Results for 'S. A. Kripke'

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  1.  20
    Saul A. Kripke. Semantical analysis of modal logic II. Non-normal modal propositional calculi. The theory of models, Proceedings of the 1963 International Symposium at Berkeley, edited by J. W. Addison, Leon Henkin, and Alfred Tarski, Studies in logic and the foundations of mathematics, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam1965, pp. 206–220. - R. Routley and H. Montgomery. The inadequacy of Kripke's semantical analysis of D2 and D3. The journal of symbolic logic, vol. 33 , p. 568. [REVIEW]David Makinson - 1970 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 35 (1):135.
    Reviews of the papers mentioned in the title.
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  2. KRIPKE, S. A. "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language". [REVIEW]R. Scruton - 1984 - Mind 93:592.
  3. A Transcription of Saul Kripke's "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language" Presented at the Wittgenstein Colloquium, March 31-April 4th 1976, at the University of Western Ontario. [REVIEW]Saul A. Kripke & Wittgenstein Colloquium - 1976
     
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  4. ABRAHAM, U. and SHELAH, S., A AZ well-order of the reals and incompactness of L (Q”“) BUSS, SR, Intuitionistic validity in T-normal Kripke structures CAICEDO, X., Compactness and normality in abstract logics CENZER, D., DOWNEY, R., JOCKUSCH, C. and SHORE. [REVIEW]L. Li, L. I. H. & L. I. U. Y. - 1993 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 59:287.
  5. How to Lewis a Kripke–Hintikka.Alessandro Torza - 2013 - Synthese 190 (4):743-779.
    It has been argued that a combination of game-theoretic semantics and independence-friendly (IF) languages can provide a novel approach to the conceptual foundations of mathematics and the sciences. I introduce and motivate an IF first-order modal language endowed with a game-theoretic semantics of perfect information. The resulting interpretive independence-friendly logic (IIF) allows to formulate some basic model-theoretic notions that are inexpressible in the ordinary quantified modal logic. Moreover, I argue that some key concepts of Kripke’s new theory of reference (...)
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  6.  27
    In Search of Wittgenstein's Scepticism: Critical Review of Saul A. Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982). [REVIEW]Charles Landesman - 1986 - Journal of Chinese Philosophy 13 (3):349-359.
  7.  80
    Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s Sceptical Paradox: A Trilemma for Davidson.Ali Hossein Khani - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (1):21–37.
    Davidson’s later philosophy of language has been inspired by Wittgenstein’s Investigations, but Davidson by no means sympathizes with the sceptical problem and solution Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein. Davidson criticizes the sceptical argument for relying on the rule-following conception of meaning, which is, for him, a highly problematic view. He also casts doubt on the plausibility of the sceptical solution as unjustifiably bringing in shared practices of a speech community. According to Davidson, it is rather success in mutual interpretation that (...)
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  8.  63
    Adding a Conditional to Kripke’s Theory of Truth.Lorenzo Rossi - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (5):485-529.
    Kripke’s theory of truth, 690–716; 1975) has been very successful but shows well-known expressive difficulties; recently, Field has proposed to overcome them by adding a new conditional connective to it. In Field’s theories, desirable conditional and truth-theoretic principles are validated that Kripke’s theory does not yield. Some authors, however, are dissatisfied with certain aspects of Field’s theories, in particular the high complexity. I analyze Field’s models and pin down some reasons for discontent with them, focusing on the meaning (...)
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  9.  89
    A Sceptical Guide to Meaning and Rules: Defending Kripke’s Wittgenstein.Martin Kusch - 2006 - Mcgill-Queen's University Press.
    No other recent book in Anglophone philosophy has attracted as much criticism and has found so few friends as Saul Kripke's "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language". Amongst its critics, one finds the very top of the philosophical profession. Yet, it is rightly counted amongst the books that students of philosophy, at least in the Anglo-American world, have to read at some point in their education. Enormously influential, it has given rise to debates that strike at the very heart (...)
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  10. Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference.Saul A. Kripke - 1977 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1):255-276.
    am going to discuss some issues inspired by a well-known paper ofKeith Donnellan, "Reference and Definite Descriptions,”2 but the interest—to me—of the contrast mentioned in my title goes beyond Donnellan's paper: I think it is of considerable constructive as well as critical importance to the philosophy oflanguage. These applications, however, and even everything I might want to say relative to Donnellan’s paper, cannot be discussed in full here because of problems of length. Moreover, although I have a considerable interest in (...)
