Results for 'Ruth Rubinstein'

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  1.  33
    Michelangelo's Lost Sleeping Cupid and Fetti's Vertumnus and Pomona.Ruth Rubinstein - 1986 - Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 49:257-259.
  2.  13
    Ajax and Cassandra: An Antique Cameo and a Drawing by Raphael.Ruth Rubinstein - 1987 - Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 50:204-205.
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  3.  26
    Lecture Notes in Microeconomic Theory: The Economic Agent.Ariel Rubinstein - 2012 - Princeton University Press.
    This book presents Ariel Rubinstein's lecture notes for the first part of his well-known graduate course in microeconomics.
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  4. Economics and Language: Five Essays.Ariel Rubinstein - 2000 - Cambridge University Press.
    Arising out of the author's lifetime fascination with the links between the formal language of mathematical models and natural language, this short book comprises five essays investigating both the economics of language and the language of economics. Ariel Rubinstein touches the structure imposed on binary relations in daily language, the evolutionary development of the meaning of words, game-theoretical considerations of pragmatics, the language of economic agents and the rhetoric of game theory. These short essays are full of challenging ideas (...)
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  5. From Ecclesiastes to Simone Weil: Varieties of Philosophical Spirituality.Ernest Rubinstein - 2014 - Fairleigh Dickinson University Press.
    This book reads major philosophers from the Western philosophical canon and beyond for the spirituality implicit in their metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, and logic. Ernest Rubinstein revives for the modern reader the spiritual import of philosophy as an area of inquiry and study.
     
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  6.  44
    On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall.Michele Piccione & Ariel Rubinstein - manuscript
    We argue that in extensive decision problems (extensive games with a single player) with imperfect recall care must be taken in interpreting information sets and strategies. Alternative interpretations allow for different kinds of analysis. We address the following issues: 1. randomization at information sets; 2. consistent beliefs; 3. time consistency of optimal plans; 4. the multiselves approach to decision making. We illustrate our discussion through an example that we call the ‘‘paradox of the absentminded driver.’’ Journal of Economic Literature Classification (...)
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  7. Dilemmas of an Economic Theorist.Ariel Rubinstein - manuscript
    What on earth are economic theorists like me trying to accomplish? This paper discusses four dilemmas encountered by an economic theorist: The dilemma of absurd conclusions: Should we abandon a model if it produces absurd conclusions or should we regard a model as a very limited set of assumptions that will inevitably fail in some contexts? The dilemma of responding to evidence: Should our models be judged according to experimental results? The dilemma of modelless regularities: Should models provide the hypothesis (...)
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  8.  40
    Instinctive and Cognitive Reasoning: A Study of Response Times.Ariel Rubinstein - manuscript
    Lecture audiences and students were asked to respond to virtual decision and game situations at gametheory.tau.ac.il. Several thousand observations were collected and the response time for each answer was recorded. There were significant differences in response time across responses. It is suggested that choices made instinctively, that is, on the basis of an emotional response, require less response time than choices that require the use of cognitive reasoning.
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  9.  31
    A Sceptic's Comment on the Study of Economics.Ariel Rubinstein - manuscript
    A survey was carried out among two groups of undergraduate economics students and four groups of students in mathematics, law, philosophy and business administration. The main survey question involved a conflict between profit maximisation and the welfare of the workers who would be fired to achieve it. Significant differences were found between the choices of the groups. The results were reinforced by a survey conducted among readers of an Israeli business newspaper and PhD students of Harvard. It is argued that (...)
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  10. A Model of Choice From Lists.Ariel Rubinstein - unknown
    The standard economic choice model assumes that the decision maker chooses from sets of alternatives. In contrast, we analyze a choice model in which the decision maker encounters the alternatives in the form of a list. We present two axioms similar in nature to the classical axioms of choice from sets. We show that they characterize all the choice functions from lists that involve the choice of either the first or the last optimal alternative in the list according to some (...)
     
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  11.  53
    Comments on Neuroeconomics.Ariel Rubinstein - 2008 - Economics and Philosophy 24 (3):485-494.
