Criticized as a nostalgic anachronism by those who oppose her version of political theory and lauded as symbol of direct democratic participation by those who favor it, the Athenian polis features prominently in Hannah Arendt's account of politics. This essay traces the origin and development of Arendt's conception of the polis as a space of appearance from the early 1950s onward. It makes particular use of the Denktagebuch, Arendt's intellectual diary, in order to shed new light on the historicity of (...) one of her central concepts. The article contends that both critics and partisans of Arendt's use of the polis have made the same mistake: they have presumed that the polis represents a space of face-to-face immediacy. In fact, Arendt compared the polis to a series of analogues, many of which are not centered on direct exchanges between political actors and spectators. As a result, Arendt's early work on the polis turns out to anticipate many of the concerns of her later work on judgment, and her theory of the polis becomes a theory of topics. (shrink)
Le polbusting est une pratique de recreation et récréation esthétique à travers laquelle les protagonistes de la culture électronique détournent et ridiculisent les messages et les corps de la politique contemporaine. Ces performances incarnent emblématiquement la vocation et la sensibilité transpolitiques de la culture postmoderne, indiquant la fête et le jeu comme les matrices sur lesquelles elle se fonde. Ainsi, il apparaît indispensable, pour comprendre la relation contemporaine entre imaginaire, médias et politique, de prendre sérieusement en considération ce qui se (...) produit dans les nouveaux paysages médiatiques, dans la mise en scène de la vie quotidienne, dans la culture de l’éphémère et dans tout ce qui a, jusqu'à présent, constitué la marge et l’ombre de la vie sociale. (shrink)
El presente ensayo tiene como objetivo el análisis del pensamiento dicotómico a través del concepto de entendimiento en Hegel. En primer lugar se expone la polémica entre Marshall Sahlins y Gananath Obeyesekere y los comentarios que cada uno hace sobre la misma discusión, luego se desarrolla el ..
There has recently been a wave of attempts to make sense of the role of de se thoughts in linguistic communication. A majority of the attempts assume a Perryan or a Lewisian view of de se thought. Views with these assumptions, I suggest, come in four varieties: uncentering (Egan 2007, Kölbel 2013, Moss 2012), recentering (Heim 2004, Weber 2012), multicentering (Kindermann 2014, Ninan 2010, Torre 2009), and no centering (Kaplan 1989, Perry 1979). I argue first that all four varieties of (...) centering are committed to what I call a shifting operation on the hearer's part. I argue second that, against common assumption, there is no real choice to make between the views. By showing that attempts to establish an advantage for some view over the others fail across the board, I make the case for neutralism regarding the varieties of centering – the claim that coverage of the empirical data is exactly the same for each view, and that the views are broadly equal in simplicity and elegance. (shrink)
The communication of de se attitudes poses a problem for “participant- neutral” analyses of communication in terms of propositions expressed or proposed updates to the common ground: when you tell me “I am an idiot”, you express a first person de se attitude, but as a result I form a different, second person attitude, viz. that you are an idiot. I argue that when we take seriously the asymmetry between speaker and hearer in semantics this problem disappears. To prove this (...) I propose a concrete model of communication as the transmission of information from the speaker’s mental state to the hearer’s. My analysis is couched in Discourse Representation Theory, a formal semantic framework that linguists use for modeling conversational common ground updates, but that can also be applied to describe the individual speech participants’ dynamically changing mental states. (shrink)
This chapter provides a critical overview of various influential accounts of de se attitudes including those proposed by Frege, Lewis and Perry. It also addresses the charge that there is nothing distinctive about de se attitudes. The second half outlines a widely accepted and influential model of communication and various complications that arise in applying this model to the communication of de se thoughts. The final section provides an overview of the papers in this volume.
