Results for 'S. A. Kripke'

1000+ found
Order:
  1. A Transcription of Saul Kripke's "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language" Presented at the Wittgenstein Colloquium, March 31-April 4th 1976, at the University of Western Ontario. [REVIEW]Saul A. Kripke & Wittgenstein Colloquium - 1976
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2.  7
    Acumen, 2004. Xiv+ 194 Pp.£ 40.00 Cloth,£ 14.95 Paper These Two Books Cover Many of the Same Topics in Kripke's Work, but Approach Them Quite Differently. Fitch is Introducing Readers to Kripke's Thought, While Hughes is Exploring in More Detail a Narrower Range of Krip-Kean Themes. Hughes's Book is the More Philosophically Rich of the Two, But. [REVIEW]Saul Kripke - 2006 - Philosophical Books 47 (2):165-170.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. The Church-Turing ‘Thesis’ as a Special Corollary of Gödel’s Completeness Theorem.Saul A. Kripke - 2013 - In B. J. Copeland, C. Posy & O. Shagrir (eds.), Computability: Turing, Gödel, Church, and Beyond. MIT Press.
    Traditionally, many writers, following Kleene (1952), thought of the Church-Turing thesis as unprovable by its nature but having various strong arguments in its favor, including Turing’s analysis of human computation. More recently, the beauty, power, and obvious fundamental importance of this analysis, what Turing (1936) calls “argument I,” has led some writers to give an almost exclusive emphasis on this argument as the unique justification for the Church-Turing thesis. In this chapter I advocate an alternative justification, essentially presupposed by Turing (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  4.  24
    Semantical Analysis of Modal Logic II. Non-Normal Modal Propositional Calculi.The Inadequacy of Kripke's Semantical Analysis of D2 and D3.Saul A. Kripke, R. Routley & H. Montgomery - 1970 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 35 (1):135-135.
  5.  17
    In Defense of Practical Reason: A Study and An Application of Arthur Murphy's Theory. [REVIEW]S. C. A. - 1972 - Review of Metaphysics 25 (3):558-558.
    An account and development of Arthur Murphy's Theory of Practical Reason and its application to contemporary moral problems. Chapter II gives a schematic account of Murphy's theory of normative discourse. Chapter III contrasts this theory with other theories and approaches. The author justly remarks that "Murphy's intent has been primarily to restore proper balance among considerations that play a role in practical discourse and to steer clear of the pitfalls which would impair or diminish the effectiveness of reason in human (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. How to Make Home Happy. An Essay. By A.S.A.Y.S. A. Y. A. & How - 1887
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7.  44
    A Companion to Plato’s Republic. [REVIEW]G. A. - 1980 - Review of Metaphysics 33 (3):651-653.
    The major portion of this important work is the "Summary of the Republic." Coordinated with Grube’s translation, it proceeds book by book, first summarizing a chunk of text anywhere from a couple of Stephanus sections to several pages, then commenting in lettered notes of from two lines to four and a half pages. More technical material, aimed at advanced students and scholars, appears occasionally in smaller type. There is a fine bibliography. The format is successful: the book is easy to (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8.  37
    The Rational Society, A Critical Study of Santayana's Social Thought. [REVIEW]T. A. - 1971 - Review of Metaphysics 24 (3):551-551.
    Singer's study of the technical problems of Santayana's systematic thought will not satisfy his friends nor his detractors. Her reduction of Santayana's Lucretian materialism to epiphenomenalism will seem inadequate to the former. The latter may see Santayana as merely technically inept. While Singer does not claim to offer a comprehensive study of Santayana's thought, her theses " that Santayana was a naturalist and a materialist in the same sense and on the same grounds throughout; that despite even radical changes in (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9.  41
    Aristotle’s Theology. A Commentary on Book Xii of the Metaphysics.R. S. - 1974 - Review of Metaphysics 27 (3):608-609.
    This is a careful, line-by-line and often word-by-word commentary on Book XII of the Metaphysics. The commentary is preceded by a seven part introduction which deals with the theology of Book XII, noûs, self-knowledge, desire, the place of the book in Aristotle’s writings, its date and structure, and the problem of Chapter 8 and Aristotle’s monotheism. Elders claims Chapter 8 was not written by Aristotle but by a disciple or disciples. He also claims that Book XII contains at least five (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10.  54
    Adding a Conditional to Kripke’s Theory of Truth.Lorenzo Rossi - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (5):485-529.
