mental representation, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   335 citations  
  4. Varieties of Meaning: The 2002 Jean Nicod Lectures.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 2004 - MIT Press.
    How the various things that are said to have meaning—purpose, natural signs, linguistic signs, perceptions, and thoughts—are related to one another.
  5. On Clear and Confused Ideas: An Essay About Substance Concepts.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 2000 - Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Written by one of today's most creative and innovative philosophers, Ruth Garrett Millikan, this book examines basic empirical concepts; how they are acquired, how they function, and how they have been misrepresented in the traditional philosophical literature. Millikan places cognitive psychology in an evolutionary context where human cognition is assumed to be an outgrowth of primitive forms of mentality, and assumed to have 'functions' in the biological sense. Of particular interest are her discussions of the nature of abilities as different (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   209 citations  
  6. Biosemantics.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (July):281-97.
  7. Pushmi-pullyu representations.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1995 - Philosophical Perspectives 9:185-200.
    A list of groceries, Professor Anscombe once suggested, might be used as a shopping list, telling what to buy, or it might be used as an inventory list, telling what has been bought (Anscombe 1957). If used as a shopping list, the world is supposed to conform to the representation: if the list does not match what is in the grocery bag, it is what is in the bag that is at fault. But if used as an inventory list, the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   219 citations  
  8. Historical kinds and the "special sciences".Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):45-65.
    There are no "special sciences" in Fodor's sense. There is a large group of sciences, "historical sciences," that differ fundamentally from the physical sciences because they quantify over a different kind of natural or real kind, nor are the generalizations supported by these kinds exceptionless. Heterogeneity, however, is not characteristic of these kinds. That there could be an univocal empirical science that ranged over multiple realizations of a functional property is quite problematic. If psychological predicates name multiply realized functionalist properties, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   147 citations  
  9. Thoughts without laws: Cognitive science with content.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (January):47-80.
  10. A common structure for concepts of individuals, stuffs, and real kinds: More Mama, more milk, and more mouse.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):55-65.
    Concepts are highly theoretical entities. One cannot study them empirically without committing oneself to substantial preliminary assumptions. Among the competing theories of concepts and categorization developed by psychologists in the last thirty years, the implicit theoretical assumption that what falls under a concept is determined by description () has never been seriously challenged. I present a nondescriptionist theory of our most basic concepts, which include (1) stuffs (gold, milk), (2) real kinds (cat, chair), and (3) individuals (Mama, Bill Clinton, the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   83 citations  
  11. Truth, rules, hoverflies, and the Kripke-Wittgenstein paradox.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (3):323-53.
  12. Varieties of Meaning: The 2002 Jean Nicod Lectures.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):674-681.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   82 citations  
  13.  43
    Naturalist Reflections on Knowledge.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1984 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 65 (4):315-334.
  14. Introducing substance concepts.Ruth G. Millikan - 2000 - In Ruth Garrett Millikan (ed.), On Clear and Confused Ideas: An Essay About Substance Concepts. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
  15. Teleosemantics and the frogs.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 2024 - Mind and Language 39 (1):52-60.
    Some have thought that the plausibility of teleosemantics requires that it yield a determinate answer to the question of what the semantic “content” is of the “representation” triggered in the optic nerve of a frog that spots a fly. An outsize literature has resulted in which, unfortunately, a number of serious confusions and omissions that concern the way teleosemantics would have to work have appeared and been passed on uncorrected leaving a distorted and simplistic picture of the teleosemantic position. I (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  16. The myth of the essential indexical.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1990 - Noûs 24 (5):723-734.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   55 citations  
  17. On Knowing the Meaning; With a Coda on Swampman.Ruth G. Millikan - 2010 - Mind 119 (473):43-81.
    I give an analysis of how empirical terms do their work in communication and the gathering of knowledge that is fully externalist and that covers the full range of empirical terms. It rests on claims about ontology. A result is that armchair analysis fails as a tool for examining meanings of ‘basic’ empirical terms because their meanings are not determined by common methods or criteria of application passed from old to new users, by conventionally determined ‘intensions’. Nor do methods of (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  18. On swampkinds.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1996 - Mind and Language 11 (1):103-17.
    Suppose lightning strikes a dead tree in a swamp; I am standing nearby. My body is reduced to its elements, while entirely by coincidence (and out of different molecules) the tree is turned into my physical replica. My replica, The Swampman.....moves into my house and seems to write articles on radical interpretation. No one can tell the difference.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   47 citations  
  19. Neuroscience and teleosemantics.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2457-2465.
    Correctly understood, teleosemantics is the claim that “representation” is a function term. Things are called “representations” if they have a certain kind of function or telos and perform it in a certain kind of way. This claim is supported with a discussion and proposals about the function of a representation and of how representations perform that function. These proposals have been retrieved by putting together current descriptions from the literature on neural representations with earlier explorations of the features common to (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  20.  34
    Language Conventions Made Simple.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1998 - Journal of Philosophy 95 (4):161.
