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Stephen Barker [55]S. F. Barker [17]Stephen F. Barker [15]Stephen J. Barker [11]
Stephen Francis Barker [7]S. Barker [5]Simon Barker [4]S. J. Barker [2]

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Stephen Barker
Nottingham University
Simon Barker
University of Tartu
  1. Being Positive About Negative Facts.Mark Jago & Stephen Barker - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):117-138.
    Negative facts get a bad press. One reason for this is that it is not clear what negative facts are. We provide a theory of negative facts on which they are no stranger than positive atomic facts. We show that none of the usual arguments hold water against this account. Negative facts exist in the usual sense of existence and conform to an acceptable Eleatic principle. Furthermore, there are good reasons to want them around, including their roles in causation, chance-making (...)
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  2. Cognitive Expressivism, Faultless Disagreement, and Absolute but Non-Objective Truth.Stephen Barker - 2010 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (2):183-199.
    I offer a new theory of faultless disagreement, according to which truth is absolute (non-relative) but can still be non-objective. What's relative is truth-aptness: a sentence like ‘Vegemite is tasty’ (V) can be truth-accessible and bivalent in one context but not in another. Within a context in which V fails to be bivalent, we can affirm that there is no issue of truth or falsity about V, still disputants, affirming and denying V, were not at fault, since, in their context (...)
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  3. The Emperor's New Metaphysics of Powers.Stephen Barker - 2013 - Mind 122 (487):605-653.
    This paper argues that the new metaphysics of powers, also known as dispositional essentialism or causal structuralism, is an illusory metaphysics. I argue for this in the following way. I begin by distinguishing three fundamental ways of seeing how facts of physical modality — facts about physical necessitation and possibility, causation, disposition, and chance — are grounded in the world. The first way, call it the first degree, is that the actual world or all worlds, in their entirety, are the (...)
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  4. Is Value Content a Component of Conventional Implicature?Stephen J. Barker - 2000 - Analysis 60 (3):268-279.
  5. Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning.Stephen Barker - 2002 - Mind 111 (443):633-639.
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  6. The Ultimate Argument Against Dispositional Monist Accounts of Laws.Stephen Barker & Benjamin Smart - 2012 - Analysis 72 (4):714-722.
    Bird argues that Armstrong’s necessitarian conception of physical modality and laws of nature generates a vicious regress with respect to necessitation. We show that precisely the same regress afflicts Bird’s dispositional-monist theory, and indeed, related views, such as that of Mumford & Anjum. We argue that dispositional monism is basically Armstrongian necessitarianism modified to allow for a thesis about property identity.
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  7. Harms and Wrongs in Epistemic Practice.Simon Barker, Charlie Crerar & Trystan S. Goetze - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84:1-21.
    This volume has its roots in two recent developments within mainstream analytic epistemology: a growing recognition over the past two or three decades of the active and social nature of our epistemic lives; and, more recently still, the increasing appreciation of the various ways in which the epistemic practices of individuals and societies can, and often do, go wrong. The theoretical analysis of these breakdowns in epistemic practice, along with the various harms and wrongs that follow as a consequence, constitutes (...)
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  8. Monism and Material Constitution.Stephen Barker & Mark Jago - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (1):189-204.
    Are the sculpture and the mass of gold which permanently makes it up one object or two? In this article, we argue that the monist, who answers ‘one object’, cannot accommodate the asymmetry of material constitution. To say ‘the mass of gold materially constitutes the sculpture, whereas the sculpture does not materially constitute the mass of gold’, the monist must treat ‘materially constitutes’ as an Abelardian predicate, whose denotation is sensitive to the linguistic context in which it appears. We motivate (...)
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  9.  70
    Renewing Meaning: A Speech-Act Theoretic Approach.Stephen J. Barker - 2004 - Clarendon Press.
    This book develops an alternative approach to sentence- and word-meaning, which I dub the speech-act theoretic approach, or STA. Instead of employing the syntactic and semantic forms of modern logic–principally, quantification theory–to construct semantic theories, STA employs speech-act structures. The structures it employs are those postulated by a novel theory of speech-acts. STA develops a compositional semantics in which surface grammar is integrated with semantic interpretation in a way not allowed by standard quantification-based theories. It provides a pragmatic theory of (...)
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  10.  27
    Paradoxes of Multi-Location.S. Barker & P. Dowe - 2003 - Analysis 63 (2):106-114.
  11. Truth and the Expressing in Expressivism.Stephen Barker - 2006 - In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore. Oxford University Press. pp. 299.
     
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  12. Material Objects and Essential Bundle Theory.Stephen Barker & Mark Jago - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):2969-2986.