    Kripke’s theory of truth, 690–716; 1975) has been very successful but shows well-known expressive difficulties; recently, Field has proposed to overcome them by adding a new conditional connective to it. In Field’s theories, desirable conditional and truth-theoretic principles are validated that Kripke’s theory does not yield. Some authors, however, are dissatisfied with certain aspects of Field’s theories, in particular the high complexity. I analyze Field’s models and pin down some reasons for discontent with them, focusing on the meaning (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  11.  51
    Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s Sceptical Paradox: A Trilemma for Davidson.Ali Hossein Khani - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (1):21–37.
    Davidson’s later philosophy of language has been inspired by Wittgenstein’s Investigations, but Davidson by no means sympathizes with the sceptical problem and solution Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein. Davidson criticizes the sceptical argument for relying on the rule-following conception of meaning, which is, for him, a highly problematic view. He also casts doubt on the plausibility of the sceptical solution as unjustifiably bringing in shared practices of a speech community. According to Davidson, it is rather success in mutual interpretation that (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. The Dispositionalist Solution to Wittgenstein's Problem About Understanding a Rule: Answering Kripke's Objection.Carl Ginet - 1992 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 17 (1):53-73.
    The paper explicates a version of dispositionalism and defends it against Kripke's objections (in his "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language") that 1) it leaves out the normative aspect of a rule, 2) it cannot account for the directness of the knowledge one has of what one meant, and 3) regarding rules for computable functions of numbers, a) there are numbers beyond one's capacity to consider and b) there are people who are disposed to make systematic mistakes in computing (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  13.  62
    A Kripkean Objection to Kripke's Argument Against Identity-Theories.Olav Gjelsvik - 1987 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 30 (4):435 – 450.
    This paper analyses and criticizes S. Kripke's celebrated argument against materialist identity?theories. While criticisms of Kripke in the literature attack one or more of his premisses, an attempt is made here to show that Kripke's conclusion is unjustified even if his premisses are accepted. Kripke's premisses have sufficient independent plausibility to make this strategy interesting. Having stated Kripke's argument, it is pointed out that Kripke must assume that the contents of the Cartesian intuitions are (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  14.  54
    On A Wittgensteinian Objection to Kripke’s Dualism Argument.Richard Double - 1981 - Philosophy Research Archives 1414:171-181.
    In 'kripke's argument against the identity theory' michael levin argues that the private language argument can be used to undermine saul kripke's cartesian claim to be able to imagine mental states and brain states existing apart, and, thus, refute his argument for dualism. in this paper it is argued that levin's use of the private language argument relies implicitly upon the descriptivist theory of mental language, to which kripke has provided a plausible alternative, "viz"., the causal theory (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15.  72
    A Sceptical Guide to Meaning and Rules: Defending Kripke’s Wittgenstein.Martin Kusch - 2006 - Mcgill-Queen's University Press.
    No other recent book in Anglophone philosophy has attracted as much criticism and has found so few friends as Saul Kripke's "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language". Amongst its critics, one finds the very top of the philosophical profession. Yet, it is rightly counted amongst the books that students of philosophy, at least in the Anglo-American world, have to read at some point in their education. Enormously influential, it has given rise to debates that strike at the very heart (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  16. A Descriptivist Refutation of Kripke's Modal Argument and of Soames's Defence.Chen Bo - 2012 - Theoria 78 (3):225-260.
    This article systematically challenges Kripke's modal argument and Soames's defence of this argument by arguing that, just like descriptions, names can take narrow or wide scopes over modalities, and that there is a big difference between the wide scope reading and the narrow scope reading of a modal sentence with a name. Its final conclusions are that all of Kripke's and Soames's arguments are untenable due to some fallacies or mistakes; names are not “rigid designators”; if there were (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. A Critique of Saul Kripke's "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language".Chrysoula Gitsoulis - 2008 - Dissertation, Graduate Center, City University of New York
    In Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke presents a controversial skeptical argument, which he attributes to Wittgenstein’s interlocutor in the Philosophical Investigations [PI]. The argument purports to show that there are no facts that correspond to what we mean by our words. Kripke maintains, moreover, that the conclusion of Wittgenstein’s so-called private language argument is a corollary of results Wittgenstein establishes in §§137-202 of PI concerning the topic of following-a-rule, and not the conclusion of an independently (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. Categoricity and Negation. A Note on Kripke’s Affirmativism.Constantin C. Brîncuș & Iulian D. Toader - 2018 - In The Logica Yearbook 2018. London: College Publications. pp. 57-66.