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  11. Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference: Some Exegetical Notes.Saul A. Kripke - 2008 - Theoria 74 (3):181-218.
    Frege's theory of indirect contexts and the shift of sense and reference in these contexts has puzzled many. What can the hierarchy of indirect senses, doubly indirect senses, and so on, be? Donald Davidson gave a well-known 'unlearnability' argument against Frege's theory. The present paper argues that the key to Frege's theory lies in the fact that whenever a reference is specified (even though many senses determine a single reference), it is specified in a particular way, so that giving a (...)
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  12.  30
    A note on Kripke's distinction between rigid designators and nonrigid designators.Sitansu S. Chakravarti - 1979 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 20 (2):309-313.
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  13.  28
    Semantical Analysis of Modal Logic II. Non-Normal Modal Propositional Calculi.The Inadequacy of Kripke's Semantical Analysis of D2 and D3.Saul A. Kripke, R. Routley & H. Montgomery - 1970 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 35 (1):135-135.
  14. The Church-Turing ‘Thesis’ as a Special Corollary of Gödel’s Completeness Theorem.Saul A. Kripke - 2013 - In B. J. Copeland, C. Posy & O. Shagrir (eds.), Computability: Turing, Gödel, Church, and Beyond. MIT Press.
    Traditionally, many writers, following Kleene (1952), thought of the Church-Turing thesis as unprovable by its nature but having various strong arguments in its favor, including Turing’s analysis of human computation. More recently, the beauty, power, and obvious fundamental importance of this analysis, what Turing (1936) calls “argument I,” has led some writers to give an almost exclusive emphasis on this argument as the unique justification for the Church-Turing thesis. In this chapter I advocate an alternative justification, essentially presupposed by Turing (...)
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  15.  96
    Kripke’s sole route to the necessary a posteriori.Erin Eaker - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):388-406.
    In ‘Kripke on epistemic and metaphysical possibility: two routes to the necessary a posteriori’, Scott Soames identifies two arguments for the existence of necessary a posteriori truths in Naming and Necessity . He argues that Kripke's second argument relies on either of two principles, each of which leads to contradiction. He also claims that it has led to ‘two-dimensionalist’ approaches to the necessary a posteriori which are fundamentally at odds with the insights about meaning and modality expressed in (...)
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  16.  62
    On A Wittgensteinian Objection to Kripke’s Dualism Argument.Richard Double - 1981 - Philosophy Research Archives 1414:171-181.
    In 'kripke's argument against the identity theory' michael levin argues that the private language argument can be used to undermine saul kripke's cartesian claim to be able to imagine mental states and brain states existing apart, and, thus, refute his argument for dualism. in this paper it is argued that levin's use of the private language argument relies implicitly upon the descriptivist theory of mental language, to which kripke has provided a plausible alternative, "viz"., the causal theory (...)
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  17. A note on Kripke's footnote 56 argument for the essentiality of origin.Ross P. Cameron - 2005 - Ratio 18 (3):262-275.
    In footnote 56 of his Naming and Necessity, Kripke offers a ‘proof’ of the essentiality of origin. On its most literal reading the argument is clearly flawed, as was made clear by Nathan Salmon. Salmon attempts to save the literal reading of the argument, but I argue that the new argument is flawed as well, and that it can’t be what Kripke intended. I offer an alternative reconstruction of Kripke’s argument, but I show that this suffers from (...)
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  18. Russell’s Notion of Scope.Saul A. Kripke - 2005 - Mind 114 (456):1005-1037.
    Despite the renown of ‘On Denoting’, much criticism has ignored or misconstrued Russell's treatment of scope, particularly in intensional, but also in extensional contexts. This has been rectified by more recent commentators, yet it remains largely unnoticed that the examples Russell gives of scope distinctions are questionable or inconsistent with his own philosophy. Nevertheless, Russell is right: scope does matter in intensional contexts. In Principia Mathematica, Russell proves a metatheorem to the effect that the scope of a single occurrence of (...)
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  19. A Reductio of Kripke-Wittgenstein's Objections to Dispositionalism about Meaning.Jakob Hohwy - 2003 - Minds and Machines 13 (2):257-268.