    Neuroeconomics is examined critically using data on the response times of subjects who were asked to express their preferences in the context of the Allais Paradox. Different patterns of choice are found among the fast and slow responders. This suggests that we try to identify types of economic agents by the time they take to make their choices. Nevertheless, it is argued that it is far from clear if and how neuroeconomics will change economics.
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  12.  52
    On the Question "Who is a J?"* A Social Choice Approach.Ariel Rubinstein - manuscript
    The determination of “who is a J” within a society is treated as an aggregation of the views of the members of the society regarding this question. Methods, similar to those used in Social Choice theory are applied to axiomatize three criteria for determining who is a J: 1) a J is whoever defines oneself to be a J. 2) a J is whoever a “dictator” determines is a J. 3) a J is whoever an “oligarchy” of individuals agrees is (...)
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  13.  43
    A Theorist's View of Experiments.Ariel Rubinstein - manuscript
    The paper springs from a position that economic theory is an abstract investigation of the concepts and considerations involved in real life economic decision making rather than a tool for predicting or describing real behavior. It is argued that when experimental economics is motivated by theory, it should not look to verify the predictions of theory but instead should focus on verifying that the considerations contained in the economic model are sound and in common use. It is argued that when (...)
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  14.  74
    (A, F ) Choice with Frames.Ariel Rubinstein - manuscript
    We develop a framework for modeling choice in the presence of framing effects. An extended choice function assigns a chosen element to every pair (A, f ) where A is a set of alternatives and f is a frame. A frame includes observable information that is irrelevant in the rational assessment of the alternatives, but nonetheless affects choice. We relate the new framework to the classical model of choice correspondence. Conditions are identified under which there exists either a transitive or (...)
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  15.  34
    Some Thoughts on the Principle of Revealed Preference.Ariel Rubinstein - manuscript
    (2) Mental preferences: These describe the mental attitude of an individual toward the objects. They can be defined in contexts which do not involve actual choice. In particular, preferences can describe tastes (such as a preference for one season over another) or can refer to situations which are only hypothetical (such as the possible courses of action available to an individual were he to become Emperor of Rome) or which the individual does not fully control (such as a game situation (...)
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  16.  31
    Freak-Freakonomics.Ariel Rubinstein - manuscript
    New York University. He is the recipient of the Bruno Prize (2000), the Israel Prize (2002), the Nemmers Prize (2004).
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  17. The Beginnings of Political Thought in Florence. A Study in Mediaeval Historiography.Nicolai Rubinstein - 1942 - Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 5:198-227.
  18.  41
    On Optimal Rules of Persuasion.Ariel Rubinstein - manuscript
    A speaker wishes to persuade a listener to accept a certain request. The conditions under which the request is justified, from the listener’s point of view, depend on the values of two aspects. The values of the aspects are known only to the speaker and the listener can check the value of at most one. A mechanism specifies a set of messages that the speaker can send and a rule that determines the listener’s response, namely, which aspect he checks and (...)
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  19.  37
    Discussion of “Behavioral Economics”.Ariel Rubinstein - manuscript
    For me, economics is a collection of ideas and conventions which economists accept and use to reason with. Namely, it is a culture. Behavioral economics represents a transformation of that culture. Nonetheless, as pointed out by Camerer and Loewenstein (2003), its methods are pretty much the same as those introduced by the Game Theory revolution. At the core of most models in Behavioral Economics there are still agents who maximize a preference relation over some space of consequences and the solution (...)
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  20. Political Ideas in Sienese Art: The Frescoes by Ambrogio Lorenzetti and Taddeo di Bartolo in the Palazzo Pubblico.Nicolai Rubinstein - 1958 - Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 21 (3/4):179-207.
  21.  21
    Language Games and Natural Reactions.David Rubinstein - 2004 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 34 (1):55–71.
    Ludwig Wittgenstein imagines a variety of eccentric social practices—like a tribe trained “to give no expression of feeling of any kind”. But he also speaks of “the common behavior of mankind” that is rooted in “natural/primitive reactions”. This emphasis on the uniformities of human behavior raises questions about the plausibility of some of his imagined language games. Indeed, it suggests the claim of evolutionary psychologists that there are biologically based human universals that shape social practices. But in contrast to E.O. (...)
