I THE CONCEPT OF ACTION Among the most basic of legal concepts of concern to the practitioners of law at all levels we find those of defence, culpability, ...
The book analyzes how one might philosophize about some of the most difficult and controversial issues in ethics and politics without abandoning either the demands of rigor or the joys of clear vistas.
The article addresses the sceptics who claim there is only one mind. the author contends that the statement 'there is only one mind' is not solipsistic and does not account for a plurality of minds. (staff).
Originally published in 1966. This book considers the perceived asymmetries between the self and others, or between self and things. An in-depth analysis of scepticism, dualism, belief, knowledge and semantics. A topic which is central to both epistemology but also the whole of contemporary philosophy.
I TRY to do the following things in this paper. I. To show briefly how one might argue for the mutual dependence of our demonstrative and descriptive conventions as they now stand. II. To suggest that this duality of convention may be a dispensable, though in some ways desirable, aspect of language and that if one of these conventions is non-essential it is our descriptive conventions. III. To show something of the philosophical implications of such a ‘non-word’ language. Perhaps not (...) the least uninteresting among these implications is what may then be said about our demonstrative and descriptive conventions as they now stand and especially what this might mean for attempts to reduce our demonstrative to our descriptive conventions, which involves us again in section I. It might be said that, while section I offers some linguistic facts, sections II and III attempt to show the contingency of some of these linguistic facts. (shrink)
Originally published in 1966. This book considers the perceived asymmetries between the self and others, or between self and things. An indepth analysis of scepticism, dualism, belief, knowledge and semantics. A topic which is central to both epistemology but also the whole of contemporary philosophy.
Originally published in 1966. This book considers the asymmetries between the self and others, or between self and things. An indepth analysis of scepticism, dualism, belief and knowledge.
Rights have two properties which prima facie appear to be inconsistent. The first is that they are conditional in the sense that one some occasions it is always justifiable for someone to act in a way which appears to be inconsistent with someone else's rights, such as when the defence of necessity applies. The second is that rights are indefeasible in the sense that they are not subject to being defeated our outweighed by utilitarian or policy considerations. If we view (...) rules and the rights which they establish as being subject to a ceteris paribus clause, the form of which generates out the exceptions, the conditionality of rights becomes reconcilable with their nondefeasibility. Such a view of rules and rights would entail that the goals of the law and their orderings be considered as a part of the law. When so viewed, propositions about goals and their orderings become legitimate premises for legal reasoning, furnishing solutions to hard cases in the law of torts, without resort to balancing of interests or judicial discretion. (shrink)
