58 found
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  1. Induction and inference to the best explanation.Ruth Weintraub - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):203-216.
    In this paper I adduce a new argument in support of the claim that IBE is an autonomous form of inference, based on a familiar, yet surprisingly, under-discussed, problem for Hume’s theory of induction. I then use some insights thereby gleaned to argue for the claim that induction is really IBE, and draw some normative conclusions.
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  2.  84
    Sleeping Beauty: a simple solution.Ruth Weintraub - 2004 - Analysis 64 (1):8-10.
    I defend the suggestion that the rational probability in the Sleeping Beauty paradox is one third. The reasoning in its favour is familiar: for every heads-waking, there are two tails-wakings. To complete the defense, I rebut the reasoning which purports to justify the competing suggestion – that the correct probability is half – by undermining its premise, that no new information has been received.
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  3.  90
    How probable is an infinite sequence of heads? A reply to Williamson.Ruth Weintraub - 2008 - Analysis 68 (299):247-250.
    It is possible that a fair coin tossed infinitely many times will always land heads. So the probability of such a sequence of outcomes should, intuitively, be positive, albeit miniscule: 0 probability ought to be reserved for impossible events. And, furthermore, since the tosses are independent and the probability of heads (and tails) on a single toss is half, all sequences are equiprobable. But Williamson has adduced an argument that purports to show that our intuitions notwithstanding, the probability of an (...)
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  4.  59
    Who’s Afraid of Disagreement about Disagreement?Ruth Weintraub - 2023 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 31 (3):346-360.
    This paper is not concerned with the (amply discussed) question as to the rational response to peer disagreement. Instead, it addresses a (considerably less often debated) problem to which many views about the (epistemic) significance of disagreement are vulnerable (to some extent or another): self-undermining. I reject several answers that have been proposed in the literature, defend one that has been offered (by meeting objections to it), and show that in its light, the prevalent assumption that the ‘equal-weight view’, a (...)
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  5.  93
    Desire as belief, Lewis notwithstanding.Ruth Weintraub - 2007 - Analysis 67 (2):116-122.
    In two curiously neglected papers, David Lewis claims to reduce to absurdity the supposition (commonly labeled DAB) that (some) desires are belief-like. My aim in this paper is to explain the significance of this claim and rebut the proof.
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  6.  20
    The Sceptical Challenge.Ruth Weintraub - 1996 - New York: Routledge.
    Do we really know the things we think we know? Are any of our beliefs reasonable? Scepticism gives a pessimistic reply to these important epistemological questions - we don't know anything; none of our beliefs are reasonable. But can such a seemingly paradoxical claim be more than an intellectual curiousity? And if it is, can it be refuted? Ruth Weintraub answers yes to both these questions. The sceptical challenge is a formidable one, and should be confronted, not dismissed. The theoretical (...)
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  7.  81
    Logic For Expressivists.Ruth Weintraub - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):601 - 616.
    In this paper I offer solutions to two problems which our moral practice engenders for expressivism, the meta-ethical doctrine according to which ethical statements aren't propositional, susceptible of truth and falsity, but, rather, express the speaker's non-cognitive attitudes. First, the expressivist must show that arguments which are valid when interpreted propositionally are valid when construed expressivistically, and vice versa. The second difficulty is the Frege-Geach problem. Moral arguments employ atomic sentences, negations, disjunctions, etc., and, by expressivist lights, the meaning of (...)
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  8. What can we Learn from Buridan's Ass?Ruth Weintraub - 2012 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (3):281-301.
    The mythical1 hungry ass, facing two identical bundles of hay equidistant from him, has engendered two related questions. Can he choose one of the bundles, there seemingly being nothing to incline him one way or the other? If he can, the second puzzle — pertaining to rational choice — arises. It seems the ass cannot rationally choose one of the bundles, because there is no sufficient reason for any choice.2In what follows, I will argue that choice is possible even when (...)
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  9. Skepticism about Induction.Ruth Weintraub - 2008 - In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford handbook of skepticism. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 129.