Two lines of investigation into the nature of mental content have proceeded in parallel until now. The first looks at thoughts that are attributable to collectives, such as bands' beliefs and teams' desires. So far, philosophers who have written on collective belief, collective intentionality, etc. have primarily focused on third-personal attributions of thoughts to collectives. The second looks at de se, or self-locating, thoughts, such as beliefs and desires that are essentially about oneself. So far, philosophers who have written on (...) the de se have primarily focused on de se thoughts of individuals. This paper looks at where these two lines of investigations intersect: collective de se thoughts, such as bands' and teams' beliefs and desires that are essentially about themselves. There is a surprising problem at this intersection: the most prominent framework for modeling de se thoughts, the framework of centered worlds, cannot model a special class of collective de se thoughts. A brief survey of this problem's solution space shows that collective de se thoughts pose a new challenge for modeling mental content. (shrink)
This paper deals with the semantics of de dicto , de re and de se belief reports. First, I flesh out in some detail the established, classical theories that assume syntactic distinctions between all three types of reports. I then propose a new, unified analysis, based on two ideas discarded by the classical theory. These are: (i) modeling the de re/de dicto distinction as a difference in scope, and (ii) analyzing de se as merely a special case of relational de (...) re attitudes. The resurrection of these ideas takes place in a dynamic setting. My formalization of the first idea involves a modification of the presupposition-as-anaphora resolution algorithm for DRT. The second involves treating acquaintance relations as second-order presuppositions, to be bound in the context by means of higher-order unification, or accommodated if necessary. The resulting framework requires no syntactic distinctions between different modes of attitude, with the exception of a specific subclass of de se reports characterized by special ‘ de se pronouns’ (i.e. PRO and logophors). These special pronouns are handled in syntax; everything alse is passed on to the pragmatic resolution module as it appears on the surface. The more sophisticated contextual resolution process nonetheless ensures adequate output truth conditions for a variety of classical and novel puzzles. In particular, I compare the new pragmasemantic system to the classical, syntactic analysis with respect to iterated and quantified reports, and monstrously shifted indexicals. (shrink)
The Sleeping Beauty puzzle has dramatized the divisive question of how de se beliefs should be integrated into formal theories of rational belief change. In this paper, I look ahead to a related question: how should de se beliefs be integrated into formal theories of rational choice? I argue that standard decision theoretic frameworks fail in special cases of de se uncertainty, like Sleeping Beauty. The nature of the failure reveals that sometimes rational choices are determined independently of one’s credences (...) in the kinds of ‘narrow’ de se propositions that Sleepy Beauty has set in relief. Consequently, in addition to pinpointing a failure of standard decision theoretic frameworks, this result casts doubt on a large class of strategies for determining principles for the rationally updating de se beliefs in cases like Sleeping Beauty, and also calls into question the importance of making such a determination at all. (shrink)
This thesis deals with the phenomenon of attitude reporting. More specifically, it provides a unified semantics of de re and de se belief reports. After arguing that de se belief is best thought of as a special case of de re belief, I examine whether we can extend this unification to the realm of belief reports. I show how, despite very promising first steps, previous attempts in this direction ultimately fail with respect to some relatively recent linguistic data involving quantified (...) and infinitival reports, logophoric constructions, and monstrously shifted indexicals. Formalizing my idea of a contextual resolution of acquaintance relations in a dynamic framework, I arrive at an alternative analysis that handles all these data. (shrink)
ABSTRACT. Thought experiments about de se attitudes and Jackson’s original Knowledge Argument are compared with each other and discussed from the perspective of a computational theory of mind. It is argued that internal knowledge, i.e. knowledge formed on the basis of signals that encode aspects of their own processing rather than being intentionally directed towards external objects, suffices for explaining the seminal puzzles without resorting to acquaintance or phenomenal character as primitive notions. Since computationalism is ontologically neutral, the account also (...) explains why neither Lewis’s two gods nor Mary’s surprise in the Knowledge Argument violate physicalism. (shrink)
Shows that both anaphoricity and egocentric de se binding play a crucial role in the interpretation of tense in discourse. Uses the English backwards shifted reading of the past tense in a mistaken time scenario to bring out the tension between these two features. Provides a suitable representational framework for the observed clash in the form of an extension of DRT in which updates of the common ground are accompanied by updates of each relevant agent's complex attitudinal state.
