According to some authors, emotions can be unconscious when they are unfelt or unnoticed. According to others, emotions are always conscious because they always have a phenomenology. The aim of this paper is to resolve the ongoing debate about the possibility for emotions to be unfelt. To do so, I focus on the notion of “unconscious emotions”. While this notion appears paradoxical, by way of a distinction between two meanings of emotional consciousness I show that it is not so. These (...) meanings are both compatible with the leading views of consciousness and they do not require one to distinguish different senses of “emotions” or “consciousness”. This distinction is helpful to define how emotions can be unconscious. (shrink)

The Corporate Social Performance (CSP) model (Wood, Acad Manag Rev 164:691–718, 1991) assesses a firm’s social responsibility at three levels of analysis—institutional, organizational and individual—and measures the resulting social outcomes. In this paper, we focus on the individual level of CSP, manifested in the managerial discretion of a firm’s principles, processes, and policies regarding social responsibilities. Specifically, we address the human resources management of employees as a way of promoting CSR values and producing socially minded outcomes. We show that applying (...) the humanist philosophy to the managerial discretion of a business organization leads to the creation of an “autonomy supportive work environment”—as defined by the self-determination theory—which in turn, facilitates the internalization of social values, citizenship behaviors, and cooperation. The objective of promoting self-determination at work (i.e., the core of a humanist management) fits well with the ontology of social responsibility since autonomy and consideration of individuals as moral actors are central tenets. Furthermore, we show that applying humanistic management philosophy to the discretion of managers can lead to socially responsible outcomes. First, intra-organizational stakeholders (e.g., employees) are treated with respect and focus is put on their well-being, satisfaction, and self-actualization at work. Second, as employees’ need of self-determination is addressed by managers, it is likely that pro-social behaviors toward other stakeholders of the organization will be adopted, leading to socially responsible outcomes for extra-organizational stakeholders (Gagné, Motiv Emot 77:58–75, 2003). Thus, this paper ultimately posits that humanistic management applied to the HRM can be a solution for developing and maintaining socially responsible outcomes as determined at the individual level of the CSP model, through managerial discretion. (shrink)

This paper suggests that autistic people relate to themselves via a third-person perspective, an objective and explicit mode of access, while neurotypical people tend to access the different dimensions of their self through a first-person perspective. This approach sheds light on autistic traits involving interactions with others, usage of narratives, sensitivity and interoception, and emotional consciousness. Autistic people seem to access these dimensions through comparatively indirect and effortful processes, while neurotypical development enables a more intuitive sense of self.

An abundant literature on autism shows differences in emotional consciousness between neurotypical and autistic people. This paper proposes an interpretation of these results through a conceptual clarification of emotional consciousness. It suggests that autistic people generally access their emotions through a thirdperson's perspective whereas neurotypical people's emotions reach consciousness via first-person access. This interpretation is based on a model of 'emotional consciousness' that applies leading theories of consciousness to emotions as well as on research on the way autistic people relate (...) to their own emotions. This model differentiates two routes through which emotions can access consciousness. Therefore, research on emotions in autism helps to give a more complete account for emotional consciousness in general. (shrink)

Objectophilia (also known as Objectum-Sexuality) involves romantic and sexual attraction to specific objects. Objectophiles often develop deep and enduring emotional, romantic, and sexual relations with specific inanimate (concrete or abstract) objects such as trains, bridges, cars, or words. . The determinants of objectophilia are poorly understood. The aim of this paper is to examine the determining factors of objectophilia. We examine four hypotheses about the determinants of objectophilia (pertaining to fetishism, synesthesia, cross-modal mental imagery, and autism) and argue that the (...) most likely determining factors of objectophilia are the social and non-social features of autism. Future studies on the determinants of objectophilia could enhance our understanding and potentially lessen the marginalization experienced by objectophiles. (shrink)