    This article considers two arguments that purport to show that inductive reasoning is unjustified: the argument adduced by Sextus Empiricus and the (better known and more formidable) argument given by Hume in the Treatise. While Sextus’ argument can quite easily be rebutted, a close examination of the premises of Hume’s argument shows that they are seemingly cogent. Because the sceptical claim is very unintuitive, the sceptical argument constitutes a paradox. And since attributions of justification are theoretical, and the claim that (...)
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  10.  46
    A bayesian paradox.Ruth Weintraub - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (1):51-66.
    A seemingly plausible application of Bayesian decision-theoretic reasoning to determine one's rational degrees of belief yields a paradoxical conclusion: one ought to jettison one's intermediate credences in favour of more extreme (opinionated) ones. I discuss various attempts to solve the paradox, those involving the acceptance of the paradoxical conclusion, and those which attempt to block its derivation.
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  11.  82
    The credibility of miracles.Ruth Weintraub - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 82 (3):359 - 375.
    Hume’s famous argument against the credibility of testimony about miracles invokes two premises: 1) The reliability of the witness (the extent to which he is informed and truthful) must be compared with the intrinsic probability of the miracle. 2) The initial probability of a miracle is always small enough to outweigh the improbability that the testimony is false (even when the witness is assumed to be reliable). I defend the first premise of the argument, showing that Hume’s argument can be (...)
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  12. What was Hume's contribution to the problem of induction?Ruth Weintraub - 1995 - Philosophical Quarterly 45 (181):460-470.
    There are very few philosophical issues which are so intimately associated with one single philosopher as is the problem of induction with Hume. This paper argues against this received opinion. It shows that Hume was neither the first to think induction problematic, nor the originator of the argument he adduced in support of the (sceptical) position. It then explains his (more modest) contribution. Its primary concern, however, is not historical. By considering Hume’s contribution to the problem of induction, it is (...)
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  13.  95
    A paradox of confirmation.Ruth Weintraub - 1988 - Erkenntnis 29 (2):169 - 180.
    I present a puzzle which seems simple, but is found to have interesting implications for confirmation. Its dissolution also helps us to throw light on the relationship between first- and second-order probabilities construed as rational degrees of belief.
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  14.  68
    Do utility comparisons pose a problem?Ruth Weintraub - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 92 (3):307-319.
    Comparisons between utilities pose a pressing problem if, while incapable of being grounded, they are required in ethical deliberation. My aim is to consider whether there are epistemological impediments to implementing such ethical choices. Can we find ourselves being persuaded of the ethical need to compare utilities of different individuals, yet unable to do so because the comparisons cannot be warranted? I argue that the problem cannot arise; no plausible moral principle will invoke magnitudes which are inscrutable.
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  15.  53
    Practical solutions to the surprise-examination paradox.Ruth Weintraub - 1995 - Ratio 8 (2):161-169.
    In this paper I consider the surprise examination paradox from a practical perspective, paying special attention to the communicative role of the teacher’s promise to the students. This perspective, which places the promise within a practice, rather than viewing it in the abstract, imposes constraints on adequate solutions to the paradox. In the light of these constraints, I examine various solutions which have been offered, and suggest two of my own.
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  16. Epistemology without knowledge?Ruth Weintraub - 1991 - Ratio 4 (2):157-169.
    Epistemologists have traditionally been concerned with two issues: the justification of particular beliefs or sets of beliefs, and claims to knowledge. I propose to examine the relative import of these questions by comparing the gravity of the threat posed by two sceptics: one who questions the justifiability of our beliefs, and one who doubts our knowledge claims.
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  17. The impossibility of interpersonal utility comparisons: A critical note.Ruth Weintraub - 1996 - Mind 105 (420):661-665.
    Hausman has recently provided an argument against identifying well-being with preference-satisfaction. I will focus on two of his premises. Hausman’s arguments for the first, I will suggest, fail. If the third premise is correct, I shall then argue, it can be used to undermine other plausible conceptions of the good.
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  18.  62
    A Problem for Hume's Theory of Induction.Ruth Weintraub - 2008 - Hume Studies 34 (2):169-187.
    According to Hume, the paradigm type of inductive reasoning involves a constant conjunction. But, as Price points out, Hume misrepresents ordinary induction: we experience very few constant conjunctions. In this paper, I examine several ways of defending Hume's (psychological) account of our practice against Price's objection, and conclude that the theory cannot be upheld.