It has recently been proposed that the framework of semantic relativism be put to use to describe mental content, as deployed in some of the fundamental operations of the mind. This programme has inspired in particular a novel strategy of accounting for the essential egocentricity of first-personal or de se thoughts in relativist terms, with the advantage of dispensing with a notion of self-representation. This paper is a critical discussion of this strategy. While it is based on a plausible appeal (...) to cognitive economy, the relativist theory does not fully account for the epistemic profile that distinguishes de se thinking, as some of its proponents hope to do. A deeper worry concerns the reliance of the theory on a primitive notion of “centre” that hasn’t yet received enough critical attention, and is ambiguous between a thin and a rich reading. I argue that while the rich reading is required if the relativist analysis of the de se is to achieve its most ambitious aims, it also deprives the theory of much of its explanatory power. (shrink)
It is rather uncontroversial that there are different ways to report de se attitudes, but there is still disagreement about the number and the nature of the different mechanisms at work. Following Anand (2006), I distinguish three types of de se reporting: one a special case of de re, another expressed by shifted indexicals, and a third expressed by dedicated de se pronouns. For the first two I propose reductions to de re and de dicto reporting, respectively, couched in a (...) dynamic framework where presupposition resolution takes center stage. For the third, I part ways with all current proposals in offering what is essentially a de re analysis of dedicated de se pronouns. I motivate this radical departure with examples of de se pronouns binding de re reflexives, as recently brought into the spotlights by Charlow (2010) and Sharvit (2010). (shrink)
In this article we consider, relying in part upon comparative semantic evidence from English and Romanian, two contrasting dimensions of the sense in which our thoughts, including the contents of imagination and memory, and extending to objects of fear, enjoyment, and other emotions directed toward worldly happenings, may be distinctively first-personal, or "de se," to use the terminology introduced in Lewis (1979), and exhibit the phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification (hereafter: IEM) in the sense of Shoemaker (1968) and (...) elsewhere. The different dimensions of the de se, we will argue, come apart in the following sense: some first-personal propositions, memories, and fears are about oneself as an experiencer of the contents in question, and others not; and some that are about the experiencer are not given as about oneself. (shrink)
Percus & Sauerland (2003) use quantified belief reports of the form 'Only Peter thinks he's...' to argue for dedicated de se LFs. The argument is targeted against any reductionist account that sees de se as merely a particular subtype of de re, viz. a de re belief about oneself from a first person perspective, requiring nothing but an account of de re attitudes. My acquaintance resolution framework is an attempt at just such a reduction and in this paper I extend (...) that theory with a projection mechanism to allow local accommodation of acquaintance relations. With this extension we can account for their data, as well as for some related data involving quantified belief reports familiar from arguments in the de se literature. Note: the embedded video of Peter's mistaken self-identity is urlhttp://ncs.ruhosting.nl/emar/dese.mpgavailable in .mpg here. (shrink)
El artículo busca profundizar en el examen de la noción de “ciudadanía” a partir del contexto teórico desplegado por la problemática ecológica, teniendo en cuenta las determinaciones y desafíos que impone a la figura de la ciudadanía la supuesta existencia de un fenómeno de devastación antropogénica como el que se sostiene que afecta al planeta en nuestros días. Se intenta esbozar algunas consideraciones que permitan el avance de una reflexión particular sobre “ciudadanía ambiental”, asumiendo que la literatura filosófico-política contemporánea presenta (...) variados alcances teóricos que podrían ser atendidos en este sentido, puesto que ellos también buscan ampliar el concepto canónico de ciudadanía presentado inicialmente por Marshall. (shrink)