    We argue that, if taken seriously, Kripke's view that a language for science can dispense with a negation operator is to be rejected. Part of the argument is a proof that positive logic, i.e., classical propositional logic without negation, is not categorical.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. The Contingent a Priori: Kripke's Two Types of Examples.Heimir Geirsson - 1991 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (2):195 – 205.
    In Naming and Necessity' Saul A. Kripke gives two types of examples of contingent truths knowable a priori. So he disagrees with the first leg of the thesis. As we will see later, his examples depend on the direct designation theory of names. While there have been attempts to provide examples of the contingent a priori that do not depend on that theory, most of those examples should be viewed as expansions, or modifications, of Kripke's examples. Philip Kitcher, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  20. A Note on Kripke's Footnote 56 Argument for the Essentiality of Origin.Ross Cameron - 2005 - Ratio 18 (3):262-275.
    In footnote 56 of his Naming and Necessity, Kripke offers a ‘proof’ of the essentiality of origin. On its most literal reading the argument is clearly flawed, as was made clear by Nathan Salmon. Salmon attempts to save the literal reading of the argument, but I argue that the new argument is flawed as well, and that it can’t be what Kripke intended. I offer an alternative reconstruction of Kripke’s argument, but I show that this suffers from (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  21. A Reductio of Kripke-Wittgenstein's Objections to Dispositionalism About Meaning.Jakob Hohwy - 2003 - Minds and Machines 13 (2):257-268.
    A central part of Kripke's influential interpretation of Wittgenstein's sceptical argument about meaning is the rejection of dispositional analyses of what it is for a word to mean what it does. In this paper I show that Kripke's arguments prove too much: if they were right, they would preclude not only the idea that dispositional properties can make statements about the meanings of words true, but also the idea that dispositional properties can make true statements about paradigmatic dispositional (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  22.  89
    Kripke’s Sole Route to the Necessary a Posteriori.Erin Eaker - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):388-406.
    In ‘Kripke on epistemic and metaphysical possibility: two routes to the necessary a posteriori’, Scott Soames identifies two arguments for the existence of necessary a posteriori truths in Naming and Necessity . He argues that Kripke's second argument relies on either of two principles, each of which leads to contradiction. He also claims that it has led to ‘two-dimensionalist’ approaches to the necessary a posteriori which are fundamentally at odds with the insights about meaning and modality expressed in (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  23.  47
    Kripke’s Puzzle and Belief ‘Under’ a Name.Alan McMichael - 1987 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):105 - 125.
    Recently Saul Kripke has drawn attention to a puzzle about belief and proper names, a puzzle of which philosophers have been aware for a long time, but which has never been completely resolved. Kripke gives a new, bilingual illustration of the puzzle:1 Pierre, while living in his native France, learns much about the city of London, which he calls ‘Londres,’ and comes to believe something which he would express in French with the words, ‘Londres est jolie.’ Using standard (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  24.  96
    Is Kripke's Puzzle Really a Puzzle?J. Angelo Corlett - 1989 - Theoria 55 (2):95-113.
    In his famous essay, "A Puzzle About Belief," Saul Kripke poses a puzzle regarding belief. In this paper I shall first describe Kripke's puzzle. Second, I shall introduce and examine five positions one might take in attempting to solve Kripke's Puzzle. In so doing, I shall show why each of these attempts fails to solve Kripke's Puzzle. The significance of this analysis is that if Kripke's Puzzle remains unresolved, then (as Kripke himself claims) the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  25.  95
    A Fregean Look at Kripke's Modal Notion of Meaning.Gilead Bar-Elli - unknown
    In Naming and Necessity Kripke accuses Frege of conflating two notions of meaning (or sense), one is meaning proper, the other is determining of reference (p. 59). More precisely, Kripke argues that Frege conflated the question of how the meaning of a word is given or determined with the question of how its reference is determined. The criterial mark of meaning determination, according to Kripke, is a statement of synonymy: if we give the sense of “a” by (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26.  6
    Kripke’s Puzzle and Belief ‘Under’ a Name.Alan McMichael - 1987 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):105-125.