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  19.  80
    Separability and concept-empiricism: Hume vs. Locke.Ruth Weintraub - 2007 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 15 (4):729 – 743.
    Hume invokes the separability of perceptions to derive some of his most contentious pronouncements. To assess the cogency of the arguments, the notion must first be clarified. The clarification reveals that sic different separability claims must be distinguished. Of these, I consider the three that are rarely discussed. They turn out to be unacceptable. Locke espouses none of them.This Article does not have an abstract.
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  20. Verificationism revisited.Ruth Weintraub - 2003 - Ratio 16 (1):83–98.
    I aim to stand the received view about verificationism on its head. It is commonly thought that verificationism is a powerful philosophical tool, which we could deploy very effectively if only it weren’t so hopelessly implausible. On the contrary, I argue. Verificationism - if properly construed - may well be true. But its philosophical applications are chimerical.
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  21.  30
    Who Is Afraid of the Logical Problem in Meta-Ethics?Ruth Weintraub - 2022 - Disputatio 14 (67):411-426.
    Expressivism, as applied to a certain class of statements, evaluative ones, for instance, is constituted by two doctrines, only the first of which will concern me in this paper. Evaluative statements, according to this doctrine, aren’t propositional (susceptible of truth or falsity). In this paper, I will argue that one of the vexing problems (that I label the “logical problem”) this doctrine engenders for the expressivist is equally pressing for some cognitivists (who think evaluative statements do have a truth-value). I (...)
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  22.  89
    Decision-theoretic epistemology.Ruth Weintraub - 1990 - Synthese 83 (1):159 - 177.
    In this paper, I examine the possibility of accounting for the rationality of belief-formation by utilising decision-theoretic considerations. I consider the utilities to be used by such an approach, propose to employ verisimilitude as a measure of cognitive utility, and suggest a natural way of generalising any measure of verisimilitude defined on propositions to partial belief-systems, a generalisation which may enable us to incorporate Popper's insightful notion of verisimilitude within a Bayesian framework. I examine a dilemma generated by the decision-theoretic (...)
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  23. Fallibilism and rational belief.Ruth Weintraub - 1993 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (2):251-261.
    Fallibilism is an attractive epistemological position, avoiding the Scylla of rationalism, and the Charybdis of scepticism. Acknowledging, on the one hand, human imperfection, yet claiming that science and rational inquiry are possible. Fallibilism is a thesis, but equally importantly – an epistemological recommendation. that we should never be absolutely sure of anything. My aim in this paper is to drive a wedge between the thesis and the recommendation. The (eminently plausible) doctrine, I shall argue, cannot be used to ground the (...)
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  24. The spatiality of the mental and the mind-body problem.Ruth Weintraub - 1998 - Synthese 117 (3):409-17.
    I consider a seemingly attractive strategy for grappling with the mind-body problem. It is often thought that materialists are committed to spatially locating mental events, whereas dualists are barred from so doing. The thought naturally arises, then, that reasons for or against the spatiality of the mental may be wielded to adjudicate between the different positions in the mind-body dispute. Showing that mental events are spatially located, it may be thought, is ipso facto showing the truth of materialism. Conversely, it (...)
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  25.  58
    The naturalistic response to scepticism.Ruth Weintraub - 2003 - Philosophy 78 (3):369-386.
    Hume is sometimes thought to provide a ‘naturalistic’ response to the sceptic. I consider two ways in which this response may be construed. According to the first, the fact that we are psychologically determined to hold a belief provides it with justification. According to the second, ‘natural’ beliefs provide limits within which reason can legitimately be employed, limits which the sceptic transgresses when he attempts to defend his position. Both versions of the naturalistic response to scepticism, I will argue, aren't (...)
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  26. Humean Bodies.Ruth Weintraub - 2011 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 28 (4):373.
    The interpretation of the belief in external objects (“bodies”) Hume ascribes to us isn’t often discussed, and this is surprising, because the parallel question, pertaining to Hume’s construal of the belief about necessity, is hotly debated. As in the case of causation, the content Hume ascribes to the belief in “bodies” is susceptible to more than one reading. Indeed, there is here a plethora of interpretations, engendered by the fact that Hume distinguishes between the belief of the ordinary (vulgar) person (...)