Leibniz' first problem with contingency stems from his doctrine of divine creation (not his later doctrine of truth) and is solved via his concepts of necessity per se, etc. (not via his later concept of infinite analysis). I scrutinize some of the earliest texts in which the first problem and its solution occur. I compare his "per se modal concepts" with his concept of analysis and with the traditional concept of metaphysical necessity. I then identify and remove the main obstacle (...) to Leibniz' employment of these concepts by reflecting on his concept of a world and comparing and contrasting it with contemporary conceptions. Finally I sketch the place that this early problem and its solution had in the context of his mature philosophy. A disagreement between Sleigh and Adams which hinges on the assumption that there is just one problem with competing solutions is seen to dissolve in this light. (shrink)
I show how a de se belief ascription such as "Privatus believes that he himself is rich" may be dealt with by means of a scope distinction over and above that one separating de dicto and de re ascriptions. The idea is, roughly, that 'Privatus...himself' forms in this statement a unity, a single "spread" sign that is at the same time in a de re and de dicto position. If so, H-N. Castañeda's contention that the "quasi-indicator" 'he himself' ('she herself', (...) 'it itself') belongs to a "unique, irreducible logical category" of singular terms is, at best, misleading. Further, my account is superior to the well-known theories of R. Chisholm and D. Lewis, according to which de se ascriptions state that the believer "directly attributes properties to himself or herself". 1. Introduction 2. Chisholm and Lewis on de se belief ascriptions 3. Fregean and Sellarsian theories of belief ascriptions 4. Geach on the reflexive pronoun 5. Admiring and self-admiring 6. A solution to the problem de se belief ascriptions 7. Belief de se 8. Conclusion. (shrink)
Este trabajo está pensado desde la concepción de los espacios como expresión deambientes tecnológicos,de acuerdo con la teoría de Marshall McLuhan. El objetivo central es la comprensión de espacios cotidianos en situaciones históricas diversas. Así, después de una descripción general del espacio, la exposición se concentra en los espacios de la oralidad, primaria y secundaria, y fundamenta, finalmente, la determinación general de los espacios en la comprensión de los ambientes como procesos socioculturales. This essay is based on the conception (...) of spaces as an expression of technological environments, according to Marshall McLuhan’s theory. The main objective is to analyze the comprehension of everyday spaces in diverse historical situations. Therefore, after a general description of the spaces, the exposition focuses on the spaces of primary and secondary speech, and finally, supports the general determination of these spaces upon the understanding of environments as sociocultural processes. (shrink)
L’origine du monde C’est une île comme il en existe des centaines, peut-être des milliers d’autres au milieu du Pacifique. Située à un bras de mer de l’île Butaritari, sur son versant méridional, elle ne se distingue par aucune caractéristique particulière. Sauf peut-être qu’elle n’a aucune existence officielle : dans cette zone, les cartes ne mentionnent que les confettis d’atolls encerclant les îles Marshall, dont elle est la proche voisine. Il paraît cependant qu’on peut l’apercevoir sur d...
O presente texto aborda as implicações subjetivas e epistemológicas da escrita, a partir da análise de três autores fundamentais, Jack Goody, Eric Havelock e Marshall McLuhan. Segue-se então uma discussão crítica do modo como estes compreendem a relação entre meio de comunicação e cultura, notadamente através de um tipo de determinismo tecnológico.
This book examines the historical development of studies of the brain and behavior from the early work of Aristotle and Galen up to the late twentieth century. Modern neuroscience, a multidisciplinary endeavor, emerged only recently as a unified field . This book does not treat the disciplinary history of neuroscience per se but, rather, the history of attempts to understand the nervous system and its relationship to behavior from a constellation of disciplines all related to what we now call “neuroscience”: (...) anatomy, physiology, psychology, psychiatry, evolutionary theory, and anthropology.Louise H. Marshall is a neuroscientist and director of the UCLA Brain Research Institute's Neuroscience History Archives. Her coauthor, the late neuroscientist Horace W. Magoun, founded the Department of Anatomy at UCLA's Medical School in 1953. Their book grew out of a series of poster presentations put together by Magoun for