Seeking to capture the multi-layered, contradictory, nature of subjectivities and social positions through a framework which insists upon the complex, dynamic nature of the social, intersectionality feminism has inspired Marxist-Feminists to push the social-reproduction feminism paradigm beyond a narrow preoccupation with gender/class relations. Yet even its most politically radical articulations stop short of fully theorising the integrative logic they espouse. This article explores the roots of this under-theorisation, and suggests that a more fully integrative ontology informs certain formulations of social-reproduction (...) feminism. In understanding the social as constituted by practical human activity whose object (the social and natural world) is organised capitalistically, social-reproduction feminism highlights thedialecticalrelationship between the capitalist whole and its differentiated parts. The challenge for Marxist-Feminism is to embrace this dialectical approach while building on the insights of intersectionality feminism to more convincingly capture the unity of a complex, diverse social whole. (shrink)

The 2011 Historical Materialism Conference in London saw the launch of a Marxist-Feminist set of panels. This issue is inspired by the success of those panels, and the remarkably sustained interest in reviving and moving beyond older debates and discussions. The special issue’s focus, Social-Reproduction Feminism, reflects and contextualises the ongoing work and engagement with that thematic that has threaded through the conferences in the 2010s. This Introduction provides a summary overview of the Social-Reproduction Feminism framework, situating it within Marxist-Feminist (...) thinking and politics more generally, and calls on readers to consider its promise and potential as an historical-materialist approach to understanding capitalist social relations in terms of an integrated totality. (shrink)

JOHN YOLTON HAS CONTRIBUTED A Locke Dictionary as a recent addition to his many works on the life and philosophy of John Locke. In the entries on “abstraction” and on “abstract or general ideas ” in that text, Yolton makes some rather bold assertions. He argues that, despite Berkeley’s attack on Locke’s theory of abstract or general ideas, Locke’s theory is in fact quite similar to Berkeley’s own account. In the course of this discussion, Yolton concludes that, for Locke, abstract (...) or general ideas are fictions and that they exist only as “modes of mind.” In this paper I discuss the Lockean theory of abstraction and explain the meaning Locke gives to the term “fiction,” showing that, for Locke, to call an idea a fiction is by no means to say that the idea exists only as a mode of mind. I also show why Locke’s theory of abstraction cannot be understood to be similar to Berkeley’s account in the way Yolton suggests, focusing on the central point of Berkeley’s criticisms of Locke and emphasizing the essential difference between the two accounts. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume 28, Number 1, April 2002, pp. 113-130 Bayesianism, Analogy, and Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural Religion SALLY FERGUSON Introduction Analyses of the argument from design in Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural Religion have generally treated that argument as an example of reasoning by analogy.1 In this paper I examine whether it is in accord with Hume's thinking about the argument to subsume the version of it given in (...) the Dialogues under the model of probabilistic reasoning offered by Bayes's theorem. Wesley Salmon attempted this project in 1978.2 In related projects, David Owen3 as well as Philip Dawid and Donald Gillies4 have more recently attempted to construct Bayesian analyses of Hume's argument concerning testimony in "Of Miracles." I want to be careful at this stage to note exactly what I will claim. It is not that Bayesian reasoning sheds no light on the argument from design, or on arguments concerning testimony. All of the analyses mentioned above are beneficial in that they have been able to expose subtleties in these arguments that had previously gone unnoticed. Salmon's paper, in particular, contributes nicely to an understanding of just how the design argument may function in relation to contemporary scientific reasoning. In this paper I argue that, nonetheless, the attempt to apply Bayesian reasoning to the argument as presented in the Dialogues is not well supported as a reconstruction of Hume's own approach to the argument from design. Sally Ferguson is Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of West Florida, UOOO University Parkway, Pensacola, FL 32514, USA. e-mail: [email protected] 114 Sally Ferguson There are two stages to my treatment of the issue. I begin by considering how much Hume knew of Bayes's theorem, and what consequence that knowledge might have had on his treatment of the argument in the Dialogues. This discussion includes a consideration of exactly what has been claimed by other authors on this subject, including what some have argued concerning Hume's reasonings in "Of Miracles," section 10 of An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. I conclude that, based on the historical data, there is little reason to think of Hume's approach to the argument from design as anything more than proto-Bayesian at best. I then argue further, through a close textual analysis of the Dialogues, that there are good reasons for not treating Hume's reasoning there as even proto-Bayesian. In the end, the benefits that have been claimed for that approach, in terms of exposing both the subtleties of the argument and of Hume's reasoning about it, can equally well be derived from a careful analysis of the argument under a model of analogical reasoning, without need of Bayes's theorem. Section One Perhaps one might think that there is not much use for a consideration of the question whether Hume himself conceived of any of his arguments along specifically Bayesian lines. As Gower argues,5 Hume's knowledge of mathematics in general was fairly limited, and Bayes's theorem was not well known even up until Hume's death. It is important, therefore, for me to establish that there have not only been those who thought that Bayesian reasoning illuminates the arguments Hume gave, but also his own thinking about those arguments. It is also important for me to establish that it is not obvious that knowledge of Bayes's theorem did not affect Hume's reasonings. Each of these points will be addressed in the following. As to the first point, the claims of some authors on the subject are ambiguous. Dawid and Gillie, for example, make no statement to the effect that the probabilities involved in Bayes's theorem were in fact examined in "Of Miracles," nor do they attempt to produce any passages from Hume in support of that view. Thus it would be assumed that they see their attempt not as an attempt to provide an analysis that represents Hume's own approach to the argument, but rather simply as one that provides an illuminating method of analysis and support for an argument that Hume happened to give. Indeed, their conclusion, to the effect that a... (shrink)