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  27.  18
    Is Hume a Methodological Empiricist?Ruth Weintraub - 2023 - Hume Studies 48 (1):117-141.
    Abstract:The question broached in the title may sound odd. It makes sense to ask whether Hume’s empiricism is successful, and whether it is the best way of rendering rigorous the (vague) empiricist view. But is it not obvious that Hume is an empiricist? I shall argue that the answer is negative, at least when we are concerned with methodological empiricism, pertaining to the way inquiry, both scientific and philosophical, must proceed. In support of my claim, I will distinguish between the (...)
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  28.  16
    Hume’s View of Geometry.Ruth Weintraub - 2023 - In Carl Posy & Yemima Ben-Menahem (eds.), Mathematical Knowledge, Objects and Applications: Essays in Memory of Mark Steiner. Springer. pp. 329-343.
    I start by considering Mark Steiner’s startling claim that Hume takes geometry to be synthetic a priori, which engenders the Kantian challenge to explain how such knowledge is possible. I argue, in response, that Steiner misinterprets the (deceptive) relevant passage from Hume, and that Hume, as the received view has it, takes geometry to be analytic, although in a more expansive sense of the word than the modern one. I then note a new challenge geometry engenders for Hume. Unlike Euclidean (...)
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  29.  32
    A Neglected Aspect of Hume’s Nominalism.Ruth Weintraub - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (2):197-207.
    In this paper, I point to two problems engendered by two assumptions that Hume makes. The first is his nominalism: the view that all ideas are fully determinate with respect to all the aspects that are represented in them. The second, perhaps hitherto unnoticed, is that names denote ideas. I propose some solutions, aiming to find one that is Humean.
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  30.  93
    A new solution to the problem of peer disagreement.Ruth Weintraub - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (8):795-811.
    ABSTRACT In this paper, I defend a new solution to the problem of peer disagreement, the question as to how you should respond when you learn that your ‘epistemic peer’ disagrees with you about some issue. I consider four test cases that together impugn every extant full-blown theory about peer disagreement. I present my own solution, show that it delivers the intuitive verdict in the test cases and address some objections.
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  31.  66
    Peer disagreement and counter-examples.Ruth Weintraub - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (7):1773-1790.
    Two kinds of considerations are thought to be relevant to the correct response to the discovery of a peer who disagrees with you about some question. The first is general principles pertaining to disagreement. According to the second kind of consideration, a theory about the correct response to peer disagreement must conform to our intuitions about test cases. In this paper, I argue against the assumption that imperfect conformity to our intuitions about test cases must count against a theory about (...)
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  32.  68
    Hume’s nominalism and the Copy Principle.Ruth Weintraub - 2012 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (S1):45-54.
    In this paper, I consider some ways in which the Copy Principle and Hume’s nominalism impinge on one another, concluding that the marriage is not a happy one. I argue for the following claims. First, Hume’s argument against indeterminate ideas isn’t cogent even if the Copy Principle is accepted. But this does not vindicate Locke: the imagistic conception of ideas, presupposed by the Copy Principle, will force Locke to accept something like Hume’s view of the way general terms function, the (...)
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  33. What Descartes' Demon Can Do and his Dream Cannot.Ruth Weintraub - 2006 - Theoria 72 (4):319-335.
    The reason Descartes cites for invoking the demon argument in addition to the dream argument is that the demon argument is intended to broaden the scope of Descartes’ scepticism, to subsume additional beliefs under it. I present an additional, unfamiliar reason. There is, I argue, an important difference between the two sceptical arguments. It pertains not to their scope, but to their “depth”, to the kind of scepticism they are capable of inducing.
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  34.  35
    The basis of justification.Ruth Weintraub - 1994 - Philosophical Papers 23 (1):19-29.
    Many epistemologists agree with the intuition that “there is no exit from the circle of one’s beliefs”. I shall construe this vague intuition as the claim that justification supervenes on the totality of one’s beliefs: two agents with identical beliefs will be indistinguishable with respect to which of their beliefs are justified and to what degree. My central purpose in this paper is to undermine the supervenience thesis. To this end I shall consider the role(s) of the concept of justification.