several national and international neuroscience meetings during the early 1980s. Magoun wrote a twenty‐seven‐page brochure after receiving much enthusiasm from neuroscientists at these meetings—both students and those more established in the field—and many wanted a publication.Not surprisingly, given its early beginnings in poster presentations, the book is richly illustrated. The chapters are arranged only loosely chronologically; their sequence is directed more explicitly by investigative themes. The first chapter outlines three basic “postulates” that direct the organization of the rest of the book and act as conceptual threads: phylogeny , the idea of a structural and functional hierarchy in the nervous system, and the notion that function determines structure. The last chapter, by way of discussion, moves into twentieth‐century developments in the understanding of certain “integrative” systems in the brain and the recognition by neuroscientists of the need for multidisciplinary approaches that integrate anatomical, physiological, and behavioral perspectives.The third postulate, the idea that “form follows function,” receives the most emphasis in the book, and most chapters touch on the oscillating relationship between studies of form and studies of function . The book also illustrates certain historical trends: the anatomical studies of the ancient and Renaissance periods, the more physiological and clinical studies of the nineteenth century, and the instrument‐centered approaches of early twentieth‐century neurophysiology.The book has certain strengths and weaknesses related to the authors' perspective as neuroscientists. As one might expect, elements of presentism arise, as the work of some investigators is described as “anticipating” that of later scientists, and other research—for example, J. L. W. Thudichum's work on brain chemistry—is deemed “surprisingly modern” . However, the book gives wonderfully detailed, precise accounts of scientific developments related to brain and behavior. The authors demonstrate a critical mastery of both primary and secondary sources, with thorough citations, and the book comes with a comprehensive bibliography.Discoveries in the Human Brain does not place neuroscientific developments within a wider cultural or social context, but the authors had no ambitions to do so. They even point to drawbacks of such historical approaches, arguing that they “create issues where none exist and … couch ideas in such convoluted language that the events and concepts become unfamiliar and difficult to fathom” . This position reflects their intended audience: neuroscientists interested in the history of their field. While there is certainly room for professional historians of science to tackle the history of neuroscience, this book will be valuable for historians because literature in the history of neuroscience is sparse. However, it is likely to be of greater value to neuroscientists—in the authors' words, “those workers at the bench who are curious to learn how it all happened.”. (shrink)
Como se organizam os meios para que seus produtos sejam oferecidos a seus usuários como produtos de comunicação? Esta é a pergunta que sustenta e justifica o estudo da gramática dos meios, segundo a articulação de códigos eletrônicos geradores das linguagens icônicas em processos perceptuais e cognitivos. Orienta-se pelas explorações que Marshall McLuhan formulou em suas análises e exercícios de seu projeto pedagógico e também na metodologia semiótica dos processos de articulação sintática, semântica e pragmática.
La jurisdicción constitucional nació el 24 de febrero de 1803 en una desangelada sala en la planta baja del Capitolio cedida por el Congreso de los Estados Unidos al Tribunal Supremo cuando su presidente, el Chief Justice John Marshall hizo pública la sentencia en el caso Marbury v. Madison. En ella se establecía la revisión judicial de las leyes (y también de los actos del Gobierno, pero éste es otro tema) sacándosela de la manga de la toga como de (...) una chistera extraen un conejo los prestidigitadores, pues la Constitución del nuevo país, promulgada en 1787 y todavía vigente, no preveía expresamente tal competencia. (shrink)
In the 1980s and 1990s the discipline of philosophy of education had an impact on schooling and the public service in New Zealand because of the contracted work of James Marshall and Michael Peters. This personal reﬂection by Robert Shaw is a tribute to James Marshall and provides insight into the relationship between Ministry ofﬁcials, the community, and educational researchers.