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  22.  28
    Equilibrium in the Jungle.Ariel Rubinstein - manuscript
    In the jungle, power and coercion govern the exchange of resources. We study a simple, stylised model of the jungle that mirrors an exchange economy. We define the notion of jungle equilibrium and demonstrate that a number of standard results of competitive markets hold in the jungle.
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  23.  21
    The Concept of Action in the Social Sciences.D. Rubinstein - 1977 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 7 (2):209–236.
  24.  21
    Choice Problems with a 'Reference' Point.Ariel Rubinstein - manuscript
    In many decision scenarios, one has to choose an element from a set S given some reference point e. For the case where S is a subset of a Euclidean space, we axiomatize the choice method that selects the point in S that is closest to e. © 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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  25.  30
    Marx and Wittgenstein: Social Praxis and Social Explanation.David Rubinstein - 1981 - Routledge & Kegan Paul.
  26.  29
    Book Reviews. [REVIEW]S. A. W. Ruth - 1968 - British Journal of Aesthetics 8 (3).
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  27. Sellars' Philosophy of Mind.Eric M. Rubinstein - 2006 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  28.  28
    Wittgenstein and Science.David Rubinstein - 1979 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 9 (3):341-346.
  29.  21
    Book Reviews. [REVIEW]S. A. W. Ruth - 1969 - British Journal of Aesthetics 9 (4).
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  30.  21
    Book Reviews. [REVIEW]S. A. W. Ruth - 1971 - British Journal of Aesthetics 11 (1).
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  31.  26
    Book Reviews. [REVIEW]S. A. W. Ruth - 1962 - British Journal of Aesthetics 2 (1).
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  32.  26
    Book Reviews. [REVIEW]S. A. W. Ruth - 1963 - British Journal of Aesthetics 3 (1).
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  33.  41
    Methodocracy, Misogyny, and Bad Faith: Sexism in the Philosophic Establishment.Sheila Ruth - 1979 - Metaphilosophy 10 (1):48–61.
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  34.  25
    Book Reviews. [REVIEW]S. A. W. Ruth - 1964 - British Journal of Aesthetics 4 (2).
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  35.  38
    Disinterestedness as Ideal and as Technique.Annette T. Rubinstein - 1931 - Journal of Philosophy 28 (17):461-466.
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  36.  41
    On the Psychoanalytic Theory of Unconscious Motivation and the Problem of its Confirmation.Benjamin B. Rubinstein - 1980 - Noûs 14 (3):427-442.
  37.  15
    Book Reviews. [REVIEW]S. A. W. Ruth - 1967 - British Journal of Aesthetics 7 (3).
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  38.  30
    A Game Theoretic Approach to the Pragmatics of Debate: An Expository Note.Ariel Rubinstein - manuscript
    In this paper, the term ‘debate’ refers to a situation in which two parties disagree over some issue and each of them tries to persuade a third party, the listener, to adopt his position by raising arguments in his favor. We are interested in the logic behind the relative strength of the arguments and counterarguments; we therefore limit our discussion to debates in which one side is asked to argue first, with the other party having the right to respond before (...)
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  39.  32
    Youth and Spring in Botticelli's Primavera.Nicolai Rubinstein - 1997 - Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 60:248-251.
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  40.  27
    Lorenzo De' Medici's Acquisition of the Sigillo di Nerone.Melissa Meriam Bullard & Nicolai Rubinstein - 1999 - Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 62:283-286.
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  41.  31
    Induction, Grue Emeralds and Lady Macbeth's Fallacy.Arthur Rubinstein - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (190):37-49.
    This paper does not purport to offer yet another ‘solution’ to the much discussed ‘new riddle’ of induction. The focus, instead, is on the genesis of Goodman's paradox and its relation to the classic problem of induction. In the arguments which led Goodman from the dissolution of Hume's problem to the discovery of the new riddle, I reveal a fundamentally flawed assumption about the nature of inductive inference which undermines Goodman's contention that the genuine problem of induction consists in distinguishing (...)