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  35. Descartes: Reception and Disenchantment. Réception et Déception. Edited by: Yaron Senderowicz & Yves Wahl.Yaron Senderowicz, Yves Wahl, Daniel Garber, Frédéric Cossutta, Georges-Elia Sarfati, Sergio Cremaschi, Anthony Kenny, Elhanan Yakira, Abraham Mansbach, Fernando Gil, Ruth Weintraub, Zauderer Naaman Noa, Keenan Hagi & Viala Alain - 2000 - Tel Aviv: University Publishing Projects.
    A collection of essays in French or English on the reception of Cartesian philosphy.
     
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  36.  35
    A Hume-Inspired Argument against Reason.Ruth Weintraub - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (1):1-20.
    In the “diminution argument,” which Hume adduces in the Treatise section “Scepticism with Regard to Reason,” he infers from our universal fallibility that “all the rules of logic require a continual diminution, and at last a total extinction of belief and evidence.” My aim in this paper is, first, to show that on all extant interpretations of the argument, it turns out to be very weak, and, second, that there is in the vicinity a significant sceptical argument in support of (...)
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  37.  70
    A Humean Conundrum.Ruth Weintraub - 2005 - Hume Studies 31 (2):211-224.
    Hume's Copy Principle, which accords precedence to impressions over ideas, is restricted to simple perceptions. Yet in all the conceptual analyses Hume conducts by attempting to fit an impression to a (putative) idea, he never checks for simplicity. And this seems to vitiate the analyses: we cannot conclude from the lack of a preceding impression that a putative idea is bogus, unless it is simple. In this paper I criticise several attempts to account for Hume's seemingly cavalier attitude, and offer (...)
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  38.  56
    A New Humean Criticism of Our Inductive Practice.Ruth Weintraub - 2013 - The European Legacy 18 (4):420-431.
    Hume’s familiar sceptical argument against induction brands as irrational our practice of generalising from observed regularities because of its reliance on the assumption that nature is uniform, an assumption which is unjustifiable. The argument which I wish to consider focuses instead on the observed regularities that are required if we are legitimately to extrapolate from experience. According to Hume, the paradigm type of inductive reasoning involves a constant conjunction. But in fact we do not encounter such invariable uniformities: our experience (...)
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  39.  46
    A Non-Fideistic Reading of William James's "The Will to Believe".Ruth Weintraub - 2003 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 20 (1):103 - 121.
    William James’ declared intention is to oppose Clifford’s claim that it “is wrong always, everywhere, and for every one, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence”. But I argue that he is confused about his doxastic prescriptions. He isn’t primarily concerned, as he thinks he is, with the legitimacy of belief in the absence of sufficient evidence. The most important contribution of his essay is a suggestion - a highly insightful and contentious one - as to what it is to believe (...)
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  40.  99
    A solution to the discursive dilemma.Ruth Weintraub - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):181 - 188.
    An impossibility result pertaining to the aggregation of individual judgements is thought by many to have significant implications for political theory, social epistemology and metaphysics. When members of a group hold a rational set of judgments on some interconnected questions, the theorem shows, it isn't always (logically) possible for them to aggregate their judgements into a collective one in conformity with seemingly very plausible constraints. I reject one of the constraints which engender the dilemma. The analogy with the lottery paradox, (...)
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  41.  52
    A Solution to the Cable Guy Paradox.Ruth Weintraub - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (3):355-359.
    The Cable Guy will definitely come between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m., and I can bet on one of two possibilities: that he will arrive between 8 and 12, or between 12 and 4. Since I have no more information, it seems (eminently) plausible to suppose the two bets are equally attractive. Yet Hajek has presented a tantalising argument that purports to show that the later interval is, initial appearances to the contrary, more choice-worthy. In this paper, I rebut the (...)
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  42. Dispositionalism and Decision.Ruth Weintraub - 1987 - Ratio (Misc.) 29 (2):148.
     
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  43.  37
    Hume's Associations.Ruth Weintraub - 2002 - Hume Studies 28 (2):231-246.