    Recently Saul Kripke has drawn attention to a puzzle about belief and proper names, a puzzle of which philosophers have been aware for a long time, but which has never been completely resolved. Kripke gives a new, bilingual illustration of the puzzle:1 Pierre, while living in his native France, learns much about the city of London, which he calls ‘Londres,’ and comes to believe something which he would express in French with the words, ‘Londres est jolie.’ Using standard (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  27.  53
    Kripke’s Contingent A Priori and Necessary A Posteriori.Peter Nicholls & Dan Passell - 1985 - Philosophy Research Archives 11:481-489.
    We think that Kripke’s arguments that there are contingent a priori truths and that there are necessary a posteriori truths about named and essentially described entities fail. They fail for the reasons that there are ambiguities in each of the three eases. In the first ease, what is known apriori is not what is contingent. In the latter two cases, what is necessary or essential is not what is known a posteriori.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28.  13
    Kripke’s Contingent A Priori and Necessary A Posteriori.Peter Nicholls & Dan Passell - 1985 - Philosophy Research Archives 11:481-489.
    We think that Kripke’s arguments that there are contingent a priori truths and that there are necessary a posteriori truths about named and essentially described entities fail. They fail for the reasons that there are ambiguities in each of the three eases. In the first ease, what is known apriori is not what is contingent. In the latter two cases, what is necessary or essential is not what is known a posteriori.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. Estudio crítico: Martin Kusch A Sceptical Guide to Meaning and Rules. Defending Kripke's Wittgenstein, Montreal and Kingston, Ithaca, McGuill-Queen's University Press, 2006.Pedro Karczmarczyk - 2007 - Fenomenologia. Diálogos Possíveis Campinas: Alínea/Goiânia: Editora da Puc Goiás 42 (89):157-188.
    El presente trabajo es un estudio del libro de Martin Kusch acerca den las tesis sostenidas en "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language" (WRPL) por Saul Kripke examinado a la luz de la controversia desatada por la publicación del mismo en 1982, una de las más intensas que han ocurrido en los últimos 25 años en el seno de la filosofía analítica. En nuestro estudio procedemos en tres etapas. En la primera, presentaremos el desafío del Wittgenstein de Kripke (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30.  80
    A Flaw in Kripke’s Modal Argument?Harold Noonan - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (3):841-846.
    The response to Kripke’s modal argument I wish to propose appeals to the distinction between indicative descriptions, i.e., descriptions formed using indicative verb forms, and what I shall call subjunctive descriptions, descriptions formed using non-indicative verb forms used in subjunctive conditionals. The contrast is between ‘the person who is richer than anyone else in the world’ and ‘the person who would have been richer than anyone else in the world’. The response to Kripke’s modal argument is that indicative (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. With Factualist Friends, Kripke's Wittgenstein Needs No Enemies: On Byrne's Case for Kripke's Wittgenstein Being a Factualist About Meaning Attributions.John Humphrey - manuscript
    _Private Language_ is that it almost universally sees KW as offering, in his sceptical solution, an account of meaning attributions (i.e., statements of the form, "X means such-and-so by 's'"; hereafter, MAs) which takes their legitimate attribution to be a function of something other than facts or truth conditions. KW is almost universally read as having rejected any account of meaning attributions which takes them to be stating facts or corresponding to facts. In a word, KW is understood as offering (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32.  19
    Saul A. Kripke. Semantical Analysis of Modal Logic II. Non-Normal Modal Propositional Calculi. The Theory of Models, Proceedings of the 1963 International Symposium at Berkeley, Edited by J. W. Addison, Leon Henkin, and Alfred Tarski, Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam1965, Pp. 206–220. - R. Routley and H. Montgomery. The Inadequacy of Kripke's Semantical Analysis of D2 and D3. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 33 , P. 568. [REVIEW]David Makinson - 1970 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 35 (1):135.
