Contents: PART 1. MODELS IN SCIENTIFIC PROCESSES. Joseph AGASSI: Why there is no theory of models. Ma??l??gorzata CZARNOCKA: Models and symbolic nature of knowledge. Adam GROBLER: The representational and the non-representational in models of scientific theories. Stephan HARTMANN: Models as a tool for the theory construction; some strategies of preliminary physics. William HERFEL: Nonlinear dynamical models as concrete construction. Elzbieta KA??L??USZY??N??SKA: Styles of thinking. Stathis PSILLOS: The cognitive interplay between theories and models: the case of 19th century optics. PART 2. (...) TOOLS OF SCIENCE. Nancy D. CARTWRIGHT, Towfic SHOMAR, Maricio SUAREZ: The tool-box of science. Javier ECHEVERRIA: The four contexts of scientific activity. Katline HAVAS: Continuity and change; kinds of negation in scientific progress. Matthias KAISER: The independence of scientific phenomena. W??l??adys??l??aw KRAJEWSKI: Scientific meta-philosophy. Ilkka NIINILUOTO: The emergence if scientific specialities: six models. Leszek NOWAK: Antirealism, realism and idealization. Rinat M. NUGAYEV: Classic, modern and postmodern scientific unification. Veikko RANTALA: Translation and scientific change. Gerhard SCHURZ: Theories and their applications - a case of nonmonotonic reasoning. Witold STRAWI??N??SKI: The unity of science today. Vardan TOROSIAN: Are the ethic and logic of science compatible. PART 3. UNSHARP APPROACHES IN SCIENCE. Ernest W. ADAMS: Problems and prospects in a theory of inexact first-order theories. Wolfgang BALZER and Gerhard ZOUBEK: On the comparison of approximative empirical claims. Gianpierro CATTANEO, Maria Luisa DALLA CHIARA, Roberto GIUNTINI: The unsharp approaches to quantum theory. Theo A.F. KUIPERS: Falsification versus efficient truth approximation. Bernhard LAUTH: Limiting decidability and probability. Jaros??l??aw PYKACZ: Many-valued logics in foundations of quantum mechanics. Roman R. ZAPATRIN: Logico-algebraic approach to spacetime quantization. (shrink)
This paper was written with two aims in mind. A large part of it is just an exposition of Tarski's theory of truth. Philosophers do not agree on how Tarski's theory is related to their investigations. Some of them doubt whether that theory has any relevance to philosophical issues and in particular whether it can be applied in dealing with the problems of philosophy (theory) of science.In this paper I argue that Tarski's chief concern was the following question. Suppose a (...) language L belongs to the class of languages for which, in full accordance with some formal conditions set in advance, we are able to define the class of all the semantic interpretations the language may acquire. Every interpretation of L can be viewed as a certain structure to which the expressions of the language may refer. Suppose that a specific interpretation of the language L was singled out as the intended one. Suppose, moreover, that the intended interpretation can be characterized in a metalanguage L +. If the above assumptions are satisfied, can the notion of truth for L be defined in the metalanguage L + and, if it can, how can this be done? (shrink)
This paper was presented at the Annual Conference of the Australian Association for Logic, Melbourne, November, 1979. The present note being complementary to , I shall only brie y recall the key notions to be exploited here, and for more details the reader is advised to consult . By a propositional logic we mean a couple , where L is a propo- sitional language and C a structural consequence de- ned on L. A couple W = is said to be (...) a referential matrix for the language L i there exists a non-empty set T such that the following two conditions are satised: i. A is an abstract algebra similar to L, whose all elements belong to f0; 1g T , i.e. they are mappings from T into the two-element set f0; 1g. ii. D = ffa 2 A : a = 1g : t 2 Tg. (shrink)
The role of classical logic as the base of formalized scientific theories seems to be unshakable. Yet legitimate doubts about its universal applicability in science have resulted in the development of alternative systems, among which constructive and modal logic are discussed in syntactic and semantic terms.
The two main points of this contribution are the following: (1) Applied mathematical theories might complement physical theories in an essential way; some applied mathematical theories allow us to understand phenomena we are unable to explain by resorting to physical theories alone, (2) In the case of social sciences it might be necessary to account for examined phenomena by resorting to the idea of goal-oriented activity (the causal approach typical for natural science might be unsatisfactory). Weinberg's idea of grand reductionism (...) ignores the two above mentioned facts and hence overestimates the foundational role of physics and its methodology. (shrink)
In this note I am reflecting on interrelations between three concepts of truth: that employed by Hilbert arguing his formalist view on the nature of mathematics, Freges idea of truth supported by mathematical intuition, and known as Aristotelian correspondence idea of truth concerning any propositions not merely mathematical.
In what follows, I will address three fundamental questions regarding the theory of knowledge. They are as follows: What is knowledge? How can it be represented? How may one evaluate its quality? In this essay I outline a certain conceptual framework within which, I believe, these questions should be examined.
I shall assume that the reader is familiar with the notions dened in  and . A consequence C dened over a propositional language L will be said to be d-structural i the consequence dC dual with respect to C is structural. The following propositions holds true.
Tarski’s papers, in which he examines the idea of a consequence operation Cn,divide into two groups. One of them is formed by the papers that offer an analysis of the general idea of the consequence operation. Resorting to fundamental ideas of logical semantics, Tarski explains what, in his view, it means to say that a formula a of a language L is a logical consequence Cn of a set of formulas X of that language. Under the definition he proposed Cn (...) is the strongest operation on sets of formulas of L that preserves truth under all possible interpretations of the language. In the papers belonging to the second group , the consequence operation Cn is treated as an object of abstract studies. More specifically, it is treated as an abstract unary operation defined on the power set of a set S such that the following familiar conditions are satisfied: T1.X⊆Cn)⊆Cnand T2.IfX⊂YthenCn⊂CnActually, Tarski imposed on Cn one more requirement which in more recent investigations is often omitted. It is as follows: T3.Ifα∈Cn,thenforafinitesubsetX′⊆X,α∈Cn is known as the finitaryness condition. (shrink)