    Hume’s three principles of association, we are led to believe from the way Hume introduces them, are supposed to account for the formation of complex ideas out of simple ones. But the account he gives, I show, is pretty poor. But Hume, in fact, has an additional issue in mind: accounting for thoughts we have with ideas we already possess, e.g.: the way one idea brings to one’s conscious mind an idea previously formed and now lying dormant, so to speak. (...)
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  44.  36
    Humean Bodies and their Consequences.Ruth Weintraub - 2024 - Springer Verlag.
    Takes both an interpretive and analytic approach to Hume's philosophy -/- Aimed at not only academics but also graduate students and researchers -/- Defends the very contentious Idealist interpretation of Hume on external objects.
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  45. (1 other version)Hume on Local Conjunction and the Soul.Ruth Weintraub - 2010 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 13.
    In the section of the Treatise titled “Of the immateriality of the soul”, Hume adduces an argument to show that nothing can be “locally conjoined” with all of a person’s perceptions. The argument is seldom discussed, and deserves attention, mainly because it can be transformed into an argument against the very existence of a soul. In this paper, I present and closely examine both arguments, Hume’s argument and the one against the existence of the soul. Both, I conclude, are fallacious.
     
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  46.  41
    Logical knowledge.Ruth Weintraub - 2001 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (1):3 – 18.
    It seems obvious that our beliefs are logically imperfect in two ways: they are neither deductively closed nor logically consistent. But this common-sense truism has been judged erroneous by some philosophers in the light of various arguments. In defence of common sense I consider and rebut interpretative arguments for logical perfection and show that the assumption espoused by common sense is theoretically superior, and capable - unlike its rival - of accounting for the informativeness of mathematics. Finally, I suggest that (...)
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  47.  33
    Locke vs. Hume: Who Is the Better Concept-Empiricist?Ruth Weintraub - 2007 - Dialogue 46 (3):481-500.
    According to the received view, Hume is a much more rigorous and consistent concept-empiricist than Locke. Hume is supposed to have taken as a starting point Locke's meaning-empiricism, and worked out its full radical implications. Locke, by way of contrast, cowered from drawing his theory's strange consequences. The received view about Locke's and Hume's concept-empiricism is mistaken, I shall argue. Hume may be more uncompromising (although he too falters), but he is not more rigorous than Locke. It is not because (...)
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  48.  34
    Naturalism, Explanation, and Akrasia.Ruth Weintraub - 1999 - Dialogue 38 (1):63-74.
    RésuméSi on la définit comme une action contraire au bon jugement de l'agent, l'action acrasique se trouve exclue par le principe selon lequel une personne a forcément l'intention de faire ce qu'elle juge devoir faire. Une fois ce principe rejeté, comme je le propose ici, le problème traditionnel de l'acrasie, qui est celui de sa possibilité même, s'évanouit. Je soutiens, cependant, qu'un problème plus limité semble se poser si nous admettons que les actions acrasiques doivent s'expliquer par des raisons, et (...)
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  49.  48
    Objectivism without objective probabilities.Ruth Weintraub - 1990 - Theoria 56 (1-2):23-41.
    After defending the pluralistic approach to the interpretation of probability statements, I argue that the correctness of objective probability statements is not to be explained in terms of objective probabilities attached to propositions. Such an explanation will enable us to uphold an intuitively appealing connection between probability and action only in indeterministic contexts, whereas the objectivity of probability statements doesn’t depend on the truth of indeterminism. I show how objective probability statements can be interpreted without ascribing objective probabilities to propositions. (...)
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  50. Psychological determinism and rationality.Ruth Weintraub - 1995 - Erkenntnis 43 (1):67-79.
    There are arguments which purport to rebut psychological determinism by appealing to its alleged incompatibility with rationality. I argue that they all fail. Against Davidson, I argue that rationality does not preclude the existence of psychological laws. Against Popper, I argue that rationality is compatible with the possibility of predicting human actions. Against Schlesinger, I claim that Newcomb's problem cannot be invoked to show that human actions are unpredictable. Having vindicated the possibility of a rationally-based theory of action, I consider (...)
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