    A central part of Kripke's influential interpretation of Wittgenstein's sceptical argument about meaning is the rejection of dispositional analyses of what it is for a word to mean what it does. In this paper I show that Kripke's arguments prove too much: if they were right, they would preclude not only the idea that dispositional properties can make statements about the meanings of words true, but also the idea that dispositional properties can make true statements about paradigmatic dispositional (...)
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  20. Is Kripke's puzzle really a puzzle?J. Angelo Corlett - 1989 - Theoria 55 (2):95-113.
    In his famous essay, "A Puzzle About Belief," Saul Kripke poses a puzzle regarding belief. In this paper I shall first describe Kripke's puzzle. Second, I shall introduce and examine five positions one might take in attempting to solve Kripke's Puzzle. In so doing, I shall show why each of these attempts fails to solve Kripke's Puzzle. The significance of this analysis is that if Kripke's Puzzle remains unresolved, then (as Kripke himself claims) the (...)
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  21.  3
    The Threat of Privacy in Wittgenstein’s Investigations: Kripke vs. Cavell.Jônadas Techio - 2020 - Wittgenstein-Studien 11 (1):79-104.
    Most readers of the Investigations take skepticism as a target of Wittgenstein’s remarks, something to be refuted by means of a clear grasp of our criteria. Stanley Cavell was the first to challenge that consensual view by reminding us that our criteria are constantly open to skeptical repudiation, hence that privacy is a standing human possibility. In an apparently similar vein, Saul Kripke has argued that a skeptical paradox concerning rules and meaning is the central problem of the Investigations (...)
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  22.  57
    Kripke’s Puzzle and Belief ‘Under’ a Name.Alan McMichael - 1987 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):105 - 125.
    Recently Saul Kripke has drawn attention to a puzzle about belief and proper names, a puzzle of which philosophers have been aware for a long time, but which has never been completely resolved. Kripke gives a new, bilingual illustration of the puzzle:1 Pierre, while living in his native France, learns much about the city of London, which he calls ‘Londres,’ and comes to believe something which he would express in French with the words, ‘Londres est jolie.’ Using standard (...)
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  23. A Descriptivist Refutation of Kripke's Modal Argument and of Soames's Defence.Chen Bo - 2012 - Theoria 78 (3):225-260.
    This article systematically challenges Kripke's modal argument and Soames's defence of this argument by arguing that, just like descriptions, names can take narrow or wide scopes over modalities, and that there is a big difference between the wide scope reading and the narrow scope reading of a modal sentence with a name. Its final conclusions are that all of Kripke's and Soames's arguments are untenable due to some fallacies or mistakes; names are not “rigid designators”; if there were (...)
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  24.  42
    Gödel’s theorem and direct self-reference.Saul A. Kripke - forthcoming - Review of Symbolic Logic:1-5.
    In his paper on the incompleteness theorems, Gödel seemed to say that a direct way of constructing a formula that says of itself that it is unprovable might involve a faulty circularity. In this note, it is proved that ‘direct’ self-reference can actually be used to prove his result.
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  25.  91
    A Flaw in Kripke’s Modal Argument?Harold Noonan - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (3):841-846.
    The response to Kripke’s modal argument I wish to propose appeals to the distinction between indicative descriptions, i.e., descriptions formed using indicative verb forms, and what I shall call subjunctive descriptions, descriptions formed using non-indicative verb forms used in subjunctive conditionals. The contrast is between ‘the person who is richer than anyone else in the world’ and ‘the person who would have been richer than anyone else in the world’. The response to Kripke’s modal argument is that indicative (...)
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  26. A Sceptical Guide to Meaning and Rules: Defending Kripke's Wittgenstein.Jussi Haukioja - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):688-690.
  27. Acumen, 2004. xiv+ 194 pp.£ 40.00 cloth,£ 14.95 paper These two books cover many of the same topics in Kripke's work, but approach them quite differently. Fitch is introducing readers to Kripke's thought, while Hughes is exploring in more detail a narrower range of Krip-kean themes. Hughes's book is the more philosophically rich of the two, but. [REVIEW]Saul Kripke - 2006 - Philosophical Books 47 (2):165-170.
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  28. Kripke’s Wittgenstein and the Impossibility of Private Language: The Same Old Story?John A. Humphrey - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Research 21 (January):197-207.