    In this paper we present a new metaphysical theory of material objects. On our theory, objects are bundles of property instances, where those properties give the nature or essence of that object. We call the theory essential bundle theory. Property possession is not analysed as bundle-membership, as in traditional bundle theories, since accidental properties are not included in the object’s bundle. We have a different story to tell about accidental property possession. This move reaps many benefits. Essential bundle theory delivers (...)
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  13. Irony and the Dogma of Force and Sense.Stephen J. Barker & Mihaela Popa-Wyatt - 2015 - Analysis 75 (1):9-16.
    Frege’s distinction between force and sense is a central pillar of modern thinking about meaning. This is the idea that a self-standing utterance of a sentence S can be divided into two components. One is the proposition P that S’s linguistic meaning and context associates with it. The other is S’s illocutionary force. The force/sense distinction is associated with another thesis, the embedding principle, that implies that the only content that embeds in compound sentences is propositional content. We argue that (...)
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  14. Paradoxes of Multi-Location.Stephen Barker & Phil Dowe - 2003 - Analysis 63 (2):106–114.
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  15. Semantics Without the Distinction Between Sense and Force.Stephen J. Barker - 2007 - In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), John Searle's Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning, and Mind. Cambridge University Press. pp. 190-210.
    At the heart of semantics in the 20th century is Frege’s distinction between sense and force. This is the idea that the content of a self-standing utterance of a sentence S can be divided into two components. One part, the sense, is the proposition that S’s linguistic meaning and context associates with it as its semantic interpretation. The second component is S’s illocutionary force. Illocutionary forces correspond to the three basic kinds of sentential speech acts: assertions, orders, and questions. Forces (...)
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  16.  20
    Global Expressivism.Stephen Barker - 2020 - In Ricki Bliss & James Miller (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics. Routledge. pp. 270-283.
    In this chapter I consider the prospects of globalizing expressivism. Expressivism is a position in the philosophy of language that questions the central role of representation in a theory of meaning or linguistic function. An expressivist about a domain D of discourse proposes that utterances of sentences in D should not be seen, at the level of analysis as representing how things are, but as expression of non-representational states. So, in the domain of value-utterances, the standard idea is that speakers (...)
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  17. Endurance is Paradoxical.Stephen Barker & Phil Dowe - 2005 - Analysis 65 (1):69-74.
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  18. Dispositional Monism, Relational Constitution and Quiddities.Stephen Barker - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):242-250.
    Let us call dispositional monism the view that all natural properties have their identities fixed purely by their dispositional features, that is, by the patterns of stimulus and response in which they participate. DM implies that natural properties are pure powers: things whose natures are fully identified by their roles in determining the potentialities of events to cause or be caused. As pure powers, properties are meant to lack quiddities in Black's sense. A property possesses a quiddity just in case (...)
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  19. Pure Versus Hybrid Expressivism and the Enigma of Conventional Implicature.Stephen Barker - 2014 - In Guy Fletcher & Mike Ridge (eds.), Having it Both Ways: Hybrid Theories and Modern
Metaethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 199-222.
    Can hybridism about moral claims be made to work? I argue it can if we accept the conventional implicature approach developed in Barker (Analysis 2000). However, this kind of hybrid expressivism is only acceptable if we can make sense of conventional implicature, the kind of meaning carried by operators like ‘even’, ‘but’, etc. Conventional implictures are a form of pragmatic presupposition, which involves an unsaid mode of delivery of content. I argue that we can make sense of conventional implicatures, but (...)
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  20. Truth and Conventional Implicature.Stephen Barker - 2003 - Mind 112 (445):1-34.
    Are all instances of the T-schema assertable? I argue that they are not. The reason is the presence of conventional implicature in a language. Conventional implicature is meant to be a component of the rule-based content that a sentence can have, but it makes no contribution to the sentence's truth-conditions. One might think that a conventional implicature is like a force operator. But it is not, since it can enter into the scope of logical operators. It follows that the semantic (...)
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  21. Can Counterfactuals Really Be About Possible Worlds?Stephen Barker - 2011 - Noûs 45 (3):557-576.
    The standard view about counterfactuals is that a counterfactual (A > C) is true if and only if the A-worlds most similar to the actual world @ are C-worlds. I argue that the worlds conception of counterfactuals is wrong. I assume that counterfactuals have non-trivial truth-values under physical determinism. I show that the possible-worlds approach cannot explain many embeddings of the form (P > (Q > R)), which intuitively are perfectly assertable, and which must be true if the contingent falsity (...)
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  22. Expressivism About Making and Truth-Making.Stephen Barker - 2012 - In Fabrice Correia & Benjamin Schnieder (eds.), Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-293.