    Reviews of the papers mentioned in the title.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33.  26
    In Search of Wittgenstein's Scepticism: Critical Review of Saul A. Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982). [REVIEW]Charles Landesman - 1986 - Journal of Chinese Philosophy 13 (3):349-359.
  34. KRIPKE, S. A. "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language". [REVIEW]R. Scruton - 1984 - Mind 93:592.
  35. ABRAHAM, U. And SHELAH, S., A AZ Well-Order of the Reals and Incompactness of L (Q”“) BUSS, SR, Intuitionistic Validity in T-Normal Kripke Structures CAICEDO, X., Compactness and Normality in Abstract Logics CENZER, D., DOWNEY, R., JOCKUSCH, C. And SHORE. [REVIEW]L. Li, L. I. H. & L. I. U. Y. - 1993 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 59:287.
  36.  27
    A Note on Kripke's Distinction Between Rigid Designators and Nonrigid Designators.Sitansu S. Chakravarti - 1979 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 20 (2):309-313.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37.  9
    R. E. Vesley. A Palatable Substitute for Kripke's Schema. Intuitionism and Proof Theory, Proceedings of the Summer Conference at Buffalo N.Y. 1968, Edited by A. Kino, J. Myhill, and R. E. Vesley, Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam and London 1970, Pp. 197–207. [REVIEW]William A. Howard - 1974 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 39 (2):334-334.
  38.  7
    Review: R. E. Vesley, A. Kino, J. Myhill, A Palatable Substitute for Kripke's Schema. [REVIEW]William A. Howard - 1974 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 39 (2):334-334.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. A Note on Kripke's Puzzle About Belief.Cristian Constantinescu - 2007 - The Reasoner 1 (4):8-9.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. A Sceptical Guide to Meaning and Rules: Defending Kripke's Wittgenstein.Jussi Haukioja - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):688-690.
  41. The Use of Kripke's Schema as a Reduction Principle.D. van Dalen - 1977 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 42 (2):238-240.
  42.  24
    A Topological Model for Intuitionistic Analysis with Kripke's Scheme.M. D. Krol - 1978 - Zeitschrift fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik 24 (25-30):427-436.
  43.  60
    Kripke’s Contingent A Priori.Michael Wreen - 1983 - International Studies in Philosophy 15 (3):55-59.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  44.  75
    On a Possible Misinterpretation of Kripke's Semantics for Intuitionistic Logic.Allen Hazen - 1982 - Analysis 42 (3):128 - 133.
  45.  3
    A Topological Model for Intuitionistic Analysis with Kripke's Scheme.M. D. Krol - 1978 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 24 (25‐30):427-436.
  46.  22
    Schwartz Stephen P.. Preface. Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds, Edited by Schwartz Stephen P., Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London 1977, Pp. 9–10.Schwartz Stephen P.. Introduction. Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds, Edited by Schwartz Stephen P., Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London 1977, Pp. 13–41.Donnellan Keith S.. Reference and Definite Descriptions. A Reprint of XL 276 . Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds, Edited by Schwartz Stephen P., Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London 1977, Pp. 42–65.Kripke Saul. Identity and Necessity. Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds, Edited by Schwartz Stephen P., Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London 1977, Pp. 66–101. Putnam Hilary. IS Semantics Possible? Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds, Edited by Schwartz Stephen P., Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London 1977, Pp. 102–118. Putnam Hilary. Meaning and Reference. Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds, Edited by Schwartz Stephen P., Cornell University Press,. [REVIEW]Tyler Burge - 1982 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 47 (4):911-915.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47.  35
    Davis's Formulation of Kripke's Theory of Truth: A Correction. [REVIEW]Allen Hazen - 1981 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 10 (3):309 - 311.
  48.  84
    A Note on Kripke’s Paradox About Time and Thought.Nathan Salmon - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (4):213-220.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49.  13
    A Solution to Kripke's Puzzle About Time and Thought.Zhaoqing Xu - 2019 - Philosophical Forum 50 (2):239-244.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50.  22
    A Neo-Hintikkan Solution to Kripke’s Puzzle.Peter Alward - 2005 - In Kent A. Peacock & Andrew D. Irvine (eds.), Mistakes of Reason: Essays in Honour of John Woods. University of Toronto Press. pp. 93-108.
1 — 50 / 1000