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S. M. Amadae
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  1.  22
    Autonomy and Machine Learning as Risk Factors at the Interface of Nuclear Weapons, Computers and People.S. M. Amadae & Shahar Avin - 2019 - In Vincent Boulanin (ed.), The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk: Euro-Atlantic Perspectives. Stockholm, Sweden: pp. 105-118.
    This article assesses how autonomy and machine learning impact the existential risk of nuclear war. It situates the problem of cyber security, which proceeds by stealth, within the larger context of nuclear deterrence, which is effective when it functions with transparency and credibility. Cyber vulnerabilities poses new weaknesses to the strategic stability provided by nuclear deterrence. This article offers best practices for the use of computer and information technologies integrated into nuclear weapons systems. Focusing on nuclear command and control, avoiding (...)
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  2.  22
    Computable Rationality, NUTS, and the Nuclear Leviathan.S. M. Amadae - 2018 - In Daniel Bessner & Nicolas Guilhot (eds.), The Decisionist Imagination: Democracy, Sovereignty and Social Science in the 20th Century. New York, NY, USA:
    This paper explores how the Leviathan that projects power through nuclear arms exercises a unique nuclearized sovereignty. In the case of nuclear superpowers, this sovereignty extends to wielding the power to destroy human civilization as we know it across the globe. Nuclearized sovereignty depends on a hybrid form of power encompassing human decision-makers in a hierarchical chain of command, and all of the technical and computerized functions necessary to maintain command and control at every moment of the sovereign's existence: this (...)
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  3.  23
    Economics Imperialism Reconsidered.S. M. Amadae - 2017 - In Uskali Mäki, Manuela Fernández Pinto & Adrian Walsh (eds.), Scientific Imperialism: Exploring the Boundaries of Interdisciplinarity. New York, NY, USA: pp. 140-160.
    This paper reconsiders whether rational choice and game theory represent cases of economics imperialism. It follows the work of Uskali Maki who analyzes the significance and characteristics of disciplinary imperialism in natural science and social science. "Economics Imperialism" is a term often used to describe the increasing impact and reach of economics with respect to its encroachment on other disciplines including political science and psychology. Maki provides a framework for assessing whether the influence of one discipline on another could be (...)
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  4.  13
    Economics Imperialism Reconsidered.S. M. Amadae - 2017 - In Uskali Mäki, Adrian Walsh & Manuela Fernández Pinto (eds.), Scientific Imperialism: Exploring the Boundaries of Interdisciplinarity. London, UK: pp. 140-160.
    This chapter uses Uskali Mäki’s (2009) concepts of “good” and “bad” imperialism to investigate the “economics imperialism” thesis. If science expands by offering (a) consilience, and (b) epistemological and ontological unity – that is, it explains more phenomena with greater parsimony – then this is good scientific expansion. Economics imperialism is only bad if the methodology of economics expands outside its domain without increasing understanding in the above manners.
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  5.  12
    Utility, Universality, and Impartiality in Adam Smith’s Jurisprudence.S. M. Amadae - 2008 - The Adam Smith Review 4:238-246.
    This paper examines how the concepts of utility, impartiality, and universality worked together to form the foundation of Adam Smith's jurisprudence. It argues that the theory of utility consistent with contemporary rational choice theory is insufficient to account for Smith's use of utility. Smith's jurisprudence relies on the impartial spectator's sympathetic judgment over whether third parties are injured, and not individuals' expected utility associated with individuals' expected gains from rendering judgments over innocence or guilt.
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  6.  24
    Understanding Institutions Without Collective Acceptance?Pekka Mäkelä, Raul Hakli & S. M. Amadae - 2018 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 48 (6):608-629.
    Francesco Guala has written an important book proposing a new account of social institutions and criticizing existing ones. We focus on Guala’s critique of collective acceptance theories of institutions, widely discussed in the literature of collective intentionality. Guala argues that at least some of the collective acceptance theories commit their proponents to antinaturalist methodology of social science. What is at stake here is what kind of philosophizing is relevant for the social sciences. We argue that a Searlean version of collective (...)
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  7.  46
    Normativity and Instrumentalism in David Lewis' Convention.S. M. Amadae - 2011 - History of European Ideas 37 (3):325-335.
    David Lewis presented Convention as an alternative to the conventionalism characteristic of early-twentieth-century analytic philosophy. Rudolf Carnap is well known for suggesting the arbitrariness of any particular linguistic convention for engaging in scientific inquiry. Analytic truths are self-consistent, and are not checked against empirical facts to ascertain their veracity. In keeping with the logical positivists before him, Lewis concludes that linguistic communication is conventional. However, despite his firm allegiance to conventions underlying not just languages but also social customs, he pioneered (...)
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  8. Nietzsche’s Thirst For India: Schopenhauerian, Brahmanist, and Buddhist Accents In Reflections on Truth, the Ascetic Ideal, and the Eternal Return.S. M. Amadae - 2004 - Idealistic Studies 34 (3):239-262.