    My goal is to illuminate truth-making by way of illuminating the relation of making. My strategy is not to ask what making is, in the hope of a metaphysical theory about is nature. It's rather to look first to the language of making. The metaphor behind making refers to agency. It would be absurd to suggest that claims about making are claims about agency. It is not absurd, however, to propose that the concept of making somehow emerges from some feature (...)
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  23.  67
    Figurative Speech: Pointing a Poisoned Arrow at the Heart of Semantics.Stephen Barker - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (1):123-140.
    I argue that figurative speech, and irony in particular, presents a deep challenge to the orthodox view about sentence content. The standard view is that sentence contents are, at their core, propositional contents: truth-conditional contents. Moreover, the only component of a sentence’s content that embeds in compound sentences, like belief reports or conditionals, is the propositional content. I argue that a careful analysis of irony shows this view cannot be maintained. Irony is a purely pragmatic form of content that embeds (...)
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  24. Semantic Paradox and Alethic Undecidability.Stephen Barker - 2014 - Analysis 74 (2):201-209.
    I use the principle of truth-maker maximalism to provide a new solution to the semantic paradoxes. According to the solution, AUS, its undecidable whether paradoxical sentences are grounded or ungrounded. From this it follows that their alethic status is undecidable. We cannot assert, in principle, whether paradoxical sentences are true, false, either true or false, neither true nor false, both true and false, and so on. AUS involves no ad hoc modification of logic, denial of the T-schema's validity, or obvious (...)
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  25. Counterfactuals, Probabilistic Counterfactuals and Causation.S. Barker - 1999 - Mind 108 (431):427-469.
    It seems to be generally accepted that (a) counterfactual conditionals are to be analysed in terms of possible worlds and inter-world relations of similarity and (b) causation is conceptually prior to counterfactuals. I argue here that both (a) and (b) are false. The argument against (a) is not a general metaphysical or epistemological one but simply that, structurally speaking, possible worlds theories are wrong: this is revealed when we try to extend them to cover the case of probabilistic counterfactuals. Indeed (...)
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  26. Global Expressivism: Language Agency Without Semantics, Reality Without Metaphysics.Stephen J. Barker - manuscript
    There is a wide-spread belief amongst theorists of mind and language. This is that in order to understand the relation between language, thought, and reality we need a theory of meaning and content, that is, a normative, formal science of meaning, which is an extension and theoretical deepening of folk ideas about meaning. This book argues that this is false, offering an alternative idea: The form of a theory that illuminates the relation of language, thought, and reality is a theory (...)
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  27. Expressivism About Reference and Quantification Over the Non-Existent Without Meinongian Metaphysics.Stephen Barker - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (S2):215-234.
    Can we believe that there are non-existent entities without commitment to the Meinongian metaphysics? This paper argues we can. What leads us from quantification over non-existent beings to Meinongianism is a general metaphysical assumption about reality at large, and not merely quantification over the non-existent. Broadly speaking, the assumption is that every being we talk about must have a real definition. It’s this assumption that drives us to enquire into the nature of beings like Pegasus, and what our relationship as (...)
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  28. Truth-Bearers and the Unsaid.Stephen Barker - 2011 - In Ken Turner (ed.), Making Semantics Pragmatic. Cambridge University Press.
    I argue that conventional implicatures embed in logical compounds, and are non-truth-conditional contributors to sentence meaning. This, I argue has significant implications for how we understand truth, truth-conditional content, and truth-bearers.
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  29. Counterfactual Analyses of Causation: The Problem of Effects and Epiphenomena Revisited.Stephen Barker - 2003 - Noûs 37 (1):133–150.
    I argue that Lewis's counterfactual theory of causation, given his treatment of counterfactuals in terms of world-comparative similarity faces insuperable problems in the form of the problem of effects and the problem of epiphenomena.
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  30.  35
    Thought and Action.S. F. Barker - 1962 - Philosophical Review 71 (3):392.
  31. On the New Riddle of Induction.S. F. Barker & Peter Achinstein - 1960 - Philosophical Review 69 (4):511-522.
  32.  66
    Material Implication and General Indicative Conditionals.Stephen Barker - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):195-211.
    This paper falls into two parts. In the first part, I argue that consideration of general indicative conditionals, e.g., sentences like If a donkey brays it is beaten, provides a powerful argument that a pure material implication analysis of indicative if p, q is correct. In the second part I argue, opposing writers like Jackson, that a Gricean style theory of pragmatics can explain the manifest assertability conditions of if p, q in terms of its conventional content – assumed to (...)
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  33. Conditional Excluded Middle, Conditional Assertion, and 'Only If'.Stephen J. Barker - 1993 - Analysis 53 (4):254 - 261.