Following González Vergara (2006a, 2009, 2012), the presence of the morpheme se in Spanish is explained by a lexical phenomenon that modifies the logical structure of sentences in which it appears. This phenomenon decreases the importance of the Actor and favors the Undergoer. According to this proposal, this phenomenon expresses itself, in most of the Spanish sesentences, as a lexical rule that makes unspecific the highest ranking argument. Taking the above as a basis, this paper explores and proposes explanations for (...) se alternating verbs of the type of matar(se), morir(se), dormir(se), despertar(se), terminar(se), adelgazar(se), engordar(se), envejecer(se), mejorar(se), controlar(se), crecer(se) y aparecer(se) in the framework of the Role and Reference Grammar. (shrink)
Da je svijet postao globalnim selom danas čujemo gotovo svakodnevno, na bilo kojoj geografskoj širini. McLuhanova metafora gotovo da je na mitski zoran način oslikala procese koji se zbivaju u suvremenom nam svijetu i kao takva postala je općepoznatom i općeprihvaćenom. Ovaj rad istražuje na koje je načine »globalno selo« najavilo globalizaciju.Marshall McLuhan je inače, već od djela Mechanical Bride počeo prepoznavati i najavljivati trendove koji će kasnije uistinu postati globalnima: od poruka oglasne industrije, promjene recepcije medija koji nam (...) donose poruke, do promjena naših uloga u svijetu…Cilj ovog rada je istražiti i prezentirati dosege McLuhanove »najave« globalizacije, posebno u djelu Global Willage, djelu u kojemu je McLuhan otkriće trendova pokušao staviti u okvire »četverostupanjske zakonitosti«. Rad želi pojam globalizacije motriti u svjetlu McLuhanovih istraživanja odnosa vizualnog i audijskog, u kontekstu analize utjecaja vizualnih tehnologija na čovjeka, te promisliti neke McLuhanove teze o robotizmu.We are hearing almost every day and on each latitude how the world has become a global village. McLuhan’s metaphor in an almost mythical way gives depicts the processes happening in our contemporary world and as such has become renowned and recognized. This paper shall examine in which ways that “the global village” has announced globalization.Marshall McLuhan had since The Mechanical Bride started recognizing and heralding the trends which would later actually become global: from the messages of the advertising industry, the change in the reception of the media which transmit messages to us, to the changes of our roles in the world etc.The aim of this paper is to examine and present the scope of McLuhan’s “heralding” of globalization, especially in the part of The Global Village in which McLuhan tries to place the discovery of trends into “four degree legality” frames. The paper would like to examine the concept of globalization in light of McLuhan’s research of the relationship between the visual and audile, within the context of the analysis of the influence of visual technologies on Man, and rethink some of McLuhan’s theses on robotics. (shrink)
In English, we use the word "I" to express thoughts that we have about ourselves, and we use the reflexive pronouns "himself" and "herself" to attribute such thoughts to others. Philosophers and linguists call such thoughts, and the statements we use to express them, de se. De se thoughts and statements, although they appear often in our day-to-day lives, pose a series of challenging problems for both linguists and philosophers. This interdisciplinary volume examines the structure of de se thought, various (...) issues concerning the semantics and pragmatics of our discourse about it, and also what it reveals about how humans think about themselves and the world around them. (shrink)
Este ensayo investiga el discurso global a la sombra de la década de 1960. Se basa en los puntos de vista de Nelson Goodman, Marshall McLuhan y Theodor W. Adorno para explorar tres conceptos centrales para la música en la época de la transmisión global: concordancia, corriente y virtualidad.
Chierchia (1989) and others have used the contrast between George hopes that he will win and Georges hopes to win in mistaken-self-identity scenarios, to argue for dedicated de se LFs. The argument, further strengthened by evidence of shiftable indexicals, appears applicable against any reductionist account that sees de se as merely a particular subtype of de re. My Acquaintance Resolution framework is an attempt at such a reduction, and this paper seeks to extend that theory with a logical principle of (...) introspection for belief, to account for the data within a unified treatment of de re and de se. (shrink)