How should we seek to account for the qualitative aspect of emotion? Strong intentionalism presents one promising avenue for such an account. According to strong intentionalism, the phenomenology of a mental state is entirely determined by that state's intentional content. Given that many views of the emotions have it that the intentionality and phenomenology of the emotions are very closely related, this makes strong intentionalism an especially promising route. However, strong intentionalism has rarely been defended for emotions and, we argue, (...) where it has, it has failed to be explanatory. This paper proposes a new explanatory form of strong intentionalism about emotion. We call it personal intentionalism. According to this view, the qualitative features of emotion are fully determined by the emotion's intentional content. This content varies inter- and intraindividually, according to one's cares and concerns, as well as one's other mental states. We assess its compatibility with theories of consciousness. (shrink)

The anti-psychiatry movement of the 20th century has notably denounced the role of values and social norms in the shaping of psychiatric categories. Recent activist movements also recognize that psychiatry is value-laden, however, they do not fight for a value-free psychiatry. On the contrary, some activist movements of the 21st century advocate for self-advocacy in sciences of mental health in order to reach a more accurate understanding of psychiatric categories/mental distress. By aiming at such epistemic gain, they depart from the (...) anti-psychiatry movement. Through the analysis of the epistemic and political influence of two of these movements – Neurodiversity and the Mad Studies, we show how this new activism has taken a scientific turn compatible with current philosophical scientific frameworks, while still developing a critical approach on psychiatry. (shrink)

Anorexia Nervosa (AN) is widely considered to be a bodily disorder accompanied by unrealistic perceptions about one’s own body. Some researchers thus have wondered whether deficits in interoception, a conscious or non-conscious sense of one’s own body, could be a primary cause of AN. In this paper, we make the case that rather than interoception being a primary cause, deficits in interoception may occur as by-products of emotions that arise upstream in the pathogenesis of AN and interact with feelings of (...) a loss of self-control. We consider interoception, emotion, and self-control as a dynamical triad involved in the explanation of AN, with emotions as the central aspect of their interactions. We begin with a critical analysis of recent empirical literature on AN and differentiate three types of interoceptive processes. We then consider the role of self-control in AN. We go on to evaluate recent empirical and philosophical work on the role of emotions in AN and assess their importance in both interoception and self-control dynamics. We develop a testable integrative model that we believe best captures how self-control, emotional and interoceptive processes causally interact in the pathogenesis of AN. In this model, AN behaviors are not caused by interoceptive abnormalities, but rather interact with changes in emotional regulation and feelings of loss of self-control, subsequently leading to interoceptive deficits downstream. To capture a later stage in the pathogenesis of AN, we show how AN behaviors are maintained as a result of feedback among components in the model. We briefly explain future plans to further complement the model using a semi-structured interview to probe patient perspectives in AN. To develop a more valid understanding of AN, this model will have to be integrated into pluralistic approaches that include patient perspectives. (shrink)

What role should the expertise of the autistic communities play in shaping the category of autism compared to the role played by science? This question led to a debate about the quantitative importance of science compared to first-person perspectives for the understanding of autism. I see this debate as lying on a false dichotomy between science and activism, according to which only scientific inquiry would reveal the empirical nature of autism, while the discourse of autistic communities would construct a socio-cultural (...) conception of autism. I consider the problems associated with such a dichotomy and show that first-person perspectives should be considered a necessary step in the scientific investigation of autism. (shrink)

Long before Jacques Derrida undertook a critique of phonocentrism as a form of ethnocentrism, a few teachers of deaf pupils rose to the challenge of working on a sign language independent of the structures of speech. For Derrida, this critique encompassed a reappraisal of Western limitations, while reflecting upon the boundaries and linearity of alphabetical versus ideographic writing. What I explore in this article is how the development of a pedagogy for deaf pupils went hand in hand with an examination (...) of language itself, including the dominance of alphabetical language, and led thinkers to question its role in the development of thought. The context of the development of a writing proper to sign language was one of the ferments in which this critique took shape, making writing practice the threshold of a critical investigation into the expressive qualities specific to sign language. My aim here is to sketch out the epistemological challenges and stakes of some of these conflicting approaches between the 1760s and the 1850s. This article analyzes some of the most radical linguistic conceptualizations about the potential of sign language to recreate the relationship between users and their language. I consider how teachers’ positionings led them to conceptualize sign language in distinct ways, ranging from a temporary, intermediary tool to an autonomous language with a writing of its own. After considering de Michel de l’Épée’s methodical signs and how far removed they are from the conception of a language of its own, as well as a discussion of them by deaf writer Pierre Desloges, I will investigate how Roch-Ambroise Bébian’s and Joseph Piroux’s conceptions of a writing specific to sign language led each of them to position it as a complete and independent language. (shrink)