    This essay represents a novel contribution to Nietzschean studies by combining an assessment of Friedrich Nietzsche’s challenging uses of “truth” and the “eternal return” with his insights drawn from Indian philosophies. Specifically, drawing on Martin Heidegger’s Nietzsche, I argue that Nietzsche’s critique of a static philosophy of being underpinning conceptual truth is best understood in line with the Theravada Buddhist critique of “self ” and “ego” as transitory. In conclusion, I find that Nietzsche’s “eternal return” can be understood as a (...)
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  9.  34
    Game Theory, Cheap Talk and Post‐Truth Politics: David Lewis Vs. John Searle on Reasons for Truth‐Telling.S. M. Amadae - 2018 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 48 (3):306-329.
    I offer two potential diagnoses of the behavioral norms governing post‐truth politics by comparing the view of language, communication, and truth‐telling put forward by David Lewis (extended by game theorists), and John Searle. My first goal is to specify the different ways in which Lewis, and game theorists more generally, in contrast to Searle (in the company of Paul Grice and Jurgen Habermas), go about explaining the normativity of truthfulness within a linguistic community. The main difference is that for Lewis (...)
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  10.  13
    Dialectical Libertarianism: The Unintended Consequences of Both Ethics and Incentives Underlie Mutual Prosperity.S. M. Amadae - 2016 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 9 (2):37.
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  11.  39
    The Long-Term Viability of Team Reasoning.S. M. Amadae & Daniel Lempert - 2015 - Journal of Economic Methodology 22 (4):462-478.
    Team reasoning gives a simple, coherent, and rational explanation for human cooperative behavior. This paper investigates the robustness of team reasoning as an explanation for cooperative behavior, by assessing its long-run viability. We consider an evolutionary game theoretic model in which the population consists of team reasoners and ‘conventional’ individual reasoners. We find that changes in the ludic environment can affect evolutionary outcomes, and that in many circumstances, team reasoning may thrive, even under conditions that, at first glance, may seem (...)
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  12.  64
    Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem and the National Security State.S. M. Amadae - 2005 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 36 (4):734-743.
    This paper critically engages Philip Mirowki's essay, "The scientific dimensions of social knowledge and their distant echoes in 20th-century American philosophy of science." It argues that although the cold war context of anti-democratic elitism best suited for making decisions about engaging in nuclear war may seem to be politically and ideologically motivated, in fact we need to carefully consider the arguments underlying the new rational choice based political philosophies of the post-WWII era typified by Arrow's impossibility theorem. A distrust of (...)
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  13.  57
    Rationality and Freedom, by Amartya Sen. Harvard University Press 2003.S. M. Amadae - 2004 - Economics and Philosophy 20 (2):381-389.
  14.  37
    Book ReviewsRichard Tuck,. Free Riding.Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008. Pp. 223. $35.00. [REVIEW]S. M. Amadae - 2008 - Ethics 119 (1):211-216.
    This review of Richard Tuck's Free Riding conveys Tuck's crucial distinction between the logic of collective action which fails due to the problem of causal negligibility, and free riding, which has been modeled as a Prisoner's Dilemma and involves casually impacting another actor in an adverse manner. Tuck also distinguishes the practice of voting which he argues neither fails due to the worry of causal negligibility or due to free riding; instead it represents a problem of achieving sufficiency of votes (...)
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  15.  42
    Computational Transformation of the Public Sphere: Theories and Cases.S. M. Amadae (ed.) - 2020 - Helsinki: Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Helsinki.
    This book is an edited collection of original research papers on the digital revolution of the public and governance. It covers cyber governance in Finland, and the securitization of cyber security in Finland. It investigates the cases of Brexit, the 2016 US presidential election of Donald Trump, the 2017 presidential election of Volodymyr Zelensky, and Brexit. It examines the environmental concerns of climate change and greenwashing, and the impact of digital communication giving rise to the #MeToo and Incel movements. It (...)
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  16.  31
    Prisoners of Reason: Game Theory and Neoliberal Political Economy.S. M. Amadae - 2016 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Is capitalism inherently predatory? Must there be winners and losers? Is public interest outdated and free-riding rational? Is consumer choice the same as self-determination? Must bargainers abandon the no-harm principle? Prisoners of Reason recalls that classical liberal capitalism exalted the no-harm principle. Although imperfect and exclusionary, modern liberalism recognized individual human dignity alongside individuals' responsibility to respect others. Neoliberalism, by contrast, views life as ceaseless struggle. Agents vie for scarce resources in antagonistic competition in which every individual seeks dominance. This (...)
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  17.  2
    Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy: Cold War Origins of Rational Choice Liberalism.S. M. Amadae - 2003 - Chicago, IL, USA: University of Chicago Press.
    This book discusses how rational choice theory grew out of RAND's work for the US Air Force. It concentrates on the work of William J. Riker, Kenneth J. Arrow, James M. Buchanan, Russel Hardin, and John Rawls. It argues that within the context of the US Cold War with its intensive anti-communist and anti-collectivist sentiment, the foundations of capitalist democracy were grounded in the hyper individualist theory of non-cooperative games.
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