Inspired by Castañeda (1966, 1968), Perry (1979) and Lewis (1979) showed that a specific variety of singular thoughts, thoughts about oneself “as oneself” – de se thoughts, as Lewis called them – raise special issues, and they advanced rival accounts. Their suggestive examples raise the problem of de se thought – to wit, how to characterize it so as to give an accurate account of the data, tracing its relations to singular thoughts in general. After rehearsing the main tenets of (...) two contrasting accounts – a Lewisian one and a Perrian one – in the first section of this paper, in the second I will present a proposal of my own, which is a specific elaboration of the Perrian account. In the first section I will indicate some weaknesses of Perry’s presentation of his view; the proposal I will articulate in the second overcomes them. I will conclude with a brief discussion of reasons for preferring one or another account, in particular regarding the issue of the communication of de se thoughts. (shrink)
This paper examines three accounts of the sleeping beauty case: an account proposed by Adam Elga, an account proposed by David Lewis, and a third account defended in this paper. It provides two reasons for preferring the third account. First, this account does a good job of capturing the temporal continuity of our beliefs, while the accounts favored by Elga and Lewis do not. Second, Elga’s and Lewis’ treatments of the sleeping beauty case lead to highly counterintuitive consequences. The proposed (...) account also leads to counterintuitive consequences, but they’re not as bad as those of Elga’s account, and no worse than those of Lewis’ account. (shrink)
Ciò che qui chiamo Materialismo indiano non deve intendersi come scuola filosofica unica ed univocamente impostata, bensì come insieme di correnti di pensiero, propugnanti differenti punti di vista, ma tutte collocate entro l’orizzonte concettuale che nega ciò che in Occidente si usa chiamare Trascendente. Inoltre, com’è ovvio, bisogna distinguere tra un Materialismo filosofico – che prenderò in considerazione qui – ed un Materialismo, per così dire, popolare – al quale mi riferirò solo se necessario. Due sono le impostazioni materialiste che (...) intendo trattare: l’una riguarda i sostenitori dell’esistenza di cinque elementi materiali (bhūtapañcakavādin) che chiamerò, seguendo Ramkrishna Bhattacharya, proto-Materialisti, l’altra concerne i sostenitori dell’esistenza di quattro elementi materiali (bhūtacatuṣṭayavādin), tra cui i Cārvāka. (shrink)
This article tries to highlight the explicit political aim and the importance for our present of the thought of the «late» Michel Foucault. Through the analysis of the role that truth plays in the pagan and Christian techniques of the self, it opposes a truth that we have to discover in ourselves in order to refuse it (Christianity) or to adhere to it (ethics of authenticity) to a truth conceived as a force of transformation of logos into ethos , of (...) the discourse into a way of life. (shrink)
The article aims to offer a few hypotheses on an analysis of the phenomenology of moral action in Nietzsche, especially in relation to Nietzsche’s formula “become who you are”, through two crucial concepts to the creation of man by the action: experience (Erlebnis) and ‘cultivation’. Man becomes what he is only in life and under the concrete conditions of his existence, without the remote suspicion of, as Nietzsche wrote, “what he is” and in this case, it is a process that (...) unfolds through his experiences. Understood as pathos or counter-concept of reason, experience acts cultivating the man in a phenomenological process of human ‘cultivation’ toward ‘becoming what one is’. (shrink)
The essay investigates the problem of Self-construction in latest Nietzsche’s thought and its relation with the question of decadence. The identity crisis of Western civilisation, the break-up of the ethical and cultural ground of modern European societies, become at the same time the opportunity for a radical renewal of humanity, the starting point for a great «anthropotechnical experiment» aimed at shaping a new human «type», a new model for a Post-Christian ethos.
Vittorio Guidano, fondatore della psicoterapia cognitivista post-razionalista, ha offerto alcuni spunti di riflessione sui cambiamenti del senso di identità che presumibilmente si sono succeduti nel corso delle epoche storiche in relazione ai diversi contesti di vita. Dell’interesse per questo tema testimonia una lezione, di cui l’autrice riporta alcuni stralci sinora inediti. La lezione si è tenuta a Roma, presso l’APC- Associazione di Psicoterapia Cognitiva, in data 26 gennaio del 1999, nell’ambito di un training di formazione in psicoterapia. Il tema discusso (...) è l’influenza della scrittura alfabetica nel dar forma all’esperienza umana, un argomento su cui è possibile intrecciare proficuamente le analisi di Guidano e le riflessioni di Carlo Sini. (shrink)
This paper concerns two points of intersection between de se attitudes and the study of natural language: attitude ascription and communication. I first survey some recent work on the semantics of de se attitude ascriptions, with particular attention to ascriptions that are true only if the subject of the ascription has the appropriate de se attitude. I then examine – and attempt to solve – some problems concerning the role of de se attitudes in linguistic communication.