    A common complaint against Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language is that whereas the aim of “the real” Wittgenstein’s private language argument is to establish the impossibility of a necessarily private language, the communitarian account of meaning proposed by Kripke’s Wittgenstein (KW), if successful, would establish the impossibility of a contingently private language. I show that this common complaint is based on a failure of Kripke’s critics (a failure that is justified, in part, by Kripke’s (...)
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  29. A Critique of Saul Kripke's "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language".Chrysoula Gitsoulis - 2008 - Dissertation, Graduate Center, City University of New York
    In Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke presents a controversial skeptical argument, which he attributes to Wittgenstein’s interlocutor in the Philosophical Investigations [PI]. The argument purports to show that there are no facts that correspond to what we mean by our words. Kripke maintains, moreover, that the conclusion of Wittgenstein’s so-called private language argument is a corollary of results Wittgenstein establishes in §§137-202 of PI concerning the topic of following-a-rule, and not the conclusion of an independently (...)
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  30.  72
    A Kripkean objection to Kripke's argument against identity-theories.Olav Gjelsvik - 1987 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 30 (4):435 – 450.
    This paper analyses and criticizes S. Kripke's celebrated argument against materialist identity?theories. While criticisms of Kripke in the literature attack one or more of his premisses, an attempt is made here to show that Kripke's conclusion is unjustified even if his premisses are accepted. Kripke's premisses have sufficient independent plausibility to make this strategy interesting. Having stated Kripke's argument, it is pointed out that Kripke must assume that the contents of the Cartesian intuitions are (...)
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  31.  58
    Kripke’s Contingent A Priori and Necessary A Posteriori.Peter Nicholls & Dan Passell - 1985 - Philosophy Research Archives 11:481-489.
    We think that Kripke’s arguments that there are contingent a priori truths and that there are necessary a posteriori truths about named and essentially described entities fail. They fail for the reasons that there are ambiguities in each of the three eases. In the first ease, what is known apriori is not what is contingent. In the latter two cases, what is necessary or essential is not what is known a posteriori.
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  32. A Fregean Look at Kripke's Modal Notion of Meaning.Gilead Bar-Elli - unknown
    In Naming and Necessity Kripke accuses Frege of conflating two notions of meaning (or sense), one is meaning proper, the other is determining of reference (p. 59). More precisely, Kripke argues that Frege conflated the question of how the meaning of a word is given or determined with the question of how its reference is determined. The criterial mark of meaning determination, according to Kripke, is a statement of synonymy: if we give the sense of “a” by (...)
     
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  33.  15
    Kripke’s Contingent A Priori and Necessary A Posteriori.Peter Nicholls & Dan Passell - 1985 - Philosophy Research Archives 11:481-489.
    We think that Kripke’s arguments that there are contingent a priori truths and that there are necessary a posteriori truths about named and essentially described entities fail. They fail for the reasons that there are ambiguities in each of the three eases. In the first ease, what is known apriori is not what is contingent. In the latter two cases, what is necessary or essential is not what is known a posteriori.
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  34.  6
    Kripke’s Puzzle and Belief ‘Under’ a Name.Alan McMichael - 1987 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):105-125.
    Recently Saul Kripke has drawn attention to a puzzle about belief and proper names, a puzzle of which philosophers have been aware for a long time, but which has never been completely resolved. Kripke gives a new, bilingual illustration of the puzzle:1 Pierre, while living in his native France, learns much about the city of London, which he calls ‘Londres,’ and comes to believe something which he would express in French with the words, ‘Londres est jolie.’ Using standard (...)
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  35.  79
    On a Possible Misinterpretation of Kripke's Semantics for Intuitionistic Logic.Allen Hazen - 1982 - Analysis 42 (3):128 - 133.
  36. Axiomatizing Kripke’s Theory of Truth.Volker Halbach & Leon Horsten - 2006 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 71 (2):677 - 712.
    We investigate axiomatizations of Kripke's theory of truth based on the Strong Kleene evaluation scheme for treating sentences lacking a truth value. Feferman's axiomatization KF formulated in classical logic is an indirect approach, because it is not sound with respect to Kripke's semantics in the straightforward sense: only the sentences that can be proved to be true in KF are valid in Kripke's partial models. Reinhardt proposed to focus just on the sentences that can be proved to (...)