  34.  81
    Even, Still and Counterfactuals.Stephen Barker - 1991 - Linguistics and Philosophy 14 (1):1 - 38.
  35. Predetermination and Tense Probabilism.Stephen J. Barker - 1998 - Analysis 58 (4):290-296.
  36.  25
    Towards a Pragmatic Theory of 'If'.Stephen J. Barker - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 79 (2):185 - 211.
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  37. The Elements of Logic.Stephen Francis Barker - 1965 - New York: Mcgraw-Hill.
  38.  89
    E-Type Pronouns, DRT, Dynamic Semantics and the Quantifier/Variable-Binding Model.S. J. Barker - 1997 - Linguistics and Philosophy 20 (2):195-228.
  39.  62
    A Meta-Model of Access Control in a Fibred Security Language.Steve Barker, Guido Boella, Dov M. Gabbay & Valerio Genovese - 2009 - Studia Logica 92 (3):437-477.
    The issue of representing access control requirements continues to demand significant attention. The focus of researchers has traditionally been on developing particular access control models and policy specification languages for particular applications. However, this approach has resulted in an unnecessary surfeit of models and languages. In contrast, we describe a general access control model and a logic-based specification language from which both existing and novel access control models may be derived as particular cases and from which several approaches can be (...)
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  40. A Dilemma for the Counterfactual Analysis of Causation.S. Barker - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):62 – 77.
    If we seek to analyse causation in terms of counterfactual conditionals then we must assume that there is a class of counterfactuals whose members (i) are all and only those we need to support our judgements of causation, (ii) have truth-conditions specifiable without any irreducible appeal to causation. I argue that (i) and (ii) are unlikely to be met by any counterfactual analysis of causation. I demonstrate this by isolating a class of counterfactuals called non-projective counterfactuals, or NP-counterfactuals, and indicate (...)
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  41. Leaving Things to Take Their Chances: Cause and Disposition Grounded in Chance.Stephen Barker - 2009 - In Toby Handfield (ed.), Dispositions and Causes. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press ;. pp. 100-126.
  42. Lewis on Implication.Stephen Francis Barker - 2006 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 42 (1):10-16.
  43. Analysing Chancy Causation Without Appeal to Chance-Raising.Stephen Barker - 2004 - In Phil Dowe & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World. Routledge.
     
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  44.  47
    The Consequent-Entailment Problem Foreven If.Stephen J. Barker - 1994 - Linguistics and Philosophy 17 (3):249 - 260.
    A comprehensive theory ofeven if needs to account for consequent ‘entailing’even ifs and in particular those of theif-focused variety. This is where the theory ofeven if ceases to be neutral between conditional theories. I have argued thatif-focusedeven ifs,especially if andonly if can only be accounted for through the suppositional theory ofif. Furthermore, a particular interpretation of this theory — the conditional assertion theory — is needed to account foronly if and a type of metalinguistic negation ofQ if P. We therefore (...)
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  45.  32
    Reasoning by Analogy in Hume’s Dialogues.S. Barker - 1989 - Informal Logic 11 (3).
  46.  98
    Parsing If-Sentences and the Conditions of Sentencehood.Stephen Barker - 1996 - Analysis 56 (4):210–218.
  47.  49
    Strata/Sedimenta/Lamina: In Ruin 1.Stephen Barker - 2008 - Derrida Today 1 (1):42-58.
    Ruins, their evocations and enigmas, have been a source of fascination since the advent of civilization. Both coordinating and distressing the relations of space and time, ruins are unparalleled catalysts of cultural analysis, as both history and adumbration. Ruins, and the concept of ruin on which they ‘rest’ and through which they decay, can be regarded in space, as strata, in time, as sedimenta, and in dynamic terms, as lamina. This essay works down through each focusing on the forceof ruin (...)
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  48.  17
    Murray Murphey's Work and C. I. Lewis's Epistemology: Problems with Realism and the Context of Logical Positivism.John Corcoran, Stephen F. Barker, Eric Dayton, John Greco, Naomi Zack, Richard S. Robin, Joel Isaac & Murray G. Murphey - 2006 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 42 (1):1-77.
  49.  49
    Truth-Making and the Alethic Undecidability of the Liar.Stephen Barker - 2012 - Discusiones Filosóficas 13 (21):13-31.
    I argue that a new solution to the semantic paradoxes is possible based on truth-making. I show that with an appropriate understanding of what the ultimate truth and falsity makers of sentences are, it can be demonstrated that sentences like the liar are alethically undecidable. That means it cannot be said in principle whether such sentences are true, not true, false, not-false, neither true nor false, both true and false, and so on. I argue that this leads to a solution (...)
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  50.  16
    Induction and Hypothesis.Stephen Francis Barker - 1957 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
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