What it would mean for phenomenology to move in an ontological direction that would render its relevance to contemporary political movement less ambiguous while at the same time retaining those aspects of its method that are epistemologically and politically advantageous? The present study crafts the beginnings of a response to this question by examining four configurations of consciousness that seem to be respectively tied to certain oppressive contexts and certain kinds of oppressed bodies: 1. false consciousness, 2. bad faith, 3. (...) double consciousness, and 4. se faire objet (making oneself an object). Such a comparison both promises to widen our understanding of the ontology of consciousness in general and generate a suggestive vision of what it would take to follow through, ontologically speaking, on the idea that consciousness is fundamentally and irrevocably of a bodily nature. (shrink)
Dan Marshall and Josh Parsons note, correctly, that the property of being either a cube or accompanied by a cube is incorrectly classified as intrinsic under the definition we have given unless it turns out to be disjunctive. Whether it is disjunctive, under the definition we gave, turns on certain judgements of the relative naturalness of properties. They doubt the judgements of relative naturalness that would classify their property as disjunctive. We disagree. They also suggest that the whole idea (...) of judging relative naturalness is a dubious business. We reply that, like them or not, such judgements cannot easily be avoided. (shrink)
Inspired by Castañeda, Perry and Lewis argued that, among singular thoughts in general, thoughts about oneself ‘as oneself’ – first-personal thoughts, which Lewis aptly called de se – call for special treatment: we need to abandon one of two traditional assumptions on the contents needed to provide rationalizing explanations, their shareability or their absoluteness. Their arguments have been very influential; one might take them as establishing a new ‘effect’ – new philosophical evidence in need of being accounted for. This is (...) questioned by the skeptical arguments in recent work by Cappelen & Dever and Magidor, along lines that a few discrepant voices had already announced earlier. Skeptics content that the evidence does not really call for revising traditional theories of content. I will discuss their challenges – first and foremost, concerning action explanations – aiming to make the case that the ‘De Se effect’ is no illusion: de se attitudes require us to revise one of the two tenets of traditional views. (shrink)
For Perry and many authors, de se thoughts are a species of de re thought. In this paper, I argue that de se thoughts come in two varieties: explicit and implicit. While explicit de se thoughts can be construed as a variety of de re thought, implicit de se thoughts cannot: their content is thetic, while the content of de re thoughts is categoric. The notion of an implicit de se thought is claimed to play a central role in accounting (...) for the phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification. Lewis has attempted to unify de re and de se in the opposite direction: by reducing de re to de se . This, however, works only if we internalize the acquaintance relations. I criticize Lewis's internalization strategy on the grounds that it rests on Egocentrism (the view that every occurrent thought is ultimately about the thinker at the time of thinking). In the conclusion, I suggest another way of unifying de re and de se , by extending the implicit/explicit distinction to de re thoughts themselves. (shrink)
A abordagem de Armstrong e Lewis sobre os conceitos psicológicos ordinários pretende-se uma síntese entre behaviorismo e cartesianismo. Ela sustenta, fundamentalmente, duas teses: (a) a de que esses conceitos, em geral, explicam e predizem comportamentos pela designação de entidades internas (isto é, próprias do interior do corpo) que são os ocupantes de papéis de causar os respectivos comportamentos; e (b) a tese de que os ocupantes desses papéis causais identificam-se com entidades cerebrais e, eventualmente, substratos internos de outras constituições físicas, (...) no sentido de identidades de tipos (e não de particulares), ainda que restringidas. Por um lado, a abordagem é formulada em oposição à ideia de que os conceitos em questão não se referem a causas internas; mas, por outro, propõe uma forma de visão materialista e entende esses conceitos como possuindo conexões lógicas com relações comportamentais do organismo como um todo com aspectos do ambiente maior. O presente trabalho procura sugerir (1) que tal abordagem é implausível, levantando a ela várias objeções; e (2) que as objeções de Armstrong e Lewis a perspectivas comportamentais não atingem pelo menos uma específica deste tipo, aqui esboçada brevemente e apoiada. (shrink)