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  42.  24
    Irrational Diversiÿcation in Multiple Decision Problems.Ariel Rubinstein - manuscript
    The paper deals with multiple decision problems, which are similar to the task of guessing the color outcomes of ÿve independent spinnings of a roulette wheel, 60% of whose slots are red and 40% white. Each correct guess yields a prize of $1. The guess of 5 Reds clearly ÿrst order stochastic dominates any other strategy. In contrast, subjects diversify their choices when facing a multiple decision problem in which the choice is between lotteries with clear objective probabilities. The diversiÿcation (...)
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  43.  23
    Money Pumps in the Market.Ariel Rubinstein - manuscript
    Agents who employ non-rational choice procedures are often vulnerable to exploitation, in the sense that a profit-seeking trader can offer them a harmful transaction which they will nevertheless accept. We examine the vulnerability of a procedure for deciding whether to buy a lottery: observe another agent who already bought it and buy the lottery if that agent’s experience was positive. We show that the exploitation of such agents can be embedded in an inter-temporal market mechanism, in the form of speculative (...)
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  44.  27
    Modeling the Economic Interaction of Agents with Diverse Abilities to Recognize Equilibrium Patterns.Ariel Rubinstein - manuscript
    We model differences among agents in their ability to recognize temporal patterns of prices. Using the concept of DeBruijn sequences in two dynamic models of markets, we demonstrate the existence of equilibria in which prices fluctuate in a pattern that is independent of the fundamentals and that can be recognized only by the more competent agents. (JEL: C7, D4.
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  45.  15
    Motives and Implementation: On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions.Ariel Rubinstein - manuscript
    A number of experts receive noisy signals regarding a desirable public decision. The public target is to make the best possible decision on the basis of all the information held by the experts. We compare two ``cultures.'' In one, all experts are driven only by the public motive to increase the probability that the desirable action will be taken. In the second, each expert is also driven by a private motive: to have his recommendation accepted. We show that in the (...)
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  46.  20
    An Extensive Game as a Guide for Solving a Normal Game.Ariel Rubinstein - manuscript
    We show that for solvable games, the calculation of the strategies which survive iterative elimination of dominated strategies in normal games is equivalent to the calculation of the backward induction outcome of some extensive game. However, whereas the normal game form does not provide information on how to carry out the elimination, the corresponding extensive game does. As a by-product, we conclude that implementation using a subgame perfect equilibrium of an extensive game with perfect information is equivalent to implementation through (...)
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  47.  23
    An ´ Etude in Choice Theory: Choosing the Two Finalists.Michael Richter & Ariel Rubinstein - unknown
    This paper studies a decision maker who tackles a choice problem by selecting a subset of (at most) two alternatives which he will consider further in the second stage of his deliberation. We focus on the first stage where he chooses the delebration set. We axiomatize three types of procedures: (i) The top two: the decision maker has in mind an ordering and chooses the two maximal alternatives. (ii) The two extremes: the decision maker has in mind an ordering and (...)
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  48.  21
    Luxury Prices: An Expository Note.A. Rubinstein - unknown
    Economists generally associate the redistribution of resources with the apparatus of taxes and transfer payments. Such redistributions are done by the power of the authorities. However, resources are redistributed by other means as well. People give away income in a variety of ways, deliberate and unintentional. In this paper, agents transfer consumption goods in return for a good which lacks material qualities and affects their preferences because it has “value”. An example of a real life commodity without intrinsic value is (...)
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  49.  19
    Sampling Equilibrium, with an Application to Strategic Voting.Ariel Rubinstein - manuscript
    We suggest an equilibrium concept for a strategic model with a large number of players in which each player observes the actions of only a small number of the other players. The concept fits well situations in which each player treats his sample as a prediction of the distribution of actions in the entire population, and responds optimally to this prediction. We apply the concept to a strategic voting model and investigate the conditions under which a centrist candidate can win (...)
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  50.  18
    A Simple Model of Equilibrium in Search Procedures.Ariel Rubinstein - manuscript
    The paper presents a simple game-theoretic model in which players decide on search procedures for a prize located in one of a set of labeled boxes. The prize is awarded to the player who finds it first. A player can decide on the number of (costly) search units he employs and on the order in which he conducts the search. It is shown that in equilibrium, the players employ an equal number of search units and conduct a completely random search. (...)
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