  21. Perceptual content and Fregean myth.Ruth G. Millikan - 1991 - Mind 100 (399):439-459.
  22.  59
    Meaning and Mental Representation.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):422.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  23. Wings, Spoons, Pills, and Quills.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (4):191-206.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  24. Speaking up for Darwin.Ruth G. Millikan - 1991 - In Barry M. Loewer (ed.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell. pp. 151-164.
  25. Styles of Rationality.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 2006 - In Susan Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press.
    By whatever general principles and mechanisms animal behavior is governed, human behavior control rides piggyback on top of the same or very similar mechanisms. We have reflexes. We can be conditioned. The movements that make up our smaller actions are mostly caught up in perception-action cycles following perceived Gibsonian affordances. Still, without doubt there are levels of behavior control that are peculiar to humans. Following Aristotle, tradition has it that what is added in humans is rationality ("rational soul"). Rationality, however, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
  26. Compare and contrast Dretske, Fodor, and Millikan on teleosemantics.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1990 - Philosophical Topics 18 (2):151-61.
  27.  30
    With Commentary.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1989 - Biology and Philosophy 4 (2):172.
  28. Language conventions made simple.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1998 - Journal of Philosophy 95 (4):161-180.
    At the start of Convention (1969) Lewis says that it is "a platitude that language is ruled by convention" and that he proposes to give us "an analysis of convention in its full generality, including tacit convention not created by agreement." Almost no clause, however, of Lewis's analysis has withstood the barrage of counter examples over the years,1 and a glance at the big dictionary suggests why, for there are a dozen different senses listed there. Left unfettered, convention wanders freely (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  29.  70
    Self‐signs and intensional contexts.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 2022 - Mind and Language 38 (4):962-980.
    Paradigm intensional contexts result from the unmarked use of referential expressions as “self‐signs”, signs that refer to themselves as tokens, types, or members of Sellarsian “dot‐quoted” kinds. Self‐signing (but unquoted) linguistic expressions are more difficult to recognize than non‐linguistic self‐signs such as the color of a felt pen's casing that represents the color of ink inside. I will discuss non‐linguistic self‐signing, then examine self‐signing in quotation, in “said that …” contexts and in “believes that … ” contexts. The phenomenon of (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  30. What has Natural Information to Do with Intentional Representation?Ruth Garrett Millikan - 2001 - In D. Walsh (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 105-125.
    "According to informational semantics, if it's necessary that a creature can't distinguish Xs from Ys, it follows that the creature can't have a concept that applies to Xs but not Ys." (Jerry Fodor, The Elm and the Expert, p.32).
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  31. Biosemantics and Words that Don't Represent.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 2018 - Theoria 84 (3):229-241.
    One of the virtues of the biosemantic view of language is the clarity and simplicity of its description of the general nature of nonrepresentational linguistic constructions. It doesn't follow, however, that it is obvious on this view how these functions should be described individually. After an explanation of the biosemantic approach, initial suggestions are made for analyses of a variety of nonrepresentational constructions that have traditionally been considered problematic. Included are “not”, “is” (of identity), “exists”, “means”, “but”, “if … then”, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  32.  87
    Comment on Artiga’s “Teleosemantics and Pushmi-Pullyu Representations”.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (1):1-9.
    “Teleosemantics and Pushmi-Pullyu Representations” (call it “TP-PR,” this journal 2014 79.3, 545–566) argues that core teleosemantics, particularly as defined in Millikan (Language, thought and other biological categories, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1984, J Philos 86(6):281–297, 1989, White queen psychology and other essays for Alice, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1993, Philosophical perspectives, Ridgeview Publishing, Alascadero, 1996, Varieties of meaning, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2004–2008), seems to imply that all descriptive representations are at the same time directive and that directives are at the same time (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  33. Explanation in biopsychology.Ruth G. Millikan - 1993 - In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  34.  59
    What has Natural Information to do with Intentional Representation?Ruth Garrett Millikan - 2001 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 49:105-125.
    ‘According to informational semantics, if it's necessary that a creature can't distinguish Xs from Ys, it follows that the creature can't have a concept that applies to Xs but not Ys.’ There is, indeed, a form of informational semantics that has this verificationist implication. The original definition of information given in Dretske'sKnowledge and the Flow of Information, when employed as a base for a theory of intentional representation or ‘content,’ has this implication. I will argue that, in fact, most of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  35. An Input Condition for Teleosemantics? Reply to Shea (and Godfrey-Smith).Ruth Garrett Millikan - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):436-455.
    In his essay "Consumers Need Information: Supplementing Teleosemantics with an Input Condition" (this issue) Nicholas Shea argues, with support from the work of Peter Godfrey-Smith (1996), that teleosemantics, as David Papinau and I have articulated it, cannot explain why "content attribution can be used to explain successful behavior." This failure is said to result from defining the intentional contents of representations by reference merely to historically normal conditions for success of their "outputs," that is, of their uses by interpreting or (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  36. The father, the son, and the daughter: Sellars, Brandom, and Millikan.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 2005 - Pragmatics and Cognition 13 (1):59-71.