Little is known about the lives of the never married. Demographic data show that rates of nonmarriage have increased significantly across racial and ethnic groups. Among women, African Americans have the highest rates of nonmarriage, followed by Asian Americans and European Americans. This research used in-depth interviews with native- and foreign-born Chinese American and Japanese American never married women to explore why these women are delaying or rejecting heterosexual marriage. Respondents were asked a series of open- and closed-ended questions about (...) their attitudes, experiences, and decisions concerning marriage and family life. Questions also focused on how their family backgrounds and occupational plans affected their decisions to marry. Preliminary findings reveal that Chinese American and Japanese American women express a number of reasons for being never married. The four most consistent factors were their parents' marriages, their status as the eldest or only daughter, their educational goals, and the perceived lack of suitors. (shrink)

In a recent paper, José Luis Bermúdez argues that Locke's claim that all simple ideas are adequate is inconsistent with other claims he makes in the Essay concerning the nature of such ideas. In particular, Bermúdez argues that Locke is unjustified in claiming that all simple ideas are adequate, because simple ideas of secondary qualities are in fact not. In this paper I argue that Bermúdez has missed an essential aspect of Locke's distinction and has therefore misconstrued his claims.

Frege's arithmetical-platonism is glossed as the first step in developing the thesis; however, it remains silent on the subject of structures in mathematics: the obvious examples being groups and rings, lattices and topologies. The structuralist objects to this silence, also questioning the sufficiency of Fregean platonism is answering a number of problems: e.g. Benacerraf's Twin Puzzles of Epistemic and Referential Access. The development of structuralism as a philosophical position, based on the slogan 'All mathematics is structural' collapses: there is no (...) single coherent account which remains faithful to the tenets of structuralism and solves the puzzles of platonism. This prompts the adoption of a more modest structuralism, the aim of which is not to solve the problems facing arithmetical-platonism, but merely to give an account of the 'obviously structural areas of mathematics'. Modest strucmralism should complement an account of mathematical systems; here, Frege's platonism fulfils that role, which then constrains and shapes the development of this modest structuralism. Three alternatives are considered; a substitutional account, an account based on a modification of Dummett's theory of thin reference and a modified from of in re structuralism. This split level analysis of mathematics leads to an investigation of the robustness of the truth predicate over the two classes of mathematical statement. Focussing on the framework set out in Wright's Truth and Objectivity, a third type of statement is identified in the literature: Hilbert's formal statements. The following thesis arises: formal statements concern no special subject matter, and are merely minimally truth apt; the statements of structural mathematics form a subdiscourse - identified by the similarity of the logical grammar - displaying cognitive command. Thirdly, the statements of mathematics which concern systems form a subdiscourse which has both cognitive command and width of cosmological role. The extensions of mathematical concepts are such that best practice on the part of mathematicians either tracks or determines that extension - at least in simple cases. Examining the notions of response dependence leads to considerations of indefinite extensibility and intuitionism. The conclusion drawn is that discourse about structures and mathematical systems are response dependent but that this does not give rise to any revisionary arguments contra intuitionism. (shrink)

BackgroundMany discretionary foods contribute both to individual health risks and to global issues, in particular through high carbon footprints and water scarcity. Snacking is influenced by the presence of snacking cues such as food availability, observing others eating, and negative affect. However, less is known about the mechanisms underlying the effects of negative affect. This study examines whether the individual odds of consuming high-calorie snacks as a consequence to being exposed to known snacking cues were moderated by experiencing higher or (...) lower total negative affect per day or higher or lower negative affect variability per day.MethodsSecondary analysis of an ecological momentary assessment study of 60 participants over 14 days with food logs and randomly timed assessments of known snacking cues. High total daily negative affect levels and negative affect variability were examined as moderators to predict high-calorie snacking in three-level hierarchical random effects logistic regressions.ResultsConsistent with previous studies, the odds of snacking increased when food was available, when others were eating, and when participants experienced more negative affect. Associations for food availability and others eating were significantly moderated by negative affect variability such that associations between cues and high-calorie snacking were weaker on days with higher negative affect variability, but not negative affect levels.ConclusionThe relationship between cues to high-calorie snacking and snacking behavior varies with variability in negative affect, suggesting a complex relationship between affect and high-calorie snacking. Clearer conceptualizations on the relation between affect and eating are needed. (shrink)