Hermann Cohen on the Way to „Religion of Reason: Out of the Sources of Judaism” Breslau Stop On the way leading Hermann Cohen from his family Coswig to Marburg and — later — to Berlin, from a Jewish province to a multicultural metropolis, Breslau is a special point. The future philosopher came here in 1857, hoping for the future of fice of the rabbi, to begin studies at the newly established Jewish Theological Seminary. Here too, four years later, he enrolled (...) at the university, opening up the prospect of an academic career. A special point, which allowed him to create in the next years an “impressive system” which is a bold attempt to present German and Judaism as identical or connected. Jewish and religious content was a permanent and constant component of Cohen’s works, and Religion of Reason and System of Philosophy form a whole. Already before the creation of works devoted to Kant, some features of Cohen’s philosophy of religion are revealed, which originated in his studies at Breslau, one of the most important Haskalah centers in the middle of the 19th century. Cohen found there an atmosphere conduciveto the later shaping of the science of the universal religion of reason. After many years, Cohen assessed the Jewish Theological Seminary as “the most important educational institution [of his] youth.”. (shrink)
Artykuł jest szkicem odpowiedzi na pytanie: dlaczego etyka Tadeusza Kotarbińskiego, będąc w istocie typem do brze znanej filozofom etyki autonomicznej, a normatywnie bliska ideom chrześcijańskiego miłosierdzia, stała się popularna i żywo dyskutowana w Polsce drugiej połowy XX wieku. Autor omawia ówczesne dyskusje, wskazując na powody zainteresowania stanowiskiem etycznym Kotarbińskiego w kręgu polskich myślicieli chrześcijańskich. Jego źródeł upatruje w reakcji na program uniezależnienia postaw etycznych od sporów światopoglądowych. Jednocześnie zwraca uwagę, że w kręgu szkoły lwowsko–warszawskiej i jej wpływów etyka Kotarbińskiego miała (...) poparcie, ale i spotkała się z krytyką. Zastrzeżenia epistemologiczne wobec niej wysuwała Maria Ossowska. Po stronie Kotarbińskiego opowiedział się Tadeusz Czeżowski, występujący z bardziej precyzyjnie sformułowaną ideą etyki empirycznej, wykazując z czasem, że jest to etyka typu aksjomatyczno–dedukcyjnego, a nie indukcyjnego. Akceptując intuicjonizm jako epistemologiczny fundament etyki, do normatywnych idei Kotarbińskiego nawiązywali w sposób twórczy również Ija Lazari–Pawłowska i Marian Przełęcki. Autor przekonuje, że nie jest bezzasadnym przypuszczenie, że program uniwersalnej etyki, niezależnej od sporów światopoglądowych i religijnych, wpłynął także na Marka Fritzhanda interpretację etyki w marksizmie oraz korespondował z tendencjami do budowania etyki dialogu i odpowiedzialności w polskich dyskusjach etycznych w czasach dominacji etyki światopoglądowej. (shrink)
This article is an attempt to reconstruct and analyse the outline of hierarchy of goods in the ethics of Professor Władysław Tatarkiewicz, a distinguished Polish historian of philosophy and aesthetics, a well known philosopher and aesthetician, but somewhat underestimated, in the opinion of the author of this article, as a moral philosopher. In his opinion Władysław Tatarkiewicz emphasized the specific features of his philosophical position most clearly in his monographs “On the Absoluteness of Goodness”, “On Happiness”, and minor axiological papers. (...) In his philosophy ethics is equated with axiology and provides a clue for reconstruction of the whole system of his views. (shrink)
The central claim of this paper is the following. There are two different types of notions applied in science, and in fact in any discourse whatsoever. Some of the notions are veristic, i.e. they refer to some specific fairly well defined entities (individual objects, species, relations, systems, regularities, etc.). But there are also heuristic notions that serve the users to call attention to the fact that a specific situation can be accounted for, or even less - there is a chance (...) that it can be accounted for, in a certain way known already from some earlier application of similar ideas. On numerous occasions we argue by analogy. Now, to argue by analogy means to treat the situation accounted for as „similar” to some other already familiar situations. The similarity in question can amount to some fairly explicitly stated expectations, which go beyond the available evidence. The heuristic notions can be characterized as the notions in terms of which such expectations are stated. Since the right interpretation of those expectations should be defined anew any time when an argument by analogy is applied, also the concepts they involve share this characteristic. Thus while the veristic concepts have some fixed references, the reference of a heuristic concept should be defined anew every time when the concept is used. A theory which involves any heuristic notions is called heuristic. A theory is said to be veristic if all the descriptive notions it involves are veristic. The notion of truth can be in a straightforward way applied to veristic theories only. (shrink)
This paper was presented at the Annual Conference of the Australian Association for Logic, Melbourne, November, 1979. The present note being complementary to [1], I shall only brie y recall the key notions to be exploited here, and for more details the reader is advised to consult [1]. By a propositional logic we mean a couple , where L is a propo- sitional language and C a structural consequence de- ned on L. A couple W = is said to be (...) a referential matrix for the language L i there exists a non-empty set T such that the following two conditions are satised: i. A is an abstract algebra similar to L, whose all elements belong to f0; 1g T , i.e. they are mappings from T into the two-element set f0; 1g. ii. D = ffa 2 A : a = 1g : t 2 Tg. (shrink)