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  37.  21
    Kripke’s Wittgenstein and the Impossibility of Private Language: The Same Old Story?John A. Humphrey - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Research 21:197-207.
    A common complaint against Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language is that whereas the aim of “the real” Wittgenstein’s private language argument is to establish the impossibility of a necessarily private language, the communitarian account of meaning proposed by Kripke’s Wittgenstein, if successful, would establish the impossibility of a contingently private language. I show that this common complaint is based on a failure of Kripke’s critics to recognize and understand his distinction between a “physically isolated” individual (...)
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  38.  30
    Kripke’s Wittgenstein and the Impossibility of Private Language: The Same Old Story?John A. Humphrey - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Research 21:197-207.
    A common complaint against Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language is that whereas the aim of “the real” Wittgenstein’s private language argument is to establish the impossibility of a necessarily private language, the communitarian account of meaning proposed by Kripke’s Wittgenstein , if successful, would establish the impossibility of a contingently private language. I show that this common complaint is based on a failure of Kripke’s critics to recognize and understand his distinction between a “physically isolated” (...)
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  39.  39
    Davis's formulation of Kripke's theory of truth: A correction. [REVIEW]Allen Hazen - 1981 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 10 (3):309 - 311.
  40. A Note on Kripke's Puzzle about Belief.Cristian Constantinescu - 2007 - The Reasoner 1 (4):8-9.
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  41.  24
    A Topological Model for Intuitionistic Analysis with Kripke's Scheme.M. D. Krol - 1978 - Zeitschrift fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik 24 (25-30):427-436.
  42.  34
    The collapse of the Hilbert program: A variation on the gödelian theme.Saul A. Kripke - 2022 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 28 (3):413-426.
    The Hilbert program was actually a specific approach for proving consistency, a kind of constructive model theory. Quantifiers were supposed to be replaced by ε-terms. εxA(x) was supposed to denote a witness to ∃xA(x), or something arbitrary if there is none. The Hilbertians claimed that in any proof in a number-theoretic system S, each ε-term can be replaced by a numeral, making each line provable and true. This implies that S must not only be consistent, but also 1-consistent. Here we (...)
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  43.  91
    A Note on Kripke’s Paradox about Time and Thought.Nathan Salmon - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (4):213-220.
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  44. Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: An Elementary Exposition.Saul A. Kripke - 1982 - Harvard University Press.
    In this book Saul Kripke brings his powerful philosophical intelligence to bear on Wittgenstein's analysis of the notion of following a rule.
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  45.  96
    Davidson’s Answer to Kripke’s Sceptic.Olivia Sultanescu & Claudine Verheggen - 2019 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 7 (2):8-28.
    According to the sceptic Saul Kripke envisages in his celebrated book on Wittgenstein on rules and private language, there are no facts about an individual that determine what she means by any given expression. If there are no such facts, the question then is, what justifies the claim that she does use expressions meaningfully? Kripke’s answer, in a nutshell, is that she by and large uses her expressions in conformity with the linguistic standards of the community she belongs (...)
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  46.  65
    Kripke’s Contingent A Priori.Michael Wreen - 1983 - International Studies in Philosophy 15 (3):55-59.
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  47.  98
    Review: A Sceptical Guide to Meaning and Rules: Defending Kripke's Wittgenstein. [REVIEW]D. Whiting - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):1132-1136.
  48. The contingent a priori: Kripke's two types of examples.Heimir Geirsson - 1991 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (2):195 – 205.
    In Naming and Necessity' Saul A. Kripke gives two types of examples of contingent truths knowable a priori. So he disagrees with the first leg of the thesis. As we will see later, his examples depend on the direct designation theory of names. While there have been attempts to provide examples of the contingent a priori that do not depend on that theory, most of those examples should be viewed as expansions, or modifications, of Kripke's examples. Philip Kitcher, (...)
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  49.  4
    A Topological Model for Intuitionistic Analysis with Kripke's Scheme.M. D. Krol - 1978 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 24 (25‐30):427-436.
  50.  10
    R. E. Vesley. A palatable substitute for Kripke's schema. Intuitionism and proof theory, Proceedings of the summer conference at Buffalo N.Y. 1968, edited by A. Kino, J. Myhill, and R. E. Vesley, Studies in logic and the foundations of mathematics, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam and London 1970, pp. 197–207. [REVIEW]William A. Howard - 1974 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 39 (2):334-334.
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