    The positions of Brandom and Millikan are compared with respect to their common origins in the works of Wilfrid Sellars and Wittgenstein. Millikan takes more seriously the “picturing” themes from Sellars and Wittgenstein. Brandom follows Sellars more closely in deriving the normativity of language from social practice, although there are also hints of a possible derivation from evolutionary theory in Sellars. An important claim common to Brandom and Millikan is that there are no representations without function or “attitude”.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  37. Content and vehicle.Ruth G. Millikan - 1993 - In Spatial Representation. Cambridge: Blackwell. pp. 256–68.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  38. On mentalese orthography.Ruth G. Millikan - 1993 - In B. Dahlbom (ed.), Dennett and His Critics: Demystifying Mind. Cambridge: Blackwell.
  39. Are there mental indexicals and demonstratives?Ruth Garrett Millikan - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):217-234.
  40.  16
    Comment on Artiga’s “Teleosemantics and Pushmi-Pullyu Representations”.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (1):409-417.
    “Teleosemantics and Pushmi-Pullyu Representations” (call it “TP-PR,” this journal 2014 79.3, 545–566) argues that core teleosemantics, particularly as defined in Millikan (Language, thought and other biological categories, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1984, J Philos 86(6):281–297, 1989, White queen psychology and other essays for Alice, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1993, Philosophical perspectives, Ridgeview Publishing, Alascadero, 1996, Varieties of meaning, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2004–2008), seems to imply that all descriptive representations are at the same time directive and that directives are at the same time (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  41.  60
    Seismograph Readings for explaining behavior.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1990 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4):807-812.
  42. In defense of public language.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 2003 - In Louise M. Antony & H. Hornstein (eds.), Chomsky and His Critics. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. pp. 215–237.
    ....a notion of 'common, public language' that remains mysterious...useless for any form of theoretical explanation....There is simply no way of making sense of this prong of the externalist theory of meaning and language, as far as I can see, or of any of the work in theory of meaning and philosophy of language that relies on such notions, a statement that is intended to cut rather a large swath. (Chomsky 1995, pp. 48-9) It is a striking fact that despite the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  43. A Difference of Some Consequence Between Conventions and Rules.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 2008 - Topoi 27 (1-2):87-99.
    Lewis’s view of the way conventions are passed on may have some especially interesting consequences for the study of language. I’ll start by briefly discussing agreements and disagreements that I have with Lewis’s general views on conventions and then turn to how linguistic conventions spread. I’ll compare views of main stream generative linguistics, in particular, Chomsky’s views on how syntactic forms are passed on, with the sort of view of language acquisition and language change advocated by usage-based or construction grammars, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  44. On cognitive luck: Externalism in an evolutionary frame.Ruth G. Millikan - 1997 - In Peter K. Machamer & Martin Carrier (eds.), Philosophy and the Sciences of Mind.
    "Paleontologists like to say that to a first approximation, all species are extinct (ninety- nine percent is the usual estimate). The organisms we see around us are distant cousins, not great grandparents; they are a few scattered twig-tips of an enormous tree whose branches and trunk are no longer with us." (p. 343-44). The historical life bush consists mainly in dead ends.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  45. Reading mother nature's mind.Ruth G. Millikan - 2000 - In Don Ross, Andrew Brook & David Thompson (eds.), Dennett’s Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment. MIT Press.
    I try to focus our differences by examining the relation between what Dennett has termed "the intentional stance" and "the design stance." Dennett takes the intentional stance to be more basic than the design stance. Ultimately it is through the eyes of the intentional stance that both human and natural design are interpreted, hence there is always a degree of interpretive freedom in reading the mind, the purposes, both of Nature and of her children. The reason, or at least a (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  46. On Reading Signs; Some Differences between Us and The Others.Ruth Garrett Millikan - unknown
    On Reading Signs; Some Differences between Us and The Others If there are certain kinds of signs that an animal cannot learn to interpret, that might be for any of a number of reasons. It might be, first, because the animal cannot discriminate the signs from one another. For example, although human babies learn to discriminate human speech sounds according to the phonological structures of their native languages very easily, it may be that few if any other animals are capable (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  47.  90
    On unclear and indistinct ideas.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8:75-100.
  48.  99
    A Theory of Content and Other Essays. [REVIEW]Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (4):898-901.
  49.  62
    Comment on the Relation between Representation and Information.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 2021 - Biosemiotics 14 (3):581-582.
    Deacon’s target article is a welcome contribution not only on “biological information” but, more generally, on representation in cognitive science. Some kind of explanation and justification for use of the terms “representation” and “interpretant” for primordial autogen system would be helpful. A connection between the notions of “information” and “representation” can be elaborated more in this respect.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  50. Naturalizing intentionality.Ruth G. Millikan - 2000 - In Bernard Elevitch (ed.), The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Philosopy Documentation Center. pp. 83-90.
    Brentano was surely mistaken, however, in thinking that bearing a relation to something nonexistent marks only the mental. Given any sort of purpose, it might not get fulfilled, hence might exhibit Brentano's relation, and there are many natural purposes, such as the purpose of one's stomach to digest food or the purpose of one's protective eye blink reflex to keep out the sand, that are not mental, nor derived from anything mental. Nor are stomachs and reflexes "of" or"about" anything. A (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
1 — 50 / 110