Sarah Arnaud C’est par une affirmation provocatrice que Hacking propose un ratio pour représenter le rapport entre science et militantisme dans le façonnement des notions sur l’autisme. Selon lui, la définition et la compréhension actuelles de l’autisme proviennent à 99 % de personnes « personnellement connectées à une personne autiste » plutôt que de la science. Kendler rejette un tel point de vue en suggérant au contraire que notre compréhension de l’autisme est le résultat d’un travail scientifique approfondi, notamment par (...) la recherche en génétique. Je considère que leur désaccord se fonde sur une fausse dichotomie selon laquelle seule la recherche scientifique est à même d’envisager l’autisme de manière empirique, alors que le discours des « p-c-a » construirait au contraire une conception socioculturelle de l’autisme. J’envisage les problèmes éthiques inhérents à un tel ratio et suggère que la perspective des personnes autistes elles-mêmes représente une étape nécessaire à l’atteinte d’une validité scientifique. (shrink)

Cet article propose une caractérisation de la sensibilité et de la conscience émotionnelle des personnes autistes grâce à des précisions terminologiques des concepts d’émotions et de conscience. Il met en évidence le caractère contradictoire qui semble caractériser la sensibilité des personnes autistes : alors que leurs états internes du corps parviennent à la conscience beaucoup plus fréquemment que pour les personnes neurotypiques, leurs émotions sont appréhendées de manière descriptive et non par le biais de ces ressentis corporels, comme c’est pourtant (...) le cas pour les personnes neurotypiques. Chez les personnes autistes, la compréhension émotionnelle semble donc être détachée du ressenti émotionnel, pourtant très présent. La mise en commun des résultats d’études mettant en évidence ces particularités permet de proposer une hypothèse explicative de cette apparente contradiction ; hypothèse selon laquelle pour les personnes autistes, le caractère accablant des ressentis du corps est évité grâce à une stratégie compensatoire d’accès explicite aux émotions, détaché du ressenti émotionnel. (shrink)

This paper advocates for the inclusion of patient perspectives in the diagnosis and treatment of eating disorders (EDs) for ethical, epistemological, and pragmatic reasons. We build upon the ideas of a recent editorial published in this journal. Using EDs as their example, the authors argue against dominant DSM-oriented approaches in favor of an increased focus on understanding patients’ subjective experiences. We argue that their analysis stops too soon for the development of practical—and actionable—insights into how to effect the integration of (...) first-person and third-person accounts of EDs. Methods Contextual analysis was used to make the case for patient perspectives. (shrink)

La limite peut être entendue dans deux sens dont les implications sont différentes, voire opposées. Elle peut être considérée comme un horizon indépassable, un mur infranchissable qui borne très distinctement des domaines d'étude et des champs d'action. Dans une seconde acception, la limite est, au contraire, la ligne qui peut être franchie et par extension, la limite devient amovible : elle peut être déplacée, même légèrement, en fonction des événements. Le thème de ce colloque nous invite non pas à étudier (...) "la limite du droit", comme le suggèrerait le premier sens du mot limite. Cette idée n'aurait pas de sens, sauf à considérer un système pur de droit, isolé de tous les autres paramètres qui peuvent graviter autour de lui. Nous sommes, à l'inverse, amenés à nous rendre "Aux limites du droit", dans cette zone d'interférence, de superposition, d'interpénétration non seulement des disciplines théoriques mais aussi des circonstances ponctuelles dont l'enchevêtrement donne à la pratique de la science juridique toute son ampleur. Les limites du droit font donc référence à un lieu de communication et de négociation où la recherche d'un équilibre spontané est autant permanente qu'impossible à pérenniser. En effet, les divers facteurs qui entrent dans les limites du droit sont si riches et pourtant si mouvants qu'il paraît judicieux de tenter, tant que faire se peut, de cerner leur essence. D'autant que les limites sont souvent révélatrices de la nature profonde du droit. (shrink)